Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 Themed Collection Part 1

Investigate the sources

Explore these sources alongside those found in part 2 of this resource.

1. Source 1: Foreign Office memo to Northern Ireland Office

   1. 

      From: Graham Archer. Republic of Ireland Department
      Date: 9 December 1992
      CC: Mr Thomas, Mr Bell, Mr Brooker
      Mr D A Cooke
      TPU, NIO – B
      Brief for Prime Ministers telephone conversation with President Elect Clinton
      1. We have been asked for a note by tomorrow morning to include in a short brief.
      2. Are you content with the following:
      Northern Ireland
      President-elect Clinton’s closest foreign policy advisers have told our Ambassador
      that we should not take too seriously statements made by him to Irish-American
      audiences during the election campaign. These included comment that a US envoy
      could be a catalyst for peace, on possible support for the MacBride principles that
      impose conditions on investment in Northern Ireland, a visa for Gerry Adams, and
      the “wanton use of lethal force.”
      We see no need for the Prime Minister to enter into any detail on Northern Ireland
      with Governor Clinton. But the Prime Minister may wish to play up our concern in a
      low key on the following lines:-
      – We hope to restart the Northern Ireland Talks process shortly;
      – We place great importance on this process. It needs careful handling and we shall
      need continuing American support for it. I look forward to having a fuller word about
      this when we meet.
      G R Archer

2. Source 2: The Sunday Press reports in Irish Republic

   1. 

      Why John Hume is right to enter into talks with Gerry Adams

      There has been considerable debate – some of it almost of hysterical proportions – concerning the decision of the leader of the SDLP, John Hume, to talk with the President of Sinn Fein. Gerry Adams. What seems to have enraged some politicians and commentators is their decision to issue a joint- statement after it was accidentally leaked that their discussions were taking place.

      In Dublin there seems to be some puzzlement about why Mr Hume did not inform them beforehand that he was out to enter these discussions, but that probably because the talks were tended to be confidential in order to give the participants the chance to make progress out of the glare of publicity. It seems incredible that after 23 years violence in the North an attempt by one of our most respected constitutional politicians, John Hume, to achieve peace should become wrapped up in petty party point scoring and, instead of being encouraged to help break the logjam, he should be vilified.

      Mr Hume does not have all the answers to the problems of Northern Ireland: he is not the only speaker for the Nationalist people of the North. But he does have answers and he does speak for sizeable section of that Nationalist community. Above all he speaks the searing truth when he says that this litany of carnage, despair, murder, destruction and human tragedy on a vast scale has got to be stopped. And he is attempting to stop it. John Hume must know there are risks involved in this strategy, but the possibility of success presents such a huge prize it is, in our view, worth taking the risks. If John Hume can get across to the Sinn Fein-IRA axis the truths that here is a better way, that 23 years of violence has not worked and that the political path is the one to tread, then he will have achieved something of historic proportions.

      Hume says that if he fails then all he will have lost is his time. It is not as simple as that, however, and there are fears that his venture will damage constitutional nationalism as well as the prospects of a successful renewal of the talks in the North. Even allowing for those misgivings Hume is right to talk to Adams if he feels he has a chance of success.

      The Irish and British Governments are making commendable efforts to restart the talks process but, as Douglas Hurd said in Dublin on Friday, it is a slow process. In the meantime lives are being lost daily. It is in that context that Hume has undertaken his discussions with Adams. The waiting game means a prolonged campaign of violence, with more deaths and heartache.

      If there is pressure on Hume to deliver something from the talks then there is equal pressure on Adams. If his objective is solely to legitimise the Republican movement by being seen to be in dialogue with the leader of constitutional nationalism in the North then he is engaged in a hypocritical exercise. Adams, like a number of his Sinn Fein colleagues, must know the campaign of the gun and the bomb has, to put it mildly, not borne fruit. It is time for a change and they surely realise there is another way. How to bring about that other way is the nub of the discussions between him and the SDLP leader and he talks are therefore not only worthwhile but probably an essential art of the process which must be gone through if we are to achieve peace.

3. Source 3: Peace Train Organisation

   1. 

      3.0 ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF PEACE TRAIN ORGANISATION

      The Peace Train Organisation came into being in 1989. The original idea is attributed to Pronsais De Rossa, a Workers Party T.D. in Dail Eireann, who together with other interested individuals decided to form a pressure group to oppose the ongoing bombing campaign against the Dublin /Belfast rail link. The idea was taken up by like minded individuals in Northern Ireland, initially by Chris and Michael McGimpsey, who formed a Northern contingent to co-operate with the group in Dublin. Eventually support committees were established in both London and Glasgow.

      10.0 RECOMMENDATIONS

      1. CCRU should extend funding for a further year,  rather than for three years, to allow time for the Peace Train to demonstrate that they have put into effect a clear development strategy. Such a strategy is not yet evident but there are clear signs that the need for it has been recognised and that attempts are under way to formulate one. 2. CCRU should reinforce to PTO as a condition of any further funding the types of output it considers appropriate for projects which it funds. 3. CCRU should give considered assessment to the value which it would place on any initiative which brings politicians from across the political divide in Northern Ireland to work together for a common purpose. This does not have a high correlation with CCRU objectives as specified and may be within the remit of another agency. Peace train should be encouraged to give precedence to an initiative highlighting Loyalist paramilitary violence . To date its campaign has been almost exclusively directed at republican violence. Such a display would almost certainly make it clear that the organisation was unequivocal in its operation and this would be likely to broaden it’s appeal and acceptability.

