Cabinet Secretaries' notebooks (CAB 195/20): USA
i) In spite of Keynsian policies, Admn is finding diffy in getting
economy moving. Row with steel is popular, but rather
demagogues. The steel cos. cd. have done it more sensibly -
by items instead of average increases & not doing it so soon.
Even so, some shadow of New Deal - risk of losing co-opn of
ii) Defence. Mr K. is in diffies: better armed v. Govt. agencies because
keeps his counsel in narrow circle. Disappointed at out-turn of
tests ques: but looks as tho' R. will do another series. After that
U.S. might be ready to give it up.
Nuclear strength of R. & U.S. has got much too large. To catch
up R. must have devoted enormous resources. A nuclear
exchange wd. kill 100 m. Europe, 130 in U.S. & 200/250 m. in
U.S. What will happen to credibility of deterrent when that is
more widely known. Will Govts. be willing to risk that sort of
destruction? If not, this is instrument wh. will never be used.
This is what causes them to think of larger conventional forces -
as reply to e.g. nipping out Hamburg.
U.S. have eliminated pre-emptive R. war - by protection of sites
& Polaris as 2nd strike.
But, unlike previous Adminn, this one believes tht. some day all
this nuclear business must stop.
K.'s emphasis, in speeches & interviews, are largely on his
domestic problems. This must reflect recognition of huge cost,
in resources of nuclear effort.
iii) Summit Mtgs. I'm anxious to concentrate this year on C. Market.
Mr K. understands this - & recognises its importance to us.
He accepts tht. pro. tem. we shd. avoid mtgs. which wd.
exacerbate de G.
iv) Berlin: W. Alliance. U.S. annoyed with Fr. and G. Cross at thought
tht. U.S. will be said to have sold Germans. Tried to make Mr K.
realise tht. this is price of power. But not sure any progress will
be made on Berlin - not a settlement anyway: perhaps
modus Vivendi which works on. That wd. give us respite until
we are ready to go forward on tests. Avoid Summit failure.
v) General relations with U.S. are good. Won't be affected by our entry
into C. Market. Depends, not on our power nor on our nuclear
capabbilty, but on fact tht. they can trust us as they can't trust
vi) Irritants - tariffs. Protection is traditional in U.S. & has now extended
to the South. Pressure to let Tariff Commn have final decision.
He must accept some of their recommendations, or he may lose
On shipping I have promised to send him a memo.
Opinion here is not sure what U.S. motive is in pressing for our entry
into C. Market. Must be political, not economic. Suspicion
therefore that our sovereignty may be impaired
Press - brought out well tht. we are defending C'wealth interests.
vii) Colonialism. Co-ordination W'ton/N. York. [Enter Hailsham, M.R.
Congo: Anglo-U.S.-Belgian co-ordinated policy.