Kennedy & Macmillan talk about Cuba

Extract from a telephone record of a conversation between Prime Minister Harold Macmillan and President John F. Kennedy at 12.30 a.m. 23rd October, 1962 (Catalogue ref: PREM 11/3689)

Transcript

TOP SECRET

(2 copies sent to Mr. Samuel (F.O) 23.10

RECORD OF A CONVERSATION BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND PRESIDENT KENNEDY AT 12.30 a.m. on TUESDAY, 1962

President Kennedy

Prime Minister?

Prime Minister

Yes, I can hear you well.

President Kennedy

Prime Minister, I’m glad to talk to you and I appreciate your messages today. I just finished giving my speech. I’m sorry to confront you with all the problems that are going to come out of it, but our strong feeling was that after my statements to them against bringing missiles in after their frequent statements that they weren’t, the fact that this was done in a wholly clandestine way would have left us in November when Mr Khrushchev was planning to come over- he kept saying that he was waiting to so substantially increase his military power that it would have, we think, just unhinged all the Latin America and thrown into question any of our statements about Berlin.

Prime Minister

Yes, I quite see that. What’s worrying me is how do you see the way out of this? What are you going to do with the blockade? Are you going to occupy Cuba and have done with it or is it going to just drag on?

President Kennedy

We could not occupy Cuba for some days and we are preparing a potential for that kind of action if it’s necessary but we didn’t start off with that action for two reasons. First because there has to be a gap of some days to assemble the forces which of course will always be public information. And secondly because we want to see a little where we begin to go on this road. We don’t know what’s going to happen in Berlin- we don’t know what’s going to happen any place else. This seemed to be the action we could take which would lessen the chance of an immediate escalation into war of course it bring that result.

Prime Minister

Yes, that’s quite true. Is your blockade going to extend beyond the military and arms into things like oil and all the rest of it in order to bring down the Castro Government?

President Kennedy

At the beginning we’re going to confine ourselves to offensive weapons of war on order not to give him a complete justification for Berlin. In other words we’re not shipping offensive weapons of war into Berlin so we’re just confining it to that. But it may be that within the next few days we may need to move it to petroleum, oils, lubricants and other things but we don’t want to do that just now because it gives him an obvious tit for tat in Berlin.

Prime Minister

What do think Khrushchev’s action will be? In the United Nations to start with some action of a positive kind?

President Kennedy

He may do what you suggest and make us stop one of his ships by force and then take some action in Berlin. He could seize Berlin or he could put on a blockade there and there are any numbers of things he could do. We just have to expect that whatever it’s going to be it’s going to be unpleasant. But I don’t think anybody is able to predict with certainty what he will do right now but I would suspect that he will do something unpleasant to us in Berlin which I think he is going to do anyway.

Prime Minister

Well what do you think the next step will have to be- to have some kind of conference with him or not?

President Kennedy

What we want to do is get these weapons out of Cuba. The Castro regime is not the issue or the Communists. We have had no plans to invade Cuba, in fact, as you know, I have taken the position that we should not, but we want to get these missiles out of Cuba. Now I don’t know what kind of negotiation we could go on which would permit some exchange or not, but that of course should be the object of our policy.

Prime Minister

Yes. What worries me- I’ll be frank with you- having a sort of dragging-on position. If you occupied Cuba that’s one thing. In my long experience we’ve always found that our weakness has been when we’ve not acted with sufficient strength to start with. However we’ve got to wait now and see what the Russian reactions are. Then we must get into very close touch. They may react in words, by arguing at the United Nations and all the points that I made in my message to you or they may react in deeds-either in the Caribbean area or in Berlin or elsewhere. But they must be ready to decide whether we’re going to meet that by demanding a Conference and settle the whole thing up or whether we’re going to force the issue by warlike measures. And I hope that we can keep on very close touch as to what the next stage is the moment we see the Russian reaction.

President Kennedy

Well I’m aware, Prime Minister, that the action we’re taking is not complete force and does not immediately solve the problem but the alternative which is the series of air strikes and the invasion of Cuba, which we may have to do, seems to me placing such a burden on us and invited him so directly into Berlin, that we are rather reluctant to do that unless it’s necessary particularly when we can’t do t for at least a week because we have to assemble our vessels. So that if we obviously had a sufficient force on hand and could take Cuba tonight that would be very nice but we don’t have that force. Now we may come to this invasion by the end of the week but we are assembling our forces in preparation for it. But what we’re attempting to do is to begin this escalation in a way that lessens the chance of a seizure of Berlin or World War III. Now we may not be able to prevent either but at least we have served notice on him that we cannot accept the procedure and the actions which he carried out.

Prime Minister

Yes, I very much appreciate that and I have just got a message from David who has explained to me his talk with you and this very valuable. I think all we can do now is just to wait for the reactions and if you would get in direct touch with me or through David Gore so that we are actually working together all the time, it’s very important. Meanwhile may I ask you- have you been in direct touch with Khrushchev- have you had a telephone talk with him or anything like that?

President Kennedy

No I haven’t. I sent him a letter about an hour ago telling him what we were going to do. As I said in my speech about his assurances, he played a double game. You remember that he kept saying he was coming over here after the election and would do nothing to disturb the situation until after the election. He said that the weapons were defensive, that they weren’t moving any missiles

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