1st July, 1916.
(stamp over)
GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.
No.................
Date..............
|
|
7.30 a.m. to 8.37 a.m.
|
At 7.30
a.m. the troops assaulted.
The right
b[attalio]n of the 87th B[riga]de, the 1st Inniskilling Fusiliers,
advanced as if on parade up to the enemy's first line. There the bulk
of the battalion was held up by wire, but a portion managed to cross
the trenches and advanced over the crest to the support line. The
2nd South Wales Borderers on their left did not succeed in penetrating
the enemy's line. Meantime the enemy barrage on our front line caused
many losses amongst the 1st K.O.S.B. and the 1st Border Regiment and
the K.O.S.B. crossed the parapet, but except for some of the leading
sections of the Border Regiments, none reached the leading battalions. |
| On the
right of the 86th Bde. the 2nd royal Fusiliers advanced at 7.25 a.m.
and immediately came under heavy cross machine-gun fire. A few reached
the mine crater, but none got as far as the enemy's wire. On the left
one company of the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers and the two companies
of the same regiment in the Sunken Road advanced simultaneously, but
failed to penetrate the enemy's wire, and the survivors took refuge
in any available cover. Meantime the enemy's barrage on our own front
lines so hindered our advance that the supporting battalions did not
cross the parapet until 7.55 a.m. The 16th Middlesex on the left moved
forward steadily, and reached the crater with considerable losses.
The Lancashire Fusiliers at 8.15 a.m. made another attack, but failed. |
| At this
time the Divisional Headquarters was under the impression that the
87th Bde. had reached its objective and the 4th Division on their
left and the 36th Division on their right were reported to be advancing
with little opposition. General de Lisle, believing that the leading
battalions of the 87th Bde. had gone through and that the German machine-guns
in the rear were checking the advance of the supporting battalions,
resolved to make another effort to capture the front line. At 8.37
a.m. he ordered the 88th Bde. to attack the German front line with
2 battalions between the western point of the "Y" Ravine
(Q.10.d.6.7.) and the right Divisional boundary. |
| 8.37 a.m. onward. |
| Accordingly
at 9.5 the 1st Newfoundland Regiment advanced to the attack, but the
1st Essex on their right were delayed by blocks in the trenches. Both
bns. suffered severely from machine-gun and shell fire, and neither
reached the German lines. |
| The
artillery was due to lift off the BEAUCOURT-BEAUMONT-HAMEL Road at
8.50 a.m., but, in view of what had happened, it was arranged to keep
the barrage there until |
|
....9.20.
|
1st July, 1916.
(stamp over)
GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.
No.................
Date..............
|
| 9.20 This was subsequently altered to 9.50, then to
10.20 and finally to 10.50. At 9.20 came the news that the 36th Division
on the right had failed with the attack on their left. At 10.5, when
it became clear that the 88th Bde. had failed to advance, General
de Lisle directed that no more troops should be sent forward at present. |
| The
Commander of the VIII Corps instructed General de Lisle to use the
two remaining battalions of the 88th Bde. for a fresh attack on "Y"
Ravine in conjunction with an attack by the 4th Division. The Divnl.
artillery was accordingly ordered to recommence the bombardment at
11.0 o'clock and to lift at 12.30 p.m. At 12 noon the fire of the
heavy artillery was brought back to the enemy's front line at BEAUMONT
HAMEL, with orders to lift at 12.25. At 12.10 p.m. the 88th Bde. requested
that the hour of attack might be deferred until 12.45, as the 4th
Worcesters had not reached the front line owing to the congested state
of the trenches. At 1.15 p.m. it was reported that the 4th Worcesters
had not attacked and the artillery barrage was accordingly replaced
on the enemy's front line. At 1.50 p.m. instructions were issued for
the line to be consolidated and the trenches cleared, as all hope
of further advance that day was futile. The 2nd Royal Fusiliers had
meantime been driven back from the mine crater by trench mortar fire,
and the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers, who made another effort to advance
at noon, had been compelled to abandon the attempt. |
The
positions now adopted were as follows:-
Right sector, 88th Bde., with in the front line, 1st Essex on the
right and the 4th Worcesters on the left, and in support 1st Newfoundland
Regiment and the 2nd Hampshires. Left sector, 86th Bde, from right
to left, 1st Dublin Fusiliers, 2nd Royal Fusiliers, 16th Middlesex
and the 1st Lancashire Fusiliers. The 87th Bde. were in the reserve
trenches behind the 88th Bde. in the following order, from right to
left :- 2nd S.W.B., 1st K.O.S.B., 1st R. Inniskilling Fusiliers,
and 1st Border Regiment. That evening an artillery barrage was placed
on the enemy's front line from 10.30 to 11.30 p.m. to facilitate the
collecting of material and wounded, and during this period the 4 Stokes
mortars which had been left at the crater were recovered. |
| 4. REASONS FOR FAILURE. |
| The
causes of failure, in the view of the Divisional Commander, were :- |
|
1.
|
The enemy was prepared and had reinforced his line. |
|
2.
|
The enemy had brought up many additional machineguns, which were
kept in dug-outs proof against heavy artillery and brought up to repel
our inf[antr]y attack. The whole of the BEAUMONT HAMEL area is honeycombed
with large caves, some of them capable of accommodating two bns. |
|
3.
|
Under these conditions the extent of "NO MAN's LAND" to
be covered by our assaulting troops was too great. |
|
4.
|
The explosion of the mine warned the enemy of the time of the assault. |
| 5. DISCIPLINE AND MORAL. |
| The
behaviour of the troops under trying circumstances was perfect. In
spite of two attacks having |
|
....failed
|
|
(stamp over)
GENERAL STAFF,
HEADQUARTERS,
4th ARMY.
No.................
Date..............
|
| failed, the two bns. of the 88th Bde. detailed for the third attack
behaved with exemplary bravery. The Newfoundland battalion, for example,
attacked 750 strong. 40 odd unwounded returned in the course of the
day and the remaining 710 were casualties. |
| 6. CASUALTIES. |
| In
the day's action the Division lost 209 officers and 5,058 other ranks. |
|
