Page three of report from British Military leaders to Prime Minister Winston Churchill on the chances of ‘Operation Unthinkable’ – a surprise attack on the USSR, 22 May 1945

Transcript

though possibly inferior by our standards, has stood the test. On the other hand, only about one third of their divisions are of a high standard, the others being considerably inferior and with overall mobility well below that of the Allies.

8. To achieve the decisive defeat of Russia in a total war would require, in particular, the mobilisation of manpower to counteract their present enormous manpower resources. This is a very long term project and would involve:-

Conclusions

9. We conclude that:-

QUICK SUCCESS

10. It might, however, be considered, as result of a political appreciation, that a quick and limited military success would result in Russia accepting our terms.

11. Before a decision to open hostilities were made, full account would have to taken of the following:-

• If this appreciation is wrong and the attainment of whatever limited objective we may set ourselves does not cause Russia to submit to our terms, we may, in fact, be committed to a total war.
• It will not be possible to limit hostilities to any particular area. While we are in progress, therefore, we must envisage a world-wide struggle.
• Even if all goes according to plan, we shall not have achieved, from the military point of view, a lasting result. The military power of Russia will not be broken and it will be open to her to recommence the conflict at any time she sees fit.

12. Assuming, however, that it is decided to risk military action on a limited basis, accepting the dangers set out above, we have examined what action we could take in order to inflict such a blow upon the Russians as would cause them to accept our terms, even though they would not have been decisively defeated and, from the military point of view, would still be capable of continuing the struggle.