OPERATIONAL SELECTION POLICY OSP11

NUCLEAR WEAPONS POLICY 1967-1998

Revised November 2005
1 Authority

1.1 The National Archives' Acquisition Policy announced the Archive's intention of developing Operational Selection Policies across government. These would apply the collection themes described in the overall policy to the records of individual departments and agencies.

1.2 Operational Selection Policies are intended to be working tools for those involved in the selection of public records. This policy may therefore be reviewed and revised in the light of comments from users of the records or from archive professionals, the experience of departments in using the policy, or as a result of newly discovered information. There is no formal cycle of review, but comments would be welcomed at any time. The extent of any review or revision exercise will be determined according to the nature of the comments received.

If you have any comments upon this policy, please e-mail records-management@nationalarchives.gov.uk or write to:

Acquisition and Disposition Policy Manager
Records Management Department
The National Archives
Kew
Richmond
Surrey
TW9 4DU

1.3 Operational Selection Policies do not provide guidance on access to selected records.

2 Scope

2.1 This policy relates to all public records on British nuclear weapons policy and development. The departments and agencies concerned are the Prime Minister's Office, the Cabinet Office, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (Security Policy Department, Defence Department, Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department, and Arms Control and Disarmament Department), HM Treasury (Defence and Material Department), the Department of Trade and Industry (Atomic Energy, and Export Control and Non-Proliferation Directorate), the Ministry of Defence (MOD), the Atomic Weapons Establishment (AWE) and the United Kingdom Atomic Energy Authority (UKAEA).

2.2 This Policy is not an exhaustive statement of all the records that will be selected for permanent preservation, but is intended to provide a clear direction to acquisition work and those who are making review decisions.

2.3 This Operational Selection Policy will focus on the period from 1967 (a major milestone in the Chevaline project) to the publication of the Strategic Defence Review (SDR) in 1998. The SDR announced the government’s
decision to reduce the number of warheads carried by the Trident submarine to 48 warheads per boat (half the ceiling announced by the previous Conservative government).

2.4 This Operational Selection Policy does not cover the procurement of nuclear systems (aircraft and submarines). These will be covered by a separate Policy on defence procurement.

2.5 The significance of intelligence assessments in the formulation of military strategy will be covered by a separate Operational Selection Policy.

2.6 The broader issues relating to the development of British military strategy including the relationship with NATO will be covered by a separate Operational Selection Policy on Strategic Direction and Coordination of Operations/Deployments.

3 Departmental responsibilities

3.1 Within the United Kingdom, constitutional responsibility for the formulation of nuclear weapons policy resides with the Cabinet. In practice, however, policy decisions relating to the acquisition, deployment and potential use of nuclear weapons were often taken by small groups of senior ministers meeting in ad hoc Cabinet committees. All records of Cabinet Committee proceedings are held by the Cabinet Office and will be selected for preservation (see OSP12, Records of the Central Direction and Oversight of Government Policy and Programmes, 1970 – 2000).

3.2 Once political approval for a project had been granted, other government departments were involved on a ‘need to know basis’. Overall co-ordination occurred at Cabinet level and was the responsibility of Defence Overseas Policy (Official) Committee assisted by the Nuclear Requirements for Defence Committee.

3.3 The development and implementation of nuclear policy within the Ministry of Defence was carried out by the Secretary of State for Defence, the Chiefs of Staff, the Senior Nuclear Group (jointly chaired by the Chief of the Defence Staff and the Permanent Secretary) and, its successor, the Finance, Planning and Management Group (Nuclear).

3.4 The Atomic Energy and Disarmament Department of the Foreign Office dealt with international issues concerning the military aspects of atomic energy and the control and regulation of armaments. The department was abolished upon the formation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) in 1968. Responsibility for disarmament questions passed to a new Disarmament Department. In 1972, the Department was renamed the Arms Control and Disarmament Department. These matters are now dealt with by the Security Policy Department (responsible for questions relating to UK, North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), French, Russian and Chinese nuclear policy) and the Non-Proliferation Department (responsible for
questions concerning nuclear proliferation beyond the established nuclear powers).

3.5 Within the Department of Trade and Industry, nuclear policy was the responsibility of the Atomic Energy Division. In 1993, questions concerning the international control of nuclear weapons were passed to the newly formed Export Control and Non-Proliferation Directorate.

3.6 Inter-departmental committees are common. The secretariat of these committees varies depending on the specific project.

4 Relevant Collection Themes in The National Archives’ Acquisition Policy

4.1 The Acquisition Policy Statement outlines certain themes that form the basis of The National Archives’ appraisal and selection decisions. Of these themes, the following are of potential relevance in considering the development of British nuclear weapons policy:

2.2.1.3 External relations and defence policy

2.2.2.2 Impact of the state on the physical environment

5 Themes for selection of records relating to nuclear weapons policy

5.1 Given the complexity of the decision making process, records will be selected from the Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence. The selection of records held by other departments and agencies will be specifically mentioned where appropriate.

