CAB 195/2

WAR CABINET

MINUTES

W.M.(42) 156th Meeting – W.M.(43) 99th Meeting
I. Military Situation.

N. Africa.

P.M. G. have no continuous line – and only expect another 8,000 men in by 2 wks.


3/5 Italian Divns “


M/East:

Weather bad – rain – no progress save on roads, where mines etc.

Followed G. on main road and sent part thro’ Msus to intercept.

11/Hussars & Royals got into them – results not known.

Posns of Afrika Korps and Italian Divns. An Italian Armoured Divn.

Landed Tripoli in last month is now moving up.

Problem now to overcome maintenance diffies.

80/40,000 fighting troops (G. and I.) + tanks 130.

Rlway open to Capuzzo and repaired to El Hamid. Tobruk 2,000 tons before we retired : hope now to work it at 1,000 t. p. day.

Distances : fr. Alex to El. Alamein …… comparison with U.K.

Can’t hope for forward move for some time – on this a/c. Unlikely to be able to fight them for a month.

29 offrs. 73.0 our casualties in last week.

31,236 in cages (8,000 G.) still more to come in.

Russia.
Round Moscow – concentrations of R. but nil occurred.

Nr. Stalingrad 2 attacks (R) both N. and S. The southern one has made progress – and cuts both railway lines leading to S. Has great possibilities. If they can close the pincers they will get surrender prisoners of G. armies within – and will free Volga.

S.R. counter-attacks have secured the Georgian pass.

P.M. G. can’t stand thro’ winter on this line.

C.I.G.S. Think not – v. dangerous esp. v. attacks from distance of present attack road. Stalingrad.

This would also imperil the G. In Caucasus.

II. Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Welles speech – v. good – effect of Willkie may be to drive Admin nearer to us – may make them more anxious to talk with us about post-war relations.

P.M. The trouble with State Dpt. at bottom, is Ottawa.

A.E. Their wish now is for early talks on political, rather than economic, questions.

P.M. Willkie – a) hope for support b) any slight. Influenced almost wholly by that.

Two things I cd. say. a) Article in Collyers – written by U.S. journalist and passed by U.S. censor: only then did B. censor pass it. But agree it was wrong. b) He thinks I declined to see him at Whitehouse. That wasn’t my fault.

I wd. be quite willing to ask President if I shd. get in touch with them.

First, I wd. explain a) & b) thro’ Halifax. If he gives friendly answer I might refer to his past help. Then we might ask him to come here.

P.M. Mr. Chang Kai Shek – shd. be asked to come over here.

III. Call-up of Royal Marines.

A.V.A. P.M. was careful in ‘41’ to say it didn’t apply to volunteers.
But on 22/10 M/L. said 19yr. old pledge still applied.

Admy. bound by no pledge save tht. don’t send boys under 17 to sea w’out consent. of parents.

7.500 and 10.000 R.M. Divn. Youths = 4%. Only volunteers wd. go.

Relief fr. pledge is asked for.

M/L. Marines hitherto covered by Army pledge.

S/Air. Admy. applied it to facts but never said so in public.

A.V.A. We’ve always sent them to sea.

Ques. now is land opns. for C.C.O.

M/L. Not worth risking a Parl’y row.

Turn down.
Beveridge Report on Social Services.

K.W. Publish Fr or Sat. Unwise to hold it up.

P.M.G. in statement to say Rpt. only just rec’d. will need careful cons’n.

A.G. unlikely to quarrel with that – and T.U.C. also want this for exam’n.

Whitely. No debate before Feb.

K.W. Rpt. to go to R.P. Cttee and thence to Cabinet.

P.M. Cost.

K.W. £100M. immediate (P.M. £86M).

P.M. If produced as part of post-war plan, wd. have figured largely. All these things have to be considered together. Finance can’t be left out of it.

Like this Rpt. but must see how it fits in to p-war plan as a whole.

Ought to finish Art 7 conv’n with U.S. If we promise this largesse, far ahead of U.S. standards, they may say “we are being asked to pay for this”.

S/Doms. U.S. reaction may be good – they may be impressed by our boldness.

Hope we shan’t take too long in consdg. on Dept. level – shd. come to Ministers soon. Well in advance of Feb. Debate.

P.M. Most serious reaction is on finance. Rate of Taxation.

K.W. These recomm’n must be considered in relation to claims of other services on the money available.

A.E. Reminder, too, on publn. of necessary expenditure on armaments after the war.

P.M. Two stage ending of war. While we finish off Japan, after collapse of Hitler, there will be interval during which United Nations will go forward in companionship: and during that these plans can be matured.

L.P. When opinion crystallises, pity to let it appear tht. Govt. dragged reluctantly to support it. Cd. we not welcome it in principle?
P.M.&K.W.  Indicated some dissent.

M/Inf.  Date. Tuesday because Front Line due out on Monday.

H.O.  Wd. prefer Wed. from that point of view.

M/Inf.  Agreed – Vote Office on Tuesday morning. Press Wed. a.m. – advance copies this wk. end.

Bev. to broadcast? – Agreed : after publication.

P.M.  May I see W.A.J.’s formula for referring to this in his reconstruction statement?

Indicated lines on which this might be drawn.
I. **Man Power.**

L.P. Gap 980,000 add. No exaggeration – some wd. say optimists.

Deficiency to be shared betwn. Services and supply.

Before balance can be struck W. Cab. must decide proportions betwn. 3 Services.

We cd. then allocate : and M/L. cd. settle intakes for early ’43.

No squeezing or pruning wd. materially affect the mass of the gap.

Cuts in Service wd. have some effect on supply demands.

If Navy ships succeeded only small man-power saving thro’ economy.

If we want max. no. aircraft, only economy savings in R.A.F.

Balance wd. fall on Army.

S/Doms. What conception is build-up for supply?

L.P. Scrutiny of Service Dept. demands is prcdg. I made cut of 150,000 in order to forestall sugg’n that gap cd. be closed by those economies.

S/Doms. My point was capital or maintenance?

M/S. Our trend must be upwds for 4/6 months. After July ’43 our demands are only 5,000. First half only 67,000 [Correct these figures]

W.O. Capital equipment not yet reached. But commun’n requirements already cut by 25%.

M/S. Switch of prod’n twds. non urgent requirements goes on continuously.

S/Doms. Have demands bn. cut in light of experience?

W.O. To some extent – but experience is limited.

L.P. You can’t affect supply demands for man-power substantially (without or) except by reducing Service strengths.

S/Air. We are short of men.
P.M. You have made expansion programme wh. isn’t being realised – prob. for lack of aircraft.

S/Air. M.A.P. told me tht. given men and tools bomber programme wd. reach 100% output by end ’43.

P.M. R.A.F. shd. be held back until aircraft catches up.

Army supply shd. be held back to equalise with Army strengths.

Navy must have their programme.

M.A.P. Key people shd. not be cut – or taken out.

M/L. a) Army is short of tradesmen. With co-op n. Supply Dpts I can take away less in total. If I can have a few highly-skilled men, they can train others in Army. This wd. be less injurious to industry.

b) Change-overs. Hope M.A.P. will improve on this.

M.A.P. Hope so.

P.M. Ammunitions for A.D.G.B. I wd. have no more than we had in Politz even tho’ no more guns.

G.A.F. not in pos'n. now to bring the same weight on us as in 1940/41.

M/L. Cd. R.A.F. Regt. not be used now in dual capacity. For Ground-staff.

