



New Document Releases

Security Service Records Release 25-26 November 2002

Introduction

This press pack offers a brief overview and description of the most interesting and newsworthy files within the latest release of Security Service records. This, the ninth and largest Security Service (MI5) release*, contains 311 files, bringing the total number of MI5 records in the public domain to 1,443. (* Numbering of the previous press pack was incorrect; this is the ninth release)

As with previous releases the bulk of records are **personal files** relating to individuals (**KV 2**), with a small number of **subject files (KV 3)** and **policy files (KV 4)**.

The majority of files are from 1939-45 but there are a considerable number from the inter-war period, dealing with a range of groups including German espionage, right-wing extremists (such as British Union of Fascists or BUF), Russian Communists and the Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB), and Communist intelligence cover organizations such as ARCOS, the Federated Press of America and ROSTA, or TASS, the Russian Telegraph Service.

For the first time, personal files are being released which cross into the early Cold War period. For example, the extensive files series on Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the CPGB (KV 2/1034-1047), Sir Oswald Mosley, leader of the BUF (KV 2/884-897) and Ezra Pound, the American author and fascist sympathiser (KV 2 875-876) span from the 1920s through to the 1950s.

The personal files are listed under the following categories:

- Right-Wing Extremists (KV 2/875-908)
- German Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/909-951)
- German Intelligence Officers (KV 2/951-978, 1084-1086)
- Soviet Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/979-1024)
- Communist and Suspected Communists, including Russian and Communist Sympathisers (KV 2/1025-1065)
- Double Agents (KV 2/1066-1083)

- Pacifists (KV 2/1087-1093)
- Soviet Intelligence Officers (KV 2/1102-1106)
- Italian Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/1107-1108)
- SOE (Special Operations Executive) Agents (KV 2/1131-1132)

There are also a number of 'untitled' personal files, that is individuals that do not fit squarely into the above categories (KV 2/1094-1101, 1109-1130).

The few subject files (KV 3/36-39) contain papers on Hitler's personal security organization the Reichssicherheitsdienst (KV 3/36), Anarchist activity surrounding and including the Sidney Street Siege (KV 3/39) and assistance to Nazi fugitives, in particular the activities of Arnold Leese (KV 3/37-38). The policy files deal with a wide range of administrative matters, including organization, function and funding (KV 4/153-156), notes prepared to educate those outside the service as to its role (KV 4/157-158), post war organization of B Division (Espionage) (KV 4/162), and the functions of a very small press section (KV 4/177).

An appendix of visual material and other artefacts can be found at the back of this pack. (Please note that this is not comprehensive.)

If you wish to consult other MI5 files already in the public domain, please use the PRO reading rooms in the normal manner.

A few files have been heavily weeded whilst others have been reconstituted from microfilm of the original document, and therefore are in photocopy form. In both cases this is indicated in the press pack.

Most personal files include a minute sheet attached to the inside cover, providing a useful index to the file.

Highlights of the release include:

- Sir Oswald Mosley and Lady Mosley (KV 2/884-897)
- St John Philby, father of the Soviet spy Kim Philby (KV 2/1118-1119)
- **Double Cross agents MUTT & JEFF, BALLOON & FREAK** (KV 2/1066-1083)
- Unity Mitford (KV 2/882)
- Countess Budberg, Mistress of Bruce Lockhart, Maxim Gorky and H.G. Wells – suspected as a Soviet agent (KV 2/979-981)
- Suspected WW2 resistance traitors Mathilde Carre (KV 2/926-936) and Henri Dericourt (KV 2/1131-1132)
- Clare Sheridan, cousin of Winston Churchill and sculptor of Lenin (KV 2/1033)
- **Ezra Pound, American author and poet** (KV 2/875-876)
- Capt Robert Canning, great grandson of Lord Byron, close associate of Mosley (KV 2/877)
- Sidney Street Siege (KV 3/39 & KV 2/1025-1026)

- Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of Communist Party of Great Britain (CPGB) (KV 2/1034-1047)

Untitled Personal Files

St John Bridger Philby (KV 2/1118-1119)

St John Philby was the father of the infamous Soviet mole in MI6, Harold 'Kim' Philby. St John was a civil servant in India and later he became an advisor to the Colonial Secretary on Middle Eastern policy. Brash and forthright in his views, St John became increasingly critical of British policy in the Middle East. After leaving the Civil Service he became an explorer and a Muslim. He continued to be an embarrassment to the British government, so much so that in 1940 he was interned, first under Indian Defence Regulations and then in Britain under section 18B. He was initially jailed in Liverpool and later moved to a camp in Ascot.

KV 2/1118 includes a first report on Philby dated 1926 – in which he is reported to have attacked government policy on Turkey. This is followed by a report on Philby's company 'Sharquieh', a group of explorers and merchants in the Near and Middle East, whose activities were causing a great deal of trouble for the Department of Overseas Trade. The company was claiming the privileges of a British company, although it was in fact registered and controlled from Vienna. The file includes correspondence from August 1929 with William Norman Ewer (see KV 2/1016-1017), a Soviet intelligence agent based in London and editor of the Daily Herald.

Page 9a states that Philby, whilst advising the Colonial Secretary, Lord Passfield, and Mr Dalton [Hugh Dalton?], on matters connected with the Near East, is in the habit of sending to Ewer copies of all his letters. An Evening Standard article on Philby's travels in the Arabian desert by author William Makin, 11 March 1932, includes a photograph.

Page 18a notes that Philby believes that Soviet intrigue in Arabia was of greater significance than Italians in Yemen.

Pages 22-39 are political intelligence summaries relating to Philby's travel and subsequent embarrassment caused to HMG (due to his armed Saudi party). Page 39 notes that the British People's Party (aligned to the fascists) named him in the Hythe by-election.

Pages 54a include three personal letters to his wife, daughter and mother, the last of which mentions 'Kim'.

Page 51 is a letter from Valentine Vivian of MI6 to Guy Liddell of MI5 regarding St. John's character - 'a bullet headed, self opinionated...if his views have been unpalatable, that does not prove that he was not both accurate and far seeing...and problem that his son (Kim) is working for MI6's D section and therefore it may be more difficult to take repressive action against the father'.

Page 61a is a note by Wilson Young (Foreign Office) which states that 'In Mr Philby's world there is only Mr Philby. Loyalty and disloyalty are only words to him'.

Page 57a is Philby's Detention order signed by Home Secretary, John Anderson. At the front of the file is a copy of 'From the Four corners: Mecca and the Arabs', a paper given by Philby on 29 November 1937.

Pages 15-16 are missing but from the minute sheet it seems as if they relate to H A R (Kim) Philby and have been placed on his file (not yet released). A note by Vernon Kell next to this entry on the minute sheet (18/8/32) says that 'Capt Liddell knows [Kim] Philby well and can supply information'.

KV 2/1119 deals mainly with Philby's detention. Page 67 is a letter from Valentine Vivian to Guy Liddell regarding his concerned over representation from Kim about his father's detention. There are various letters from his wife, Dora, and British officials stating the case for Philby's release.

Correspondence between Vivian and Liddell reveals that after his release Philby was in touch with Lord Semphill, a fascist sympathizer. Finally there are papers dealing with Philby's exit permit to Arabia.

Double Cross Agents

Background to the Double Cross System

The Double Cross System was one of the greatest intelligence coups of the Second World War. J C Masterman, Chairman of the Double Cross Committee, concluded that 'we [MI5] actively ran and controlled the German espionage system in this country [Britain]'. The Double Cross Committee was known as the Twenty Committee because the Roman numerals, XX, formed a double cross.

Due to a combination of counter-espionage work prior to the War and signals intelligence during it, MI5 were in a position to monitor and pick up German agents as they were 'dropped' into Britain. These agents were then 'turned' and began working for the British authorities. The preferred communication was via wireless telegraphy (W/T), although secret ink, microphotography and, in some cases, direct contact with the enemy was also employed.

Initially the Double Cross System was used for counter-espionage purposes, but its comprehensive success provided an excellent conduit for strategic deception, culminating in the D-Day deception operation, known as FORTITUDE. This plan misled the Germans into believing that the Pas de Calais was the real landing area of the Allied invasion, rather than Normandy. Further successes were achieved in U-boat and V-weapon deception. A good summary of the most significant double cross cases may be found in JC Masterman's book, *The Double Cross System*, available from the Press Office.

MUTT & JEFF

In early April 1941 two Norwegians, John Moe (MUTT) and Tor Glad (JEFF) arrived at an Aberdeenshire beach, having travelled via seaplane and then rubber dinghy. They immediately gave themselves up to the local police as German spies. On being informed, MI5 soon 'turned' them, coining their comical codenames, MUTT & JEFF, cockney rhyming slang for deaf, which originates from a late 19th century American saying describing two bungling men. H C ('Bud') Fisher's 'Mutt and Jeff' was also the first regular daily cartoon strip, appearing in the San Francisco Chronicle in 1907.

Primarily trained as sabotage agents, MUTT & JEFF's mission was to start fires in food dumps and factories, sever power lines and create panic and disruption wherever possible. They were also charged with a secondary intelligence role, reporting via wireless transmitter, the location of airfields, troop movements and the state of civilian morale. MI5 of course used MUTT & JEFF's radio sets to play back false information, leading the Germans to believe that Britain intended to invade Norway.

To keep up the pretence MUTT & JEFF notionally carried out acts of sabotage in the UK. One such attack on a power station in Bury St Edmunds used a real explosion and gained media attention. So convinced were the Abwehr that they conducted four separate parachute drops to re-supply them with equipment, radios and cash. However, by the end of 1943 MI5 believed that MUTT & JEFF had been compromised and with dwindling interest from their Abwehr 'controllers' the case was allowed to fizzle out.

KV 2/1067 (MUTT) – This file includes photographs of MUTT & JEFF as well as their Norwegian Abwehr (German Secret Service) controller, Karl Andersen. There is also a unique photograph of MUTT being trained in Morse and wireless telegraphy by his Abwehr tutor Pauloski. The file includes Moe's British birth certificate. Page 594a is a case summary, p. 80k is a report of their arrest by Banffshire Constabulary. Page 224a is a handwritten account of their supposed cover story. Page 357 is an account of operation PORRIDGE, a German airdrop of wireless equipment and money. Similar subsequent operations (HAGGIS & OATMEAL) are also referred to. There are also accounts of fake sabotage and deception operations, GUY FAWKES (fake sabotage on food dump in Wealdstone), OMNIBUS (invasion of Norway) and PYRAMID. There is a copy of a questionnaire developed for the interrogation of further sabotage agents as well as a signed declaration under the Official Secrets Act.

KV 2/1068 (JEFF) – Unfortunately this file is heavily weeded and much material, such as radio traffic no longer survives. Some of the contents are copies of papers found in KV 2/1067. A summary interrogation report by MI5's chief interrogator, Capt 'Tin Eye' Stephens, is found on p.6a. Page 254a is a report by T A R Robertson (MI5's chief architect of the Double Cross System) which mentions concerns over JEFF's ultimate allegiance. MI5 became extremely concerned with JEFF's case, due to a security breach but also because of his knowledge of MI5's strategic deception plans, and he was ultimately sent to Camp WX on the Isle of Man. Page 374a is a handwritten

letter from Glad reprimanding MI5 for his treatment in regard to leakage of information. The file includes photographs of Glad, a forged certificate of registration, his Norwegian passport, a forged national registration card and a detention order signed by Herbert Morrison, Home Secretary and Minister of Home Security. Although detained, his radio continued to be used to send back false information. In 1945 JEFF was repatriated, the Norwegian authorities arrested him over his dealings with the German secret service but the charges were subsequently dropped.