Nuclear strategy and world affairs

5.2 The United Kingdom has possessed an operational nuclear weapons capability from the mid-1950s. Initially this comprised a fleet of bombers, the V-force, armed with strategic nuclear weapons and the Canberra force equipped with theatre nuclear weapons. In 1969 responsibility for operating Britain’s strategic deterrent was transferred to the Royal Navy’s Polaris submarine fleet with the air force assuming a theatre nuclear role. In comparison with both superpowers the British nuclear arsenal is relatively small. Governments of both left and right have exhibited a consistency on nuclear issues when in office. The decision to proceed with a Polaris improvement programme (Super Antelope/KH793/Chevaline) was initiated by the first Wilson government in 1967, approved by the Heath government (1970-74) and finally ratified by the second Wilson government in February 1974. Wilson’s successor as Prime Minister, James Callaghan, initiated studies which recommended the replacement of Polaris by Trident. The formal decision to purchase Trident was made by Margaret Thatcher and endorsed by the Labour government under Tony Blair.
5.3 Throughout the Cold War, the strategic rationale underpinning Britain’s possession of an independent nuclear force was designed to meet two related goals: to enhance deterrence by providing a second centre of decision within NATO while maintaining the capability to act independently if supreme national interests were threatened. The desire to maintain this balance between alliance cohesion and independent action has been a central and constant aspect of British nuclear policy.

5.4 British nuclear forces were assigned in accordance with NATO plans. The main body responsible for the development and implementation of nuclear strategy within NATO was the Nuclear Planning Group (NPG). Records that detail the discussions within the NPG will be selected for permanent preservation. In addition to supporting NATO, UK nuclear forces were also declared in support of the Central Treaty Organisation and the South East Asia Treaty Organisation. Records which detail the military planning and deployment of nuclear forces in support of these organisations will also be selected for preservation.

5.5 Following the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the break-up of the Soviet Union in the mid-1990s, the Conservative government reduced the number of nuclear weapons operated by British forces. To fully assess the role to be played by Britain’s nuclear forces, the Labour government initiated the Strategic Defence Review (SDR), the conclusions of which were published in July 1998. The SDR recommended further reductions in planned warhead numbers and changes in the operational posture of the nuclear deterrent. It also stated that to enhance transparency and support long-term nuclear arms control, the United Kingdom would be significantly more open about its nuclear forces and stocks of nuclear material.

5.6 Specific policy areas on which records will be selected for preservation are contained at annex 1.

Policy implementation

5.7 In June 1967, the Labour Government announced in Parliament its decision not to upgrade the Polaris system by purchasing Poseidon missiles from the United States. Instead of deploying Poseidon, it was decided to re-direct work at Aldermaston to investigate the possibilities of designing a new warhead capable of penetrating Soviet defences using decoys, hardening techniques and penetration aids. These early studies were continued by the Conservative administration under Edward Heath and given the code name Chevaline.

5.8 In 1972, in support of Britain’s application to join the European Economic Community (EEC), Edward Heath initiated discussions with Paris on the possibilities of Anglo-French nuclear collaboration. The discussions reached an advanced stage but no formal agreement was reached. In subsequent years, the Anglo-French nuclear relationship was periodically re-examined. Records that detail the nuclear relationship between Britain and France will be selected for preservation.
5.9 In 1974, the new Labour government entered office with a manifesto commitment renouncing any intention of acquiring a new generation of strategic nuclear weapons. To assess the future of the Chevaline project, Wilson assembled a small group of senior ministers comprising Dennis Healey (Treasury), Roy Jenkins (Home Office), James Callaghan (FCO) and Roy Mason (Defence). The group agreed that Chevaline was not a new generation of strategic system but a means of maintaining Britain’s current nuclear capability. The decision was taken to proceed with development at a cost of £250 million. The full Cabinet was later informed of the decision in April. The ministerial committee was supported by a working party chaired by Fred East, Chief Weapon Systems Engineer. Policy records which detail the decision to proceed with Chevaline will be selected for preservation.

5.10 By 1975, the estimated cost of Chevaline had risen to £400 million. At Treasury insistence the project was reviewed to determine whether full-scale development should proceed. The decision was regarded as a watershed in UK nuclear weapons policy: cancellation of the project would have effectively marked Britain’s decision to withdraw from the strategic nuclear weapons field. In September 1975, agreement was reached to take Chevaline to full completion. Policy records which document this decision will be selected for preservation. Treasury records that detail the cost of the deterrent will also be selected for preservation. Financial records from other departments will only be selected if they highlight significant aspects of Chevaline’s development cost.

5.11 The existence of Chevaline was first disclosed to Parliament in January 1980 by Conservative Defence Secretary Francis Pym. The cost of the project was given as £1,000 million making Chevaline the most expensive defence project not to be made public. The high cost resulted in a highly critical report by the Public Accounts Committee published in 1982. Records describing the Government’s response to the report will be selected for preservation.