S/Air. Of 75.000 – 25.000 = A.A. Gunners

25.000 = exposed Fighter Aerodromes

25.000 = training and oddments.

P.M. Navy Priorities – a) Anti U-Boat. b) Merchantmen.

L.P. Then, subject to small cut, give R.N. the personnel requ'd

P.M. Wdn’t object to holding some vessels (not anti U-Boat) in reserve.

M/L. Cd. we at least confirm the figures of 1.6m. as maximum supply?

I must then consult with B/Trade and other Ministers.

L.P. Cab. shd. understand what this means. 500.000 of less essential industries.

P.M. Let Cab. decide that this is the target at wh. M/Labour shd. aim.
Agreed.

H.O. Have cut C. Def. by $\frac{1}{6}$ ($\frac{1}{3}$ in N.F.S.). But shall need some more for replacement of wastage.

P.M. a) Blitz 1940/41 shd. be taken as more than worst we must guard against.

b) Parachute attack. We know now how little force they cd. put in.

Affects scale of airfield defence.

M/L. Cd. there be re-examination of demands for part-time service in Home Guard and C. Defence.

W.O. We are 1¾m. now : we are aiming at 2m and W.O. askg. for another ¼m. I can stop the last.

M/L. I wd. like to refrain from directing more people in.

P.M. Re-assess invasion risk. We shd. have enough warning to build up again.

W.O. Consider a H.G. Reserve. When trained, let him off subject to refreshers.

M/L. Since our victories, tendency to “case-up”.

Propose therefore statement on man-power shortage in S. Session. House shd. know salient facts.

P.M. Certainly – when we have got nearer the end of our examination.

P.M. R.A.F. Total Squadrons.

My weekly returns don’t look anything like this expansion.

Bomber squadrons 61. in this country.

Fighter “ 96)

Coastal “ 40)

Army Co-op 16)

Oddments 6) 219

S/Air. Figures in Table X will certainly be fulfilled as at end ’42.

Admittedly 1944 is less certain.

P.M. 1st shot. 2nd shot.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Navy</th>
<th>300</th>
<th>400</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A.F.</td>
<td>700</td>
<td>700</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>600</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

3rd shot.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Service</th>
<th>Cut</th>
<th>100,000</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>R.A.F</td>
<td>350,000</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Army</td>
<td>450,000</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>


S/Air. Fighters determined more by overseas requirements than anti-raids.

P.M. Cdn’t night fighters be made dual-purpose?

P.M. In Torch. We prescribe 60,000 fighting men.

The nos. who went were 180,000. The 120,000 were tails.

S/Doms. These rear-ward form help the other Services.

L.P. Cd. Services and Supply Dpts say what they can do.

P.M. I will prescribe a task for you to work out.

W.O. Cd. the nos. be related to Jan ‘43’ onwds.
W.M.(42) 163rd Meeting

1st December 1942

I. Man Power.

A.V.A. Strong strategical case for demands: but recognise man-power shortage.

Our requirements made no allowance for contingencies. 40%. 50%. 60% due to contingencies in last 3 years.

Don’t see how we can cut serv. personnel – tho’ appt’d. Cttee to make cuts.

We will take P.M.’s figure and make it do: so long as Cab. realise a) it will mean retardation of everything but anti U-Boat craft and manning b) extra strategic demands on us will call for further resource.

M/L. Can’t absorb 186 in shipbuilding.

A.V.A. Over 18 months: 57,000 = transferred capacity. Other intake at rate of 88,000 p.a.

Apart fr. transfer. no more intake than in the past.

W.O. a) Army will run down by 100,000 in ‘43, taking a/c of wastage and casualties. Since July had to pass to offensive role overseas.

On M/L. figures it will keep its level, on same assumptions re wastage etc.

If a) accepted, no chance of carrying out pr. Directive.

If b) “, some chance of keepg. up offensive strength by cutting out anti-invasion prep

S/Doms. Shdn’t M/L have increased M/S. pro rata?

M/L. No. Because M/S. programmes taper off before Army does.

M/S. So far as requirmts. are cut, we can make a saving.

I assume a) cut in requirements
b) withdrawal of man-power mainly after June ’43.
   By then we can hope to get a) settled in detail.
c) Not to be given to M/L. local office as a mandate.

Subject to these, don’t raise violent obj.
W.O. We shall have to improve cuts in our requirements on M/S. otherwise we can’t do what you ask.

P.M. Admy. heavy shell – over 6 inch. Return of stock and consumption up to date + production. But you’re banking on more than you’ve figures up to date.

Return to be made.

R.A.F. S/Air: Effect of loss of 75,000 to M.A.P. will be 2500 bombers in 2 years.

= 30,000 men and women on personnel
   30,000 on economies
   20,000 on training organisation
   5,000 works squadrons cut by 50%
   20,000 R.A.F. Regt. cut by 25%
   15,000 cut in Balloon Command. Public reaction
   15,000 15% cut in Fighter Command
   25,000 M/East. 34 squadrons cut fr. expansion. 10/12 U.S. squadrons there now & 44 eventually.
   50,000 India. 48 Squadrons cut fr. expansion
   5,000 W. Africa

P.M. 502 on 31/12/43.

C.A.S. About 100 by then : 140 by mid ’44.

S/Doms. Use Indians to man squadrons in India.

S/Air. We’re trying to expand our training organisation. Will take time.

We don’t know how many aircraft M/P. may have got out of U.S. If he gets many. M.A.P. shd. have use, & we more men.

C.A.S. These are not hard & fast decisions – we may want to spread differently.

M.A.P. S/Cripps.

Our calculns by Dept. 75 red\(^n\) = 2,500 heavy bombers by end ’44.
150 red\(^n\) = 5,000 “ “ “ “

Don’t believe these figures are watertight. Haven’t had time to go into it myself.

Wd. hope for economies in industry wh. wd. balance a cut of 75,000.
Intake rate: depends on mobility etc. have taken in 29,000 in past: with larger industry: greater potential dilution believe we cd. absorb at required increased rate.

M/L. Was hoping for greater efficiency fr. this industry.

When we have put in more than 20/25,000 we have had complaints tht, they aren’t put to work. Managements. haven’t bn. made to use their head.

Take 25,000 a month to end June: then look for more on transfer from M/Supply.

M.A.P. Want the increased man-power early – meanwhile can improve efficiency and then later we won’t want so many more.

C.A.S. Loss to M.A.P. will be on heavy bombers mainly – may mean 20 squadrons by end ’43.

M/L. Put M.A.P. to 100 cut: leaving R.A.F. with 225

M.A.P. Agreed.

Civil Defence.

P.M. Not askg. H.O. to bear sole responsibility. Glad to take that myself.

M/L. What view about gas warfare:

P.M. Can be cut down.

M/L. Large nos. employed. What prep ns. are G. making for anti-gas?

P.M. Anti-gas might be looked into. Offensive gas however is already up to saturation point: prod nth cd. be suspended.

H.O. Decontamination – almost all 1.a. employees.

Anti-gas prod nth down to bare requirements.

If C.O.S. & M/Defence give me a lower risk, v. well. But any night he cd. send 40 over – even tho; much weaker – I must be ready all over the country.

Nos. in 1940/41 were not more than needed. We have since then cut down – as at top of p.2.
Room for cut in London. But S. Wales v. few whole timers. N.F.S. is thin on the ground & fire risk is enormous. Bolero shd. increase the risks in certain areas of concentration.

Modest squeeze only.

P.M. You cdn’t have an assurance they won’t do it. They will. But they won’t do it often or heavy. Scale and frequency will be substantially less than in 40/41. The risks are less : you can’t have the same insurance.