4. Source 4: Meeting of Unionists and Irish Government Department of Affairs

   1. 

      CONFIDENTIAL
      DJW/39/5 FROM: DJ WATKINS US CENT SEC
      DATE: 27 MAY 1993
      CC: PS/PUS (B&L) – B Mr Thomas – B Mr Bell – B Mr Williams – B Mr Brooker – B Mrs Collins – B Mr Cooke – B Mr Maccabe – B Mr Maxwell – B Mr Mccusker – B Mr Quinn – B Mr Archer, RID – B HMA, Dublin – B
      PS/Mr Fell – B
      DFA AND UNIONISM
      1. Following the meeting chaired by PUS on 27 April, Mr Maccabe and I have now derived the attached list of people who might be fielded before the DFA, in appropriate social circumstances, in the process of encouraging our Irish colleagues to develop a rather more comprehensive understanding of the nature of unionism. I have myself noticed no diminution in the evidence suggesting that that educational process is necessary, though Bishop McMullan provided an effective counterbalance to DFA prejudice.
      2. We have sought to provide three very broad categories of unionists, viz:-
      (i) those active in party politics;
      (ii) those not (or no longer) active in party politics but known to hold unionist views; and
      (iii) those such as community leaders who may represent that strand of particularly working-class unionism. This group offers the additional prospect that they might also be able effectively to represent some of the causes of the current ferment in the unionist community at large.
      DFA AND UNIONISM
      “Unionists” who are active in Party Politics
      Jeffrey Donaldson. Robert Coulter. Raymond Ferguson. Ian Paisley (Junior). Gregory Campbell. Roy Bradford. Liz Seawright. Sean Neeson. Seamus Close. Ian Adamson. Hugh Smyth. Drew Nelson
      Non – Political Unionists
      AT Q Stewart. Clifford Smith. Lord Cooke. Lord Blease. Alisdair McLaughlin. Godfrey Brown. Paul Hewitt. Peter McLachlan. Rae Davey. Basil Glass. Lady Faulkner.  William Fitch. Paul Bew. EdnaLongley. James Hawthorne. Peter Smith QC. Robin Bailie. Noel Stewart. Sir A Campbell. Anthony Hart. John Martin. Robert McCartney. Addie Morrow. John Morrow. Sir D Lorimer.
      Community Leaders
      Jackie Redpath. Billy Hutchinson. Sammy Douglas. Monica Barrett (Quaker). Jackie Hewitt. Jack Hanvey. Rev Jim Rea. Eddie Callaghan.

5. Source 5: Letter from UK to Irish Taoiseach

   1. 

      10 Downing Street

      London SW1A 2AA

      The Prime Minister

      25 November 1993

      Strictly Confidential

      Dear Albert

      It was good to talk to you last Saturday. I am sorry to have intruded on your weekend off. I hope that you and Kathleen were able to get some relaxation during your trip. If I may say so, I thought your interview with David Frost went very well.

      Making no bones about it, we have had an extremely difficult and depressing week. I need not labour the reasons why. I had allowed myself to feel a little optimistic after my meeting with Robin Eames on 18 November. But I am afraid that the following day’s leak and the Hume/Adams statement on Saturday last have had precisely the effect I feared when we spoke on the phone.

      I have spent all week trying to repair the damage through a series of meetings and public statements. I fear that I have had only limited success. In the current political atmosphere, there is clearly no hope of securing even tacit acceptance by the Unionist mainstream of a Joint Declaration on the lines of your draft. The text would be seen as deriving from Hume/Adams, and thus would assumed to be the product of negotiation with Sinn Fein. This is an impression which successive statements from Hume and Adams have done nothing to dispel. As we have agreed all along, association with Hume/Adams is the kiss of death for any text intended to secure acceptance on both sides of the Community.

6. Source 6: Meeting UK Prime Minister and Taoiseach

   1. 

      SECRET AND PERSONAL

      NOTE FOR THE RECORD

      TÊTE-À-TÊTE MEETING BETWEEN THE PRIME MINISTER AND

      THE TAOISEACH, DUBLIN CASTLE, 3 DECEMBER 1993

      Martin Mansergh (Special Adviser to the Taoiseach) and I joined the tête-à-tête between the two Prime Minsters [sic] from 1150 until about 1300.

      The Taoiseach agreed with the Prime Minister that the common objectives of the two governments were to promote a cessation of violence and a lasting political settlement. He also agreed that, to achieve them, it was necessary to carry both sides of the community in Northern Ireland, and opinion within the government, parliament and public in the UK and Ireland.

      The Prime Minister and the Taoiseach had been working towards these objectives since their first meeting in Downing Street soon after the Taoiseach took office – and long before people had heard of the Hume/Adams dialogue. Since June 1993, they had been working on a draft Joint Declaration originally put forward by the Taoiseach, but since amended towards a more balanced document.

      Recent events had not helped this work. The Irish Government had felt let down on learning of exchanges between HMG and PIRA, and wondered whether it was caught in a Dutch auction. The Prime Minister said there had been no Dutch auction. HMG’s exchanges with PIRA had been limited in nature and consistent with our public position. The confidential nature of these exchanges had made it impossible for the Prime Minister to discuss them with the Irish Government.