5.12 Prior to deployment of the first Chevaline system aboard *HMS Renown* in summer 1982, the search for a successor had already begun. In 1978 two concurrent studies were initiated. The first, chaired by Sir Anthony Duff, Deputy Under Secretary at FCO examined military and international implications; the second chaired by Professor Ronald Mason, Chief Scientific Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, examined alternative delivery systems. Both working groups reported directly to a small group of senior ministers comprised of James Callaghan (Prime Minister), Denis Healey (Treasury), David Owen (FCO) and Fred Mulley (Defence). The records of these bodies will be selected for preservation.

5.13 In January 1979, during a meeting at Guadeloupe, Callaghan received private assurances from US President Jimmy Carter that a British request to purchase Trident missiles from America would be received favourably in Washington. No decision concerning Trident was taken before the UK
general election of May 1979. The Guadeloupe summit resulted in the formation of an alliance working group to study the arms control implications of NATO’s Long Range Theatre Nuclear Forces (LRTNF) modernisation programme. The conclusions of the working group formed the basis of NATO’s ‘dual track’ decision taken in December 1979 to deploy 572 LRTNF warheads on 108 Pershing II and 464 land based cruise missiles. Records that detail these events will be selected for preservation. (see also 5.13 below)

5.14 Following the election of the Conservative Government in May 1979, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher established a Cabinet Committee (MISC 7) to examine a replacement system for Chevaline/Polaris. In July 1980, the British Government announced its decision to purchase the Trident I missile system from the United States. The policy options examined by the new Conservative government will be selected for preservation.

5.15 In March 1980, the government published and distributed the leaflet Protect and Survive which detailed the precautions to be taken by the public in the event of nuclear war. Records relating to this publication and the government’s attitude to civil defence will be covered in a separate Operational Selection Policy.

5.16 In tandem with its decision to purchase Trident, the government announced its intention to allow the US to station 160 Cruise missiles at Greenham Common in Berkshire and Molesworth in Cambridgeshire. Policy records detailing NATO’s modernisation programme, the role played by the UK in this process and the relationship with the parallel ‘arms control’ negotiations (dual track decision) will be selected for preservation.

5.17 During its annual conference in October 1980, the Labour Party voted for unilateral nuclear disarmament and the removal of all US bases from UK. In August 1981 the Women’s Peace Camp outside Greenham Common was established. In 1982, the Secretary of State for Defence, Michael Heseltine, established Defence Secretariat 19 (DS 19) within the Ministry of Defence. The task given to DS 19 was to promote the government’s case on nuclear deterrence and challenge the arguments put forward by the nuclear disarmament movement. Records that document the government’s policy towards the anti-nuclear movement will be selected for preservation.

5.18 In October 1981, the United States announced the decision to phase out production of the Trident C4 missile and proceed with the development of the more advanced Trident D5 missile. In response Britain announced its decision to purchase the D5 missile. Policy papers relating to the decision will be selected for preservation.

5.19 In January 1988 work began to upgrade the Chevaline system. The project was the last major contract on the system before it was replaced by Trident. Policy records relating to this decision and its implementation will be selected for preservation.
In October 1991, the British government announced its intention to reduce the stockpile of WE 177 bombs by 50%. This was followed by a further announcement in June 1992 that all naval theatre nuclear weapons were to be removed from surface ships and aircraft. Records relating to the government’s policy on denuclearisation following the dissolution of the Soviet Union will be selected for preservation.

In July 1998, the Ministry of Defence issued the Strategic Defence Review, *Modern forces for a Modern World*. The review stressed Britain’s commitment to Trident for the foreseeable future. Background papers and drafts of the review will be selected for preservation.

Parliamentary oversight

Until the creation of the select committee system in June 1979, the ability of Parliament to scrutinise British nuclear weapons policy was limited to debates in the Chamber, parliamentary questions and reports of the Public Accounts Committee and the Select Committee on Estimates. With the creation of the select committee system, the ability of parliament to scrutinise the executive increased considerably. Records that describe the government’s response to the reports produced by the Select Committee on Estimates, the Public Accounts Committee and the Select Committee on Defence relating to nuclear policy and procurement will be selected for preservation.

Project management

Within the United Kingdom, nuclear weapons research and development takes place within the Ministry of Defence. The initiation and evaluation of proposals for new weapons systems was the responsibility of the Assistant Chief of the Defence Staff (Policy and Nuclear) who reported to the Deputy Under Secretary (Policy). Proposals for new nuclear weapons were drawn up as Staff Targets. Once initial agreement was reached, the project proceeded through a series of phases: Feasibility Study, Project Definition, Full Scale Development and Production. The decision to move from one stage to the next required the approval of ministers. Research and production of new nuclear warheads was the responsibility of the Controllerate of R&D Establishments, Research and Nuclear.