N. African front will draw off G. aircraft.

M/L. Wd. take 50/60,000 – if w’out tags to them.

H.O. Cdn’t give you that figure.

L.P. But you have made do with part-timers in S. Wales & in Scotland.

P.M. Make a scheme to yield 100,000 and we’ll see what’s involved.

M/L. Will you need all the airfields wh. we are bldg?

Do the Army still need so much bldg?

Shd. Bolero programme be reviewed in light of U.S. latest attitudes.

Won’t much of U.S. effort now go to N. African Front.

P.M. Civil Defence, purely defensive = ⅓ of R.A.F.

L.P. Why not apply to C. Defence the conception of dual-purpose Army.

Agreed. H.O. to explore with L.P.

P.M. 3.160.000 RAF and M.A.P.
4.180.000 Army and Supply

Let the 2 pairs consider how they cd. adjust inter se.

P.M. Let Dpts. tell me what wd. be effect of my original proposals.

Government Staffs.

L.P. M/Home Security to rank as Service Dept. for this purpose.

S/Doms. Clerical labour in munitions industries.
P.M. In next few days – heads of proposals showg. how to meet the cuts.

On the basis of printed figures save 100 to M.A.P.

War Cab. again a week today.
W.M.(42) 164th Meeting 3rd December 1942

I. Position of Italy.

A.E. Little diff. betw. P.M’s memo and mine. Save this –

If your forecasted events occur, then follow a nil. commitment to help her.

P.M. Not automatically. If it begins to fight G. and ask our help, our decision cd. await on circs.

C.O.S. referred to dangers of commitment. But it will be for us to decide in the event. Is Malta a commitment or an asset? A worthwhile commitment is an asset.

Musso. may be able to hold the country down – with his Fascist control + Gestapo.

A.E. Peace-feelers fr. Italy.

M/L. No names shd. be mentioned. Danger of securing peace while rivelting Fascism on Italy.

P.M. Not prepared to tie my hands to deal only with non-Fascists. Enormous advantage to us if Italy came out, whatever the political complexion of the men who lead her out.

P.M. U.S. v. anxious to deal with Italy and bring her out of the war. They are going pretty strong on this line.

H.O. Are we not leaving too much of the political shaping of N. Africa to the U.S.A.?

Don’t let’s leave too much to them as regards Italy.

At least we must be in on it fr. the start.

A.E. Darlan’s decl’ is unilateral inspiration of his own – and I have said so, in H/Commons.

But I wd. like to ask U.S. wthr. they knew and what they think.

H.O. Has Eisenhower got competent political advisers?

M/L. Are we going to be excluded fr. Dakar?
P.M.  U.S. view = B. hated and U.S. loved everywhere. This (+our attitude) leads the Darlans to cling to the Americans.

A.E.  As rgds. Italy. we must wait and see what man will emerge. We shan’t try to build up Ghandi or anyone else.

H.O.  Our x/ in para 14. I wd. have thght we cd. begin to provoke reaction v. Fascism.

A.E.  Disintegration yes – but no anti F. element to deal with after 20 yrs. of Fascism.

Peace feelers fr. Italy. Minnows so far.

Propose not to pursue any of these at present. Promise nothing in advance.

Will, however, tell U.S. and Russia for what is worth : ask if they’ve heard anything.

P.M.  Agreed – let us look at the pos^n when it arises.

Albania.  Proposal approved.

Prisoners of War.


This decision reached after they had seen German Govt’s reply.

P.M.  You will doom our men to indefinite shackling.

Their cond^n was apology and undertakg. about tying men in action.

It was a Cab. decision & C.R.A. agreed with it. Now you want to back out.

Canada is behavg. v. badly.

A.E.  They are going ahead & announce. That will queer our pitch.

We must act with them.

P.M.  I’m ready to surrender.

A.E.  But let’s do it on basis of appeal by Swiss – ask Swiss to make this appeal. Read out text of proposed telegram to Swiss –
a) repudiating G. Note: measures only taken with object of procuring a mitigation of harsh treatment inflicted on B. prs.

b) if they will ask both Govts. to unshackle on a given day, we will act immediately.

P.M. “On/contrary as we at disp. of P.P. will show they have observed in strictest manner every provn. of the Convention [have immed. remedied anything to wh. P.P. have drawn attnt'n] [I was queried. “Any conflict has always reqd. immed. attnt’n”]

A.E. Announce when Swiss appeal comes in. Urge them to do it v. quickly.

P.M. Telegram telling Doms. wht. we have done and askg. no independent action meanwhile.

Foreign Service.

P.M. Cab. Cttee to try to reach an agreement. Composition - ? interested parties.

A.E. Don’t want to re-open decision taken by War. Cab. 18 months.

P.M. Small Cttee or Conf. of Ministers: and I will choose personnel of Cttee.
Foreign Affairs


b) Mack recalled. Says story of our unpopularity in N. Africa is quite untrue.

Parade there – most enthusiasm for B. troops. B. national anthem.

Genl. Bettois at Gib : thought gradually work in others eg. Catroux. Darlan will go in end because unpop. with French.

Noguls unreliable therefore Morocco a cause for anxiety.

L.S.A.  “Massacre” at Oran – any news?

A.E.  None.

A.V.A.  No news from Godfrey.

M/L.  Jibuta?

A.E.  Hope it’s going well : but no def. news.

A.E.  Bettois “the mystic of Pétain was appalling”. Giraud 48 hrs too late.

P.M.  Dangerous if this so handled tht. U.S. had to decide to ruin Darlan at all costs while we backed de Gaulle. Quite a risk of this.

A.E.  If you are patient enough, there’s chance of bringing these people together.

Later on U.S. shd. employ some of these well disposed French like Bettois.

Keep on altering complexion of administration by introducing people well disposed to us until they say they can get along w’out Darlan – i.e. let French themselves remove him.

Mission of M/Production to U.S.A.

P.M.  Welcome home – bringing sheaf of a certain size wh. we’ll go into later.
M/P. Puttg. in memo. to supplement President’s Lt.

My policy was to negotiate with Services, bring F.D.R. in only in deadlock.

Shipping – 27 m. tons for import programme only : other promises for help with mil. shipping needs.

Will Ministers suspend judgement on F.D.R.s letter until they see the whole picture.

Aircraft was most difficult. After v. gt. tussle, Arnold’s good will is behind the new agreement : based on 80% fulfilment of 80,000 combat aircraft. We will get our whole allocation if they reach 80% and a bonus if they get more.

A.V.A. Escort vessels. Principle 1 : 1 : 35 being observed in latest allocation.

Prisoners of War.

P.M. Stokes’ Ques. Propose to tell the truth – no time to consult them (ie for prev consult with Dom.Govts) thought matter was urgent.

A.E. Nuisance when we were waitg. for Swiss appeal.

G. say they will release our men for a week at Xmas.

P.M. W’out waiting for Swiss appeal – let us say on hearing of this G. offer we have decided to unshackle G. prs. – wh. we only adopted in hope of securing better treatment for our men.

A.E. This was made by Cttee. We have acted thro’ Swiss Govt.

P.M. We shall never get a better way out.

A.E. Will inform Swiss tonight tht. we propose to say this tomorrow.

Will draft statement for P.M. to make tomorrow after Ques.
W.M.(42) 168th Meeting 14th December 1942

I   Military Situations.

N. Guinea.


H.S. troops v. Buna. Japs. v few them now : another attempt to re-inforce has failed.