      The Prime Minister pointed out that the briefing of the press by the Irish Government had been most unhelpful, and had made success much harder to achieve. The Irish had failed to acknowledge the advances and risks taken by HMG, and had made damaging remarks about self-determination, about the British draft statement, and about an alleged deal with the UUP. The Irish had also impeded the talks process by failing to produce the paper requested in September. The leak of a draft of that paper to the Irish Press had caused uproar in the North, by giving the impression that the Irish had a hidden agenda.

7. Source 7: Civil service notes on the Downing Street Declaration

   1. 

      SECRET AND PERSONAL

      DRAFT LETTER FROM RODERIC LYNE TO:

      Private Secretaries to Members of the Cabinet

      ANGLO-IRISH JOINT DECLARATION INITIATIVE

      The Prime Minister reported to Cabinet last week that negotiations with the Irish Government on a Joint Declaration were close to completion.

      2. The Prime Minister and Taoiseach will meet again in London [today/tomorrow] when the Joint Declaration will be made. (The text, which may be subject to some minor last minute adjustment, is attached.

      3. The background to the making of the Joint Declaration is a little complex. The Irish Government, and the Taoiseach in particular, have come to the view, based to some extent on contacts with the Provisional Movement, that a significant component of the organisation is looking for a way of bringing the “armed struggle” to an end. This is more than a hope, but less than a firm prediction. The Joint Declaration was conceived as a way of providing cover to enable the IRA to bring its campaign to an end, and to commit itself wholly to political and democratic methods, without acknowledging abject surrender. At the same time, and in parallel, Mr John Hume has been conducting an intermittent dialogue with the Provisional Movement, and in particular with Mr Gerry Adams, with the same objective. There have been many drafts of the Joint Declaration and the parentage of different elements in it is obscure, and may subsequently be contested.

      4. Until very recently the position of the British Government, […]

8. Source 8: Letter from Gerry Adams to John Major

   1. 

      GERRY ADAMS
      President of Sinn Féin
      51/55 Bóthar na bhFál, Béal Feirste BT12 4PD

      15 February 1996

      John Major MP
      Prime Minister
      10 Downing Street
      London

      A Chara

      Everyone was deeply shocked and saddened by the events of last Friday evening. Allow me therefore to extend once again, through you, my sympathy to those injured and to the families of those killed in last Friday’s explosion.

      The responsibility for that incident rests with the IRA. But there is also a clear responsibility on everyone to approach the peace process with a greater urgency and determination.

      I have already made clear the dangers posed to the peace process by the British government’s failure to seize the opportunity offered to it and the consistent bad faith with which your government acted. I know that you will have a different view of this. Clearly the only way to bridge this gap is through proper and substantive all party peace talks. Sinn Féin’s view of your proposal for an elected process is already well known.

      A new phase of the peace process is urgently required. You are already publicly committed to commencing this at the end of the month. To be successful this new phase should proceed with urgency and within an agreed time-frame upon an inclusive agenda and without any preconditions whatsoever.

      Your government’s refusal to meet with Sinn Fein since last Friday is a disappointing and inadequate response to the serious situation which we all face.

      But despite the difficulties and the danger involved, I remain absolutely committed to the search for a negotiated settlement. What is required is dialogue and inclusion.

      I would urge you to consider this approach.

      Is mise

      GERRY ADAMS

9. Source 9: Letter from Gerry Adams to Sir Patrick Mayhew

   1. 

      Sinn Féin Ard Oifig

      6 June 1996

      Sir Patrick Mayhew
      Secretary of State
      Northern Ireland Office
      Whitehall
      London

      I understand from the media that invitations have been sent to party leaders to nominate their negotiating teams. Sinn Fein have not received such an invitation. I want to protest in the strongest possible terms at your discriminatory approach. Those who vote for our party gave us a negotiating mandate which you should respect and accept. I am therefore sending you the names of our negotiating team.

      GERRY ADAMS

      MARTIN McGUINNESS

      GERRY KELLY

      LUCILITA BHREATNACH

      PAT DOHERTY

      ANNE (DODIE) McGUINNESS

      Martin McGuinness is our chief negotiator and in my absence he will lead the Sinn Fein negotiating panel. Note also that Siobhan OHanlon has been appointed by us to head up our secretariat and she can be contacted in the usual manner.

      Is mise

      GERRY ADAMS

10. Source 10: Stormont peace talks June 1996

    1. 

