13.04.1998
5 Extracts from a report written by John Holmes, to Tony Blair on the final 72 days of negotiations – Thursday 9 April, 1998, Catalogue ref: PREM 49/412
Transcript
At breakfast with Ahern, the Irish went through the North-South problems again. They were
angry that, having made concessions in negotiation with us the previous day, these had been
set aside by the Unionists. Not for the first time, the Taoiseach revealed his extreme suspicion
of Unionist intentions, based on nationalist experience of many years. He recalled Unionist
failure to deliver on the North-South front in both 1921 and 1973. He was worried at the idea
that he could change Articles 2 and 3, and then get nothing for it. There was consequently great
stress on the Irish side on the need for Westminster legislation to ensure that the North-South
bodies would definitely be established. The Irish also showed further concern about Sinn Fein’s
position.
The Prime Minister put the Unionist North-South proposal to Ahern, and pushed him hard. Ahern
accepted that the basis of a deal was there, but repeated that Westminster legislation had to
be part of this, even if the Assembly helped to draft the legislation. The Prime Minister saw no
reason why we should not reintroduce the previous reference to the two governments making
all necessary legislative and other preparations. After Teahon and Gallagher had studied the
Unionist text in more detail, and suggested some more changes, the Irish reluctantly agreed
to it, together (apparently) with the list of proposed subjects for co-operation / implementation
bodies.
The Prime Minister then put the proposed Irish amendments to Trimble, who accepted the
essential ones. So a deal appeared to have been struck on Strand 2, and a breakthrough
achieved. Strand 1 negotiation could start in earnest, together with efforts to resolve the
remaining textual problems over rights, policing, decommissioning, etc.
However problems soon appeared. Word began to reach us of serious difficulties about the new
text in the Irish camp, fuelled by Andrews, O’Donnell and Mansergh, and unhappiness on the
part of Sinn Fein and the SDLP. The Prime Minister explained at length to both parties why the
new text was satisfactory from their point of view. The SDLP seemed reasonably convinced.
Sinn Fein were not.
After a long period of silence from the Irish, during which the Prime Minister tried in vain to
contact the Taoiseach,
It was a disaster — the Irish had altered the balance fundamentally, reintroducing the necessity
for Westminster legislation throughout the text and putting all the responsibility in the hands of
the two governments. There was fury on our side that the deal had so quickly fallen apart. The
Prime Minister quickly told Ahern that the text could not be seriously reopened, but he was ready
to see whether the UUP might accept one or two amendments. A difficult negotiation between
me and Teahon/Gallagher followed. I agreed to try on the Prime Minister and, if he agreed, the
UUP, half a dozen small but significant textual changes.
The Prime Minister met Trimble and Taylor, and put the Irish changes to them. Since they did
not fundamentally alter the balance of the text, they accepted four of the six amendments, to our
relief. The Irish were in turn satisfied. So the deal seemed to be back on, and attention could
switch back to the wider problem of whether Sinn Fein would sign up to a deal, not least since
Ahern had made increasingly clear that a deal would be almost impossible for the Irish if they
did not. Ahern had already spent hours with Adams trying to persuade him that the deal was
worth accepting, and listening to Sinn Fein demands for improvements, particularly on policing,
security, the Irish language and prisoners (whom they insisted all had to be out in a year). Dr
Mowlam had also been engaged in tough negotiations over the latter point for two days, with
us deliberately refusing to reveal our hand. Sinn Fein’s public line had meanwhile turned very
negative and it looked as if they were preparing to disassociate themselves from any agreement.
However a series of meetings over the night of 9/10 April with Dr Mowlam; Ahern and the Prime
Minister separately; two very long meetings with just the Prime Minister and Ahern on one side,
and Adams and McGuinness on the other; and a 3 a.m. telephone call to Adams from Clinton,
seemed to turn the tide. No concessions were made on Sinn Fein demands, but their concerns
were listened to. Dr Mowlam wrote a letter of comfort on some of the issues. The Prime Minister
promised to meet Adams after Easter to discuss them further. It eventually became clear early
in the morning of 10 April that, while they would not sign up to the deal on the spot, not least
because of their annual conference a week later, they were ready to make positive noises about
it and argue for it. It was made clear in return that, while we would stick for now to the planned
two year release deadline for prisoners, we would be ready to advance this if Sinn Fein did sign
up and circumstances allowed.
Meanwhile the deal on Strand 2 had indeed unblocked Strand 1. The SDLP’s patience was
rewarded and the UUP accepted early on Friday morning the essence of what they had rejected
for so long: a Northern Ireland executive, with a First Minister and First Deputy Minister, and
a reasonable form of sufficient cross-community consensus for voting on key issues. Other
pieces of the jigsaw had also fallen into place, with new words on decommissioning and policing
agreed, and the UUP having finally accepted the Irish amendments to Articles 2 and 3 (despite
having deluded themselves that a better offer was on the way).