Hi, I’m Mark Dunton, contemporary specialist at The National Archives. I specialise in 20th century British political, economic and social records, and in particular, the records of the Prime Minister’s office and the Cabinet papers.
Now, the Prime Minister’s office originated in 1916, and its purpose is to support the work of the Prime Minister, then David Lloyd George. It is different from the Cabinet Office, which was created around the same time to support the work of the Cabinet. The Prime Minister is appointed by the sovereign and is usually the leader of the political party holding the majority of seats within the House of Commons.
The Prime Minister’s office records consist of the official correspondence of successive Prime ministers from David Lloyd George to Tony Blair. A 20 year closure rule applies to most historical records. These are the papers which cross the prime ministerial desk. The records range widely in their subject matter and represent a virtual A-Z of governmental activity. There are discussions with ministerial colleagues about policy at home and abroad, and the big and often difficult decisions which need to be taken in government. The papers also reflect the fact that the role of Prime Minister has expanded considerably since 1945.
The records often include comments written in the margins in the Prime Minister’s own hands, which can reveal their reactions to memoranda and letters and give insights into their approach to the job and the pressures they work under and aspects of personality. The extent of these marginalia varies depending on the style of individual prime ministers.
Today we’re talking about this file, PREM 11/1152, which relates to the Suez crisis in 1956. And by the summer of 1956, tensions had been building between Britain, France and the US on one hand, and Egypt led by Colonel Nasser on the other.
On the 26th of July, Nasser suddenly announced that he had nationalized the Suez Canal. About three quarters of Western Europe’s oil was transported through the canal, as well as a considerable amount of trade for Commonwealth countries, so this was certainly a significant event.
Conservative Prime Minister Anthony Eden was determined to reverse Nasser’s action and establish control of this vital route. Eden had served as Foreign Secretary three times and a volume of his memoirs was entitled ‘Facing the Dictators’. And Eden became obsessed with the idea that Nasser was another Mussolini who should most definitely not be appeased, but faced down in the strongest possible way and be overthrown. The historical consensus on this is that Eden misapplied the lessons of history.
When Nasser announced the nationalisation of the canal, Eden was furious and initially he said that he wanted to respond with force immediately. But the chiefs of staff explained that a military operation and invasion of the Canal Zone would take weeks to prepare. A committee was set up, the Egypt Committee, a sort of inner cabinet, rather like a war cabinet, which supervised the military planning and liaison began with the French political leaders and military chiefs. France was committed to action partly because they were concerned about Nasser’s support for Algerian rebels who wanted independence. Algeria was a French colony.
Eden and his foreign secretary, Selwyn Lloyd, well, they pursued some peaceful solutions, including using the auspices of the United Nations, but these efforts were received with little enthusiasm by Nasser and Eden’s views hardened.
Initially, the British public mood had been in favour of taking firm action against Egypt. But by mid-August, that mood was beginning to change as people started to realise the difficulties involved in triggering a war with Egypt and the consequences for the wider Middle East started to look increasingly problematic.
This file covers that August 1956 period, and it shows some strains appearing in the Cabinet overseas policy, even though it’s not the peak of the crisis. It’s clear from some letters written to the Prime Minister that some members of the Cabinet were not keen on using military force and they wanted to postpone it until absolutely everything else had been tried.
One minister expressed his concern to the Prime Minister about the lack of information being conveyed to the wider Cabinet and that minister was Duncan Sands and he was Minister of Housing and Local Government. On this file we see a draft reply from the Prime Minister drafted by Cabinet Secretary Norman Brooke. And the message from Eden is, and I paraphrase here, if we do find that all other options have failed and that we do have to launch a military operation, the Cabinet as a whole will, of course, be asked to take the final decision on this.
But Eden goes on to say, and I quote, ‘It would not, however, be possible for the Cabinet as a whole to discuss the plans for any military operations that might have to be undertaken. Knowledge of these details must, for obvious reasons of security, be confined within the narrowest possible circle.’ And then it reads in brackets, ‘I could not widen that circle, even if I wish to, without breach of the security plan we have agreed with the French government’. And we can see in the margin, Norman Brooke’s annotation; he’s put a question mark and the word ‘omit’.
And indeed, that second sentence in brackets was omitted from the final version of the letter sent to Duncan Sands. It’s clear from Sands reply that while he acknowledges the broad point the Prime Minister is making, he remains concerned. ‘I hope that you will take us into your confidence before it is too late for any views we may have to be taken into account’, he writes.
So this draft letter shows how guarded and secretive Eden was becoming about the military plans for Suez. And as we know, secrecy was absolutely to the fore when in mid-October, the British, French and Israeli governments came to a confidential agreement that Israel would launch an attack on the Egyptian frontier. Britain and France would then call for both sides to withdraw from the Canal Zone. Egypt would almost certainly refuse to do this. British and French forces would then intervene and take control of the Canal Zone. The United States was not consulted about this plan, or made aware of it at this time.
And this planned sequence of events did indeed play out when Israel attacked Egypt on the 29th of October, leading to conflict between the two nations. Anglo-French forces landed on the 5th and 6th of November and began occupying the Canal Zone. However, a huge diplomatic row erupted. Soviet leader Khrushchev threatened a nuclear response. The United States reacted furiously and applied massive pressure on Britain to withdraw and refused to support Sterling, which was in trouble on the exchange markets.
Eden was forced to halt the operation. British and French forces withdrew by December and Israel finally conceded, giving up control of the canal to Egypt, which reopened the Suez Canal in March 1957. It was a national humiliation for Britain and a personal disaster for Eden, whose health was now in significant decline. In late November, he flew to Jamaica to recuperate, but soon after he returned, he resigned.
This is just one of thousands and thousands of pages in the files of the Prime Minister’s office, which are available here at the National Archives. And it really is such a rich resource. Often, the records include handwritten comments made by the Prime Minister themselves, which reflect the mood of the Prime Minister. Often it shows the great pressures that prime ministers are subject to, and we see their reactions. When you look at these records, it can make you feel very connected with the person of the Prime Minister; how they’re feeling at the time. This is history coming alive.