Nuclear co-operation for defence purposes between the UK and US is undertaken via the 1958 Mutual Defence Agreement (MDA). The Joint Atomic Information Exchange Group controls the release of nuclear weapons information of United States origin. At the working level, Joint Working Groups (JOWOGS) and Exchange of Information and Visit Reports (EIVRs) are the principal means of exchanging scientific and technical information. Between 1967 and 1998, at least 25 JOWOGS and 16 EIVRs are known to have existed. The reports and papers generated by these bodies will be selected for preservation. Each JOWOG is also subject to an annual audit to determine whether its work is still justified. The
records of decisions taken during this audit will be selected for preservation.

5.25 Separate working groups exist for the national warhead programme (Polaris and Trident). These are the Joint Steering Tasks Group, the Trident Joint Re-Entry Systems Working Group and the Joint Systems Performance and Assessment Group. The reports and papers generated by these bodies will be selected for preservation.

5.26 Detailed scientific and technical reports will not be selected for permanent preservation at The National Archives. The only exception will be those reports which led to major design alterations or resulted in policy changes. Those records not selected for permanent preservation will at present be retained at AWE for administrative reasons. When no longer required by AWE these records may be offered to a suitable archive in accordance with the criteria laid out in The National Archives’ Disposition Policy.

5.27 In addition, to the above, the records of the following projects will also be selected for preservation.

Chevaline

5.28 In 1967, the deputy Chief Scientific Advisor at the Ministry of Defence, Sir William Cook, established a Committee under Vic Macklen (Director of Atomic Weapons Development) to examine Soviet ABM systems and the implications for work carried out at AWRE. The work of the Macklen committee eventually led to the Super Antelope project. Policy records held by AWE relating to the work and conclusions of the Macklen committee will be selected for preservation.

5.29 Policy records relating to the development of the CQ941 Falstaff test vehicle will be selected for preservation.

5.30 In April 1972, the US authorities were given a presentation on KH793 at San Bernardino. Briefing papers for this visit will be selected for preservation.

5.31 In 1972, approval was given to proceed with the project at a cost of £175 million for a five-year period. Overall responsibility for the project transferred from Aldermaston to the Procurement Executive of the Ministry of Defence. Policy records describing these decisions will be selected for preservation.

5.32 Management responsibility for the project was shared between a number of different organisations. In January 1976, the project was placed under the control of the Admiralty’s Polaris Executive. In 1977 management of the project was transferred to British Aerospace and a Strategic Systems Executive was established in MoD to provide co-ordinated management of all nuclear projects. Records relating to this reorganisation, including the
work undertaken at RN (Bath), and the overall management of the programme will be selected for preservation.

**Trident**

5.33 The communiqué issued after the December 1979 summit between Prime Minister Thatcher and President Carter announced the joint decision to continue close US/UK nuclear co-operation and to maintain a credible British strategic deterrent. The statement laid the foundation for the sale of Trident to the UK. Records that detail the summit negotiations will be selected for preservation.

5.34 In June 1980, the British and American governments signed letters of agreement sanctioning the purchase of Trident. Records relating to these letters of agreement will be selected for preservation.

5.35 In July 1980, the government informed Parliament of its decision to purchase the Trident system to replace Polaris. The background to the decision is published in Defence Open Government Document 80/23. Records detailing these events and the government’s attitude in encouraging debate concerning the Trident purchase are to be selected for preservation.

5.36 In March 1982, the Government announced its decision to purchase Trident II (D5) rather than Trident I (C4). Bilateral discussions were held with the Americans at Colorado Springs to finalise the agreement. The agreement was ratified by an exchange of letters between the Prime Minister and President. The issues were laid out in Defence Open Government Document 82/1. Records detailing these events are to be selected for preservation.

5.37 The first batch of Trident warheads was completed in September 1992. The warheads were anglicised by the AWE. Policy records held by AWE which describe the development of the warheads will be selected for preservation.

5.38 In the early 1990s, the government announced its decision that Trident would possess a sub-strategic capability. Policy papers which detail this decision will be preserved.

**WE177**

5.39 The WE 177 free-fall nuclear bomb entered service with the RAF in 1966. Initially two variants were produced: the WE 177 A and the WE 177 B. In 1971, a C variant entered service. During the 1970s, substantial numbers of WE 177s were deployed with RAF aircraft (Buccaneer, Jaguar and Tornado) and with the Royal Navy. Records relating to the development of WE 177 and its intended military role(s) will be selected for preservation.
5.40 The decommissioning of all RAF WE 177 nuclear weapons was completed ahead of schedule in March 1998. Records which describe this process will be selected for preservation.

5.41 Prior to the withdrawal of WE 177, studies were initiated on a replacement weapon (TD 127). The project was eventually cancelled. Policy records detailing the background to TD 127 and other possible replacement theatre nuclear weapon will be selected for preservation.