MUTT & JEFF

KV 2/1067 (MUTT); KV 2/1068 (JEFF)

Photograph of Helge Moe and Tor Glad, who trained as Nazi sabotage agents and then became MI5 double agents, MUTT & JEFF.



So convinced were the Nazis by MUTT & JEFF's deception that they continued to supply them with cash and material. This is a detailed account of one such drop.

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492^a

MUTT & JEFF - OPERATION CATHERAL

The party was in Scotland between 1st January, 1944 and 7th January 1944 with the object of receiving delivery of a wireless set and sabotage material as well as money which had been promised by the Germans to their agents MUTT & JEFF, and which was to be dropped by parachute. Mr. Faulton and MUTT proceeded to Scotland on the night of the 31st December, and I followed on the night of the 1st January. The dropping operation had been tentatively fixed for the 2nd, 3rd or 4th of January, this being the period when MUTT & JEFF were supposed to have their Christmas and New Year extra leave days.

On the 30th December a message was received stating that delivery would take place on the night of the 2nd between 2300 and 2400 hours MEZ, and this was agreed to by JEFF. On the 2nd January no radio communication was possible, but from the 3rd to the 6th inclusive it took place daily but communication was irregular and in general was only at all satisfactory during the afternoons. Communication invariably broke down after dark, which made the question of last-minute confirmation of the dropping operation very difficult. For instance, it was only on two nights, the 4th and the 6th, that any sort of confirmation was possible at all.

To cover the possibility that the Germans might drop either a bomb or a booby trap, certain precautionary measures were taken. For instance, the various people who went out to the field to await the plane scattered, and MUTT himself, who was flashing the torch, had instructions to take cover as soon as the plane had passed over. These arrangements were made by Mr. Faulton with Inspector Hunter of the Aberdeen County Police prior to my arrival in Aberdeen.

On the 2nd January I called on the Chief Constable of the City and County Police and, by arrangement with the latter, was driven out by Inspector Hunter to Longside aerodrome, Peterhead, where I interviewed Wing Commander Ratten, D.F.C., the Station Commander. He explained to me that, after discussion with Group, he had arranged for two Beaufighters to patrol during the expected period of dropping; one off the coast north of Fraserburgh (this would patrol on a line W.N.W. to E.S.E. several miles off the point); the other off the coast near Aberdeen (this would patrol on a line W.S.W. to E.N.E.). They would patrol at 2/3,000 feet, and would thus be too low to be picked up by the enemy radio location, but high enough and far enough away not to be heard by MUTT or to get mixed up with the operation. They would maintain wireless silence until called from the ground. They would take off half an hour before the beginning of the period given, and would continue until the enemy plane had arrived or until the period was ended. Ratten thought that the risks of the enemy getting to know of these precautions was very small as two night fighters did practice interceptions several nights a week at various times of the night, and he thought that the enemy would assume, when the plane failed to return, that they had been unlucky enough to run into a plane either practising or on patrol. If the plane was picked up by the radio location and followed he would wait until it was seen to be returning and then order the two Beaufighters to dive and intercept it at a point several miles off the mouth of the Ythan. If the radio location did not pick it up, he would wait until he could act on Observables Corps reports. He calculated that by the time these reports got through to him the aircraft would have completed its mission, and he would therefore forthwith order the Beaufighters to dive to an agreed spot off the coast, and hope that when they got there they would be able to pick up the enemy aircraft with their A.L. With regard to the security within his own unit, Ratten said that he had told the minimum number of officers, including the pilots, and had impressed on them that the plane would be undertaking a mission in respect of which it was essential that the greatest security be maintained. I kept in touch with Wing Commander Ratten from that time onwards, and also with Colonel Perfect and with Head Office. Colonel Perfect was in contact with Group Headquarters and, except on one occasion, I had no conversation or dealings with them.

On the 2nd January, as we had made no radio communication, we decided that we should attend at the dropping place, and I notified Wing Commander Ratten and the others mentioned above accordingly. The following party went out on that and all subsequent nights. Mr. McConnach, Chief Constable City Police, Inspector Hunter, County Police, Mr. Ingram, the City Police wireless expert who has been giving assistance in regard to the MUTT & JEFF case throughout, Mr. Faulton, MUTT and myself. We travelled in two cars, one belonging to Inspector Hunter, and the other belonging to the Chief Constable. The latter is a very distinctive car and very highly polished, but he insisted on taking it. He invited himself, and it was not easy to discourage him. Just before we left on the 2nd January the air-raid sirens were sounded in Aberdeen, but this turned out to be a false alarm, due presumably to the fact that a special watch had been ordered for that night and the operators were a bit on edge; it was in fact a barrage balloon being towed by a ship. Unfortunately, however, Superintendent Ramsay of the County Police, who does not get on very well with the City Police, arrived because of the air raid and saw that the Chief Constable of the City had decided to go out too. He was obviously not very pleased about this, but I explained to him on the following morning that we had not asked the Chief Constable to be present, but he was very anxious to come, but it appeared that Ramsay's annoyance was only momentary and he did not refer to the matter again or show any signs of really minding about it. I also made the same explanation to the Chief Constable of the County Police, Mr. Gauld.

Nothing happened on the night of the 2nd January. We stayed out until after one in the morning and then returned. I communicated with Wing Commander Ratten, who reported also that there had been no signs of enemy planes. The weather was pretty good, visibility very good, but there was a strong westerly wind blowing.

On January 3rd a message was received sent blind in the morning stating that owing to bad weather delivery would take place 24 hours later, but that we should listen from 1600 to 1800 hours for a final decision. Unfortunately radio conditions prevented the reception of any message during that period, and once again we had to go out on chance. Weather conditions had deteriorated a good deal and there were snow showers, which increased in length and density as the night progressed. The wind was stronger than on the previous night. We did not stay out so long on this occasion. On our return I communicated with Wing Commander Ratten, who informed me that he had a very nasty time with his planes in the air as conditions had deteriorated very rapidly during the night and he had had difficulty in getting one of them in.

On the 4th January a message was received stating that weather conditions on the 3rd made the dropping impossible, and that they had fixed provisionally to come on the 4th only two hours later. We were instructed to listen as on the previous day. This message was so drafted that it had apparently been ready the night before, but there was, of course, no proof of this as they were not heard sending it blind. We replied in clear telling them that they must send on various frequencies, and at 1514 hours a message was received saying that delivery would take place between 1000 and 2000 hours MEZ. This seemed to be a definite decision, and in addition the weather had improved greatly. Therefore, after notifying the necessary parties, we went out again and waited for the plane. Nothing, however, came and we returned about 3 o'clock. On return to the Police Station I received a message to ring up Wing Commander Ratten, who informed me that an enemy plane had approached the coast off Fraserburgh at 1230 hours (i.e. half an hour before our dropping was due). He gave me certain information, and I saw him on the following day at Ellon and he gave me in all the following information. When the plane was about four miles away it did one circle and then dived down to tree-top level and proceeded back to Norway at maximum speed. Later at 0140 hours

our 'Y' Service intercepted a plane belonging to the J.U.88. Reconnaissance Squadron at Stavanger, notifying that it was going to land there. This seemed to prove, in his opinion, that the plane which had come over was from that squadron, which it was considered was the unit which would carry out the operation. The only thing which appeared to be inexplicable was the fact that the plane had arrived off the coast half an hour before the beginning of the period fixed. Ratten thought that it was then about five minutes flying time from the dropping place. He also thought it possible that they had miscalculated the wind because up to that time there had been a fairly strong westerly wind which had suddenly dropped to nothing, but this miscalculation would not account for more than 10 minutes at the most. I suggested that perhaps if the pilot had been nervous, he would have wished to complete the job as quickly as possible, and would have flown over at a higher speed than he should have done. Ratten agreed with this and thought it quite possible. It therefore appeared, putting all these factors together, that an explanation might be possible of the earliness of the plane's arrival, but it still remained very peculiar. With regard to the reason for the plane turning back, Ratten informed me that as that was the first good night for quite a long time all the training aerodromes from Fraserburgh to Inverness had night flying practice going on. There were dozens of machines up from Fraserburgh alone, and the aerodrome was fully lit up. He had discussed with the Commander the advisability of laying off night training, but the latter was of the opinion that the Germans would think it much more extraordinary if there was no night flying by training aircraft in that area than if there was normal activity. I am bound to say that I agree with this view. Ratten said that it was impossible that the enemy aircraft had spotted his machines taking off because they only had a few lights on the aerodrome, and the two Beaufighters were not at that time airborne. It appeared in his view certain that the aircraft had spotted the lights at Fraserburgh (when he turned he was exactly in the position where he would have spotted them), and lost his nerve. Ratten said that this was lucky for the pilot because he had come in at a fairly good height and had been picked up by our radio location and followed the whole way. If he should come in at this height again an interception would certainly be possible. In this particular case the interception would also have been possible only the Beaufighters had been late in taking off. Ratten said this had got him out of an extremely difficult position, i.e. whether or not to intercept and shoot down the plane when it turned for home. As it was he had been able to give all the pilots and crews concerned a good ticking off for not having got into the air at the time they were ordered to do so, and in addition no harm had resulted.


On the 5th January the Germans reported that the attempt was abandoned on the previous night on account of air activity. This definitely fits in with the information we had from the R.A.F. They announced their intention of trying to repeat delivery on the 5th January at the same time, but once again wireless communication broke down late in the afternoon, and we never got the last-minute confirmation. The party, however, went out on the night of the 5th, but nothing happened and the R.A.F. also gave an entirely negative report.

On the 6th January a message was received which may or may not have been sent on the previous evening (if it was not sent it was drafted to look as if it had been), saying that the previous night was impossible on account of the weather, that they were coming on the 6th and instructing us to keep listening. We were then in a difficult position because we had told the Germans that MUTT & JEFF's leave ended on the 4th. If we were to hang on indefinitely they might have any suspicions confirmed. On the 5th January we had informed them shortly that leave ought to have ended on that day, but JEFF would stay to receive, and on the 6th he announced that, whether successful or not, he must leave Aberdeen on the following day. On the 6th we laid on a procedure whereby the Germans should send their last-minute confirmation blind on four different frequencies at every quarter of an hour. This they carried out and from 1600 to 2000 hours they sent every quarter of an hour a message stating that if the weather permitted they would try to come at 0300 hours on the 7th. The

party assembled once more, but again nothing happened and it was then decided that it was too risky to go on making radio contact. A watch was kept throughout the 7th, but no messages were intercepted and no explanation has yet been given of the failure to come on that night. Both the nights of the 6th and the 7th appeared suitable so far as local conditions were concerned. Ratten confirmed that his planes had no difficulty in doing their patrol, but the wind had risen on both the 5th and the 6th again, and the conditions were definitely not as good as they had been on the 4th. Further, conditions were slightly worse on the 6th than they had been on the 5th, so that if the explanation given by the Germans of their failure to come on the 5th is a true one, it is probable that the weather prevented them again from coming on the 6th.

