Teaching resource

The British response to the German occupation of the Rhineland

Use the Foreign Office document in this lesson from March 1936, to find out about the motives and attitudes of the British government after German troops re-occupied the Rhineland.

Age ranges: Key stage 3 (Ages 11–14); Key stage 4 (Ages 14–16)

About this image

The reoccupation of the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland, 7 March 1936.

IWM (NYP 68058)

Time period

Early Twentieth Century (1901–1945)

Theme

War and revolution

Enquiry question

What should Britain do about it?

Sources overview

Select a source to view it in more detail.

Jump to source 1: Cabinet conclusions
Jump to source 2: Baldwin's views
Jump to source 3: Unready for war
Jump to source 4: Economic sanctions
Jump to source 5: Anthony Eden's suggestion

Investigate the sources

These sources are extracts from a document where the Foreign Secretary describes a meeting he has had with the French, Belgian and Italian governments.

Source 1: Cabinet conclusions
1. Germany
  —
  The Locarno Treaty
  —
  German Re-occupation of the Demilitarised Zone.
  —
  (Previous Reference : Cabinet 17(36) conclusion 1).
  The Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs gave the Cabinet an account of the conversations he and the Lord Privy Seal had held with representatives of the French, Belgian and Italian Governments in Paris on the previous day. Both Ministers were impressed by the complexity and gravity of the situation which confronted Europe, and more expecially our own counrty as one of the guarantors of Locarno. On the outcome of the present situation depended the course of events in Europe over the next ten years, and it had to be remembered that our influence was greater than that of any other nation.
  The Ministers had soon discovered that our policy of condemning the German action and then developing a constructive policy to re-establish the European situation had no chance of acceptance. he thought it inevitable that the French and Belgians would both announce their intention – if Germany could not be persuaded to evacuate the demilitarised zone – to ask the Council of the League of make a pronouncement. Then if Germany was still obdurate, they would proceed to military measures and ask us to do the same. In that case we should have to decide whether we intend to fulfil our Treaty obligation – and we should be in an impossible position if we refused.
  Minutes from the Foreign Office meeting on the Treaty of Locarno in 1936. Catalogue reference: FO 371/19892
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Examine the source
- What clues are there that the British Cabinet thought the situation was serious?
- What was British policy for dealing with the crisis?
- How did this policy go down with our allies?
- Why do you think they reacted in this way?
- What did Anthony Eden expect the allies to do next?
- Why would this put Britain ‘in an impossible position’?
Source 2: Baldwin's views
1. The Prime Minister thought at some stage it would be necessary to point our to the French that the action they proposed would not result only in letting loose another great war in Europe. They might succeed in crushing Germany with the aid of Russia, but it would probably only result in Germany going Bolshevik.
  
  Minutes from the Foreign Office meeting on the Treaty of Locarno in 1936. Catalogue reference: FO 371/19892
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Examine the source

What does this tell us about Baldwin’s attitude to:
- war?
- communism?
How might each of these worries affect how Britain would deal with the crisis?
Source 3: Unready for war
1. In this connection it was suggested that a stage would very soon be reached in the forthcoming conversations when it might be necessary to tell the French our position as to the possibility of fulfilling our obligations under the Locarno Treaty. That subject, it was admitted, might be fraught.
  From information given by the Service Ministers it transpired that our position at home and in home waters was a disadvantageous one, whether from the point of view of the Navy, Army or Air Force, or anti-aircraft defence. In addition, public opinion was strongly opposed to any military action against the Germans in the demilitarised zone. In particular, the ex-Service men were very anti-French. Moreover, many people, perhaps most people were saying openly that they did not see why the Germans should not re-occupy the Rhineland. In these circumstances, it was generally accepted that it was worth taking almost any risk in order to escape from that situation.
  
  Minutes from the Foreign Office meeting on the Treaty of Locarno in 1936 Catalogue reference: FO 371/19892
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Examine the source
- According to this document, why was Britain unready to go to war with Germany over the Rhineland?
- How would this affect our readiness to go along with what France wanted?
Source 4: Economic sanctions
1. One suggestion was that we should adopt the proposal of the French and Belgian Governments to begin with financial and economic sanctions. In support of this it was pointed out that it was known from various sources that Dr. Schacht had opposed the re-occupation of the Rhineland owing to his apprehensions of economic and financial sanctions, more especially the resulting inability of Germany to secure foreign exchange. That was bound before long to bring about a financial crash and this would force Germany to decide either to come to terms or to fight. In the latter event, particularly if they attacked France or Belgium, public opinion both in this country and in the world as a whole would rapidly change. The objection to this course was that the United States of America and perhaps other nations, might refuse co-operation, and economic pressure could not then be supported without blockade which would be very difficult.
  [Dr Schacht was a leading Nazi and the President of the Reichsbank, the central bank of Germany at this time]
  
  Minutes from the Foreign Office meeting on the Treaty of Locarno in 1936. Catalogue reference: FO 371/19892
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Examine the source