**NATO stockpile**

5.42 From the mid 1950s, the British Army deployed US nuclear weapons in defence of NATO territory. The majority of these systems were battlefield nuclear weapons including the Corporal and Honest John surface-to-surface missiles. In 1976, these systems were replaced by the Lance missile. Four missile batteries were formed with British officers receiving training on the system at Bundeswehr Artillery School. Lance training flights were also conducted at Benbecula. Policy papers relating to the deployment and operation of the Lance and Honest John systems will be selected for preservation.

5.43 In addition to missile systems, the United States also supplied British forces in Europe with nuclear artillery shells; atomic demolition mines; ‘dual-key’ theatre nuclear weapons on RAF aircraft; and nuclear depth bombs for RAF maritime patrol aircraft. Records describing the deployment, operation and potential use of these munitions will be selected for preservation.

5.44 In July 1992, as part of President Bush’s Presidential Nuclear Initiative, all Lance missiles and nuclear artillery shells were to be removed from Europe and returned to America. Policy papers describing the implications and consequences of this decision will be selected for preservation.

**Site management**

5.45 Initially part of the Ministry of Supply, the Atomic Weapons Research Establishment (AWRE) at Aldermaston was transferred to the newly created UKAEA in 1954. In these early years, the nuclear facilities operated by UKAEA were managed as three groups: production, research and weapons. The weapons group consisted of AWRE together with the trials range at Foulness in Essex. In 1971, the production activities of UKAEA were transferred to the newly-created British Nuclear Fuels Ltd (BNFL) with headquarters at Risley. In 1981, the BNFL reprocessing facility at Windscale was renamed Sellafield to distinguish it from the remaining UKAEA activities on the same site. Records describing this reorganisation will be selected for preservation.

5.46 Further reorganisation occurred in 1973 when, by Act of Parliament, AWRE was transferred to Procurement Executive in the Ministry of Defence. In 1987, AWRE was combined with the two Royal Ordnance Factories at Burghfield and Cardiff to form the AWE. In 1989, the government
announced its intention to find a suitable private company to run AWE under a Government Owned/Contractor Operated arrangement. Policy papers relating to these events and decisions will be selected for preservation.

5.47 The company eventually selected to manage AWE was Hunting Brae Ltd who took over responsibility for the site on 1 April 1993. As part of a rationalisation programme undertaken by the new company, work was concentrated onto two sites at Aldermaston and Burghfield. Part of the site at Foulness was transferred to the Defence Evaluation and Research Agency. The remainder of the site and the site at Cardiff were closed down. Records that detail the policy process leading to these events will be selected for preservation.

5.48 Following the UK’s signature of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), AWE was given the lead responsibility for managing the UK’s Stockpile Stewardship and Capability Maintenance programme. Policy records which detail the initiation and management of this programme will be selected for preservation.

5.49 Routine administrative papers concerning the general management of each site will not be selected for preservation.

Health and safety

5.50 Throughout the history of AWRE and its successors, health and safety has been an important aspect of the production process. Employees at all sites are monitored for radioactive contamination. Atmospheric and liquid discharges are monitored by a variety of bodies including the National Radiological Protection Board, the Health and Safety Executive, the Environment Agency and the Nuclear Installation Inspectorate. Records which relate to health and safety policy on nuclear sites will be selected for preservation.

5.51 In August 1978, high levels of radiation were discovered at Aldermaston. The government established an inquiry into radiological safety under Sir Edward Pochin. His report was completed two months later and recommended the construction of three new radioactive waste processing facilities: one for solid waste, one for liquid waste and one for contaminated heavy equipment. Only the liquid waste facility was built. Completed in April 1990, and known as building A 91, the facility soon experienced difficulties and was closed for repairs in early 1991. Policy records relating to the immediate impact of the Pochin Report and its longer-term consequences will be selected for preservation.

5.52 In tandem with the construction of A 91, the government authorised the refurbishment of the plutonium processing facility (A 90) to meet health and safety standards. Construction work on A 90, which produces the plutonium components for Trident warheads, began in 1983 and involved a workforce of 1,200 employees. Estimated at a cost of £1,500 million, the A 90 facility
was the largest single investment at the Aldermaston site. The prime contractor for the project was the Property Services Agency. In 1987, John Brown Engineering were contracted to integrate the various construction works already underway on the site. Policy records that detail the construction of the A 90 facility will be selected for preservation.

5.53 Records describing AWE’s response to the following reports and inquiries will be selected for preservation:

- Pochin Report (1978)
- National Audit Office Report (1990)
- *Inside the Citadel*, Greenpeace (1990)
- The Reading Community Inquiry (1994)
- The Radioactive Waste Management Advisory Committee (1995)
- Health and Safety Executive (1998)

5.54 By law all accidents which occur within nuclear licensed sites have to be logged. Only records relating to those accidents that resulted in fatalities, serious injury or radioactive release will be selected for preservation.

### Emissions into the environment

5.55 All nuclear sites have a statutory requirement to disclose the level of radioactivity discharged into the environment. Only aggregated data contained in electronic datasets will be selected for preservation.