       CONFIDENTIAL

       RECORD OF PLENARY SESSION, CASTLE BUILDINGS, 12 JUNE

       Independent Chairman (after adjournment)

       Senator Mitchell

       General de Chastelain

       Mr Holkeri

       British government team

       Secretary of State

       Michael Ancram 

       Sir David Fell

       Irish government team

       Tanaíste

       Mrs Owen

       Mr de Rossa     

       Alliance Party

       Dr Alderdice

       Mr Close

       Mr Neeson 

       Labour

       Malachi Curran     

       NI Women’s Coalition

       Ms Sagar

       Ms McWilliams   

       PUP

       Mr Smyth

       Mr Ervine

       SDLP

       Mr Hume

       Mr Mallon

       Mr. McGrady  

       UDP

       Mr McMichael

       Mr White

       UDUP (for part of meeting)

       Dr Paisley

       Mr Robinson

       Rev McCrea

       UK Unionist (for part of meeting)

       Mr McCartney

       Dr O’Brien

       Mr Wilson

       UUP

       Mr Trimble

       Mr Taylor

       Mr Empey

       1. The meeting began at 12.20 am.

       5. When other delegates had arrived, the Secretary of State opened the meeting. The day had seen a long and useful period of deliberation, which had led the two Governments to put forward a paper which they believed offered a way forward (A possible approach to resolving procedural difficulties, 00.01am draft, annexed at A). On the basis of this, in particular paragraph 4.1, he invited Senator Mitchell to take over, following a five minute adjournment. Dr Paisley shouted ‘No, no, no’; and the rest of his delegation, and the UKUP’s, left, with disparaging comments about ‘British democracy’; Mr Wilson (UKUP) moved to take over one of the Independent Chairmen’s chairs.

       6. As proceedings were about to resume after the adjournment, Dr Paisley addressed Senator Mitchell. He said he did not accept him in the chair; his name had not been put to the meeting, and he objected in the strongest manner to the intrusion. He repeated his points about undertakings that proposals put forward would have to be to the satisfaction of participants, undertakings which had not been met. The Secretary of State had not given an opportunity to discuss it. His lackey had seen to it that he had not visited the DUP room. (I was the lackey who had visited delegations to tell them a paper, then a meeting, were imminent, if that is what was referred to: there was no-one in the DUP office, and Dr Paisley was already in the Private Office).

       7. Dr Paisley then left the room, shouting that he did not wish to sit with a member of the Irish Government who threatened that there would be bodies in the street, a remark ascribed to the ‘man with the beard’ [presumably Mr de Rossa. It had been reported around the building that he had made such a prediction, in the event that Senator Mitchell was not appointed and the process broke down].

11. Source 11: Press release peace talks update

    1. 

       NORTHERN IRELAND: MULTI-PARTY TALKS

       12 June

       Press Statement

       The participants in the talks engaged in a round of intensive bilateral exchanges during the day.

       In a plenary meeting they agreed the approach resolving procedural difficulties set out in the attached paper.

       At the invitation of the two Governments, Senator Mitchell assumed the chair of the opening plenary session. General de Chastelain and Mr Holkeri were appointed as chairman of Strand 2 and the Business Committee and alternate chairman respectively.

       The British and Irish Governments, the Alliance Party, Labour, the Northern Ireland Women’s Coalition, the Progressive Unionist Party, the Social Democratic and Labour Party, the Ulster Democratic Party and the Ulster Unionist Party all confirmed their total and absolute commitment specifically to the principles of democracy and non-violence as set out in paragraph 20 of the report of the International Body.

       The participants will meet again this morning to confer on the issues mentioned in paragraph 5 of the attached paper.

12. Source 12: John Major meets David Trimble

    1. 

       10 Downing Street
       London
       SW1A 2AA
       The Prime Minister
       12 June 1996
       Dear David,
       Just a quick note to say how pleased I am that a way forward was finally found yesterday, and that we now have a basis for the talks to proceed. I know you worked hard to achieve this and am grateful for your efforts.
       I hope we can move forward from here successfully, although I have no illusions about how difficult the process is likely to be. If you need to be in touch at any stage, I am always available as you know.
       Yours Sincerely,
       John M
       David Trimble Esq MP

13. Source 13: John Major meets John Hume

    1. 

       10 DOWNING STREET

       LONDON SWIA 1AA

       THE PRIME MINISTER

       27 September 1996

       Thank you for your letter of 8 August and the text which you faxed on 6 September.

       The IRA’s position, as you describe it, is that if we are ready to make this statement, and the IRA knew when we were going to make it, they would respond shortly afterwards, at a time specified in advance, with an unequivocal restoration of the August 1994 “total cessation”.

       When I wrote to you on 24 July. I said that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without any further prevarication. But, in response to the suggestion that reassurances from the British Government on certain issues in line with its established public policy would help to bring this about, l set out words which could be used.

       Now they have returned with one significant issue – the timeframe – which is simply not under our control, and an altogether longer text covering a host of other issues. Meanwhile, continued preparation for further IRA attacks goes on, as the arrests and arms finds on Monday demonstrated all too clearly. Intimidation and so-called punishment attacks also continue to increase in

       2

       number and brutality. As I have already said publicly, Sinn Fein’s talk of peace can have little credibility against this background.

       It remains the case that the IRA should restore their ceasefire without further ado and without the need for further statements. The Government is certainly not in the business of negotiating a restoration of the IRA ceasefire, nor in giving secret assurances to bring it about. Sinn Fein must understand that we mean in private what we say in public.

       Nevertheless, if there is genuine doubt or uncertainty over the Government’s policy, I am happy to look at that. Because I am in no doubt of the benefits, for the people of Northern Ireland and the negotiations, of a genuine and unequivocal restoration of the IRA ceasefire, we will repeat and reaffirm our approach on the key issues. The attached text has been prepared for this purpose, and will be published in the near future.

       Yours sincerely

       John M

14. Source 14: A conversation with David Ervine

    1. 