On the 7th January I spoke to Ratten on the telephone and informed him that we were abandoning the attempt, and would try again as soon as possible. I thanked him very much for his co-operation. He said that he was very sorry nothing had come of the attempt, but he did not seem to be at all fed up with being put to so much trouble, which is very satisfactory because every single one of his nights had been completely taken up with this matter (he lives several miles from the aerodrome). I spoke also to Colonel Perfect on the telephone, who informed me that Squadron Leader Colquhoun at Inverness had been on the telephone to him and had complained about the whole affair, saying that the various officers at Group, who had to sit up all the night waiting for the plane, were getting fed up and wanted to know how much longer this would go on for. Perfect had retorted that he did not think the Air Force had much to complain about because they were sitting up in their offices, whereas we were sitting up in much less comfortable circumstances. He had added, however, that the whole affair was nothing to do with him, and that he would get me to communicate with Colquhoun. I rang Colquhoun up and he did not appear to be seriously annoyed about the affair. I explained to him that on each of the nights in question we had reason to believe that the plane might be coming over, and my orders were to inform the Air Force of this fact so that they could be prepared to intercept it. I told him that it was very unfortunate that the plane had not come, not only because we were very anxious that it should in our own interest, but also because, having undertaken to produce the aircraft for their attention, I was very anxious that we should carry out our undertaking. At the end of the conversation Colquhoun seemed quite happy, and said that he would try and come and see me when I next came up to Scotland.


Faulton and I travelled down on the night of the 7th from Aberdeen. We left MUTT in Aberdeen to make contact during the week and see whether the attempt could be renewed in the period 14th to 21st January. I have informed the Chief Constables of the City and the County that MUTT was staying, and have instructed the latter to report his movements to the Police. While he is up there he will be under the supervision of Mr. Ingram.


C.H. Harmer.
(Captain)

B. L. A.
14. 1. 44.

CONCLUSIONS.

1. The facts are probably consistent with the explanations given by the Germans from time to time being true. It would be of assistance, however, to obtain a meteorological report on the weather conditions over Stavanger and the North Sea during the nights in question, and I am applying to P/Lt. Cholmondeley, A.I.S.4. for this information.
2. The facts are equally consistent with the Germans knowing that the case is controlled, and therefore the Germans playing with us. If this is so it would explain why they sent a plane half an hour early (i.e. in case we were waiting to shoot it down), also why it came in at a height where it could be picked up by radio location and why it turned back.
3. On the whole, and taking into consideration also the messages received in the MUTT & JEFF case previous to this period, I am of opinion that the facts point more to a continuation of the Germans' belief in the case than the contrary. I say this for the following reasons:
 - (a) The Germans are taking an immense amount of trouble to deal with the wireless side of the case, which is only explicable (if they disbelieve it) on the basis that they regard it as sufficiently important to play as a triple-cross. If that is so it is confirmed by the R.A.F. that the operation would be very simple for an experienced pilot, who could come in sufficiently low not to be picked up and be away again before any interception were possible. If, therefore, they had decided to play it seriously I should have expected either a good and sufficient explanation for not carrying out the operation at all or a serious attempt by a good pilot.
 - (b) The plane which came over admittedly came from the Reconnaissance unit at Stavanger, which is known to have pilots of low grade and morale. The facts of the attempted visit on the night of the 4th/5th, and the explanation given thereafter, are consistent with this.
 - (c) We know that in practically all other cases there has been considerable delay before an operation has been successfully carried out. MUTT & JEFF, for example, waited a week before they set off, and the same is true of the case of HANSEN. The only exception to this really is the first dropping operation to MUTT & JEFF last February, which worked so smoothly according to plan that we are apt, I think, to expect too much. It is noteworthy that on that occasion they carried out a bombing raid on Peterhead and Fraserburgh, which suggests that the operation on that occasion was handled by an operational squadron whose efficiency and morale are admittedly much higher.
 - (d) If the failure to carry out the operation is genuine and due to the Luftwaffe not being capable of or anxious to carry it out, it would explain the previous message that the control of the case was being moved to another place, after which the dropping operation would take place.


C.H. Harmer.
(Captain).

A unique photograph of a German Secret service officer teaching a Norwegian agent, Helge Moe, transmitting techniques. Moe became a double agent for MI5. He and his companion Tor Glad were named by MI5 as MUTT & JEFF.



BALLOON (KV 2/1069-1083)

Double agent BALLOON (whose real name does not appear anywhere on this file) was one of two agents first recruited by the famous double agent TRICYCLE, Duskov Popov (whose personal file is already available in the PRO). The TRICYCLE case was a large and successful network within the Double Cross system (see above for background).

In February 1941 BALLOON was recruited along with another agent, GELATINE, although they were not known to one another. BALLOON, named so because of his stout stature, was an ex-Army officer; who had been forced to resign his commission due to financial irregularities and had then become a secretary to a small arms firm. It was agreed that he would act as a technical and military expert and would answer questions of this nature posed by the Germans. Run from 1941 to 1944, he showed a great capacity to elicit sensitive (usually military) intelligence from a wide range of contacts. Most of his reports were sent through TRICYCLE, although some were sent directly to the Abwehr.

The following files largely contain BALLOON's traffic, via letter:

- KV 2/1070 – includes a note on recruitment and agent career as well as a sketch map of Brooklands Aerodrome, letters, and a German questionnaire with answers
- KV 2/1071 – copies of letters giving military intelligence
- KV 2/1072 – similar to 1071. Says that BALLOON's information is 'simply horrifying in its accuracy'
- KV 2/1073 – gives details of BALLOON's military career and the offences for which he was court marshalled
- KV 2/1075 – note on the inter-connection of double agents in the TRICYCLE network and consequent handling problems. Also Government policy on information to be released for use by them
- KV 2/1076 – note on Abwehr suspicions about TRICYCLE and, by association, BALLOON
- KV 2/1077 – p.419a gives a summary of the case
- KV 2/1079 – p.601a is a note on the German view of BALLOON
- KV 2/1080 – photographs of BALLOON
- KV 2/1081 – record of payments to BALLOON

RAINBOW (KV 2/1066)

This thin and heavily weeded file deals with double agent RAINBOW. Having been brought up and employed in Germany until 1938, RAINBOW was approached by the Abwehr via an old school friend. He reported the approach and soon began work as a double agent for MI5. A summary of this case can be found on pages 46-48 of J C Masterman's book, The Double Cross System.

FREAK (KV 2/1069)

Double agent FREAK acted as a wireless operator for the highly successful TRICYCLE network (see above for details). He also supplied his own intelligence. FREAK was involved in a plan to run a Yugoslav escape route, thus acquiring more agents and gathering intelligence. After the war FREAK received an OBE for his work, but as with most of the Yugoslavs within the TRICYCLE network he was unable to return to Tito's new regime.

The file contains accounts of wartime Yugoslavia and highlights the problems caused by the widespread belief, within the country, that the men were actually working for the Germans. There is a photograph on the file.

Right-Wing Extremists (KV 2/875-908)

Unity Freeman Mitford (KV 2/882)

Unity Mitford, the fourth daughter of Lord Redesdale and known as 'Baba', became famous as a society girl who was a fervent admirer and friend of Hitler. She, along with her sister Diana, spent much of her time in Munich and supported the Nazi cause. Diana married the prominent British fascist Oswald Mosley, and according to one report on p.91a was married in Hitler's house.

After the outbreak of war however, Hitler snubbed Unity Mitford, partly for her own good. It was subsequent to this that Unity attempted suicide by shooting herself in the head. The attempt failed but left her in a semi-vegetative state. Unity was brought back to Britain by Lord and Lady Redesdale and spent the rest of her life being cared for by her mother. She died in 1948.

The file (KV 2/882) contains a Special branch report from Aug 1935 reporting Unity's hatred for Jews as revealed in the Jewish Chronicle; SIS reports from 1936 stating that she is a great friend of Mosley and sees a lot of Hitler when he is in Munich, is 'more Nazi than the Nazis', that she gave the 'Hitler salute' to the British Consul General in Munich and he requests that her passport be impounded.

Page 5a is a Special Branch report after a search of her belongings in February 1937, which revealed that her baggage contained Nazi literature and several portraits of Hitler. In April Special Branch conducted another search, now referred to as 'the usual search', that noted she was now wearing a swastika lapel badge.

The file also includes intercepted correspondence, a passport photograph and application and an account of her being chased in Hyde Park at a Socialist Party demonstration. There is a comment from MI5 on p.37a that notes 'she seems fundamentally a hysterical and unbalanced person who would probably be of no use to the Germans in case of war. Recommend restriction of her movements' (May 1939).

A transcript of a telephone conversation on p.71c records Lord Redesdale complaining to his wife about the cost of hiring an ambulance train to pick

Unity up after her failed suicide attempt. Page 75a is a 7 page report by the security control officer at Folkestone - refuting claims made by the Daily Mail about the search and interrogation of Unity upon her arrival back in the UK on 3 Jan 1940.

Page 91a is a summary of correspondence discussing the case for Mitford's internment. She was not interned and the files suggests that this decision was taken against MI5's wishes as the police were satisfied that she was not engaged in activities against the national interest, and was also simple minded after her suicide attempt and therefore incapable of doing so. Page 91 provides a summary of the case - Guy Liddell (head of MI5 B Division) suggests that if she were left at liberty, the Home Office might be criticized to the effect that she owed her immunity to her being the daughter of a peer. A report by the Chief Constable of Oxfordshire on 8 June 1941 gives reasons why Mitford should not be interned.

Ezra Pound (KV 2/875-876)

American poet and author, who gave support to the BUF publication Action. KV 2/875 contains a photograph of Pound and two original letters and a transcription of a letter from Oswald Mosley to Pound (12 May 1940) KV 2/876 contains newspaper clippings.

KV 2/875-876

Ezra Pound

Intercepted letters of Ezra Pound, the American author and poet. MI5 were concerned about Pound's support for the Fascist movement in Britain.

ANNO
XVIII
VIA MARSALA 12 - 5
RAPALLO

14 Jan
EZRA POUND



Dear Mr Heard

I dont know what you think about ex post facto laws.

U.S.A.
In america they are forbidden by the constitution and no form of infamy has ever been considered worse, no tyranny more foul and generally destructive of all public order, all justice or any pretense of the citizen having any rights whatsoever.

I wd. advise you to look into English constitutional law. Wherever angle saxon right is swamped by kahal custom, naturally all form of extortion are introduced.

cordially yours

[Handwritten scribble]
in your circle
lawyer who is an authority on the
If you haven't a constitutional

constitution, you might get an opinion from J.P. Angeld
(I hear he has joined the colours) but his address was
Oaklyn, The Milden, Westcot Surrey

[Handwritten scribble]

CROSS REFERENCE

SUBJECT - Ezra POUND.