### Flight trials and nuclear tests

5.56 Since 1967, there have been 49 confirmed test flights of UK Polaris and Chevaline missiles. This number is broken down as follows: 27 Demonstration and Shakedown Operations firings from submerged submarines; 12 Chevaline firings from flat pad at Cape Canaveral; 6 Chevaline development flight tests; and 4 development flight tests of new Polaris rocket motors. Records, which describe the purpose and outcome of these tests, will be selected for preservation. Those records relating to logistics, telemetry and routine administration will not be selected for preservation.

5.57 In addition to flight trials, 19 underground nuclear tests have been conducted by Britain at the Nevada test site in America. Following the UK’s signature to the CTBT no further nuclear tests will be carried out. Records, which describe the purpose, yield and outcome of these tests, will be preserved. Routine administrative material will not be selected for preservation.

### Films and photographs

6.1 Films and photographs, which document the above themes, will be selected for permanent preservation. This will be achieved in conjunction with the Imperial War Museum (IWM). Those photographs not selected for...
permanent preservation will be offered to IWM, AWE museum or other suitable archives on a presentational basis in accordance with the criteria laid out in The National Archives' Disposition Policy.

7 **Models and 3D representations**

7.1 Scale models of artefacts and 3D representations, which document the above themes, will be selected for permanent preservation. The disposition of the models will be in accordance with the principles laid out in The National Archives' Disposition Policy.

8 **Implementation**

8.1 An implementation strategy will be agreed with the relevant departments and agencies as part of the regular review process.
Annex 1: Events and functions to be documented

9.1 The National Archives is actively seeking to preserve records in the following areas. It is not until a detailed review has been conducted that it will become apparent whether records have survived for all these events and functions.

9.2 Unless otherwise stated, only those records held by the lead department will be selected for preservation. If no lead department is apparent, or the records of the lead department have been destroyed, records will be selected from the Cabinet Office, Prime Minister’s Office, Foreign and Commonwealth Office and Ministry of Defence. Records held by other departments and agencies will be selected as appropriate.

9.3 January 1967: the treaty on principles governing the activities of states in the exploration and use of outer space, including the moon and other celestial bodies (Outer Space Treaty) was signed by governments of USA, USSR and UK. Further progress in arms control occurred in February 1967 when the treaty for the prohibition of nuclear weapons in Latin America (Treaty of Tlatelolco) was opened for signature. Policy records which detail the negotiations and ratification of both treaties will be selected for preservation.

9.4 September 1967: the United States announced its decision to deploy a limited Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) system – SAFEGUARD – to protect US Minuteman sites. To operate the system successfully, US authorities required information supplied from the early warning radar station at Fylingdales, Yorkshire. The system was discontinued in the early 1970s Policy records that document British involvement in ABM research (collaborative and independent) will be selected for preservation.

9.5 January 1968: NATO formally adopted the strategy document MC/13 commonly known as flexible response. Policy records that detail UK input into the evolution and implementation of NATO strategy will be selected for preservation.

9.6 July 1968: the governments of the USA, USSR and UK signed the treaty on the non-proliferation of nuclear weapons (Non-Proliferation Treaty, NPT). Records relating to the UK’s role in the negotiation and ratification of this treaty including its entry into force in 1970 will be selected for preservation.

9.7 Mid-1968: the Labour government initiated a comprehensive review of British nuclear weapons policy. Policy records relating to this review will be selected for preservation. Those records that detail the development of UK targeting policy will also be selected for preservation.

9.8 Throughout 1969, discussions continued on the employment of tactical nuclear weapons within NATO. These discussions resulted in the Healey-Schroder report which formed the basis for the *Provisional Political*
Guidelines for the initial Defensive Tactical Use of Nuclear Weapons approved by the Defence Planning Committee in 1970. Records which detail the debate within NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group (NPG) over nuclear release procedures and subsequent amendments will be selected for preservation.

9.9 November 1969: the first round of the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) conducted between the USA and USSR commenced in Helsinki, Finland. The purpose of SALT was to place a ceiling on nuclear warhead production and delivery systems. Over the next 36 months seven rounds of talks were undertaken. The SALT process culminated in May 1972 with the signing of the SALT I interim treaty which placed limits on the number of fixed site Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles. Records that detail the role, objectives and reaction of the UK to SALT I, including bilateral discussion with the US, will be selected for preservation.

9.10 March 1970: the Governments of Britain, the Netherlands and West Germany sign the Interim Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Isotope Separation by means of the Gas Centrifuge Process. Policy records relating to the UK’s involvement in the development of centrifuge technology for isotope separation will be selected for preservation.

9.11 February 1971: the governments of the USA, USSR and UK signed the treaty on the prohibition of the emplacement of nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction on the sea-bed and ocean floor (Sea-Bed Treaty). Records relating to the UK’s role in the negotiation, ratification and monitoring of this treaty will be selected for preservation.

