Clear tht. only country wh. cd. help China = U.S. And looks as tho' U.S. have now written them off.
Little chance of Chang Kai surviving.
Will successor Govt. be Chinese Comm. or R. dominated? A fair chance that, outside Manchuko, they will be Chinese. Mustn't therefore hang on so long to old tht. we lose chance of influencing the new. Our interests are v. large.
Effect on contiguous and neighbouring countries.
Diffy. of getting united front -
a) India/Pakistan troubles leave E. Parkistan open to Comm. influences from Burma. Can't get them into conference on this ques.
b) Cdn't get I./Pakistan to meet in conference with France because of Indo-China. Fr. Parties, due to diffies. in France, are unable to face Indo-China problem. Think of sending Dening to Paris to see if we can get Fr. to come out with bold approach to Indo. China problem.
All I can do is to get Macdonald to see Powers in S.E.A. one at a time and urge measures of defence v. Comm. Get C.R.O. to approach I./Pak.
Pessimistic about R. influence in Asia.
In Asia R. has moved into tepid war.
Uncertainties of Fr., U.S. policy etc. mean tht. events move on to point at wh. nothg. can be done.
V. serious if this is beginning of R. dominn. of F/East and S.E.A.
Not only because of defence, but because of trade.
Hong Kong and Shanghai - may become another "Berlin".
Shd. we not have organn. to ensure we aren't out-manoeuvred by R. in F/East? As we have O.E.E.C. etc. for Europe.
A. and N.Z. vitally concerned.
Cd. we not get organn. with U.S., France, Holland, A. and N.Z. to review situation and hammer out a policy?
Trouble has bn. with narrow minded Colonial outlook of Dutch.
French much the same over Indo-China.
Diff. therefore to get them to march with A. and N.Z. - still more I./Pak.
Diff. constitutional issue raised now by India. Warning.
On genl. line of this memo. I agree - no alternative.
U.S. cut us out in F/East. Now are dropping it. Their mess.
No doubt tht. sitn. in Malaya and H. Kong will be directly affected.
Friendly relations with victorious Comms. may help us - wish I cd. be sure. Various indications of tie-up with Russia.
Chinese popn. in Malaya and H. Kong will become more diff.
Recommn. (ii). We have recent apprecn. by C's-in-C. F/East: now under consn. by C.O.S. M'while, what to do over Shanghai.
Telegram fr. Naval C-in-C. : saying strong feeling aroused by announcement (F.O.) tht. we wd. not send any troops. His plans do provide for mil. support.
2 cruisers in China seas. 2 destroyers. 4 frigates.
1 Austr. cruiser.
2 battns. and F.A. regimt. + 5 flying boats in H. Kong. Considering fighter squadron or less fr. Philippines. Gurkha battn. sailing from Singapore.
For defence of B. lives and property only.
Discontent of Ch. peasant. But unlikely to adopt new faith.
Wd. accept protn. of anyone against robbery.
At Comm. mtg. Fraser was doubtful about Fr. or Dutch support. But wanted Comm. countries and U.S. to consult. And get U.S. to settle Japan. Much easier then to get common front v. Comm.
Press therefore for early action on Recommn. (i) confined to Comm. countries and U.S.A.
Don't press U.S. too far lest they w'draw from Europe.
Gt. opportunity missed when I got Byrnes to agree to U.S. and Comm. countries on F/East under cover of talk about Pacific Islands.
But Evatt stabbed me in the back.
Kuomintang have driven all Third Force elements out.
Liberals will therefore collaborate with Comm.
Will prob. not be offensive to for. industrial interests in early stages.
Won't be economically dominated by R.
Too big an area and too diff. a psychology for R. to intervene directly.
Agree therefore we must keep contact with these Comms. and prevent their getting close to Russia.
Immedte. situation. a) Encouraging B. interests to stay. Must be careful how we do that. Claims to compensn. Heavy ones already from Shanghai. Shd. prefer concln. : we shd. not discourage them fr. staying.
b) On Recommn. (i) I wd. not bring France and Netherlands in at present. (E.B. I agree : wd. see them separately - and ? later.)
Refugees to Hong Kong.
Can't stop them coming in by sea.
If any I.R. Orgn. is to help, we shd. prefer they shd. do it outside H. Kong.
Many Comms. in H. Kong. Wd. be trouble with them.
We mustn't appear by action in H. Kong to be associatg. ourselves with Kuomintang elements.
Risk of Comm. infiltration thro' Siam to Malaya.
Need to get strong Govt. in Malaya and H. Kong.
May be some fortificn. will be necessary.
Hope no time will be lost.
Govts. cdn't be stronger. C.O.S. have every confidence in Govrs.
Early consultn. with U.S. and Comm. countries re protn. of strategic interests.
But won't do if U.S. try to go on supportg. Kuomintang. Mustn't encourage them to that sort of line.
Don't want Kuomintang to take refuge in Formosa under U.S. protn.
a Liberal Govt. there wd. be another matter.
What we want consult U.S. about is our concerted attitude twds. a Comm. Govt. in China when it emerges.
Agree. Will instruct Franks to approach them on this.
Local co-ordinator on Killearn model? Won't it be wise to do that now - to co-ordinate prepns. of Govts.
Macdonald's organn. in Singapore is effective enough.
May have to send someone out to handle refugee problem. My diffy. is that I can't find good men. Might get Tucker out of I.R.O. or Jackson, now available from U.N. Will speak to E.E.B.
Close consultn. with Comm. countries.
Start with U.S.
Separate but simultaneous?
Propose approach U.S. first.
Recommn. i) U.S. first. }
ii) C.O., A.V.A and F.O. to consult } Agreed.
Taken from C.M. 80(48) - Meeting held on 13 December 1948.