Int. letter to A. Raven THOMSON, British Union,
Sanctuary Buildings, Gt. Smith St. S.W.

from Ezra POUND, Via Marsala 12-15, Rapallo.

dated 6th Dec 16th Year of Fascism (1939)

CROSS-REFERENCE

" Thanks for pamphlets and one copy of Action
(August 19th read.) I wd. do with a few more copies of
that issue. Have you an export permit for issues after
Oct. 1st? I dont think any have reached me since then.

I dont know what i can write for you. foreigner better
keep out of yr. local affairs in these days?

IF you had a government that wanted European welfare
you wd. hand back Dobruggia or whatever it is to Bulgaria.

Rothermere was right re friendship with Hungary.

The people who backed Roumania probably all knaves.
anyhow the wrong horse. A balkan bloc to stop Russia
shd be built on FIRST Bulgaria and then Hungary.

If England cant understand at least that much about
the Balkan's gornnoze where she will hit bottom.

Were I in English party struggle I shd, as tactic,
lay off peace for a week or two and plug for a strong Balkan
bloc to stop Russia.

Have you printed "As national defence one farmer is
worth 40 money lenders"??

Monopoly stinks. I doubt if trying to corner ANYthing
ever brought luck, since St. Ambrose made his wisecrack on
"captains annonan"

and so forth, yrs.

Ezra P.

Lymington's paper seems to pass the censor.

Ezra POUND.

P.F.46785 THOMSON v.4. 152a

dated as above.

AMC 20.12.39.

Captain Robert Cecil Gordon Canning (KV 2/877-878)

Canning, a captain in the Royal Hussars during World War I, was the great grandson of the poet Lord Byron. In 1934 Canning joined the British Union of Fascists (BUF), became a close associate of Mosley and met senior Nazi officials. In 1938 he broke with Mosley on personal grounds, becoming the treasurer of the anti-war group, the British Council for Christian Settlement. He was detained under 18b of the Defence Regulations until 1943. These two files have been reconstituted from the original microfilm.

Sir Oswald and Lady Diana Mosley (KV 2/884-897)

Mosley was the leading figure in the British Union of Fascists (BUF), redubbed the British Union of Fascists and National Socialists in 1936. After the war Mosley led a modest revival of the fascists in Britain, refashioned a further time as the 'Union Movement'. Mosley and his wife, Diana, the sister of Unity Mitford (see KV 2/882), were interned under 18B of the Defence Regulations from 1940 to November 1943. He was released on grounds of ill health.

KV 2/884 – This file largely contains CID reports from all over the country on fascist political meetings, newspaper clippings and intercepted correspondence. It includes a copy of The Blackshirt, Feb 1933; p.2b reveals a scheme to contact relatives of those who had been killed in action in the Great War to try and convert them to BUF ideals; p.3a mentions 'our special source' within the BUF; a report from the special source (p.3g) shows that Mosley is receiving considerable sums of money from Italy; p.7a is a report on a visit to BUF HQ (Great Smith Street, Sanctuary Buildings, currently the Department for Education and Skills) to investigate documents and finances of the BUF; p.8x and 8y are SIS reports of names connected with the Hamburg Abwehrstelle run by Hans Lorenz; p.31b is a transcription of a Mosley speech, p.34z is a report from 'special and reliable source' showing financial links with Germany; p.36a is a letter from author/poet Ezra Pound; p.362b is a Special Branch report of arrest and list of property seized during arrest, which included several guns and ammunition, truncheons and swords, and intercepted correspondence from jail; on p.38g 'Lady Mosley is said to be far cleverer and more dangerous than her husband and will stick at nothing to achieve her ambitions - she is wildly ambitious'. Diana acted as a go-between for Mosley and Hitler. It is worth noting that Diana Mosley was interned a fortnight after Mosley, on the evidence of her sister Nancy who had contacted the authorities to urge this course.

KV 2/885 – Home office advisory committee to consider appeals against orders of internment, p.58g 120 page question and answer document; secondary hearing 15 July 1940 similar document; p.71a and 82a letter from General J F C Fuller to Mosley; p.83a letter regarding actress Francis Day and association with Mosley; p 90a letter from admiring ladies in Holloway.

KV 2/886 – p.109b travel since Aug 1930; 29 June 1939, papers dealing with the move of Mosley to Holloway to be with his wife in the married section.

KV 2/887 – visits, correspondence etc, papers dealing with release

KV 2/888 – telephone checks, intercepted correspondence

KV 2/889 – similar to above, bomb thrown into Shaven Crown Hotel, Westminster Dragoons, papers dealing with moving house etc

KV 2/890 – p.545a copy of Mosley's new book April 1946 *Mosley's Answer*, telephone checks etc

KV 2/892 – photograph, 'Mosley is afflicted with a nervous complaint affecting his eyes...during his speech, his eyes suddenly distended and contracted again, giving him a weird expression' (photograph included)

KV 2/893 – general note on the revival of the Union after the war

KV 2/895 – p.881 Brigadier-General, J F C Fuller luncheon with Mosley, revival of Mosley and his return to political life in February 1948, reports on his foreign travels, SIS reports

KV 2/896-897 – foreign travel, reports on revival of the Union etc.

German Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/909-951)

Mathilde Lucie Carre, alias Victoire, La Chatte (KV 2/926-936)

Carre was second-in-command of a large French resistance network known as the 'Interallie', initially developed and run by Polish Intelligence in Paris in 1940 under the guidance of a Polish Officer, codenamed Walenty. However, by December 1941 the entire Interallie organization (some 100 agents) was in German hands.

In February 1942 Carre came to Britain with the leader of another resistance group, Lucas. She admitted to him that she had in fact been turned by the Germans, although on her arrival in the UK she re-converted, with her radio being used as a deception channel. However, there were grave doubts about her bona fides and after an investigation by MI5 it was discovered that she had betrayed a large number of resistors, and as a result was interned for the duration of the war. She was returned to France in 1945, where she was tried and sentenced to death. This was later commuted to life and subsequently commuted again. For further information see Hinsley's Official History, Vol 4, p.335.

KV 2/926 deals with Carre's arrival in the UK (February 1942) and several interrogations of both Carre (mainly referred to as Victoire throughout the files) and Lucas, her confession and the plan of the new organization arranged between herself and the Germans. There are several discussions between representatives of MI5, SIS, SOE and Polish intelligence, on the subject of whether or not she could be trusted to return to France. The file includes a registration certificate with photograph and a list of members of the Walenty organization.

KV 2/927 – p.132a is a note from Mrs Barton (MI5 informer) regarding a party at Claridges at which Victoire met Lord Selbourne (Minister for SOE). They seemed to have got on extremely well as he offered to take her out alone to discuss her predicament about not being fully trusted. Moreover, she 'seems to be dreaming of becoming [Lord Selborne's] mistress'. Barton goes on to say that 'Lord S may be merely playing up to her but even if only half of what she told me is true it seems to me that he is behaving exceedingly foolishly'. Page 140b is another note from Barton about her general view of Victoire including her attitude toward men; this is a scathing account of her, suggesting that she 'is an exceedingly dangerous woman'.

KV 2/928 includes a summary of Victoire's memoirs, her arrest and original intercepted letters. Page 179k is an eight-page report from U.35, who was a special agent in the German embassy, in which a case for her duplicity is laid out. It was on the basis of this report that she was detained (see p.189g).

KV 2/929 largely deals with conditions in Aylesbury prison. it includes a photograph of 'VIOLETTE', an associate (p.279a), and a note on p.290a shows what lessons were learnt from the Victoire case about the penetration of intelligence organizations - this also provides a good summary of the case.

KV 2/930 deals mainly with Victoire's transfer to Holloway and her subsequent prison condition etc. It includes letters arguing the case for her release.

KV 2/931 examines the Victoire case as a possible cause of post-war controversy.

KV 2/932 – p. 418 of this file is an interrogation/interview conducted on 7 October 1944 of Violette, Renee Borni. A resistance fighter and associate of Victoire, Violette was captured and then beaten by the Germans. During this interrogation she was told that not only was 'La Chatte' working for the Nazis (February 1942) but that she was the mistress of the German Abwehr officer Bleicher. Violette admitted that she was also compelled to work for the Germans.

KV 2/933 contains a 27-page summary of the whole case and includes identity documents with photographs of Carre.

KV 2/934 contains original letters (in French) and manuscript notes about the arrest of agents in the Walenty organization and an original report prepared by Victoire with the approval of the Germans. There are also two leather notebooks filled with French text and sketches of symbols as well as a map of resistance areas in France. The file also includes a summary of traffic between February and March 1942.

KV 2/935 – payments to Victoire

KV 2/936 – a copy of Victoire's memoirs, 'Les Memoires d'une'. This is all in French and has a sketch of a black cat on the cover.

Henri Dericourt (KV 2/1131-1132)

Dericourt, alias Gilbert, was a French civilian pilot who came to the UK via the Middle East. He arrived by boat with another French airman, Leon Doulet, on the basis that they would be employed by BOAC. Despite some uncertainty as to his reliability he was taken on by SOE. Dericourt was responsible for the movement of agents in and out of France belonging to the Buckmaster network. In 1943 he was denounced as a double agent, but as the accusation came from a rival and difficult Resistance leader, the investigation proved inconclusive. Dericourt's loyalty was also propped up by the fact that he had extricated a senior British SOE officer, Charles Boddington (MI5 file already released). After the war the capture of German documents led to a trial in France. He was controversially acquitted after Boddington gave evidence for the defence.

KV 2/1131 – p.3a is an 8 page summary of Dericourt's particulars and history, including his arrival in the UK. Page 7a is a Royal Patriotic School report on his bona fides. Various papers discuss whether Dericourt and Doulet can be used, and whether they should be sent to work for BOAC in the Middle East. Page 6a casts doubts over Dericourt's loyalty and comments on his links to Abwehr officer, Colonel Heinrich. Page 39a is a summary of the case, with extracts of interrogations of other agents, prisoners. Also included are Special Branch reports on Dericourt and his wife's movements after the decision not to send him back into the field. Pages 93-97a contain reports by prisoner Bleicher mentioning Gilbert and implicating him as a SD (Sicherheitsdenist) agent. Page 98 deals with an attempt by Dericourt to smuggle gold, platinum and sterling. Page 110b is an interview with a prostitute that Dericourt frequented.

Soviet Intelligence Agents and Suspected Agents (KV 2/979-1024)

Marie Ignatievna Budberg, formerly Countess Benckendorff (KV 2/979-981)

KV 2/979 covers the early Cold War period, Formerly Countess Benckendorff, Marie married Baron Budberg in 1922. In 1923 she left Budberg and took a post as secretary to Maxim Gorky in Berlin, soon becoming his mistress. A visa application for entry to Britain in 1922 prompted the SIS report on p.65a. The report suggests that Budberg is innocent of involvement with the Soviets and that the case against her is motivated by spite on the part of monarchist white-Russians. The report continues: 'Gorky is the Bernard Shaw of Russia and about as futile'. Page 70a contains a letter from the British Embassy in Moscow. The letter reveals that the Embassy considered her a very dangerous woman, she was seen in the company of H G Wells and had met Stalin several times and brought him an accordion. There is also the implication that she met Duff-Cooper in London and then returned to Moscow to report to Stalin.