What arguments are put here for and against economic sanctions against Germany?
Source 5: Anthony Eden's suggestion
1. The Secretary of State for Foregin Affairs’ suggestion was as follows:
  To send for the German Ambassador that very evening To tell him of the acute consciousness of His Majesty’s Govermnent of the very grave situation created by the German action, and to speak quite plainly as to the feelings of His Majesty’s Government and of the House of Commons on the subject. He would point out the difficulties into which the Germans had plunged His Majesty’s Government and would remind him of our own guarantee under the Treaty of Locarno and of what our obligations are, as well as of our reputation for fulfilling our obligations. To emphasise how inexcuseable the German action was vis-a-vis Belgium who had no part in the Franco-Soviet Alliance. He would emphasise that despite all this we were anxious to obtain a peaceful settlement; that we were not asking for anything impossible; but that we wanted some contribution from Germany to give our efforts some prospect of success in the difficult circumstances.
  What he would ask Hitler to say would be that, having stated that he wanted to negotiate a series of new pacts as a basis for peace in Europe, he would, as proof of his intentions, withdraw all his forces from the Rhineland over and above the troops necessary for a symbolic occupation. In addition that, pending the conclusion of the new pacts, for the regularisation of the situation, he should not reinforce the “symbolic” troops, nor build fortifications in the demilitarised zone. He proposed to fortify this request by reminding the German Ambassador that in his first communication he had stated that the number of troops would be small and limited to a symbolic occupation.
  
  Minutes from the Foreign Office meeting on the Treaty of Locarno in 1936. Catalogue reference: FO 371/19892
  Image details for "The British response to the German..., source 5: Anthony Eden's suggestion" | Download image: "The British response to the German..., source 5: Anthony Eden's suggestion"
Examine the source
- What deal does Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, want to offer Germany?
- What do you think were Eden’s motives in making this offer to Germany?
- Did this deal abide by the terms of the Treaties of Versailles and Locarno?
- Why do you think he didn’t consult the League of Nations?

Teachers’ notes

In this lesson students explore a series of extracts from Foreign Office meetings over the German re-occupation of the Rhineland. They reveal the crisis it produced for Britain and her some of her allies. The key concerns can be inferred within the documents, including:

Horror of war and sense of growth of peace movements
Unpreparedness for war
Belief that communism was an evil to be avoided an any cost
Mistrust of our key allies
Weakness of the League of Nations
Recognition that the Treaty of Versailles may have been wrong in parts and readiness to revise it
Assumption that it was possible to negotiate with Hitler and his demands could be seen as reasonable

The events of the Rhineland crisis are important for those studying the history of appeasement in international relations prior to the outbreak of war in 1939. With this is mind, some teachers may wish to use this lesson with our three other lessons on Chamberlain and Hitler, Eden’s last stand, and Adolf Hitler shown in Related Resources.

All sources are provided with transcripts. Students could work on the sources individually or pairs and report back to the group with their findings.

Connections to the curriculum

Key stage 3 (Ages 11–14)

Challenges for Britain, Europe and the wider world 1901 to the present day: the inter-war years: the Great Depression and the rise of dictators.

Key stage 4 (Ages 14–16)

AQA GCSE History: Germany, 1890–1945: Democracy and dictatorship
Edexcel GCSE History: c1900–present: Warfare and British society in modern era
OCR GCSE History: War and British Society c.790 to c.2010; attitudes and responses to war

Extension activities

Discuss how significant are these documents in revealing the British reaction to the German re-occupation of the Rhineland?
Create your own map to show how Hitler acted against terms of the Treaty of Versailles in the period 1935-1938.

Background information

The Rhineland and the Treaty of Versailles

According to the Treaty of Versailles, the Rhineland, a strip of land inside Germany bordering on France, Belgium and the Netherlands, was to be de-militarised. That is, no German troops were to be stationed inside that area or any fortifications built. The aim was to increase French security by making it impossible for Germany to invade France unawares. Other terms restricted the German army to 100,000 men and the navy to just 36 ships. Germany objected to the terms of the treaty but were told to sign it or the war would begin again.

Impact of Treaty of Versailles on Germany

The Treaty of Versailles also set up the League of Nations, an international peace-keeping organisation. It was based on the idea of collective security, that is, the nations of the world would act together (collectively) to preserve peace. Unfortunately, one of the most powerful, the USA, did not join the League.

Germany in the 1920s was keen to get back on normal terms with other nations and signed the Treaty of Locarno. By this treaty Germany agreed to accept the terms of the Versailles Treaty, at least on her western borders. France continued to worry about their safety against Germany particularly after Adolf Hitler became Chancellor of Germany in 1933. He had always declared his firm intention of overthrowing the Treaty of Versailles and uniting all Germans in one country, even if it led to war. Germany began to re-arm. Could France trust collective security, or should they find military allies?

Germany reoccupies the Rhineland 1936

In May 1935 France signed a treaty of friendship and mutual support with the USSR. Germany claimed the treaty was hostile to them and Hitler used this as an excuse to send German troops into the Rhineland in March 1936, contrary to the terms of the treaties of Versailles and Locarno. It was a gamble on his part, and his generals were nervous about it. German re-armament had not yet reached a point where they felt ready to take on a well-armed nation like France. The move, in terms of foreign relations, threw the European allies, especially France and Britain, into confusion. What should they do about it?

British reaction to events

Following the discussions described in the documents, the British Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, did indeed meet the German ambassador and make his proposals. Hitler refused to withdraw his troops and put pressure on the League of Nations to act. France was on the verge of a general election and would not act without Britain’s support. However, the British people felt that the Treaty of Versailles was unfair on Germany and was over-restrictive, and so partly because of this, the British government decided to do nothing. Hitler moved on from the occupation of the Rhineland in 1936, to the annexation of Austria and the seizure of the Sudetenland in 1938, to the take-over of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939 and then to Poland in September 1939.

Related resources

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