1. During the first two phases of the operations, outlined
in para 4 (1) and 4 (2) of the above orders, there may arrive a
moment when the enemy's resistance may break down, in which case our
advance will be pressed eastwards far enough to enable our cavalry
to push through into open country beyond the enemy's prepared
line of defence. Our object will then be to turn northwards, taking
the enemy's lines in flank and reverse, the bulk of the cavalry
co-operating on the outer flank of this operation while suitable
detachments will be detailed to cover the movement from any offensive
of the enemy from the east. For the latter purpose the line LES
DOEUFS – BAPAUME – high ground east of MORY – high ground west of
GROISILLES – MONCHY – le – PREUX is of tactical importance. The front
gained between the rivers SOMME and ANCRE will meanwhile be maintained
by part of the forces available.
2. During which phase of the operations the enemy's resistance
is likely to break down it is impossible to foretell, but the Army
Commander wishes to be prepared for the most favourable situation to
ourselves, while at the same time running no risk of a less favourable
situation finding us unprepared.
If the enemy's resistance breaks down during the first
phase of the operations it is necessary to have the cavalry close at
hand to exploit our success and that all other troops should make
way for their advance. On the other hand, if the enemy's resistance
is not at once broken and hard fighting ensues on the Green line,
then it is essential that nothing should interfere with the rapid
advance of our artillery and reserves in preparation for attacking
the Brown line and maintaining our position on the Green line.
The cavalry must in this case be kept back and clear of all routes
to be used by artillery and infantry in their advance.