No cause for immed. anxiety.

Russia.

Russian effort in last week confined to resistg. G. attack – successfully until end of week when they failed stop G. penetration S.E. of Stalingrad.

II   Foreign Affairs.

Jews in Poland.

P.M. Any confirm" of story of wholesale massacre? By mass electrical methods.

A.E. Nothg. direct : but indic" tht. it may be true. Can’t confirm the method.

Know tht. Jews are being withdrawn eg. fr. Norway and sent to Poland, for some such purposes evidently.

Agreement reached on joint decl" – prob for issue Thursday. This commits us to punishg. those responsible.

Madagascar.

A.E. Agreement signed.

Switzerland.

A.E. G. are makg. old demand again. W’out agreement on this, they will make the excuse for not unchaining our men.

P.M. Wait. They will unchain for Xmas. They may not resume.

A.E. We needn’t comment on G. note for a few days.
P.M.  Wdn’t absolutely exclude mtg G. wishes by announcing. tht. “orders have
bn. given tht. no G. pr. will be tied”.

Leaving it to be understood tht. they will be killed.

Think it over. Say nil now abt. G. note.

Tell Doms. tht. this is wht. we are going to do.

II  Admission of Jewish Children from Bulgaria to Palestine.

O.S.  Last month J. Agency went to H. Commr on behalf of Genl. emmigrn of
Jews. That was turned down, rightly, on Govt. policy.

When Ag. came to see me they asked only on behalf of children – they
seemed to realise objs. to adm of adults.

Telegram exchanged. I sugg’d 5.000 of wh. 500 wd. be. adult women.

Agreed.
W.M.(42) 170th Meeting 17th December 1942

I. Building Programmes.

M/P. 115,000 short on programme.

Immed. cut of 15% on value will give us relief needed.

Suggest therefore I shd. examine how cuts can best be shared out.

Not a uniform cut – I will distribute this over-all cut.

M.A.P. Aerodromes included in super pref. works.

M/L. Doesn’t meet me. Airfields stand out in special pos(n) (43 not started).

Strategic pos(n) shd. (43 not started) be defined first.

M/P. Can’t do that.

Is Bolero to stand, or be modified.

S/Air. Cd. meet M/L. on this.

Roughly 51 sites under cons(n) or cleared or ready for requisition etc.

Of these, can say we shan’t want labour for 42. Either we cd. do them ourselves or in N.I. : or U.S. will provide labour. We wd. give up 30/31.

I wd. discuss which with M/Ag.

Leave it to be discussed with Dpts. concerned.

M/L. Shd. we make Bolero provision or not?

Little of accomm(n) constructed is occupied.

W.O. In reply to P.M.

Assuming 5 Divn. Bolero (490,000) by April 1943.

M/L. diff’t is tht. tho’ no. due by Apl. reduced by 50% our instns stand tht. they will come later. Thus, tho’ work can be postponed, it can’t be cancelled.

£10m. contracts stopped altogether. But still assumg. whole of storage & hospital accomm(n) will be required.
M/L. Morale – main trouble now = living accomm

M/H. Supported this.  
   a) Houses needg. more than 1st aid repair (w’in limit of £150-£200) : 97.000 : labour was diverted to Bolero.  
   b) Now at point when modest bldg. of new houses must begin in rural areas. M/Ag. confirmed tht. this was necessary for food prod.  

M/H. Scottish housing problem even more acute.  

W.O. Overall redn. of 30% not possible w’out reduction of Bolero programme.  

P.M. Scale of Bolero needs re-examination.  

M/Ag. Recruitment of Land Girls held up because of lack of houses.  

P.M. Disposed to take airfields first : make a 20% cut.  

S/Air. My offer wd. meet M/L.  

M/L. Yes, it would.  
   a) 510 in use.  
   b) 106 under const.  
   c) 54 projected.  

Can’t give up whole of c). Because e.g. 3 are specially long run-ways for x/ heavy bombers. nr. the coast. We’ve only 1 so far.  

P.M. No new ones to be begun w’out further instns.  

If, for time being, you finish the 106 : then if you get congested you can tell U.S. to send Army vice A.F. That is worst wh. cd. happen.  

S/Air.  
   a) I won’t be responsible for safety of bombers w’out x/.  
   b) Expansion in coastal command for U-Boat camp. 1 new O.T.U. needed for that.  
   d) Disastrous to stop beginning work where sites requisitioned and farmers turned out.  

P.M. No work on new airfields for next 2 months. This doesn’t exclude special x// exceptions for wh. a special case can be made out to M/Defence.  

P.M. C.O.S. say by July/Aug. 12/15 U.S. Divns. is maximum possible.
We are preparing for 27 Divns. If they aren’t here till Aug. they won’t be any use – needn’t be brought until Spring ’47.

S/Air. X/ Can I exclude N.I. + those constd. by U.S. labour?

P.M. 2) The 97,000 houses shd. be tackled.

3) Bring back to the towns evacuated persons for whom accommn. is available.

M/Ag. And 3,000 cottages in rural areas in ’43.

P.M. 4) Do the cottages have any relief fr. returns of evacuated persons.

5) Army. We have sent out 9 B. Divns. and there is their accommn.

W.O. No. Taken a/c of. Rather look at storage and hospital accommn.

Assume not more than 65% of Bolero needed in ’43.

(5) Agreed. (Given these decision on airfields.

(M/P. to review remainder of field on this assumption as to Bolero.

M/P. to report in a week or 10 days – giving a Table.

As instn. to Ctte Airfields. (1) overleaf : and also concentn. of labour on airfields under constn.

Army. Due a/c shd. be taken of large no. of Divns already sent out of U.K. Only 1 U.S. Divn. here now.

W.O. to prepare Table showg. what was to have bn. ready by ¼ and what is ready now – i.e. in troops.

This work is not wasted because it will be needed tho’ not until later than we assumed.

W.O. Can yr. redn. to 65% be accepted as firm?

P.M. Not yet. Wait for U.S. re-action. (Ir. fr. F.D.R.)

W.O. But cdn’t we work on it – assumg. they won’t come or will pass on quicker.
M/P. 65% = 650.000 vice 1.125.000.

P.M. Priority for 65% w’in the original plan.

M/L. Shd. not evacuated offices be encouraged to return?

M/H. I shan’t be able to accommodate the workers.

Agreed M/Home Sec. to consider reversing the evacuation bias.
W.M.(42) 171st Meeting 21st December 1942

A.E. Russia.

{G. plan for spring – persist in Caucasus poss. embodied with (advance thro’ Turkey.
{Maisky’s informn® defensive in Italy and Balkans : tho’ some support to
{N. Africa.

Rome – Open City


5m. messages fr. C. Hinsley to P.M.

Draft telegram settg. out our 4 condns. C.O.S. have addns. to suggest.

Halifax app’d. Hull – not encouraging response – they might regd. it as ultimatum and we don’t want to bomb R. anyway. We don’t agree tht. it is ultimatum.

Telegram fr. Rome (4688. Berne) giving Card. S/S latest views : saying M = 16 staffs were leaving Rome. They are getting out before they’ve had our conditions.

P.M. Nothg. much in R. worth bombing.

C.I.G.S. Yes Rlway.

C.A.S. Not thro’ centre of city : but v. vulnerable marshalling yards just outside.

P.M. Not concluded on this : but no harm in playing game with them. V. damming to their morale if they bolt.

They raised this – we aren’t committing ourselves, either to bomb or not to bomb R. It wd. be a v. important decision – when it came to decisions. For W. Cab.