       14 April 1997

       No of pages including this one 3

       To: HQ

       For: Second Secretary O hUiginn

       From: Belfast

       From: Joint Secretary

       Subj:

       Conversation with David Ervine

       1. I had a conversation with David Ervine at a BIA reception last Friday evening.
       2. Ervine was deeply pessimistic about the future of the Loyalist ceasefire in the wake of the IRA’s shooting of Constable Alice Collins in Derry the previous day. It could be taken for granted, he said, that members of one or other of the CLMC’s constituent organisations would respond over the next few days, probably by carrying out another attack on a Sinn Féin member.
       3. Once again, this would be presented as a “measured response” to an IRA provocation. There would be no claim of responsibility and the CLMC ceasefire would remain technically intact. What concerned Ervine, however, was that the cumulative effect of the series of “measured responses” to date was to transfer the initiative increasingly away from the relatively moderate CLMC leadership and into the hands of a hard-line element who were demanding a full-scale return to paramilitary activity. It was only a matter of time, Ervine suggested, before the hard-liners would succeed in having the ceasefire brought explicitly to an end.
       4. Part of the difficulty, according to Ervine, arose from friction and competition between the CLMC’s three constituent groups. The rogue elements within each would claim that their particular organisation had been targetted in some recent IRA operation and that they were entitled, accordingly, to take retaliatory action. The greater the provocation from the IRA, the more these elements competed for the “honour” of responding to it – and the weaker the CLMC’s restraining influence became.

15. Source 15: UK Prime Minister meets UUP politicians, 7 May 1997

    1. 

       10 DOWNING STREET
       LONDON SWIA 2AA
       From the Private Secretary
       7 May 1997

       Dear Ken

       CALL BY THE UUP, 7 MAY

       The Prime Minister decided that, before he saw the Taoiseach, he would like to touch base in person with David Trimble. Trimble therefore called on the Prime Minister in the House of Commons for 10 minutes this afternoon, accompanied by Geoffrey Donaldson. Jonathan Powell and I were there on our side.

       Trimble began by thanking the Prime Minister for seeing him. This would be an important signal to the Unionist community. The Prime Minister said that in the ideal world he would not have been seeing the Taoiseach so soon, but he was in town anyway and a meeting could hardly be avoided. Trimble accepted this. But the Irish were busy trying to make something of the meeting and giving the impression that things were being done behind the backs of others.

       The Prime Minister said that his aim was to sort out the Northern Ireland problem. He had no predilection whatsoever for a united Ireland, and he would want to find the right way of making this clear in due course. Trimble welcomed this. There was considerable nervousness on doorsteps in Belfast about the views of the new government.

16. Source 16: UK Prime Minister meets UUP politicians, 12 May 1997

    1. 

       10 DOWNING STREET
       LONDON SWIA 2AA
       From the Private Secretary
       12 May 1997
       Dear Ken
       CALL BY THE UUP, 12 MAY
       David Trimble and John D Taylor called on the Prime Minister this afternoon for about 45 minutes. Dr. Mowlam, Jonathan Stephens, Jonathan Powell and I were present on our side. The Prime Minister began by asking for Trimble’s assessment of the situation.
       Trimble said that he was particularly worried about the Loyalist ceasefire. The situation on the ground was worse than it had been for many years, with considerable tension in urban areas. Recent spontaneous attacks on individuals of one community or the other were the most obvious signs of this. The continuing IRA violence was a major factor, compounded by worry about what might happen in the marching season and, to a lesser degree, nervousness about a Labour government. Feelings in the Protestant community were not helped by public suggestions by Dr. Mowlam that the RUC could be radically reformed.
       2
       The Prime Minister looked forward to the eventual solution. This would presumably involve a devolved assembly commanding confidence from both Unionists and Nationalists, and proper cross border arrangements. Both the UUP and SDLP appeared to envisage something like this. Taylor agreed but pointed out that there was a big difference between practical cross border cooperation e.g. the Foyle Fisheries Commission, and the kind of all Ireland bodies with executive powers demanded by the Irish government. If discussion could move away from the latter proposal, the package could be sold to Unionists. Meanwhile the current talks process was stuck. If the governments continued to wait for the IRA to make up their mind, and the argument about decommissioning continued, there would never be progress.
       The Prime Minister suggested that it would be better if Sinn Fein were in the talks. Taylor disagreed. It was better for them to be out. They were not in practice in a position to go back to full scale violence because people would not accept it. Trimble agreed. The republicans were in a difficult position. They were not ready to turn their backs on violence definitively and found the choice of going wholly political unpalatable. There was a lot to be said for keeping them in their present awkward position. In theory it would be good to get Sinn Fein in, but only if they had genuinely given up violence. Otherwise the pressure on them should be maintained until the movement split. That would be inevitable because the Slab Murphys of this world would never give up violence.
       Taylor drew attention to the problem for the UUP if violence got worse, and the Loyalists had to be thrown out of the talks. The UUP needed the Loyalists in order to meet the rules of sufficient consensus. Otherwise they could be out-voted by Paisley and McCartney. So it was extremely important to keep the Loyalists in if possible. Trimble emphasised the same point.
       3
       Discussion moved to Irish elections and the prospect of Ahern as Taoiseach. Taylor suggested that, judging from his most recent comments, Ahern would be happy to see Sinn Fein in talks even without a ceasefire. Trimble said that he did not think Ahern would adopt this policy. He was very ignorant about Northern Ireland. But he had just had a reasonably good private meeting with Ahern – which Ahern had kept secret, unlike Trimble’s experience with Bruton. However, Ahern would be subject to the influence of Martin Mansergh and others.

