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"Edwards" AIR 2/5686 (2)
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On this occasion he pressed home his attack with great determination from a low level in the face of fierce A.A. fire. By this time it was apparent that he was an outstanding and determined leader which resulted in his being selected to command No. 105 Squadron and promoted after only three months of operational flying to acting Wing Commander. He was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross for his part in an attack which he led his Squadron against an enemy convoy off the Hague on 15th June. On this occasion he pressed home his attack from mast height and scored two direct hits on a 4,000 ton ship which was seriously damaged if not sunk. Whilst commanding a Squadron he has continued to show those outstanding qualities of which he showed early promise when he joined his first operational Squadron in February of this year. To implement the policy of pressing home the attack on Germany by daylight bombing raids in order to help Russia and force reinforcements to be drawn from the Russian or Middle Eastern theatre to provide protection for the German Homeland, instructions were received that a daylight bombing raid should be carried out against Bremen. Bremen is one of the German cities most heavily defended against air attack on account of its great industrial importance and its population of some half a million people. It lies some 325 miles from home bases in East Anglia and as the crow flies the penetration into occupied territory and Germany is some 170 miles. It lies behind the heavily defended area of Holland and the Frisian Islands where by reason of the numerous fighter bases and flak defences one would have said that the day bombing of Bremen on this route would have been impossible. The alternative route lies overseas to the North and turning South in the heavily defended areas of the Heliggoland Bight over land from the vicinity of Cuxhaven to Bremen. The enemy defences in this area are also at great strength, though the number of fighters deployed in this area was not accurately known. Such fighter bases as Sylt, Wangerooge, Langeoog, Jever and many others must be passed while the intelligence screen in the terms of reporting vessels and observer corps was known to be formidable. To bomb Bremen in daylight on this routine was a formidable task to give any bomber leader since on the face of it the likelihood was that the approach of the formation would be reported before it crossed the Coast. Bremen lying at such a distance inland – some 55 miles from Cuxhaven – gave the defences every advantage in plotting the track of the incoming bombers and concentrating from fighter aerodromes over a wide area a force of fighters sufficient to annihilate the bomber formation. Indeed had it been possible to get the bomber formation to the objective with slight loss the door on the homeward journey was to all intents and purposes closed since the whereabouts of our bombers would be known from moments to moment after the attack and in every direction from Bremen towards this Country the German highly organised air defence system was stretched out in great strength and therefore able to meet and dispose of an unescorted daylight bomber raid. Furthermore it would of course have been possible, using the cover of clouds, to have carried out a raid of this |
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