Invited views of colleagues.

Personally, thought worth promising if all our conditions fulfilled.

M.A.P. If they agreed to condns. p. opinion wd. be v. much against our bombing R.
S/Doms. No need to promise perhaps – say we bomb only places of mil. importance if you make it otherwise then we shall take a/c of that in deciding what targets we bomb. Don’t like arguing or agreeing with Axis Govt.

W.O. Nodal points of rlways tho’ they are on outskirts, are so near you cdn’t bomb them without risk of hitting City.

M.A.P. Deal with Pope : not Ital. Govt.

P.M. Shd. we add to our cond one tht. no use of rlway thro’ Rome (as defined 3 miles fr. Palazzo Veneza) for military traffic.

Some feeling tht. this wd. be regarded as impossible cond wd. minimise chance of their agreeing.

M/P. wd. make it impossible for them to agree.

C.A.S. Why not keep this back for the moment – under cover of a genl. phrase “no part of the area to be used as base or channel for mil. operations”.

Agreed.

Jibuti.

A.E. Telegram. Leave this to Platt.

P.M. de G’s pos affected by rise and consolid of Darlan & Giraud.

D. is delivering the goods : impressing U.S. who will come to think more of him than of any others.

Giraud’s demand to be put i/c : Eisenhower will give him etwas.

Developmnt. of Fr. Army in N. Africa. A force will be growing up there wh. will be stronger force than anything de G. can show. If D. faded out & G. faded in, de G’s pos wd. be v. much overshadowed. Bad for de G. unless he united himself with G.

In the common interest tht. de G. shd. come closer together with D. & G. If he doesn’t deal with D. he will cut much less ice later if D. goes and he has to deal with G.

A.E. U.S. gettg. into pos – we keep D. but want honest Frenchmen in the admin. But the 2 things are inconsistent.

P.M. de G. is missing his market.
A.E. But he will never make a deal with Darlan.

P.M. Supposing Fr. in N. Africa get 250,000 troops – they will surely represent France outside Met. country.

Risk of U.S. thinking of “our Darlan & their de Gaulle”.

Appointment of B. & U.S. representatives to Eisenhower’s staff.

P.M. F.O. think our man shd. be “Ambassador” to Eisenhower, not on his staff.

President retorted both to be equal and similar. Doubt if U.S. will agree to our man being difft. fr. theirs.

President has today announced tht. Murphy, with rank of Minister, has been appr’d.

They mean therefore diplomatic Minister. We had in mind political Minister.

We had thought “with but not under”. F.D.R. means “under”.

A.E. V. awkward to put a Junior Minister in this position.

If F.D.R. insists we shall have to send a Minister in the diplomatic sense.

Spain.

A.E. Rodriguez Vega recently encouraged by S.O.E. to leave Spain is now in Lisbon.

Associate of Negrin, who has asked tht. he may come here en route from Mexico.

I wd. prefer not – Negrin, who came here en route for Mexico, is still here.

S/Doms. I wd. be satisfied if we facilitated his leaving Lisbon – for Mexico.

Agreed : facilitate journey to Mexico & so inform Citrine.

Prisoners of War.

A.E. Any decision now?

P.M. Wait – see wthr. they unchain for Xmas and wthr. they resume thereafter.
Extra Territoriality in China – Kowloon.

P.M.  
Stick to principle tht. all territorial changes are reserved for Peace Conference. As with Russia.

Say therefore “This has nothg. to do with the Treaty : No questions of territory can be discussed in advance of Peace Conf”

O.S.  
Hong-Kong has spilled over into the leased territory. E.G. water supply. airfield and part of docks.

M.A.P.  
This is leased – can’t use term “territorial changes”.

O.S.  
Nervous about first sentence in para. 5.

L.S.A.  
Bring in reference to our lease of bases to U.S.A.

A.E.  
Avoid phrase wh. brings in Hong Kong.

M.A.P.  
“If Chinese desires discussion of terms of lease of these territories, this can be discussed at Peace Conf.”

Agreed.

Posthumous Honours Awards.

P.M.  
Service Ministers’ views?

W.O.  
Cttee say tht. scheme will cause more heartburning that it will cure.

That is my view. S/Air & First Lord agreed.

L.P.  
Real diffy. is that you can’t do it for W.S.O. And that being so, it’s v. difficult to do it for decorations.

M/L.  
Better to leave majority of wives and parents under impression tht. death was in heroic circs, than give a token award in 2% - 5% of cases.

Requisitioning of Accommodation.

Note taken of W.P.(42)589.
W.M.(42) 172nd Meeting 23rd December 1942


P.M. Document adopted.

H.O. (Minute to P.M.) wants definition of redns. possible on assumptions of raids, not invasion.

H.O. Need for guarding key-points.

C.I.G.S. We are examining this – Ctte under Vice-Chiefs – will take a/c of raids by para-troops.

II. Civil Administration & Security in French N.W. Africa.

H.O. Three causes of concern - a) must be many unreliable people there, who cd. act as agents or cd. stir up trouble. Are the security arrangements adequate? No. Strengthen it (i) on merits (ii) to relieve E.

b) civil admin^n. if adaptable to needs of war, shd. be. stiffened with some more competent people.

c) B. subsidiary to U.S. Shd. we not be in a stronger pos^n. because we are experienced and competent in these matters.

And of. C.O. point about B. prestige in this area.

A.E. We don’t want U.S. to think we are nagging them on this.

P.W. done by our people and censorship is to be done.

Send Mack a summary of what’s going on, and couple it with an offer to E. to send [2 or 3] experienced men on the security side.

L.P. A security executive is no good except to bind together competent Dpts.

W.O. You won’t get efficient admin^n. in an unsound political condition.

P.M. Don’t see what can be done?

H.O. Fairly high level discussion with U.S. Puttg. one or two people in isn’t enough.
S/Air.  R.A.F. much concerned.

A.V.A.  Suggest thro’ Mack executive with U.S. Chairman. B. Deputy.

L.P.  Trouble is French. Genl. Patten has said he doesn’t regard Morocco as occupied territory.

C.I.G.S.  C. thinks pos^n not too bad. But anything we can do to tighten up wd. be helpful. But won’t get at root of matter until Nogués goes.

P.M.  We shan’t be able to run this in detail, from here.

M.A.P.  Cd. we not offer thro’ Mack a man who has experience of security in this type of area.

P.M.  Difficulties of joint undertaking – friction already betwn. E. Anderson. Make allowance for fact that we’ve only bn. there 6 wks. We haven’t taken over civil admin^n and cdn’t.

M/L.  Best to try to win our way thro’. Ask for more when we have proved success of what we have sent already – eg. Mack, censorship then onwards by degrees.

Confidence thro’ achievement.

A.E.  Yes – by my sugg^d approach thro’ Mack.

P.M.  These points wd. be w’in scope of 2 Ministers sugg^d by F.D.R. – one B. and one U.S.

Read exchange of telegrams with F.D.R. about status of our rep^v. : formula finally suggested was “H.M.G’s pol. rep^v at Genl. Eisenhower’s H.Q.” So tht. he wd. not be “on the staff” of E. He must have right of direct communication with H.M.G. tho’ his activities wd. be subject of course to over riding veto by C-in-C. if necessary on military grounds.

Macmillan – shd. be lent by C.O. and not replaced for a time anyhow.

C.O.  Agreed – on a temporary basis. Will try and carry on alone : if I can come to you when I find it impossible.

