Source 9a
The time has come when I must place on record my
conviction that an attack by the Fleet on the Dardanelles Forts,
or any attempt to rush the Straits without assistance from
the Army, is doomed to failure, and is fraught with possibilities
of disaster out of all proportion to any advantage
to be expected therefrom.
I have always insisted that the North Sea is the proper
theatre of operations of our Fleet, since there alone is it
possible for the enemy to cause us irreparable disaster. For
this reason I have looked with misgiving on the drain of
naval force to the Dardanelles, which has been carried out
so gradually, that it has been difficult for me to decide at
what point danger was occasioned in the North Sea.
In my opinion we cannot afford to expose any more ships
to the risk of loss in the Dardanelles, since the ships there,
though not consisting in the main of first line units, are
the reserve on which we depend for supremacy in the event
of any unforeseen disaster. …
Source 9b For the above reasons I cannot, under any circumstances,
be a party to any order to Admiral de Robeck to make an
attempt to pass the Dardanelles until the shores have been
occupied. I consider that naval action unsupported by the Army,
would merely lead to heavy loss of ships and invaluable men,
without any reasonable prospect of success in any way
proportionate to the losses, or the possible consequences of those
losses. I wish it to be clearly understood that I dissociate
myself from any such project.
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