12.05.1997
Part of a record of a meeting on 12 May 1997 between the UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and David Trimble, leader of the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) and John Taylor, the Deputy Leader of the UUP, Catalogue ref: PREM 49/108
Transcript
10 DOWNING STREET
LONDON SWIA 2AA
From the Private Secretary
12 May 1997
Dear Ken
CALL BY THE UUP, 12 MAY
David Trimble and John D Taylor called on the Prime Minister this afternoon for about 45 minutes. Dr. Mowlam, Jonathan Stephens, Jonathan Powell and I were present on our side. The Prime Minister began by asking for Trimble’s assessment of the situation.
Trimble said that he was particularly worried about the Loyalist ceasefire. The situation on the ground was worse than it had been for many years, with considerable tension in urban areas. Recent spontaneous attacks on individuals of one community or the other were the most obvious signs of this. The continuing IRA violence was a major factor, compounded by worry about what might happen in the marching season and, to a lesser degree, nervousness about a Labour government. Feelings in the Protestant community were not helped by public suggestions by Dr. Mowlam that the RUC could be radically reformed.
2
The Prime Minister looked forward to the eventual solution. This would presumably involve a devolved assembly commanding confidence from both Unionists and Nationalists, and proper cross border arrangements. Both the UUP and SDLP appeared to envisage something like this. Taylor agreed but pointed out that there was a big difference between practical cross border cooperation e.g. the Foyle Fisheries Commission, and the kind of all Ireland bodies with executive powers demanded by the Irish government. If discussion could move away from the latter proposal, the package could be sold to Unionists. Meanwhile the current talks process was stuck. If the governments continued to wait for the IRA to make up their mind, and the argument about decommissioning continued, there would never be progress.
The Prime Minister suggested that it would be better if Sinn Fein were in the talks. Taylor disagreed. It was better for them to be out. They were not in practice in a position to go back to full scale violence because people would not accept it. Trimble agreed. The republicans were in a difficult position. They were not ready to turn their backs on violence definitively and found the choice of going wholly political unpalatable. There was a lot to be said for keeping them in their present awkward position. In theory it would be good to get Sinn Fein in, but only if they had genuinely given up violence. Otherwise the pressure on them should be maintained until the movement split. That would be inevitable because the Slab Murphys of this world would never give up violence.
Taylor drew attention to the problem for the UUP if violence got worse, and the Loyalists had to be thrown out of the talks. The UUP needed the Loyalists in order to meet the rules of sufficient consensus. Otherwise they could be out-voted by Paisley and McCartney. So it was extremely important to keep the Loyalists in if possible. Trimble emphasised the same point.
3
Discussion moved to Irish elections and the prospect of Ahern as Taoiseach. Taylor suggested that, judging from his most recent comments, Ahern would be happy to see Sinn Fein in talks even without a ceasefire. Trimble said that he did not think Ahern would adopt this policy. He was very ignorant about Northern Ireland. But he had just had a reasonably good private meeting with Ahern – which Ahern had kept secret, unlike Trimble’s experience with Bruton. However, Ahern would be subject to the influence of Martin Mansergh and others.