M/P.  Security is a mil. matter. Our offer shd. be on mil. not civil, side.

P.M.  If M. is accepted and goes out he can bring out all these points – even incldg. the ques of mil. security if he gets on good enough terms.
We (ie U.S.) must make the French run the show. The U.S. can’t do it themselves.

Better do this not thro’ Mack. but thro’ Macmillan when he arrives.

H.O. Agree this is the best beginning: but I hope my suggns will then be followed up by M.

A.E. Wd. like to send a F.O. man out with M.

P.M. Let him go alone in first instance. Later relented. Talk to M.

III. American Influence in West Africa.

P.M. Thought Cab. shd. see tho’ don’t know we cd. do.

M/P. From economic pt. of view we have bn. v. well treated. So long as we stand where we do we shall have no cause for complaint.

C.I.G.S. Request for us to appt. 2 (naval and air) on Adml. Glassford’s Mission to Dakar.

This is encouraging.

P.M. Brazzaville Radio – will be cause of complaint to us – continued violent anti Darlan campaign. U.S. will soon say trouble being caused by de Gaullist faction.

M/State Also fr. F. French in Syria.

C.D. All we suggest in this memo is appt of American to Swinton’s staff.

Also 3 pts. at end of memo. to be taken up thro’ this man if appt’d. or thro’ dipl. channel. First of these is v. important.

M/State. Much of this due to Pan. American Airways – employees.

P.M. I wd. mention this to Hopkins.

A.E. Cd. be done by Halifax.


D.S. Only there 2 days: and only at H.Q. Impressions based on that.
a) Greater part of senior offrs’ time (B. & U.S.) was taken up with problems of F. politics. E. talked of little else: and spent ¾ of his time on it.

This will prejudice posn of the troops.

X/

E. wants to be relieved of this. But meanwhile feels he must deal with these ques. himself – a major mil. interest. Ability to take Tunis quickly depends wholly on F. co-op and good will.


c) Agents. Large Italian popul. Army H.Q. located and bombed – presumably because enemy has good intelligence.

d) Darlan is doing all he’s told up to limits of his power: but this is limited. Cdn’t dismiss all the unreliable men in the admin.

e) If this attempt on Tunis fails, we’ll have diffy. with Axis sympathisers jobbing back. Unsympathetic if not worse. Situation may then pass beyond D’s control. D. wd. have to be induced to withdraw in favour of Giraud. D. wd. have to appoint G.

f) If we take Tunis quite soon no urgent need for a change. But even so change in favour of G. before v. long wd. be good thing.

Military Situation. 8th Army. wh. I had just left. were far more assured than 1st Army. No one put our chances in Tunis higher than 6:4.

B. troops have fought well. Only criticism is tht. they rushed too fast into final attack.

Anderson’s concern is about tanks. U.S. have best faults, with less experience, and our more experienced men have less valuable tanks.

U.S. troops disappointing. V. green and untrained. Tactical handling of troops and weapons is unsatisfactory.

One particular incident: U.S. combat group wh. ran out. Commander under arrest.

Air Situation. Our M/E. commanders not satisfied with way in wh. combined air force are being used. E. wants Tedder to take charge.
System of Allied Command not easy to work. U.S. not used to havg. troops under B. command and tend to issue orders to their men who are under B. command.

Strong desire, however, to work together. As time goes on, solutions will be found.

In reply to Questions –

Air. U.S. nervous of anything wh. might separate air forces fr. Army.

Wd. feel anxious about Tedder on that score.

M/State. Shall I, while in Washington, explain how my machine works w. ref to X/.

D.S. Murphy doesn’t take the load off E. because he hasn’t the status.

P.M. Friction between Anderson and Americans?

D.S. A. is not personality to get on well with back-slapping Americans. Nothg. more than that. But if impendg. action not successful, likely to be recriminations.

C.A.S. Plan. Tedder to have advance H.Q. with E. to control Libya and Malta based bombers.

( Army co-op Command under U.S.
( Strategic bombing force “ “
( G.R.A.C. and defence of ports “ B. offr.

Tedder to have joint Anglo-Am. staff for priority of supplies etc.

E. provoked to put this sugg up to Combined C.O.S. or to both C.O.S. separately.

V. Russian Convoys.

P.M. Have asked Admy. to consider 2 in Jan.

A.E. We want a decision on this quickly - ? to-morrow.

A.V.A. We wish to communicate with C-in-C. who is at sea.

A.E. Want dec before Xmas if the stuff is to be loaded. in time.

P.M. The ½ convoy 17/1 is settled
The only doubt is that due to start 25/1

Surely the ½ convoy, firm decision will give you enough to go on for loading.

Cab. view is we do everything possible. Admy. must say wthr. possible.

1st S.Ld. By 25/1. much daylight : narrow channel : we can’t then send cruisers : we shall therefore need 15 U.S. destroyers. My idea is to get the destroyers and run them in ½.

All Naval losses in Torch have fallen on us.

Agreed : assume, for loading, tht. convoy will sail.

VI. Jews.

F.O. Saw dep“ today : v. anxious for us to find places for those who can get out via Bulgaria or Portugal.

C.O. H.O. F.O. Ctte to consider and report.

VII. Bombing of Marseilles.

A.V.A. Any political objns. to bombing ships in Marseilles harbour fr. a. carrier?

P.M. They are being made ready for handg. over to Axis.

F.O. No objn.

P.M. Let them go in, then, so long as E. don’t object, and sink these ships.
N. Africa – de Gaulle’s wishes.

P.M. To meet Giraud in Africa: Chad - alone without B. assessors, to discuss future arrangements. Plan G = military : de G. political.

G. has replied – moment not opportune – will reply further after advice.

Prob. wants to consolidate political and military control.

de G. apply not hostile to Noguès: wd. work with him.

de G. views N. Africa as under French sovereignty : B. and U.S. troops invited in as guests.

A.E. de G. saw me this p.m. to explain further about F. sovereignty. Can be derived only fr. a) Petain or b) Republic (= the part of Fr. wh. continued to resist).

There must in his view be an authr for Frenchmen. There must either be fusion of 2 parties or choice of l. There can be no ‘Federation’ betwn. the two.

P.M. F.D.R. has stopped de G. going to U.S.

He is in a high-stepping mood. Anxious to embroil us with Americans.

N. Africa needs gripping.

Cd. send telegram to F.D.R. followg. my interview with de G. - read out draft.

Macmillan’s appointment. F.D.R. suggd postponement. I telegraphed at week-end urging him to agree to early appointment.

Chinese Treaty – Kowloon.

A.E. Referred to prev. decision.

a) Subsequent telegram giving Koo’s views on this.

Further instns. to Seymour. I wd. advise standing firm to prev. decision. Agreed.
It’s going to be tiresome – we shan’t get much support from U.S. tho’ they shd. support us : I will ask them to do so.

P.M. Warning about declarations like Colonial declaration.

Readiness to give away our Imperial rights. Don’t let us go any further than we have gone.

P.M. Mr Casey. Farewell. Valued his presence at our counsels. Will be able to take our views back.
Indian States

L.S.A.  Summarised memo. So far as concerns need for public statement, this wd. be met fully now by statement in H/Commons. Prefer now to send the long explanation, as in Viceroy’s draft, as a private letter.

Ld.Chanc. ) Enough now to stand on the answer given in H/Commons.,
M.A.F. )

L.S.A.  Viceroy wants to send it. Pl. let him do so.

Ld. Chanc.  At least link up answer in H/Commons with the private letter.