9.12 March 1971: the International Atomic Energy Authority (IAEA) established guidelines to safeguard nuclear material produced by signatories to the NPT (INFCIRC/153). To monitor the export guidelines, NPT member states established the Zangger Committee. Records held by the DTI that detail the development of British policy in relation to IAEA safeguards will be selected for preservation.

9.13 September 1971: agreement on measures to reduce the risk of outbreak of nuclear war between the USA and the USSR (US-Soviet Nuclear Accidents Agreement) was signed in Washington. Records relating to the UK’s role in this agreement will be selected for preservation.

9.14 May 1972: US-Soviet treaty on the limitation of anti-ballistic missile systems (SALT ABM Treaty) was signed in Moscow. Records relating to the UK’s role in the negotiation of this treaty will be selected for preservation.

9.15 June 1973: US-Soviet Agreement on the prevention of nuclear war was signed in Washington. Records relating to the UK’s role in the passage of this agreement will be selected for preservation.

9.16 October 1973: during the six day war in the Middle East, US nuclear forces were placed on high state of nuclear alert. Records detailing the
consequences of US nuclear alerts within the UK will be selected for preservation.

9.17 In May 1974, India exploded a small nuclear device using material supplied from its Canadian supplied research reactor. Meeting in London, representatives of Britain, the USA, France, Canada, West Germany, Japan and the USSR agreed a list of sensitive technologies which would not be exported unless adequate safeguards were in place. The group was subsequently enlarged and initially known as the London Supplier Group. The name of the group was later amended to the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Records relating to the initiation of the group in 1974 and its subsequent meetings to discuss NSG guidelines for the control of nuclear related exports will be selected.

9.18 June 1974: NATO heads of state meeting in Brussels signed the Declaration on Atlantic Relations. The declaration was later approved and published by North Atlantic Council meeting in Ottawa. The Ottawa Declaration specifically assigned a role to both British and French nuclear forces in the defence of NATO territory. Records that detail British input into the declaration and the role played by UK nuclear forces in the defence of NATO will be selected for permanent preservation.

9.19 July 1974: US-Soviet Treaty on the limitation of underground nuclear weapons tests (Threshold Test Ban Treaty – TTBT) was signed in Moscow. The treaty placed constraints on UK testing activities in the US. Records that detail the discussions between the UK and US on this issue including the ratification and monitoring of the treaty will be selected for preservation.

9.20 November 1974: Joint US-Soviet statement on the question of further limitations of strategic offensive arms was signed in Vladivostock. The Vladivostock Agreement placed further limits on the numbers of strategic delivery systems possessed by both sides. Records which detail the UK’s role and involvement in this statement will be selected for preservation.

9.21 1975: the first review conference of the NPT was held in Geneva. By the end of the year 97 states had signed the treaty. It was also agreed to hold a Review Conference every five years. Records that document the negotiations at the 1975, 1980, 1985, 1990 and 1995 Conferences will be selected for preservation (see also 9.49 below).

9.22 May 1976: US-Soviet Treaty on underground nuclear explosions for peaceful purposes (Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty – PNET) was signed in both Moscow and Washington. Records relating to the UK’s role in the negotiation and ratification of this treaty will be selected for preservation. Those records that detail the UK’s development programme in relation to PNET will also be selected for preservation.

9.23 July 1977: The Carter administration announced its intention to deploy Enhanced Radiation Weapons (the neutron bomb) in West Germany. Despite public hostility, the decision was eventually supported by German
Chancellor Helmut Schmidt. In April 1978, President James Carter unilaterally cancelled deployment of the weapon. The episode caused a major rift in US-German relations. Records that detail the British role in the neutron bomb negotiations will be selected for preservation.

9.24 October 1977: UK-Soviet agreement on the prevention of accidental nuclear war was signed in Moscow. Records relating to the UK’s role in the negotiation and ratification of this agreement will be selected for preservation.

9.25 October 1977: In an attempt to resolve the question of whether fast breeder technology posed an unacceptable proliferation risk, the UN sponsored the International Nuclear Fuel Cycle Evaluation (INFCE) which met in Vienna from 1977-79. Records which detail the discussions at the INFCE and the British role in the negotiations will be selected for preservation.

9.26 June 1978: At the UN Special Session on Disarmament, the UK government declared that in support of the NPT it would not use nuclear weapons against a non-nuclear weapons state party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, unless it acted in association or alliance with a Nuclear Weapon State. Records that detail the government’s decision to offer negative security assurances will be selected for preservation.

9.27 January 1979: Meeting at the Guadeloupe summit, Prime Minister James Callaghan received informal assurances from President Carter that Britain would be permitted to purchase Trident missiles from the USA. Records that detail the objectives and outcome of the summit will be selected for preservation.

