Four Power Talks
Four Power Talks
*Records of private talks will be circulated in summer boxes*
Far the more dangerous. Private talk with E. : formed impn. U.S. wd. not intervene in Q & M. E. has "bear by tail" : can't get Ch. to move out. R & R. weren't v. effective emissaries. Suggd. mght be wise to hold islands only as outposts - to evade loss of prestige if over-run. In second talk : E. admitted his posn. in U.S. is due to his success in gaining peace in Korea & avoidg war over Dien Bien Phu. He will continue in such efforts.
D. on other hand said, if islands were attacked & didn't at once fall, U.S. wd. have to intervene because D. B. Phu atmosphere. And interventn. wd. be with atomic weapons. A most dangerous policy. D. showed no enthusiasm for 'outpost' soln.
E. will do his utmost. But he is worried.
My view is tht. Chiang is black-mailing U.S.
V. diff. to assess. My belief : R. want relaxn. of tension, not merely to gain time. Strongest motive = fear of G. revival. That is instinct of R. people. Even dictatorship must take a/c of that. B.'s remark tht. "I can't agree here to E. Germany joining with W. in NATO: my people cdn't understand that : Stalin wd. never have accepted it". B., however seems to realise tht. somethg. will have to be done to re-insure v. risk wh. a united G. wd. represent in 10 yrs' time. Significant that they never spoke of threat by U.S.
Talk on last evening. Went on to garden. Rush of photographers. No security screen at all. Most unlike Stalin regime.
K. asked for increased contacts. E.g. exchange of mily. missions. We wd. show you what you want to see. "Send any soldier you like" etc.,
B.'s suggn. of my visiting Moscow. I declined. Then, under his pressure, I said : why don't you come here". He replied : I wd. like to come. I have invited him : prob. next spring.
A v. good thing.
Details now arranged. Will announce in H/C. Wedy.
Peace is secure. R. have decided, clearly, no war while nuclear is available. Wd. they feel the same if n. weapons prohibited? Complicates v. much our conduct of discns. on disarmament.
How do we exercise influence in developmt. of intern-affairs, if war is excluded?
Far less R. talk of U.S. bases than we had expected. It is G., not U.S., that they fear. Plus, prs., where will R. be when China is as strong as G.
Shan't get far on G. unificn. in Oct. But steady pressure may lead to agreemt. on basis of Security Pack.
R. are more relaxed a) because atomic war b) because Stalin is dead. Fear of wholesale purges has bn lifted. c) Tho' Malenkov is out, they wd like to adopt his policy on consumer goods vice investmt. & re-armament.
Taken from C.M. 26(55) - Meeting held on 26 July 1955.