M.A.P.  Bring in at end of para 1. of draft letter statement tht. this dealt with in public statement in H/C. by HMG. Then let Viceroy’s letter be personal – i.e. omit concl. words para 1.

Parliamentary Delegation to U.S.S.R.

S/Doms.  Lab. Party resolution on relations with Russia. Executives promised to try to arrange delegation to Russia. Maisky has said they wd. welcome it if senior members included. That means Ministers.

Delegation fr. one party only is difficult.

A.E.  Diff. to justify one party delegation.

M.A.P.  Parly. delegation – as to China. This wd do more good than a party delegation.

P.M.  Numbers.

H.O.  5 if Labour only : 10 if all Party.

A.E.  Keep nos down.

S/Doms.  7 wd. be enough.

L.P.  Both Houses? Agreed : wd. be necessary.

P.M.  Shd. be Parly delegation representing both Houses. Ministers not to be included.

S/Doms and A.E. to consider and put to Speaker : Ld. Chancellor. after
submission of names to P.M.

**British Prisoners of War.**

**S/Doms.** Message fr. Swiss Govt. tht. G. have resumed shackling. Do we do any more?

**P.M.** Not going to apologise. We’ve unshackled : we can do no more.

**M.A.P.** We can do what Swiss ask – repeat to them our original statement about tying up.

**P.M.** Leave it to Canada to ask if they want any more from us. Don’t volunteer any further statement to Canada or Swiss.

**Agent Genl. in N. Africa.**

**F.D.R.** agreed – A.E. to draft Directive for Macmillan.
Military Situation.

C.I.G.S. Libya.

8th Army closing up on R. Dispositions explained.

Admin problem. (2,350 p. day Benghazi
Clearance of stores averages (800 p. day Tobruk

Tanks – improved mainly in Shermans and Crusaders. 546 in all.

R. uneasy: largely because short of transport.

N. Africa.

Situation of troops unchanged. Improvg. comm* and supply.

Relations with U.S. and French fairly smooth: but co-ord problems are great.

G. now 44,000 of wh. 30,000 Germans and 230 tanks. – i.e. their re-inforcement has continued at strength.

P.M. Discussed pos with offrs. who have returned – somewhat reassured. We hold heads of the passes, unlikely tht. G. cd. rush our positions.

Small prop of infantry in 1st Army: yet 51% of the casualties among infantry. Sugg that the prop is unduly unfavourable to infantry. Takg. up with W.O. need for better balance.

Trouble with Boisson – complaing. of Brazaville Radio. Have telegraphed to him suggesting he meets with Swinton.

“Basket of snakes” – Giraud out of his depth in political intrigue.

Need for bldg. up something with some foundation, tho’ not provisional Govt. to take place of this crude military dictatorship.

State Dept. v. critical of de Gaulle.

Russia.

V. Luki held by Russians tho’ G. still denying that.

Kantamisova.

Millerovo. R. driven back : but now near Kamenskv.

Toimlyanskaya. R. gains.


Mozdok taken by Russians.

1st Panzer Army withdrawing.

If R. stay over Don. G. will have to come out of Caucasus.

Hoth’s Army (e. 150.000 : remnants of 22 Divns.) is getting v. hard pressed. 500/700 tons p. day when they can fly are being put in by transport aircraft.

Extra-territoriality in China.

A.E. Chinese abandoned Kowloon point. Treaty shd. now be signed.

Bombing of Rome.

A.E. U.S. not v. keen : prob. don’t want to bomb Rome anyhow.

Position of Cairo. They will want to be called open city.

Advise therefore leaving it alone – leave them in uncertainty.

Argentina.

A.E. Rude statement on Saturday.

Ambassador today was plaintive – attempt to make bad blood between us and U.S. Govt.

Prisoners of War.

M.A.P. Easy to make consistent our various statements.
P.M. Pick out fr. our various statements what we have said about shackling in the field and make of them a statement for comm to Swiss Govt.

W.O. {If only alternative is to kill, then its justifiable.
{Any general order wd. not be justifiable.

M.A.P. Declaration given as to what our future practice wd. be. 9.10.1942.

P.M. H.M.G. have nil to add to above and P.M.’s statement in H/Commons.
i.e. they adhere to the statement….. to which they have nothing to add.

Bruce. Australian experience in N. Guinea is that Jap. prs. must be tied up.


If you are going to quote H/C. statement, I wdn’t quote first at all.

P.M. Tell Canadian Govt. that we propose to say ….. H/C. only.

M.A.P. Begin by making it clear that G. have no justification for going on with this.

F.O. to draft statement, in consult with D.O. W.O and M.A.P.
[Make it clear we are not going to have any enquiry.]

[W.O. German prs – fr. Dieppe, who at first denied tying : 2 Poles now say they were.]

Communicate that draft to Canadian Govt.

Church House, Westminster.

L.P. Have written to speaker (no reply) and Ld. Chancellor (who agreed).

Ch. Whip. Condition for re-occupation. Agreed.
W.M.(43) 2nd Meeting 5th January 1943

Food Stocks for Relief.

M/F. Raised because practical problem for my mission in Washington.


Problem is food, rather than free food, for Europe.

Americans are asking.

P.M. Who?


M/F. U.S. about to ration in order to build up stocks. They want our support in putting this across to their people. What can we offer? Proximity, organisation, a little food. Small in compn. with U.S. contributions. I want to be able to show willing. I want to say little more than P.M. said in 1940. Joint decln. by the 2 countries will relieve uneasiness of Dutch and Norwegians. Decln. tht. we will not revert to unlimited consumptn. until immed. necessities of Europe met.

If we don’t continue rationing. after the war, we shall have v. serious trouble.

Therefore make a virtue of necessity.

There will be some reserves in U.K. at end of war – e.g. the corned beef.

Reason for my change of view is tht U.S. are now contemplating the introduction of rationing.

A.E. Difference also that this proposal is for a joint declaration.

K.W. President is not, as supposed, about to make genl. statements (as in memo). Not opposed to joint decln. in suitable terms, but no need to rush in now. Don’t know what President’s eventual decision may be.

M/Ag. Size of problem. If war ends early ’44 and assuming no transport difficulties, world supplies (other than wheat) will not give Europe a ration of ½ our rations. When that is realised, won’t there be demand from our own people tht. we should help. B. agriculture can still increase its prodn. –
by 15% this year and a future 20% in 1944 – given labour and fertilisers. We cd. then allow world supplies to go to Europe.

Prob. 3 years before cereal prod\(^n\) in Europe is adequate \(\textit{on most}\) assumptions. Prob. a generation or a generation and a half cattle popul\(^n\) favourable in Europe is adequate \(\textit{on most}\) assumptions.

We cd. also provide some cattle and eg. vegetable seeds.

20m (out of 354 m. pop\(^n\) in Europe) only cd. be catered for out of the U.S. proposed stock pile.

S/Doms. Shd. we not ask Doms. what contribution they cd. make, by accumulating stocks.

P.M. Why shd we bind ourselves to rationing more severe than U.S. impose upon themselves?

S/Doms. If we liberate Europe, we shan’t want to see it starving under our administ\(^n\)s.

P.M. We have done our share already. Don’t bind ourselves in advance.

B/T. Other commodities. Here we cd. help w’out hurt to ourselves – e.g. wool (9 months’ supply here : 3 yrs in Aust.) and cotton (1 years’ supply here : 2 years’ overseas).

P.M. Do we want to pledge ourselves in advance to give away our only liquid assets?

B/T. Don’t want to promise free gifts. Many countries cd. pay.