9.28 June 1979: US-Soviet treaty on the limitation of strategic offensive arms (SALT II Treaty) was signed in Vienna. The SALT II treaty established for both parties, a ceiling of 2,400 ICBMs, SLBMs and heavy bombers with limits placed on the number of MIRVed warheads. The SALT II treaty was criticised by conservative members of the US Congress. The treaty was eventually withdrawn by President Carter before a vote was taken. Records relating to this treaty and the role of the British government in the negotiations will be selected for preservation.

9.29 December 1979: In response to the Soviet deployment of the SS 20 missile, NATO agreed to modernise its long-range theatre nuclear forces by stationing Cruise and Pershing missiles in five European countries including the UK. Deployment of the missiles was to begin 1983. Records that document the development of British policy to these events will be selected for preservation.

9.30 1980: The UK government approved the construction of a tritium production plant at Chapel Cross. Policy records that detail this decision and subsequent implementation will be selected for preservation.
9.31 July 1980: The British government announced its decision to buy Trident missiles from the USA. Policy papers relating to this decision will be selected for preservation.

9.32 June 1981: the Israeli air force attacked and destroyed the Iraqi nuclear reactor site at Tammuz. Records that detail the reaction of UK government to these events will be selected for preservation.

9.33 August 1981: the US administration advanced proposals (the zero option) to remove intermediate nuclear forces (INF) from Europe. The proposal was rejected by the USSR. Records that detail the role of the British government in the subsequent INF negotiations will be selected for preservation.

9.34 April 1982: Argentina invaded the Falkland Islands. In response, a naval task force was assembled and sent to the South Atlantic. Records that detail the public debate over the role played by nuclear capable forces during the conflict will be selected for preservation.

9.35 March 1983: during a television address President Reagan announced his determination to develop and deploy a space-based strategic defence initiative (SDI) to counter Soviet ballistic missiles. Records that detail the response and involvement of the British government in the initiative will be selected for preservation.

9.36 October 1983: NATO’s Nuclear Planning Group meeting at Montebello agreed to modernise battlefield nuclear weapons and reduce NATO’s nuclear armoury. The decision was not made public until 1987. Records which detail the role of the British government in these discussions will be selected for preservation.

9.37 January 1986: Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a plan for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons by the end of the century. Records that describe the reaction of the British government to this proposal will be selected for preservation.

9.38 October 1986: President Reagan and President Gorbachev agreed to meet at Reykjavik, Iceland. The discussions resulted in a number of significant arms reduction measures. Records describing the role and response of the British government will be selected for preservation.

9.39 1987: Seven nations, including the UK, agreed to establish common guidelines to cover the sale of missile systems. To monitor the agreement, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) was established. Policy records that detail Britain’s involvement in the MTCR will be selected for preservation.

9.40 July 1990: NATO Council approved the London Declaration on a Transformed North Atlantic Alliance. Records relating to this decision and the background to the declaration will be selected for preservation.

9.42 July 1991: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) was signed in Moscow between the US and USSR. The agreement reduced number of warheads held by each side from 10,000 to 6,000. Records that document the British negotiating position on the treaty and its consequences will be selected for preservation.

9.43 November 1991: NATO issued new strategic concept (MC 14/3) which replaces previous concept of ‘flexible response’. Records documenting the role of the British government will be selected for preservation.

9.44 1993: the START II Treaty signed between US and Russia announced further reductions in the number of warheads held by each country to 3,500 by 2007. Records that document the role and response of the British government to the treaty and its consequences will be selected for preservation.

9.45 1993: In announcing its decision to impose a moratorium on nuclear testing, the US also imposed a de facto moratorium on the UK nuclear testing programme. Records which detail the UK response to this decision and the negotiations with the US on the matter will be selected for preservation.

9.46 May 1995: the NPT Review and Extension Conference held at the United Nations agreed to extend indefinitely the provisions of the NPT. Records that document the negotiations and role played by the British government will be selected for preservation.

9.47 June 1995: French nuclear tests resumed in the South Pacific. Records that document the reaction of the British government to the resumption of testing will be selected for preservation.

9.48 March 1996: France, UK and US signed the protocol to 1985 South Pacific Nuclear-Weapons Free Zone (NWFZ) Treaty (Treaty of Rarotonga). This was followed in April by the UK signing the protocol of Pelindaba which created a NWFZ in Africa. Records that relate to the negotiations and passage of this and all other NWFZ treaties will be selected for preservation.

9.49 August 1996: the Australian Prime Minister established the Canberra Commission. Its report recommended the complete elimination of nuclear weapons. Records that document the reaction of British government to the report will be selected for preservation.

9.50 September 1996: the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was opened for signature in UN General Assembly with all five nuclear states signing on the first day. Records that document Britain’s role the passage of this treaty will be selected for preservation. In addition, those records, which describe
the UK’s role in the previous trilateral UK-US-USSR negotiations on the CTBT between 1977-1980, will also be selected for preservation.

9.51 May 1998: India and Pakistan conducted a series of underground nuclear test explosions. The reaction of the British government to these events will be documented.