Biography

Frank Sheridan – Irish Government Diplomat and Researcher, The National Archives (Ireland)

• Irish Foreign Service 1973 – serving in USA, Britain, the European Union, South America and Africa.
• Private Secretary to Irish Foreign Minister.
• Irish Ambassador to Mozambique.
• Irish Ambassador to Brazil.
• 2014 Masters in contemporary Irish History, Trinity College Dublin.
• Researcher film documentary – John Hume building Irish lobby in US.
• Researcher for Seamus Mallon, former Deputy First Minister in Northern Ireland, politics memoir.
• Edited memoir by British diplomat, Sir David Goodall, on negotiation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement 1985.
• Researcher on Anglo-Irish affairs identifying documents for release to the Irish National Archives.

Interpretation

Unlike all the previous attempts at finding a solution to the conflict in Northern Ireland, the negotiations of the Belfast Good Friday Agreement were overseen by an external chairperson acting as a sort of referee on who could participate, the agenda for talks, and how to conduct them.  That person was neutral, with no prior affiliation to any group in Northern Ireland or the two governments.  He was former U.S. Senator, George Mitchell, a lawyer and politician with a strong record of achievement, and in 1995 he was proposed for the role by U.S. President, Bill Clinton.

The idea of such an appointment came from Irish-American pressure during the US presidential election in 1992 and on election, President Clinton appointed Mitchell, recently retired, first as advisor on Northern Ireland and then proposed to the British and Irish government leaders that Mitchell oversee all-party talks on the conflict.

It took almost a year to secure the agreement of all involved to Mitchell’s appointment.  On the thorny issue of admission to talks of representatives of paramilitary groups, Mitchell drew up the Mitchell Principles, requiring a solemn pledge to non-violence and the use of only democratic means.  For two years, with endless patience, Mitchell oversaw talks with the parties, slowly nudging them towards agreement and securing the involvement, usually by telephone calls from the White House to party leaders, of President Clinton, in support of his efforts which culminated in the Belfast Good Friday Agreement on 10th April, 1998.

Task

Study each interpretation and summarise the key points made by the historian.

1. What do they argue is the most important factor, individual or group?
2. How did this contribute to the peace process and Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement?
3. What challenges and obstacles had to be overcome?
4. What evidence is given to support this interpretation?
5. Does the historian’s biographical information help to explain their interpretation?
6. From your own knowledge how convincing do you find this interpretation?
7. What further evidence would you want to find in the documents to make the interpretation convincing?
8. If you were to provide a one-word summary of this individual’s contribution, which of these would you choose, or can you think of a better word?
   • Obstructive / Unhelpful / Marginal / Constructive / Helpful / Pragmatic / Visionary / Essential

Notes from a meeting between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and the Taoiseach Bertie Ahern, 28 March 1998.

Context notes

Blair became Prime Minister in May 1997 and Ahern became Taoiseach in June 1997. The two leaders had a good working relationship which helped the peace process. In this conversation they refer to a number of developments. Strand One was the creation of a new Assembly to govern Northern Ireland. Strand Two concerned relations between the Irish government and Northern Ireland, and the creation of organisations which would have a role in issues which ran across the border between Northern Ireland and Ireland, such as heritage or cultural bodies.

Extracts from the opening remarks of Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams to the first meeting of Northern Ireland parties and the UK and Irish governments in October 1997.

Context notes

When the peace process began there were three main strands of the discussions. Strand One concerned the Northern Ireland Assembly. Strand Two concerned issues within the island of Ireland and relations between the Irish government and Northern Ireland. Strand Three concerned relations between the British and Irish governments. This document sets out the opening comments made by the Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams at the opening talks on Strand Two. Sinn Féin was a Republican party in Northern Ireland. Unionists and the British government regarded Sinn Féin as the political wing of the Provisional IRA. However, Sinn Féin always denied that there was an official connection.

A letter from the UK Prime Minister John Major to the SDLP leader John Hume, September 1996

Context notes

One of the key dates in the peace process was the Downing Street Declaration of 1993. In this agreement, the UK and Irish governments enshrined the principle of consent – that Northern Ireland would remain in the United Kingdom unless the majority of the people of Northern Ireland decided otherwise. Another key principle was that only political parties which rejected violence would be included in talks about the future of Northern Ireland. In 1994 the Provisional IRA (PIRA) announced a ceasefire. This helped Sinn Féin to be accepted into discussions. However, the PIRA broke its ceasefire in February 1996. The Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP) leader, John Hume, had been in discussions with Sinn Féin leader Gerry Adams through the early 1990s and as this letter suggests, continued to try to encourage communication between Republicans and the UK government.