KV 2/980 – copy of registration card (p.128); p.124a -Special Branch report that Budberg had been in contact with Duff-Cooper and then surreptitiously communicated with Maisky, Russian ambassador in London; p.201a - note about Guy Burgess suggesting that someone of his character and position

should not become friendly with Budberg (this was in August 1950, before it was known that Burgess was a Soviet spy).

KV 2/981 – discussion of the Burgess and Maclean case, but no real links established. On pages 274 and 275a, 28 August 1951, MI5 report 'the most starting thing that Moura told me was that Anthony Blunt, to whom Guy Burgess was "most devoted" is a member of the Communist Party. When I said: the only thing I know about him that he looks after the King's pictures', Moura retorted; 'such things could happen only in England'. On page 285b 'she can drink an amazing quantity, mostly gin, without it showing any apparent slow-up in her mental process. She drinks gin like one would drink vodka...a source also suggests that Budberg may have lesbian tendencies. If so, they would probably dominate no more than 50% of her personality.'

Edith Tudor-Hart, alias Suschitsky (KV 2/1012-1014)

Edith Tudor-Hart is of interest because of her friendship with Litzi Friedmann, who was Kim Philby's first wife and almost certainly spotted Kim as a potential Communist agent during his stay in Vienna.

Edith came to the UK from Austria in 1925, she married another Communist and member of the CPGB, Alexander Tudor-Hart. She set herself up as a photographer, but also acted as a courier; in 1938-39 Burgess used her to contact Russian intelligence in Paris. She came to the attention of Special Branch in October 1931 after attending a demonstration in Trafalgar Square and was thereafter periodically watched.

KV 2/1012 – first detection and intercepted correspondence

KV 2/1013 – summary of the case on p.51

KV 2/1014 – copy of Communist party registration form, post-war papers including 1951 paper on her relationship with the Philbys.

Clare Sheridan (cousin of Churchill), KV 2/1033

Sheridan was an anti-British propagandist who lived in the Soviet legation in Constantinople, applying her energies to the furtherance of Soviet schemes. She was in touch with Ewer (see KV 2/1016) and George Slocombe.

The papers include intercepted correspondence and an interview with Churchill who said he was not willing to bail her out. Page 57 features an article in the *London Evening Standard* in which Sheridan claims that she had been employed by British intelligence to watch over Leo Kameneff, a leading Soviet who was executed by Stalin. The article includes a newspaper photograph of Sheridan with a bust of Lenin.

Harry Pollitt (KV2 1034-1047)

These files follow Harry Pollitt from the 1920s through to the late 1950s. Pollitt was an outspoken Communist and General Secretary of the party in Britain from 1929-1956. The papers are of most interest as an insight into the world of the British far left and how it reacted to various crises of the period. For example, an early file (KV2/1034) has a report of Pollitt urging British troops in

India to turn their rifles on their officers next time they are ordered to fire on the natives. Later in the 1930s, files like KV2/1037 and KV2/1038 contain leaflets and transcriptions of speeches, demonstrating opposition to a Second World War, but urging the British working class to support the struggle against fascism in Spain ('Arms For Spain!', 'Defend The Spanish Republic'). The Communist party was opposed to British involvement in the Second World War until Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, and Pollitt's speeches and writings of this period are critical of Churchill - 'Whenever Churchill speaks there is always blood and death in the offing' (KV2/1039) - and demonstrate the Communist anxiety to open the Second Front as soon as possible.

After the War, Pollitt continues to tow the party line even when it gets him into serious trouble. In KV2/1044 there is a report on Pollitt describing him as a 'very sick man' after a speech in praise of Red China shortly after the HMS Amethyst incident, which led to him being attacked by an angry crowd and then, according to Pollitt, beaten up by the policemen who rescued him. Doubtless the telegram from Mao Tse Tung in KV2/1045, thanking him for his opposition to the Korean War, cheered him up.

Federated Press of America (KV 2/1099-1101)

This file contains intercepted letters showing the Press, based at 50 Outer Temple, to be a cover organization for Soviet Intelligence. It was set up in 1923 by W N Ewer to provide a cover for Russian espionage activity in this country. Until its closure in March 1928 the organization was the nerve centre of red espionage in Britain, providing a place of employment for agents and a clearing house for Soviet money going to agents throughout Western Europe.

William Norman Ewer, alias Kenneth Milton (KV2 1016-1017)

W N Ewer was central to the Russian intelligence operation in London from 1919 until 1929. In his position as foreign editor of the *Daily Herald* he was able to travel abroad freely and as well as setting up the Federated Press of America controlled many of its activities. In later years he renounced his earlier communist sympathies.

KV2/1016 – This bulky file, indexed by name, mainly consists of intercepted correspondence, some papers seem to be missing, photograph of Ewer. Summary at 809a.

Fredrick Robert Kuh (KV2 983-988)

Kuh was a respected American journalist working in wartime London. His peripheral involvement with the Federated Press of America in the twenties (KV2/1099-1101), and friendship with a number of Soviet diplomats, led to suspicions that he was leaking information to the Russians. Despite heavy surveillance throughout the War he was never proved to be the source for the leaks.

KV 2/984 – photos from registration card, working in London for United Press Association and registration card of Renate Kuh

KV 2/985 – telephone checks show Kuh to be very well connected

KV 2/987 – p.827a list of extensive contacts - journalists, diplomats, SHAEF, Ministry of Information, Etousa, US Embassy, Fighting French, BBC, MPs etc

KV 2/988 – 16-page report concluding that Kuh was an 'extremely clever and astute journalist' and the 'best US journalist in London'. A telephone check was requested by the Foreign Office after the realization hit that Kuh had extremely good relations with the Soviet ambassador, Maisky.

Jacob Moness (KV 2/982)

Jacob Moness was arrested in New York after information recovered by the Metropolitan Police in the ARCOS raid of 1927 implicated him in a worldwide Soviet espionage organization. The American authorities discovered a large number of documents at Moness's New York apartment. These provided considerable proof of Soviet espionage networks in the US and revealed that the Russians' principal interest in the US lay in their armed forces and defence industries.

KV 2/982 – photograph of Jacob Moness and daughter Pauline Moness, series of questionnaires re US military targets, also a series of photo-micrographs (p.7a) used to examine the handwriting of Kate Gussfeldt, alias Ethel Chiles, who, in March 1927 entered Britain on an irregular passport, and after refusing to answer police questions was sentenced to two months in prison. There is a summary of Chiles' case between pp.11a - 10a. Lists of secret addresses were found on Anton Millar during the ARCOS raid.

Subject Files (KV 3/36-39)

Reichssicherheitsdienst, Nazi security organization (KV 3/36)

KV 3/36 shows the organization and list of personnel of the Reichssicherheitsdienst, the security apparatus for Hitler, leading party and Wehrmacht officials.

Arnold Leese (KV 3/37-38)

These two files deal with individuals organizing escape routes to assist Nazi and Dutch fugitives from British PoW camps just after the war, in particular the activities of Arnold Leese, head of the Imperial Fascist League. Leese was detained for the War, but after release began assisting enemy escapees. He was convicted in 1946 under Defence Regulations.

KV 3/37 contains copies of statements of 20 individuals including Leese, recordings of telephone conversations and other papers.

KV 3/38 has papers relating to the trial and press cuttings examining the progress of the case.

The Siege of Sidney Street (KV 3/39)

The Sidney Street siege was the culmination of a series of illegal events, including various robberies and the murder of two policemen perpetrated by a

gang of Latvian (Lettish) anarchist refugees based in the East End of London. The police tracked two gang members to 100 Sidney Street and cordoned off the area, on the morning of 3 January 1910. A gun battle broke out and a company of the Scots Guards was rushed from the Tower to assist the police. After some time the Home Secretary, Winston Churchill, arrived to supervise the action, a politically rash decision that he later regretted, as it laid him open to charges of grandstanding. Eventually a fire broke out, burning the building and its occupants to the ground. The gang was supposedly led by a mysterious figure called 'Peter the Painter', who was never captured or positively identified.

The file contains a summary of events leading up to the siege, including the Houndsditch murders and a report identifying Peter the Painter as 'Piatkov a Lett born in Russia in 1883' (see p.3 of file). It is also reported that he later held a position with ARCOS.

Policy Files (KV 4/153-196)
MI5 Press Section (KV 4/177)

KV 4/177 – A short history of the press section of MI5, and an idiosyncratic report by the Press Officer. The Press Office consisted of himself and a secretary. During the history there is an admission that he had only contacted three journalists in six years.

Brief notes on the Security Service and its work prepared for the Permanent Under Secretaries, Service Intelligence Depts, CIGS, Courses etc (KV 4/157-159)

KV 4/157 contains papers, notes and memoranda on the work of the Security Service, including a 24-page report, intended for internal and external use, entitled 'The Security Service, A Brief Outline'. It deals with the Service's history up to 1945, including formation, organization, the effects of the Russian Revolution, the growth of National Socialism, interrogation, relations with SIS, and the present problems of Germany and Russia (1946).

KV 4/158 contains similar papers as well as a pamphlet 'A short note on the Security Service and its Responsibilities'.

Selected Visual Material

Identity documents of Double Cross agents MUTT & JEFF KV 2/1067-1068
Printed pamphlet 'A short note on the Security Service and its responsibilities' KV 4/158

Identity document with photograph of Mathilde Carre, alias La Chatte, French resistor and traitor KV 2/933

Two leather note books of traitor Mathilde Carre, text in French KV 2/934
Diagram demonstrating the organization of the Walenty resistance group KV 2/934

Chart showing organization of British Intelligence KV 4/157

Copy of the BUF newspaper, The Blackshirt, Feb 1933 KV 2/884

Copy of 'Britain First' fascist pamphlet with verbatim report of speech made by Mosley, July 1939 KV 2/885

Communist propaganda highlighting dangers of gas attack KV 2/1037(p.291)
Sketch plan of food depot at Wealdstone, used for faked sabotage by MUTT & JEFF KV 2/1067

People

American poet and author Ezra Pound, supporter of BUF	KV 2/875
Mathilde Carre, alias La Chatte, French resistor and traitor	KV 2/926 & 933
Helmut Herzfeld, German Communist, cartoonist and KPD agent	KV 2/1011
William Norman Ewer, prime Russian Intelligence officer in London	KV 2/1016
Jacob Moness & Pauline Moness (daughter), Soviet agent in New York	KV 2/982
Photo-micrographs, essentially enlargements of text to analyse handwriting of Edith Ciles related to Moness case	KV 2/982
Unity Mitford	KV 2/882
Sir Oswald Mosley	KV 2/892
Double cross agents, MUTT & JEFF	KV 2/1067
Karl Andersen, Abwehr 'controller' of MUTT & JEFF	KV 2/1067
Pauloski, Abwehr morse tutor of MUTT & JEFF	KV 2/1067
Double agent JEFF	KV 2/1068
Double agent BALLOON	KV 2/1080
Double agent FREAK	KV 2/1069
Robert Kuh, American journalist	KV 2/984

Artefacts

Identity documents of Double Cross agents MUTT & JEFF	KV 2/1067- 1068
Printed pamphlet 'A short note on the Security Service and its responsibilities' KV 4/158	KV 4/158

Identity document with photograph of Mathilde Carre, alias La Chatte, French resistor and traitor KV 2/933	KV 2/933
Two leather note books of traitor Mathilde Carre, text in French KV 2/934	KV 2/934
Diagram demonstrating the organization of the Walenty resistance group KV 2/934	KV 2/934
Chart showing organization of British Intelligence KV 4/157	KV 4/157
Copy of the BUF newspaper, The Blackshirt, Feb 1933 KV 2/884	KV 2/884
Copy of 'Britain First' fascist pamphlet with verbatim report of speech made by Mosley, July 1939 KV 2/885	KV 2/885
Communist propaganda highlighting dangers of gas attack KV 2/1037(p.291)	KV 2/668
Sketch plan of food depot at Wealdstone, used for faked sabotage by MUTT & JEFF KV 2/1067	KV 2/578

The Second World War diaries of Guy Liddell

Guy Maynard Liddell CB CBE MC (1892-1958) was one of Britain's principal wartime spymasters.