17. Source 17: ‘A new beginning’ peace talks

    1. 

       A Chairde,

       Ba mhaith liom a rá ar son Sinn Féin, go bhfuil athas orainn bheith anseo. Is lá stáiriúil é seo.

       Today we enter into negotiations, the agreed outcome of which will inevitably mean far reaching change.

       A democratic settlement acceptable to all the inhabitants of this island means that we need to approach these negotiations in the knowledge that the status quo has failed to deliver a society where all citizens are treated as equals.

       A Democratic Peace Settlement:

       There is no going back to the failed policies of the past. Partition has failed. The partition of this small island and the division of our people have created a failed political entity in the North of our country. The inequality and the discrimination against nationalists and the militarisation of this part of our country must end.

       This requires a negotiated and democratic settlement of the conflict. We now, for the first time since partition, have the opportunity to negotiate that settlement.

       Britain’s policy which resulted in the undemocratic partition of our national territory, sustains division among our people, and it follows that our people cannot be united while our country remains divided.

       There Must Be Change

       We enter into these negotiations as Irish Republicans but in a spirit of openness, flexibility and friendship. We are willing to engage in real and meaningful negotiations with those who come to these negotiations with a pro-Union agenda. Our objective is, through dialogue among all the people of this island, to achieve an agreed Ireland.

       It is our view that Britain’s policy is the root cause of conflict in our country and therefore is the key matter which must be addressed in these negotiations.

       All political, economic and historical arguments prove that a United Ireland offers the best guarantee of equal citizenship and the basis for stability and an enduring peace. History has shown that an internal Six-County arrangement is not a viable option. An ‘arrangement’ is not a solution.

       Overcoming Mistrust

       We can empathise with the concerns of the unionist population about their position in an Irish national democracy. And in this process they must be addressed and resolved in a real manner. We need to reach an agreement which rejects exclusion for any reason. That is not only the basic concept of democracy but a practical necessity if we are to reach a settlement and an agreed peaceful Ireland.

       Sinn Féin is aware that there is mistrust between republicans and the unionist section of our people. We realise also that dialogue and negotiation is the best way of dealing with that mistrust. We believe that this dialogue and negotiation can be the bed-rock on which, together, we can build a peaceful settlement to the age old conflict.

       For too long we have fought with each other and talked past each other. It is time that we started talking to each other.

       Sinn Féin recognises that all sides have suffered and that great patience will be required in any process of reconciliation. We want to reach an accommodation with the unionist people of this island.

       We want to overcome the mistrust which exists between us. But building trust and reaching accommodation is a shared responsibility. The unionists must also want to build trust and reach an accommodation.

18. Source 18: Ulster Unionist Party at Peace talks

    1. 

       Ulster Unionist Party (UUP)

       Statement

       by the

       Ulster Unionist Party

       Launch of Strand 1 Talks

       7 October 1997

       The Ulster Unionist Party is participating in these talks because the best way to defend and promote the cause of the Union is not by abstention, but by fighting for our cause from within the talks process. Too often, we have seen the wishes of the greater number of people of Northern Ireland ignored and the imposition of so-called solutions, such as the Anglo-Irish agreement, forced upon them. These talks require the principle of consent to be accepted by the participants and the reality that the Union will continue for as long as that is the wish of the greater number of the people in Northern Ireland. By attending these talks the Ulster Unionist Party is determined to challenge the sincerity of Sinn Fein/IRA’s declared commitment to peace and to the democratic process. We view consent and actual disarmament as a test of Sinn Fein’s commitment to exclusively peaceful means as required by the Mitchell Principles. Terrorists must not be allowed to use, or threaten to use, their weaponry in order to extract concessions at the table of democracy. If Sinn Fein/IRA is truly committed to democratic and exclusively peaceful means of achieving political accommodation within Northern Ireland, it no longer needs to retain its murderous arsenal.

       The Ulster Unionist Party and its supporters oppose a United Ireland because we are British. We actively espouse the United Kingdom and the Union that exists between the people of England, Scotland and Wales and Northern Ireland. We believe that the United Kingdom, by adding up those four parts, equals more than the sum of those four parts, and it reflects the interaction which has existed in the British Isles throughout history. The Union with Great Britain is a Union in the hearts and minds of the Unionist people. The feeling of Britishness is not a device or artifice which has been imposed on an unsuspecting people by successive British governments. Britishness is at the heart of the Unionist philosophy, the feeling of belonging; the feeling of sharing with our fellow-citizens in Great Britain in great national events; of being part of something larger than simply the six counties in the north-eastern corner of this island It is a shared psychological bond; a shared emotional bond, common bonds of history and of shared adversities, shared triumphs and shared sacrifices.