Extracts from a Question and Answer session between US President Bill Clinton and US journalists on 13 April 1998

Context notes

The USA had a large population of Irish-Americans, descended from people who had emigrated to the USA since the 1600s. As a result, US Presidents tended to be very interested in the situation in Ireland, particularly Democratic Presidents as the Democratic Party had a large support among Irish-Americans. When he was first elected in 1995, President Clinton was relatively critical of the British government in Northern Ireland. However, over time his position changed and he worked to support the peace process alongside the UK and Irish governments and the political parties in Northern Ireland.

Source 5

Extract from a statement by the UK Secretary of State for Northern Ireland, Dr Mo Mowlam in April 1998. Catalogue Ref: PREM 49 / 412

Context notes

In 1972 the Northern Ireland Parliament (based at Stormont on the edge of Belfast) was suspended due to the political upheavals in the province. What followed was known as Direct Rule – Northern Ireland was governed directly by the UK Government, and the main responsibility for Northern Ireland lay with the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. When Labour won the 1997 UK General Election, Dr Marjorie ‘Mo’ Mowlam became the Northern Ireland Secretary. In this document she set out the main terms of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and in this extract gives credit to some of those who made it possible. Senator George Mitchell is an American politician. John de Chastelain is a Canadian diplomat and former army general. Harri Holkeri is a former prime minister of Finland. Tony Blair is the UK Prime Minister. Bertie Ahern is the Taoiseach (Prime Minister) of Ireland.

Extract from a report summarising talks between the UK government and various political parties and community groups in Northern Ireland, 14 October 1997. Catalogue Ref: PREM 49 / 119

Context notes

This meeting took place about six months before the final Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach met with all of the Northern Ireland parties. This extract records their discussions with the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition (NIWC). This was a cross-community party founded in 1996 by a Catholic academic, Monica McWilliams and a Protestant social worker, Pearl Sagar. They did not campaign specifically as a feminist organisation, and they were not Nationalist or Unionist in their aims. The movement principally aimed to try to represent the views of the wider community and not the main political parties or the paramilitary groups.

Extract from a report written 14 April 1997 by an official to Seán Ó hUiginn, the Joint Secretary of the Anglo-Irish Secretariat in Belfast. It describes a conversation with David Ervine, a former Loyalist paramilitary and member of the Progressive Unionist Party.

Context notes

For most of the 1970s, 1980s and early 1990s Loyalist paramilitary organisations had been active in Northern Ireland. They attacked IRA activists, Sinn Féin politicians, other Republican activists but also many who were simply members of the Catholic or Nationalist communities. By the 1990s Loyalist paramilitaries were becoming more active than the Provisional IRA in terms of the number of attacks carried out. However, an important group within the Loyalist paramilitaries favoured an end to conflict by the early 1990s. One of the most important was Gusty Spence of the Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF). Another was David Ervine, also a former paramilitary. Ervine met Spence in prison and was greatly influenced by him. He rejected violence and both Ervine and Spence became key figures in bringing about a Loyalist ceasefire in 1994. Leaders of the paramilitary groups the UVF, the Ulster Defence Association (UDA) and the Red Hand Commando formed an umbrella organisation called the Combined Loyalist Military Command (CLMC). This organisation co-ordinated the actions and statements of Loyalist organisations, although it was always a difficult job to control all of the factions within their respective organisations. Ervine himself went on to be a representative in the Northern Ireland government after the Agreement and was generally very well regarded by other politicians involved in the peace process.

Part of a record of a meeting on 12 May 1997 between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Taylor, the Deputy Leader of the UUP. Catalogue Ref: PREM 49/108

Context notes

This document was a record of a meeting between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Taylor, the Deputy Leader of the UUP. Blair had only just won the UK election on May 1^st. All sides were anxious to see whether the new government would maintain the same position as the previous Conservative government or whether Blair would take a different approach. At the time all groups were making plans for talks to set up a new government in Northern Ireland which would be based in Northern Ireland and run by representatives elected in elections in Northern Ireland. One of the biggest issues was the inclusion in elections of parties which had not signed up to the principles of The Downing Street Declaration of 1993, which had made clear that a party which did not renounce violence could not be part of any talks. Another point of disagreement was on the issue of cross-border cooperation, which related to the role and degree of influence of the Irish Government in matters affecting Northern Ireland. Ahern refers to Bertie Ahern, leader of the Fianna Fáil party in Ireland. As this meeting was taking place an election was due in Ireland in June and Ahern was expected to win, which he did.

Part of a record of a meeting on 7 May 1997 between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Jeffrey Donaldson, of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Catalogue Ref: PREM 49/108

Context notes

This document was a record of a meeting between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and Jeffrey Donaldson, of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP). Blair had only just won the UK election on May 1^st. All sides were anxious to see whether the new government would maintain the same position as the previous Conservative government or whether Blair would take a different approach.