At an early stage of World War Two, Guy Liddell, a career intelligence officer of Britain's counter-espionage bureau, the Security Service (MI5), rose to become the head of B Division. B Division was charged with investigating espionage, conducting counter-espionage operations and running agents, and of all MI5's branches it represented the sharp edge of the service.

Generally the head of B branch could expect to go on to become Director General (DG) of the entire service. Liddell was a counter-espionage officer of the highest calibre and was certainly groomed for the top job. Although he rose to become deputy DG, he was unfortunate in his choice of friends who included Guy Burgess, the well known Soviet mole. Liddell retired in 1953 at the age of 61, but after leaving 'The Firm' he took up an appointment as Security Advisor to the Atomic Energy Authority, a post he held until his death on 2 November 1958.

These twelve volumes of Liddell's diaries represent almost a daily account of his work for the entire period of World War Two (August 1939 to June 1945).

At the end of each day his secretary, Margot Huggins, would diligently type up his dictation and later she also produced an invaluable index for each volume. Although the diaries provide a fascinating and unique insight into the workings of one of Britain's most secret organisation and provide snippets of office gossip, they shed very little light on Liddell's personal life. The diaries would have been considered Top secret and would never have left the office. Even by Security Service standards he was considered a very private individual and by some accounts a very shy man, which was often misconstrued as lofty composure and icy detachment. However, the diaries show that he was without a doubt one of the most influential figures within the British intelligence community. Liddell presided over a very difficult organisational period for the service, coming through it with the most spectacular intelligence coups of the war, the double cross system. Although outside the remit of the diaries Liddell also co-ordinated counter-subversion in the 1930s as well as in the early Cold War period. The official MI5 'Curry' history mentions Liddell more than any other individual. He appears in the index no less than thirty-five times, ten times more than Sir Vernon Kell, who served as MI5's chief for a record breaking thirty years.

Born on 8 November 1892, Guy Liddell was educated at St Georges Windsor and Repton College, later attending Angers University, Marne et Loire, France. He spent a year in Germany learning the cello, at which he became an outstanding practitioner. In 1914 Guy followed his brothers, David and Cecil, and joined up, serving as a private with the Honourable Artillery Company (HAC). In May 1915 he was commissioned and moved to the 49th battalion 3rd Division of the Royal Field Artillery. Liddell served with distinction, being mentioned in dispatches, and received the MC, being demobilised in February 1919 with the rank of Captain. Shortly after leaving the army he joined the strident Sir Basil Thomson and his re-organised Special Branch at Scotland Yard. Liddell's small but competent team concentrated on anti-Communist subversion and in 1927, with the help of MI5, launched the well-known ARCOS raid, a major operation aimed at the Russian trade delegation in Britain, which was acting as a front for Communist espionage.

On 1 October 1931, along with a switch of responsibilities between Special Branch and MI5, Liddell took his knowledge and proficiency to MI5's B branch, spearheading operations against Communist and Nazi subversion in Britain and the Empire. He soon established himself as MI5's resident expert on Communist subversion.

Shortly after the outbreak of war, despite rounding up some twenty German agents, Sir Vernon Kell, the longstanding Director General of MI5, was forced into retirement by the new Prime Minister, Winston Churchill. Brigadier Jasper Harker, head of B division, was moved up as temporary DG until Sir David Petrie took up the permanent post. With this shuffle of staff Liddell found himself in the limelight as the head of B branch. This, however, was not an easy time for the Security Service, which, due to the outbreak of war was experiencing a huge influx of work and undergoing a unprecedented growth. Not only was there a bureaucratic revolution, but the ascendancy of the

founding DG and his deputy Eric Holt-Wilson was now gone. Several official enquiries were conducted into re-organisation of the Service. A report by Lord Hankey, Minister without Portfolio, was quickly followed by further investigation and recommendations by Lord Swinton, former Secretary of State for Air. Initially, Swinton made the mistake of appointing William Crocker and Liddell as joint chiefs of B Division, an administrative and practical disaster. Further appointments included Mr Horrocks who was brought into to revise the registry system and another disastrous appointment of Mr Frost, who was put in charge of a new W branch, which duplicated areas of B branch work. It was at this stage that Liddell and several officers considered resignation. However, their strong sense of duty at a critical time stage in the war convinced them to stay. The problem was largely resolved when in September 1940 Crocker left, leaving Liddell as sole head of B division.

Liddell proved his worth, excelling under Petrie, developing B branch, liaising with foreign intelligence services, both those in Britain (Czech, Poles etc) and those abroad, particularly Ireland, US and Australia. He also diplomatically picked his way through the problem of Communist espionage, particularly after the launch of Operation Barbarossa, the German invasion of Russia, but most significantly he presided over and fostered the hugely successful double cross system. Liddell won the respect of his colleagues as well as a reputation as an excellent intelligence officer. In 1944 he received formal recognition of his wartime work, in the form of a CBE. The historian, Hugh Trevor Roper, a fellow wartime intelligence officer and close friend, described him as a 'remarkable and very charming man who gave B Division its special character: open, genial, informal, but highly professional.*

*Hugh Trevor Roper, 'The man who put intelligence into spying', Sunday Telegraph (Review section), 9 April 1995

On Petrie's retirement in 1946, most believed that Liddell would succeed him. However, it has been suggested that the new post war Prime Minister, Clement Atlee, was suspicious of the intelligence community and instead chose a policeman, Percy Sillitoe, to head the service. Liddell was however promoted to Deputy DG, a post he held until his retirement (aged 61) in 1953, when he received a further honour - the Companionship of the Bath (CB). On retirement, he took up a security position at Harwell, the Atomic Energy Authority.

Liddell married the Hon Calypso Baring, daughter of the 3rd Baron Revelstoke although the marriage was dissolved in 1943 due to irreconcilable differences. There were four children as a result of the marriage: a son, Peter, and three daughters, Juno, Gay and Maude. Liddell died on 2 December 1958 of a heart attack and was buried in Putney Vale.

Liddell's close friendship with the diplomat and gay extrovert, Guy Burgess, was well known. When Burgess fled to the Soviet Union with fellow spy Donald Maclean in 1951, Liddell came under investigation. It was also revealed that Liddell had also been on friendly terms with another gay Soviet spy, Anthony Blunt, who served within wartime MI5 itself. Both these compromising relationships and the fact that Liddell was an intensely private

individual, led to unsubstantiated rumours that Liddell himself was gay, and moreover, that he had informed Blunt of Burgess and Maclean's deceit, and that Blunt in turn had warned his Soviet colleagues who then fled back to Moscow. Neither claim has been furnished with any evidence nor do the diaries shed any light on this episode. The most likely informer, which allowed Burgess and Maclean to escape, was the notorious third man Kim Philby. The diaries do show however, that Liddell was also on friendly terms with Philby (see vol 8, 12 Nov 1943).

Themes that emerge in the diaries include: internment policy and MI5's divergence with Home Office views; supposed Fifth Column activities; the development of the double-cross system for counter-espionage to an offensive tool for strategic deception; the role of Ireland; liaison and information from MI6 (SIS, Secret Intelligence Service) and SOE (Special Operations Executive); the amalgamation of MI5 and MI6; and concern over Russian espionage and the extent of Japanese espionage.

Notes on the Liddell Diaries:

The following notes offer a brief overview and are not comprehensive. Please note that explanations of acronyms appear the first time they appear on this page. Please also note that there are comprehensive indexes within each volume.

Volume 1 (August 1939 - February 1940) KV 4/185

28 August Internment policy. B.2 (agents section of Espionage Division) should make list of those for internment for outbreak of war. Cession of Danzig - British reply, everybody thinks Italy is doing her best to avoid war... DMO [Director of Military Operations] optimistic about the situation....Van[sittart, Sir Robert, Chief diplomatic advisor to the government] seemed slightly more hopeful.... There is to be no Munich, if no war within next 48 hours then the crisis would peter out.

30 August U.35 [unidentified British agent in German embassy] sent in report which indicates that the Germans have got the jitters. Home Office says tribunals. No, should be interned first and then ask for release - otherwise will have time to be organised by the enemy. U.35 very confident that disintegration has set in - doubts whether they [Germans] would march, if order given.

Poles pleased Hitler pushing more (think they will get British support). French assessment of Italy (probably stay neutral but might change). We have the Germans on the run and if we stand firm then may well not be a war. If Germans do decide to fight - won't last long.

2 September Fascist party taking a definitely pro-German attitude. Van[sittart] now feels war is inevitable.

Winston had heated discussion with French ambassador - worried re. lack of French action

Coding expert in FO has been handing info to the Soviets. [Refers to Foreign Office cipher clerk John King]

11 September Govt war Book Chapter 9 p11 - "it is not proposed that general internment should be automatic on the outbreak of hostilities. It is however expected that it would probably be necessary very shortly afterwards" - this policy was altered just before the war.

U.35's special source reports that German FO thinks France is not keen on war. And that leaflet campaign failure.

22 September Frequent reports coming in about submarine bases on the west coast of Eire.

25 September Need to take stock of BUF (and Nordic League) etc and make some definite suggestions for cleaning up the organisations.

30 September An SIS report on Eire is somewhat alarmist - and attempt at revolution does not appear to be out of the question.

2 October SIS reports indicate that Italy is to stay neutral.

3 October Winston's son refused permit for 3 day honeymoon in Paris - because of insufficient grounds for travel.

4 October DSS attended a meeting about the death penalty appears to have been overlooked in our DRs - trial by high treason too cumbersome. Should frame law whereby judge has no choice but death.

7 October Censorship of mails to Eire.

9 October The real answer is of course that all enemy aliens should be interned.

10 October We have been asked to receive 17 Polish cryptographers. - refers to collaboration between British and Polish re cracking the Enigma codes. Aliens should have onus to show why they should not be interned.

Mussolini reported to have said -I have the cards, let me play them.

U.35 - SIS have contacts in Reichswehr who are proposing coup d'etat - Hitler will be allowed to remain as a puppet head

12 October Eire neutrality is rapidly becoming a farce - German sub sailed into Dingle bay for repairs - (Civic guard: "who are we supposed to be neutral against!").

15 October CPGB [Communist Party of Great Britain] discussion as to whether should infiltrate army and cause disaffection or whether should refuse to serve.

...question of permits to EIRE.

p.103 KING [Foreign Office cipher clerk] got 10 years (for sending information to the Soviets).