       Since 1177, when the Normans came to Ulster, eastern Ulster has been loyal to the crown of, firstly England, and then, Great Britain. But, our Britishness is more than loyalty to the Crown. It is a sense of communion with the rest of the peoples of the United Kingdom built up over centuries. Northern Ireland itself has been a part of the United Kingdom from before the time when Nelson defeated the French at Trafalgar and before Wellington defeated Napoleon at Waterloo. Our ancestors shared in the project of the Empire; sacrificed themselves for King and Country on the battlefields of Europe, whilst Republicans rose in revolt in Ireland; and stood alone with Britain during the Second World War, while our southern neighbour remained aloof from the battle to preserve European civilisation. Indeed, as Winston Churchill said,

       But for the loyalty of Northern Ireland…the light which now shines so brightly throughout the World, would have been quenched ‘

       In short, our sense of Britishness was forged in sweat and blood.

       [Footer of the paper reads:]

       3 glengall street
       Belfast 12
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       building your future within the union

19. Source 19: Gerry Adams meets Northern Ireland parties

    1. 

       P28

       Sinn Fein enters these negotiations as an Irish republican party seeking to promote the broad nationalist objective of an end to British rule in Ireland.

       It is our firm view that this Strand, which deals with north-south relations, is a critical area of negotiation because the resolution of this conflict will only be found in an all-Ireland context.

       British policy at present upholds the union. It enforces the partition of Ireland. Democratic opinion in Ireland and in Britain must seek to change this policy to one of ending the union.

       The issue of sovereignty, the claim of the British government to sovereignty in a part of Ireland, is a key matter which we will raise in the negotiations. Our objective is to achieve through dialogue among the Irish people an agreed Ireland. The political and historical evidence shows that political independence, a united Ireland, offers the best guarantee of equality and the most durable basis for peace and stability. An internal Six-County arrangement cannot work.

       Equality

       There are many issues which fuel the conflict. For example there needs to be equality of treatment in terms of employment, economic development and the Irish language and culture, as well as on the difficult issue of cultural symbols, of flags and emblems. In other words there needs to be equality in all sectors of society – in social, economic, cultural, education, justice, democratic and national rights issues.

       P29

       These issues do not require negotiation. They are issues of basic civil and human rights. The British government should act on these issues immediately by outlining a programmatic approach which delivers real change, which makes equality a reality and which builds confidence in the wider peace process. The immediate responsibility for equality rests with the British government and there should be no artificial distinctions, no arbitrary barriers placed in the way of these rights.

       But the Irish government and Irish nationalists also have a responsibility; a responsibility to ensure that the concerns and fears of the unionist population are addressed and resolved through negotiation. A process of national reconciliation must secure the political, religious and democratic rights of the northern unionist population. That is not only the democratic norm but a practical necessity if we are to advance the cause of peace in Ireland.

       Bridging the Gap of Distrust

       I welcome the contribution of Senator Mitchell and his colleagues to the negotiating process. Sinn Fein has long argued for an international dimension to the search for peace in Ireland. The international dimension is one which can play a crucial part in maintaining the momentum and dynamic through the negotiations. There is a huge gap of distrust between nationalists and unionists. It must be bridged. We need to secure an accommodation, based on equality. Building peace is a collective responsibility. In setting out the

       P30

       republican position I also want to stress our willingness to listen to other positions and to see and to uphold the dignity of all sections of our people.

       The British government also has a crucial and constructive role to play in persuading unionists to reach a democratic agreement on the issue of Irish national reunification with the rest of the people of this island and to encourage, facilitate and enable such agreement.

20. Source 20: Talks with political parties and communities in Northern Ireland

    1. 

       From the Private Secretary

       14 October 1997

       Dear Ken

       NORTHERN IRELAND: TALKS WITH THE PARTIES, 13 OCTOBER

       The Prime Minister spent well over an hour touring the party delegation offices in Castle Buildings, and meeting all the parties, together with the Independent Chairmen and the Irish delegation. I have recorded separately the meetings with the Alliance and Sinn Fein. I record below briefly all the other meetings. Dr Mowlam, Paul Murphy, Jonathan Powell, Alastair Campbell, Jonathan Stephens and I were there throughout.

       Women’s Coalition

       Monica McWilliams, Bronagh Hinds, Pearl Sager and three others were there. The Prime Minister began by recalling his previous meeting with the Coalition, and saying that he would be happy to meet them again in Downing Street. Monica McWilliams said that Dr Mowlam and Paul Murphy had done an excellent job, and transformed the situation. But she wanted to emphasise the wider aspects of the new Government’s policies to create a new democracy in Britain, for example creating a Scottish Parliament and a Welsh Assembly. The new principles of the Government should be applied to Northern Ireland too. Northern Ireland should not be run as it had been in the past. One issue was electoral systems. The list used for the Forum elections had real advantages, not just because it had put their Coalition in the talks, but because it helped pluralism and encouraged people to cross the traditional divides. She also hoped that the Government would pledge that any new Assembly would have 50 per cent women membership. She was also concerned that preparations should begin for the referendum campaign. To be successful, this would need resources and an early start, to educate people. The parties themselves could only do so much. The Government had to be fully involved.

       The Prime Minister said that he would certainly like to see more women in politics in Northern Ireland and would proselytize for it, although it would be difficult to impose. He wondered whether old party loyalties would disappear after a settlement. McWilliams said that sectarianism was not likely to disappear overnight. But she hoped the smaller parties could get together and build new centre ground.

Extension activities

Once students are familiar with the collection it would be worth discussing as a group:

• How historians use documents to develop a line of argument and formulate their own interpretations.
• Why does this collection contain documents from The National Archives, the National Archives of Ireland, and the Public Record office for Northern Ireland?

