|
(Official crest)
WAR OFFICE
130.B. Secret)
|
| I will
take these points seriatim. |
| (1) What
should be our foreign policy, speaking of course from a military point
of view ? |
| Writing
as a simple soldier I would say that a foreign policy which ignored
strategy was no policy at all. It is axiomatic that policy and strategy
must walk hand in hand. That being so if we examine the map ( as we
were doing yesterday evening ) we can see the value to us and France
if Belgium is actively hostile to Germany. But as far as my knowledge
goes Belgium will remain passive and neutral if she possibly can even
if, and when, German armies over run all her country south of the
Meuse and Sambre. She will remain passive and neutral unless she is
convinced that we are going to join France and are determined to fight
this war out to a victorious finish. If Belgium believed this she
would join with us. And for this reason. She hates the idea of being
absorbed into the German Empire and she fears, and with good reason,
that even if she remains neutral she will as a matter of fact be swallowed
up by her big neighbour after the war is over if Germany is victorious.
On the other hand she knows that neither England nor France have any
designs on her independance and she would incline to them if she was
persuaded that they had determined on joint action. My opinion therefore
is that, for the single and specific case of an unwarranted attack
by Germany on France or an attempt by Germany to seize or absorb Belgium,
England and France should have an offensive and defensive alliance
and in this Belgium would join. Whether Holland could be induced to
join I am not sure nor do I much care. Denmark ought to be brought
into it and I take it for granted that Russia is already there. |
| A Belgium,
hostile to Germany, would mean that the line of the Meuse was secure,
that the fortresses of Namur and Liège and the work at Huy
were impregnable. It would mean an open and friendly country for us
to operate in, it would therefore mean a constant and ever increasing
menace to the German right flank and the German line of communication;
and most important of all, it would mean that the superiority in German
numbers could not be brought into play. |
| A hostile
Denmark might very well mean an appreciable reduction of German forces
on the French frontier. |
| Of Russia
I will speak later on. |
| The
difference that such a state of affairs would make on our strategy
would be incalculable and, again writing as a soldier, I venture to
urge the vital importance to this country of policy and strategy being
worked in the most intimate connection and, in furtherance of this
aim, I would press with all the weight I possess for an (circled)offensive
and defensive alliance between ourselves, France, Belgium and, if
possible, Denmark. |
|