19 October SIS report - little doubt that Italy will remain neutral.

21 October SIS report on attempt resignation of three admirals over Baltic policy.

Opinion is that our leaflets are too dull

24 October DDS is staggered at HO [Home Office] - war going on! (re tribunals etc).

27 October SNOW [first 'double cross' agent] case looks promising - going on training course in Germany on intelligence and sabotage.

29 October SIS reports Russia and Germany are working in close harmony.

31 October SIS reports show talks in mid-Oct of Hitler stepping down for Goering

9 November Somebody wants to exchange photos between ourselves and the Germans - positively indecent.

12 November VENLO - [an incident where two MI6 officers were kidnapped on the Dutch border after being duped into a fake German coup d'etat plot] Stevens has been shot last Thursday and his body taken off to the Gestapo. Best also kidnapped. No details as yet available. (Nov 15 - VV [Valentine Vivian, SIS] came over and told me about Stephens..)

16 November Soviet espionage seems to be on the increase. We are still looking for a man in CID [Committee of Imperial Defence] reported to us by Krivitsky [Walter Krivitsky first Soviet defector].

24 November Indian govt are being pressed by HMG to relax internment very considerably.

Special material shows that Persia, Turkey and Egypt are contemplating a Moslem block to resist possible Russian aggression.

Hot news - Musso[lini] has returned to the Church

SIS - recent crisis in Nazi party has been overcome for the moment.

p.185 Refugees: view them with utmost suspicion. SIS have ascertained that the Gestapo are putting a 'J' on the passports of agents who they want to get into this country.

27 November Not happy about Eire government coast watching service

28 November TAR [TA Robertson, MI5 officer and protagonist of the double cross system] is worried about the large number of reports coming in, particularly from the Air Ministry, to the effect that lights have been seen flashing at various parts of the country (NB. later Liddell - thought most were rubbish. SIC makes it worse in early days. At beginning have high hopes for HDSE (but soon gets annoyed by them)

30 November Russia has invaded Finland in true Nazi style.

7 December SIS - Germans contemplating move in eastern Europe - need raw materials.

Youth arrived from Eire with arsenal of bombs - can only get a month's detention because of age.

8 December We are still without the death penalty.

13 December (Constant worries about Eire). Source in German legation in Dublin is sending torn up pieces of paper from German minister's confidential waste. – inconclusive

14 December SIS - Yugoslavia in a cleft stick. Italians want to start anti-Bolshevik crusade.

TAR has spoken to me about lights.

p.221 We may have case for dealing with the whole of the BUF - govt should make clean sweep of the organisation (otherwise piecemeal drives them underground).

17 December Regulations laid down by CID not adhered to, so large number of aliens at large. Therefore 4/5 our time in controlling movements and only 1/5 c-espionage. Need to impose proper restrictions so that we can do our job properly.

2 January Unity Mitford coming to UK - Liddell wanted to search, but Maxwell and Home Secretary refuse . (Jan 8 - Home Office had no rights to prevent her search - it's a military matter).

10 January concerns re. Snow (something gone wrong - Germans not overconfident).

Re. supplying XX [double cross] agents with information - pick up rumour/gossip and local observations, vet and then pass on.

12 January DSS [Director of Security Service] spoke to me re. Crocker coming in to overhaul office machinery. We have no policy or guiding principles on which to work, the internal organisation seems bad, and very little has been achieved in the way of investigation.

14 January SIS reports - Germany openly carrying out preparatory measures for possible action against Scandinavia.

17 January Spent most of morning trying to get something done about the setting up of an organisation to deal with codes.

20 January Krivitsky [Walter Thomas, first Soviet defector] has arrived.

22 January We are threatened with a large influx of Belgian and Dutch refugees in the event of an invasion.... They will doubtless be riddled with GESTAPO agents.

24 January Had a talk with B3 [Communications branch of B division] regarding mysterious lights. Apparently this scare has more or less died down.

25 January Internment and tribunals
Krivitsky tells of Oldham case (forerunner of King)... Over next months he opens up.

p.287 Unity Mitford [MI5 wanted Mitford interned due to her close links with Hitler]

30 January Sneath had meeting with MOSLEY..."I want peace now before England is reduced to a dung heap.. Germany can withstand blockade for at least 7 years....convinced Hitler would not harm England in anyway".

7 February MI5 organisational problem - like 'youth at the helm', anybody could walk in and say working in B.21 [Agents branch of B Division] for example.

11 February Goering in favour of Russian co-op with him in charge. Russian economic negotiations unsuccessful

23 February CSS of opinion that the Germans will attack the west before very long.

29 February Stalin not anxious to fight any great power.

Volume 2 (March 1940 - September 1940)

KV 4/186

March Internees should be sent abroad - priority over evacuating children.

10 September Use XX to encourage the Germans to invade

Volume 3 (October 1940 - May 1941)

KV 4/187

3 October M.I.14 [German branch of British Intelligence] , 2.10.40 - no indication that Germany has abandoned the intention of invading the UK.

5 October [Roger] Hollis wanted to know about Communism (poor troop morale)

6 October Review of internees for release. We think the tribunal system has been complete failures and no point in re-opening all these cases.

7 October Swinton came down today and cross-examined us about the spy cases. The PM had evidently been asking why we had not shot some of them. I told Swinton that we understood we had been given a more or less free hand to promise a man his life if we thought we were going to get information and that information was really by far the most important matter to be considered... I am still in ignorance of what Swinton's position is... all we know is that he appears to think that he is head of MI5 and to some extent even of MI6."

Communication with Blenheim [branch of MI5 where registry was located] is frightful, only two lines (and one of them is not working at the moment).

19 October Re. destruction of files not added to in last 10 years - unsound. (Oct 29 - five sacks here to be destroyed, showed DSS some I didn't think should be destroyed, need going through. DSS said I should support his decision so as to show discipline. I said two separate issues. He thought files should be destroyed. I registered my protest.)

24 October So far not one single case of light signalling has been traced to enemy action.

27 October Asked to Blenheim because discipline of B branch left a lot to be desired. B branch had feeling of frustration, had to take more kicks than other depts and needed to feel that their work was useful.

12 November Have suggested to VV [Valentine Vivian, head of Counter-espionage section V of MI6] that we ought to try and get at Kanaris [Admiral Canaris, Head of German Secret Police, the Abwehr]. If we could stage an interview somewhere in Portugal we might make some use of the information about him which we got from Mr Thomas (Krivitsky). There is no doubt that he [Canaris] was in Russian pay. [There have been rumours that Admiral Canaris, an-anti-Nazi, was in the pay of British intelligence]

15 November Possible amalgamation of MI5 and SIS.

18 November Meeting with W committee re proposals about making use of our XX system.

Jane Archer [Krivitsky's case officer] has been sacked for insubordination (serious blow to us all).

27 November Swinton said 'Guy thinks I'm a bloody shit'. - Lord Swinton was brought into re-organise MI5 causing adverse effects on B Branch, so much so, that Liddell and others considered resignation.

p.687 90% of our troubles were in the Directorate and the fact that the registry was not working.

4 December Frost given dressing down and was told to make his apologies to me. This is most unsatisfactory and I am really at my wit's end. My feeling is that I should resign if Frost is not removed. People here don't think it is right but would give me their full support. I feel a very definite loss of self-respect.

5 December Frost came to see me - told him no room for place-hunters or kudos seekers. Told him it was no longer possible for TAR to be in W Branch and would bring him over to B (SNOW case had only gone to W because it TAR was rigorously au fait with it.... (next day told Swinton that XX business must come back to where it belongs).

8 December Dick has produced another magnum opus based on the Group messages and captures agents. Now beginning to get quite a good picture of the German espionage organisation.

10 December Horrocks presented his famous plan - turned into dog fight. Horrocks had been brought by Lord Swinton and proposed radical changes to the registry system, initially this was badly received by B branch, but a great improvement was seen over time.

12 December TAR moved over from W [Wireless Board, senior committee of double cross system] with his minions.

13 December Dick [Dick White, Deputy head of B Branch] and I drew up counter re-org.

17 December Famous meeting re. re-org.
Mrs O'Grady - sentenced to death (sees herself wrongly as master spy).

26 December Not feeling very well. This has gone round the office, who think I have got a hangover. Quite untrue of course.

1 January Petrie [Sir David Petrie new Director General of MI5] arrived.

3 January Saw de Gaulle re. Muselier case documents - he said they were forged by either British Intelligence or.... Very conceited man.

(Dec 27 - letter said Muselier had warned Vichy about the Dakar project p.706)

8 January Collin admitted to have forged the documents - to reinstate himself and boost the French Security Service. Unlikely.

Attending a meeting of the JIC to discuss XX committee.

9 January Spent day at Scotland Yard and FO re Muselier case. Collin confessed whole story.

13 January SUMMER escape attempt.

14 January Certain documents have been found indicating that the Nordic League was in closer touch with Germany than we imagined.

27 January Cross-examined by attorney general re Muselier case.

2 February Messages from group 3 indicate that Germans are anxious about the French fleet.... Felix say that this group is one formerly used by a number of French XX agents.

6 February Liaison with French re. security (more on Musilier)

10 February SIS reports - Bulgaria is going to let Germany in.
p.764 Question of bumping off agents.

Nb. FOES - an inter-service org which puts itself in position of enemy intelligence services and tries to work out what the enemy is likely to do.

11 February Japanese assistant, Nakamo, is doing espionage work - trying to get info re movement of our ships to China Seas. Japanese difficult to watch because all look alike.

13 February Agent prosecution.

Hawes has been instructed to form a Jewish Division - for vetting those who joined the division plus arranging for skilled Jewish technicians to come here from America.... I think it would be a political blunder - will be used as propaganda against us by both the Arabs and by the enemy. Moreover, pin us down to granting concessions to Jews in Palestine after the war. One of those things done in time of crisis and which are bitterly regretted afterwards.
(p.769).

15 February SNOW [double agent] is up to something...

7 March Petrie officially appointed DSS [Director of the Security Service]

10-11 March SO2 [Special Operations executive propaganda section] giving a great deal of trouble - very slipshod and indiscreet

22 March SNOW has admitted to Germans that working under duress. In spite of this he has been given a sum of £10,000 and a new contract.

26 March WO booklets on German military organisation found in packing of bottles of hair wash (WO and BBC use firm which pulps most confidential and uses rest for packaging).

p.841 23.3.41 - interview with De Valera.

29 April Russia's long term view to watch Germany and England exhaust themselves then resume an active world revolutionary policy. I know it was unorthodox, but still thought that idea of world revolution still held a place in Soviet policy.

6 May Lloyd George defeatist, doesn't think we can win the war.

23 May TATE [double agent] meets Jap on number 16 bus with times and money. Jap party unsuccessful, no-body turned up. To be repeated on 31.

Volume 4 (June 1941- November 1941)

KV 4/188

Contains good deal on Rutland case - Fredrick Rutland was an ex-Air force officer who had been employed by Japanese against the US (based in Britain) since 1923, on outbreak of war with Japan he was interned, but there were discussion as to whether he would make a suitable double cross agent.

