Part of a record of a meeting on 12 May 1997 between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Taylor, the Deputy Leader of the UUP. Catalogue Ref: PREM 49/108
Context notes
This document was a record of a meeting between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Taylor, the Deputy Leader of the UUP. Blair had only just won the UK election on May 1st. All sides were anxious to see whether the new government would maintain the same position as the previous Conservative government or whether Blair would take a different approach. At the time all groups were making plans for talks to set up a new government in Northern Ireland which would be based in Northern Ireland and run by representatives elected in elections in Northern Ireland. One of the biggest issues was the inclusion in elections of parties which had not signed up to the principles of The Downing Street Declaration of 1993, which had made clear that a party which did not renounce violence could not be part of any talks. Another point of disagreement was on the issue of cross-border cooperation, which related to the role and degree of influence of the Irish Government in matters affecting Northern Ireland. Ahern refers to Bertie Ahern, leader of the Fianna Fáil party in Ireland. As this meeting was taking place an election was due in Ireland in June and Ahern was expected to win, which he did.
Transcript
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SWIA 2AA
From the Private Secretary
12 May 1997
Dear Ken
CALL BY THE UUP, 12 MAY
David Trimble and John D Taylor called on the Prime Minister this afternoon for about 45 minutes. Dr. Mowlam, Jonathan Stephens, Jonathan Powell and I were present on our side. The Prime Minister began by asking for Trimble’s assessment of the situation.
Trimble said that he was particularly worried about the Loyalist ceasefire. The situation on the ground was worse than it had been for many years, with considerable tension in urban areas. Recent spontaneous attacks on individuals of one community or the other were the most obvious signs of this. The continuing IRA violence was a major factor, compounded by worry about what might happen in the marching season and, to a lesser degree, nervousness about a Labour government. Feelings in the Protestant community were not helped by public suggestions by Dr. Mowlam that the RUC could be radically reformed.
2
The Prime Minister looked forward to the eventual solution. This would presumably involve a devolved assembly commanding confidence from both Unionists and Nationalists, and proper cross border arrangements. Both the UUP and SDLP appeared to envisage something like this. Taylor agreed but pointed out that there was a big difference between practical cross border cooperation e.g. the Foyle Fisheries Commission, and the kind of all Ireland bodies with executive powers demanded by the Irish government. If discussion could move away from the latter proposal, the package could be sold to Unionists. Meanwhile the current talks process was stuck. If the governments continued to wait for the IRA to make up their mind, and the argument about decommissioning continued, there would never be progress.
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be better if Sinn Fein were in the talks. Taylor disagreed. It was better for them to be out. They were not in practice in a position to go back to full scale violence because people would not accept it. Trimble agreed. The republicans were in a difficult position. They were not ready to turn their backs on violence definitively and found the choice of going wholly political unpalatable. There was a lot to be said for keeping them in their present awkward position. In theory it would be good to get Sinn Fein in, but only if they had genuinely given up violence. Otherwise the pressure on them should be maintained until the movement split. That would be inevitable because the Slab Murphys of this world would never give up violence.
Taylor drew attention to the problem for the UUP if violence got worse, and the Loyalists had to be thrown out of the talks. The UUP needed the Loyalists in order to meet the rules of sufficient consensus. Otherwise they could be out-voted by Paisley and McCartney. So it was extremely important to keep the Loyalists in if possible. Trimble emphasised the same point.
3
Discussion moved to Irish elections and the prospect of Ahern as Taoiseach. Taylor suggested that, judging from his most recent comments, Ahern would be happy to see Sinn Fein in talks even without a ceasefire. Trimble said that he did not think Ahern would adopt this policy. He was very ignorant about Northern Ireland. But he had just had a reasonably good private meeting with Ahern – which Ahern had kept secret, unlike Trimble’s experience with Bruton. However, Ahern would be subject to the influence of Martin Mansergh and others.
« Return to What led to the Belfast Good Friday Agreement? (KS5)Questions
Content
- What were the main concerns of Trimble in his opening summary?
- According to Blair, what would the ‘eventual solution’ look like?
- What was the attitude of Trimble and Taylor to Sinn Féin?
- What else was worrying the UUP?
Inferences from the content
- What can be inferred from Blair asking Trimble to summarise the situation?
- What can be inferred about Blair’s attitude towards Taylor and Trimble?
Inferences from the context
- Can anything be inferred about the differences between this meeting and the meeting on May 7th (Source1).
Lines of Argument
- Which historian could use this document as supporting evidence?