Background information

The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement (BGFA) of 10 April 1998, is the most significant attempt, since partition in Ireland, to address division in Northern Ireland.

It was the third agreement between the United Kingdom and Ireland (following the Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 and the Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985) focused on securing a solution to divisions and an end to the campaign of violence in Northern Ireland and, at times, across the two countries, particularly since 1969, although there had been occasional violent campaigns since the Fenian bombing campaign in the UK in the nineteenth century. The violence in Northern Ireland had endured for centuries involving the native Irish and descendants of British colonists who had arrived with the Plantation in the seventeenth century, thus as long in Ireland as Europeans in North America.

The Sunningdale Agreement of 1973 was negotiated between the UK and Irish governments as well as the then government in Northern Ireland and the main opposition party. It failed to secure broad support from the unionist community and collapsed the following year in 1974.

The Anglo-Irish Agreement of 1985 was between the two governments alone. It endured until the Belfast Good Friday Agreement in 1998 and secured the right of the Irish government to have an input on issues in Northern Ireland, a right underpinned by international law through the registration of the Agreement with the United Nations.

The BGFA differed in a number of important respects from the earlier agreements, not least its far-reaching nature, seeking to address all the dimensions of division.

Firstly, in terms of inclusion, it was close to comprehensive. The two governments, as well as all political parties bar one, the Democratic Unionist Party, were involved. That inclusivity meant that, for the first time, subject to strict conditions on non-violence and eventually on putting all weapons beyond use, representatives of paramilitary groups, which had been engaged in violent campaigns, were involved in the negotiations.

The second way in which the BGFA differed from earlier agreements was in external arbitration, the appointment of an experienced outsider, United States Senator George Mitchell, as the Chair of the talks. His presence, as a respected outsider with no prior engagement on Ireland, together with his wide experience as a senior member of the US Senate (Majority Leader 1989-1995), helped keep the focus on the issues.

The BGFA, as mentioned, embraced a wide agenda, dealing with issues like sovereignty, discrimination, the disbandment and disarmament of paramilitary groups, reform of justice and policing, self-government in the province, the release of prisoners. It established two institutions in Northern Ireland – the Assembly and the Executive – and three North-South institutions – North-South Ministerial Council, the North-South Inter-Parliamentary Association and the North-South Consultative Forum. Three institutions were set up to facilitate interaction between the UK and Irish governments – British–Irish Intergovernmental Conference, the British–Irish Council and the British–Irish Interparliamentary Body.

Thus, by creating this broad system of interaction, the Agreement provided institutional mechanisms for cooperation on a broad level and for dealing with divisive issues as they arise.

Importantly, the BGFA addressed the consent principle in a fundamental way.

Through two referendums on the 22 May, 1998, held simultaneously in both Ireland and Northern Ireland – thus, island-wide – it secured agreement to there being no change in the sovereign status of Northern Ireland until and unless a majority there so voted. But, equally and no less importantly, by gaining a significant majority for the Agreement in Northern Ireland (70%), implicitly it secured, for the first time since partition, the consent of a significant nationalist minority to being part of Northern Ireland. Moreover, because of the island-wide referendums, the BGFA has a huge majority mandate of support from the people of Ireland.

This project, From Conflict to Peace, aims to acquaint students at secondary school level (GCSE and A level) with the BGFA, to demonstrate the enormous benefits of the Agreement to society in Northern Ireland and to sensitise them to the fact that their generation is one of the first to go through school and live in peace, with no intrusive security industry impinging on their daily lives, and, importantly, without ever hearing the sound of a gunshot or an explosion.

Moreover, the Agreement has created the drivers which offer the prospect over time of a blurring of communal and traditional identity and a greater degree of finding common social cause across communities. Equally, the Agreement’s emphasis on parity of esteem and fair employment, as well as its reforms in law enforcement, removes the impulse to see challenges in communal, sectarian terms and shifts the focus to the same drivers as in a settled, unified community.

Obviously, there is no guarantee that the BGFA will hold and not be threatened by the actions of the minority still committed to violence. Yet, as demonstrated by this project, there is a dramatic and popular contrast in society post-BGFA and the divided society which preceded it.

The historically strong popular mandate given to the Agreement in 1998 needs bolstering, not least through projects like From Conflict to Peace which remind the generations which follow of the division which went before and of the huge benefits of an Agreement involving all the main elements of society. The current generation of young people have the opportunity to bed down the Agreement further and continue the process of helping social division to wither.

Related resources

Teaching resource

Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement 1998 Themed Collection Part 2

This resource includes all the original documents used to create our resources about the signing of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

Teaching resource

72 Hours to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement

This resource looks at two documents in depth that trace the final 72 hours leading up to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

Teaching resource

What led to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement?

This lesson for key stage 5 students investigates what was the most important factor which led to the achievement of the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

Teaching resource

The road to the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement

This lesson, aimed at key stage 3 students introduces students to two of the key moments on the road towards the Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement.

Teaching resource

The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement

This resource for key stage 4 students looks at the significance of The Belfast (Good Friday) Agreement and looks at how historians use sources.

Teaching resource

Downing Street Declaration

This resource, designed for key stage 4, looks at the significance of the Downing Street Declaration and how historians use sources.