"Edwards" AIR 2/5686 (3)

kind with slight loss, but instructions to Group were that the raid should be carried out in full daylight without regard to cloud conditions in order to test out the strength of the enemy air defence system and to try and strike a sudden hard blow.

It was known that the enemy night fighter defence was strong in the neighbourhood and in the attempt to prevent the night fighters from taking part in action against the daylight raid, Bremen was subjected to a heavy scale of night bombing attack on the night previous to the raid with the object of tiring out the night fighter pilots and getting the night fighter aircraft on the ground re-fuelling. This was the situation which faced the leader of the Bremen raid.

On 28th June a composite formation of eighteen bombers from 107 Squadron and 105 Squadron took off to attempt this raid. Wing Commander Edwards was following 107 Squadron. This raid was abandoned in the Heligoland Bight close to the enemy coast for various reasons and Wing Commander Edwards received the signal to turn away and return to base which he did.

I then placed wing Commander Edwards in command of the second attempt. It will be noted that in order to carry out the direct if it was necessary to strike a hard sudden blow in full daylight and therefore unless the formation could reach Bremen as a cohesive striking force desultory and ineffective results could only ensue.

I spoke to Wing Commander Edwards before he took off and his attitude was one of cold courage and clear cut determination to carry out his duty. I also placed at his disposal a striking force to act as a diversion – the object of this attack was to carry out a low precise bomb attack on some important coastal town while Wing Commander Edwards' formation was returning to the Coast, thus to split the fighter defences and in the attempt to ensure that a force capable of annihilating the main force would not be concentrated against it. Wing Commander Edwards after considering the situation decided that this attack should take place on Norderney.

On the early morning of 30th June subsequent to a heavy night attack on Bremen, Wing Commander Edwards took off with his formation. Thick unpredicted fog, however, intervened in the Bight, as a result of which he lost his formation and very rightly abandoned task.

I saw him when he landed at Swanton Morley. He resisted my suggestion that another Squadron should be chosen to lead this attack His attitude after this disappointing incident remained firm – he was determined to lead the raid and lead it well. I asked him his re-actions regarding the casualties he was likely to suffer and he said that he thought that by flying in on the surface of the sea to Cuxhaven, turning due South to a leg 55 miles to Bremen at tree height and carrying out his attack over the city at chimney height, he would reach the objective with least opposition from fighters.

He felt that heavy casualties would be inflicted when he turned away from the objective before he reached the sea. Nevertheless his determination to lead the raid and for his squadron to have the honour of taking part in it was quite unshakeable, although it will have been noted that he and his crews of 105 Squadron had been standing by for a period of 72 hours to carry out