16 September PM wants a report on Jap contacts in this country. I have asked Blunt to compile this and to send it to Loxley who will collate it with other information from the FO

Volume 5 (December 1941- May 1942)

KV 4/189

7 December Declaration of war [Japanese]...action taken in England. Intern. House arrest and cut lines.

17 December Tricycle's [double cross agent] questionnaire is now in our possession. It shows quite clearly that in August last the Germans were very anxious to get as full particulars as possible about Pearl Harbor.

10 January LODDA - an Italian XX, do we make XXX or will Italians just make him XXXX?

14 January De Gaulle is being extremely truculent (problems with Dansey) [Clause Dansey assistant chief of SIS],

19 January XX account shows a balance in our favour of between £7-8,000. We have netted about £26,000 odd and spent over £19,000. This figure does not include sums of money taken from spies who have been executed. If they were included the total receipts would be in the neighbourhood of £33,000

30 January ISOS [codename for German police intercepts] shows report supposedly from this country re movement of large convoys to Africa - so grossly inaccurate as to be completely valueless (GARBO?).

19 February Planning Committee today. Rather controversial issue of XX agents and TARs relations with DANSEY were under discussion. Throughout Lots about CALVO. Calvo was the press attaché at the February Spanish Embassy in London, double agent, G.W., had gained Calvo's confidence and the partnership provided a very fruitful conduit for passing bulking documents via the diplomatic bag. Calvo was however, involved in a large Spanish network in the UK and it was decided, against the wishes of B branch, to arrest him and the rest of the organisation.

5 March DG, Cecil [Cecil Liddell, B Branch officer for Ireland] etc too complacent - ignore the possibility of the IRA being used for an espionage organisation. The recent case of Tom Kennedy in Glasgow is a very good illustration of use to which the IRA may be put.

15 April Communist party membership is now 45,000 and increasing. Throughout this volume - debates over the amalgamation of SIS and MI5.

Volume 6 (May 1942 - November 1942) **KV 4/190**

2 October re. Fifth Column - no evidence to show existence of a widespread organisation either controlled or uncontrolled by the Germans but that in time of crisis there might be more people than we know prepared to help the enemy. Our information on this part of the problem seem more negative than positive.

1 November Report on two SIS reps who had managed to get away from Japan. There is no doubt that the Russians are far better in the matter of espionage than any other country in the world. I am perfectly certain that they are well bedded down here and that we should be making more active investigations. They will be a great source of trouble for us when the war is over.

Volume 7 (December 1942 - June 1943) **KV 4/191**

10 December [Deputy Director General] called us to discuss Curry's [John 'Jack' Curry, F Division, Subversive Activities, Curry was later to write MI5's

official history] fifth column memo - DG thought the fifth column aspect was rather out of date. Both Curry and I disagree.

15 April We now have 17 actual XX agents and 6 notional

20 April Away ill with jaundice, in my absence....

31 May I returned from sick leave this morning.

Volume 8 (July 1943 - November 1943)

KV 4/192

11 August Lunched with Pouverie and Louis Frank who has just taken over the Low Countries and France in SOE [Special Operation Executive]. He is evidently looking at everything with a critical eye, and has the impression that much of the SOE organisation on the continent may well be blown. I told him that we had a somewhat similar impression. He welcomes operation Starkey as he thinks it will give him a much clearer idea of where he stands.

p.168 I personally don't think we should judge German bestiality and Russian bestiality along the same lines as Russian bestiality. The Russians are a much more primitive and tough people, whereas the German is bestial when he is top dog, but when he begins to feel that he is beaten he is apt to cringe and to become sentimental.

5 October SOE and Russian affairs.

p.276 Russian Trade Unionist who attended the conference have objected to having their papers examined. FO waived his rights ... no real reason why papers should not be examined but I am quite sure that the Russians will merely think we are stupid. It is an entirely mistaken notion to think that incidents of this kind jeopardise diplomatic relations.

p.278 Told Ellis that for four years we had somehow not been able to arrive at a satisfactory liaison with the FBI - obviously desirable (by analogy of functions) that we have close contact.

16 October Hellmuth case (helped topple the Argentine government) see also p.361

21 October During the last year, 43 agents have been brought to this country (15 for espionage in this country). Total agents for UK is 75. Hansen (latest arrival) says more are being trained - shows German anxiety re. invasion.

9 November I was asked whether I aspired to be DG - I certainly was not breaking my neck to get the job, but if it were offered I would revise previous view that I wouldn't

12 November Dined with Walter Bell and Kim Philby - talked to Kim about organisation - our ideas more or less coincide except that Kim is for total

amalgamation of SIS and MI5. He thinks it would be difficult to separate CE [counter-espionage] work from the offensive side. Personally I do not agree.

Volume 9 (December 1943 - April 1944)
KV 4/193

1 December Tremendous fuss about Mosley's release.

11 December SIS have received report of a plot to assassinate Smuts.
p.105 Discussion re. future of the office.

1 February There is a warning out for Celery's arrest for embezzlement.
Celery has apparently disappeared.

16 February VERMERHEN's defection from Abwehr (in Ankara)

17 February DG gave a dinner for me at Hyde Park Hotel to celebrate my CBE.
p.199 Communist Party and reporting of PLUTO - perhaps more malicious.

31 March Leakage case in Ankara. - seems like files had been looked at on train from Cairo to Ankara or someone had a key to the Ambassador's box

Volume 10 (May 1944 - August 1944)
KV 4/194

13 May Possibility of Brandenburg Regiment raids from now onwards.

29 May Bogus Monty scheme appears to have been successful.

3 June Curry is really rather at his wits end re. the inefficiency of SIS

5 June Neptune [D-day naval operations] postponed because of bad weather.
Appalling slip up by offices of the Associated Press in US - message issued for cabling to America saying "Eisenhower's troops have landed in France today". Meant to practise getting the message out quickly. By mistake it was broadcast all over America.

6 June Second front opened at 5 this morning with aircraft roaring overhead.

7 June PM in his speech to the House said that the recent landings in France were only the first of a series of landings that would take place on the continent of Europe. I cannot help feeling that this is a mistake. The Germans should deduce that this is the one and only landing.

9 June C [head of SIS] deception - through blind transmitter under German control asked where escapers and evaders should meet. Was told.

15 June DMI [Director of Military Intelligence] very complimentary. He had thought that it would not be possible to deceive the enemy as to our real intentions for more than 4-6 days and that quite possibly it would not be possible to deceive him at all.
p.114 Reference to 'Big Ben' - carries 5 tons of explosives.

17 June Iron Cross II awarded to GARBO [most successful double agent] by the Germans - because of his important work and to maintain his morale ("as he is being bombed by us at moment").

28 June Dick, TAR, Roger and I had meeting re. post-war organisation. We came to conclusion that (1) we should aim at total amalgamation with SIS (2) failing that, an offensive organisation under C and a defensive one under ourselves - the latter to control counter-intelligence activities abroad as well as at home....

1 July P/W mail shows that an Irish camp near Berlin has been formed for purpose of forming a Free Irish Movement which will fight against the North. (one letter- 'how do Germans expect us to join such a movement when they have been feeding us pig swill for months').

5 July Discussion re. future of Curry's section in SIS... It was an open question whether we should go to SIS or SIS come to us.

8 July More discussion re. future of MI5/6.

22 August Told TAR about plan for threatening the Germans with the uranium bomb if they attempt to use V2. He said C had a good deal of information re uranium bomb but was very cagey
p.238 Harris has a plan for evacuating Garbo to the Argentine, where he may have considerable post-war value.

25 August Saw C about the Uranium bomb... he said he didn't think that V2 use was imminent, however there was nothing to lose and said he would put the suggestion to the PM who might take it up with Roosevelt on next visit early next month. (C shocked that large number of people in US, inc. FBI, knew about uranium bomb).
p.259 Proposal that Garbo goes to Canada.

Throughout July and August - lots on operation Crossbow (deception campaign to destroy V1 and V2 sites, MI5 pursued a deception plan through double agents in order that the range of V1 and V2s was shortened).

Volume 11 (September 1944 - December 1944)
KV 4/195

Mainly covers what's going on in France, Crossbow and post-war re-organisation of MI5 and MI6.

1 September Palestine is a hotbed and might at any moment go up in the air.

4 September PG Wodehouse interview with Home Sec. Some MPs want to imprison him and try him for treachery. (cf p78)

6 September Lunched with Jane (Archer) - she will lose her pensions if not reinstated. Certainly it would be a scandal if after her many years of service she was given nothing. I advised her to stick at SIS until re-org sorted and if worst comes to worst. I'll try and get back to her what she is really due.

13 September Attitude of the Russians at moment is quite interesting - deliberately leaving the resistance movement in Warsaw in the lurch (refusing to allow our planes to drop arms).

25 September I think we should have division into offensive and defensive and the abolition of the 3 mile limit... Worst aspect of this war has been the ruling that we were to conduct all our business through Section V instead of talking to the people who were doing the particular job in question. Forced to deal through a bad bottle-neck.

p.114 Katyn murders (see previous ref).

28 September More on post-war re-organisation (one united show).

p.130 Middle East (general review of intelligence etc).

p.150 Eire

p.152 Naval deception and Neptune.

10 October PM a bit bored with Old Joe's (Stalin's) constant pleading of ill-health which will not permit him to leave his country.

13 October Guy Burgess came to see me.

23 October Curry worried re. rapid development of Section IX (communism) which he thought would preclude any chance of amalgamation.

31 October Zigzag has been telling a number of his dubious acquaintances of his war time activities. Take this opportunity to shut him down. Possible that Zigzag has a pact with his german spy-master, Graumann...

10 November Patton - concerted effort to finish war in west by 31 Jan. It is thought there is a reasonable chance of doing this.

21 November The French have arrested PG Wodehouse and his wife and Cussen is to go over to Paris to sort things out.

25 November Garbo received MBE from King

p.284 Harikari club in one of the German P/W camps in Canada - based on the Wagnerian philosophy of the Gotterdammerung where the gods kill off each other in a final orgy of violence. When the destruction of the German Army

becomes imminent, all weaklings in the camp are to be murdered. The others will break out, murder commandant etc and then commit as many acts of sabotage as possible before they themselves are killed.

20 December Read the case of Henrik Miersman - has given information showing that the Germans had been running about 10 SOE transmitters for 18 months August 1942 to February 1944.

Volume 12 (January 1945 - June 1945)

KV 4/196

p.44 Allen talked to me re Bevan's letter on deception in the Far East.

27 January Marriot thinks that outside Garbo, Brutus and TATE there is nothing left in B1A which is really worth running.

29 January Bennett came to ask me about the atomic bomb.

2 May Interrogation report of a P/W named Rudolf RATHKE, a member of the Gestapo concerned with the detecting of illicit wireless and running D.As. Shows that the Gestapo did quite a lot of DA work with captured Russian agents - Nov 1942 rounded up a Russian network in France, Belgium and Holland inc. Gilbert

1 June JIC has issued a report on our future conduct in relations with the Russians outside the diplomatic field. No longer is information to be given gratuitously.... Refer to London and delay several weeks during which time we can see what the Russians are prepared to show us. That is the only way we can command any respect. Our current policy of handing over whatever does no good - it ends with us being treated with contempt.