The consensus of opinion of our bombing by the German officials is summed up in the word "annoying." Judging from observations and conversations with German officials, this statement is neither an exaggeration or an under-estimate.

Raids have been far too frequent to allow them to belittle our bombing, and instances of really serious raids have left an impression on their minds never to be forgotten.

Considering the number of raids carried out on stations, the officials think they have been lucky, and sum up the damage caused as slight. The only exception to this was at Metz, where they state that the damage had been considerable. Instances of great raids, such as those previously mentioned at Metz, Thionville, Saarbrücken, and Ehrange have greatly impressed them. They stated, however, that in almost every case the damage was repairable within a short time.

They considered our shooting was moderate, but pointed out that it varied very much. As regards the stoppage and dislocation of traffic, they maintained that damage had never been so great as to entirely isolate a station for a period of long duration. The possibilities of this danger had been minutely investigated by those responsible, and the result, on the whole, had not caused more inconvenience than had been anticipated. They admitted, however, that alarming situations had occurred which, for short periods, had seriously upset their working arrangements. Whenever traffic had to be deviated from its original course it meant that the damage was such that trains would not be able to resume their normal running for some time. As a result of raids and alarms on Saarbrücken trains were constantly held up for two hours, or, on rare occasions, for even longer periods.

They stated that attacks on trains running on open lines between stations had been frequent, but this was outside their experience, and they professed not to know what effect it had had. In their opinion, the moral effect of attacking stations had been great. On occasions it had been difficult to prevent panic, especially at night, when the idea of giant machines, flying at a low height, was very terrifying, and greatly impressed the officials as well as the general public. They expressed surprise that these machines dare to come so low.

At Saarbrücken the enemy officials were very proud of their A.A. defence, which, they maintained, had contributed largely to their comparative immunity.

Thionville, they considered, was not sufficiently defended, a fact which very materially lowered the morale of the railway hands.

At Treves the mayor considered the railway station on the left bank of the Moselle of greater military importance than that to the east of the town, and could not understand how this had escaped almost entirely.

The opinion of the stationmaster at Ehrange is interesting. He considered that the moral effect of the raids had been very considerable, pointing out how people got no rest from them and from the alarms day or night. As far as the railway was concerned he denied that results of any military value had ever been attained at Ehrange, and even the delays caused could have been eliminated had there been urgent necessity.

All officials agreed as to the importance of attacking locomotive sheds, workshops, and permanent railway installations necessary to ensure smooth running of traffic. At Metz, for example, they emphasised the importance of the Montigny workshops, and at Thionville those of Basse Jeutz. The authorities admit that, generally speaking, the material damage has been constantly recurrent, with serious consequences on occasions. No effort was made, however, to belittle the moral effect produced, which had been considerable throughout the war, and reached its highest pitch in 1918.

It should be borne in mind that the above are the statements of German officials who, in some cases, have not undergone the trials and dangers of bomb raids.

The people of Metz appreciated the fact that surprisingly little damage had been done to the town itself, and all were unanimous in stating that they thought every effort had been made to avoid hitting the town.

Generally speaking, the directors did not attach much importance to air raids. They were ready to admit the justifiability of bombing from a military point of view, but condemned the Allies' principle of attacking workmen's colonies.

With a few exceptions the directors asserted that the material damaged had been insignificant, and had not affected the war one way or the other. Such damage had invariably been repaired at once without any difficulty, and in very few cases had any stoppage of work resulted.

The moral effect of the various raids was admitted to have been very considerable: the constant alarms and attacks had got on the workmen's nerves. No difficulty had, however, been experienced with the workers, and very few had left the works during the war.

The directors stated that day raids caused them little inconvenience, but night alarms and raids were feared, and were spoken of as "exceedingly annoying" from every point of view.

Our shooting, they considered, was very erratic both by day and night. They were anxious to know what portion of the works was aimed at; the vital points, the buildings, the workmen's cottages, or the works as a whole.