Also med. supplies, Army etc, clothing and boots.

Our total contrib\(^n\) cd. thus be not inconsiderable even to recipients.

P.M. By comparison with weight of European misery, not really significant.

Support M/F. proposal that we shd. get what value we can fr. a joint declaration.

Make it clear tht. there is something we can do and we will do it.


Debate in H/Lords.
Important to avoid impn tht U.S. are only people doing anything in this field.

Not hypocritical to make proposed statement abt. continuance of rationing, tho’ words in M/F. go too far. “Anything in our power, whtr. in rationing or otherwise, to help ……” vice M/F. words.

M/Ag. U.S. proposed contribution in terms of their production.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commodity</th>
<th>Percentage of 1942 Production</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Meat</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Eggs</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milk</td>
<td>1½%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citrus</td>
<td>5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Potatoes</td>
<td>11%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Beans</td>
<td>8%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

M/P. No harm in genl. decln with no mention of rationing. We can bld. up stocks of some commodities here and in Empire. We can promise contribution from those stocks.

A.E. a) post-war relief shd. be international and not American.
    b) food in U.S. Soon will be shortages. Rationing will be necessary.

Referred to telegram of 3/1 fr. Halifax.

All we need to say is (i) if we have stocks, we will make some use of them. (ii) something, jointly with U.S. abt. our food policy.

On these grounds strongly support M/F. proposal.

H.O. Endorsed a). If we can get joint decln with U.S. that is an advance.

Such a decln wd. be item of political warfare, both now and in post-war period when we shall need source of authority in Europe.

V. important psychol. tht. at end of war we shd. not let go and each look for most luxurious life we can find. We shall get into real trouble that way.

x/ Wise proposal provided we can get U.S. into it jointly. Good thing also for U.S. to get into right mood, as at x/.

K.W. Don’t dissent. Question of terms and time.

A.E. M/F. only suggests announcement when U.S. is ready. All we want is to discuss now for announcement there.
K.W. Let President decide wthr. he wants to keep this separate from Lend Lease.

A.E. Only ques. is wthr. conversations shd. proceed on this basis.

K.W. Find out wthr. President really wants this now.

P.M. What parity between U.S. and U.K. in a joint decl?

S/Doms. It need not be U.K. alone : it must include the Dominions.

M/P. Shipping diffy. cuts both ways. It means tht. we are piling up stocks overseas.

P.M. Ready to say we won’t be behind the U.S. in imposing rest on ourselves for the sake of a starving Europe.

L.P. If relief isn’t done in an organised way, we shall come off v. badly.

K.W. This shd. be taken up on a much higher level than the Combined Food Boards. We shd. ascertain the personal intentions of the President.

M/W.T. Shipping wd. prob. prevent us fr. lifting stocks fr. 5. Doms. for some time after the war.

C. Ascertain 1) wthr. decl wd. embarrass President.
   2) if wanted, genl. decl on lines sugg by M/P.
   3) re rationing, will go as far as do the U.S.A.

M/P. Draft a genl. decl on stocks (omitting rationing) and ask Hal. wht. President has in mind.

M/Ag. Remember that U.S. admin wish to use accumulation of stocks as argument to induce U.S. people to accept rationing. It is in our interest that U.S. shd. introduce rationing.

P.M. a) Willing to say we are not going to be behind U.S. or any other country in clarity, self sacrifice and philanthropy.

You will prejudice chance of war-time rationing in U.S. by tying it up with post-war rationing.

M/F. I’m guided by the views of people in U.S. Halifax and my people both say this will be helpful to President.
C. What limit wd. you specify for rationing. To what wd. you pledge yourself?

M/F. That’s not the ques. It is a ques. of not allowing unrestricted consumption.

P.M. Willing also to say that we will ration after the war to the extent U.S. ration.

K.W. Refer Halifax to Phillips’ telegram of 29/12.; and ask him wthr. it really wd. help President to have a declaration (in terms not to be specified).

M/F. Ask what kind of decl^n wd. help President to get the stock piles going.

P.M.’s conclusions - a) above b) ascertain President’s views via Hopkins c) “ views of Dom. Govts.

M/F. If we don’t get U.S. to reduce their consumption, we shall be in a v. bad way.

We shall lose the eggs and dried milk we are getting now.

It will not be shipping then, but supply tht. will be the bottle-neck.

What I want to do is to strengthen hands of U.S. in bldg. up a stock pile.

A.E. U.S. will want fr. us some decl^n. about stocks.

M/F. Don’t proceed with c) until you get answer to b).

S/Doms. agreed.
I. Colonial Policy.

P.M. Referred to Halifax’s telegram No. 75 dated 5.1.43 – Hull spoke before consulting President.

A.E. Hull is extraneous – discussion arose independently of him.

C.O. When Hailey and Halifax saw President, the President said he liked the idea but not the word. He must therefore have known of the proposal.

A.E. These ideas discussed here when Halifax was last here.

S/Doms. And Doms. want some statement.

P.M. Time taken off the war in order to find a formula to gratify the Americans.

Why shd. we apologise? We showed the world a model of Colonial development.

Only criticism is that we haven’t spent enough in Colonies.

A.E. Or defend them.

P.M. Not so. When the war ends, we shall find we have defended them all.

L.P.S. This did not come from pressure fr. U.S. or Doms.

Gt. pressure here for statement of Colonial policy ever since loss of Malaya.

Halifax was over : I told him statement of policy was possible : he then mentioned it to Hull.

P.M. Pressure – yes, fr. fretful people not in on the war.

A.E. Smuts, who is in on the war, favoured it.

S/Doms. This may get U.S. in to share responsibility for defence.

C.O. I thought decl^h abt. P. State (accomp^d by clear statement tht. P. State remained responsible for admin^n) was reverse of giving away : rather asserting determ^h to hold on to our responsibilities. I, havg. heard Back-Bench talk, believed tht. a decl^n on these lines wd. be generally welcomed.
P.M. Why bring this up now: We are busy enough with the war. If you do nothing, it will blow over.

A.E. What did Viceroy have?

L.S.A. Only the telegram wh. went to Doms.

L.S.A. While I object to tying our hands, I see nothg. in revised text of declaration to wh. I need object on these grounds. In fact, I think I can support the document.

A.E. I never liked Mandates Comm° manned by rep° of countries with no Colonial experience.

C.O. Togoland administered by Comm° more backward than Nigeria.

Gt. advantage in this that it assert “personal” responsibility of P. State.


A.E. Wd. you rather not re-define our Colonial policy?

Ld. Ch. This is not a decl° of B. colonial policy: it is of colonial policy in general: and analogous to Atlantic Charter.

C.O. I believe this is our right policy: not toned down to pacify U.S. opinions.

H.O. The Atlantic Charter is in v. genl. terms: advantage in this that it circumscribes the Charter qua Colonies.

P.M. V. well, w’in our domestic circle: but why hurry into any public statement or bringing in foreign countries.

C.O. Business consid° alone wd. force us into consultation councils eg Caribbean.

Advantages therefore in bringing U.S. in early.

L.P.S. These bodies will be consultative, not executive. What harm then if U.S. backed out as out of L/Nations?

A.E. & L.P. This will rescue us fr. dangers of Atlantic Charter.

Pinch in para 4 “can’t be pursued without … co-operation betwn. Nations”.

C.O. But that is just what I want. Co-op with other Colonial Powers. E.g. in transport, regional consult is inevitable.

P.M. Delay the statement as long as possible and have proper consultation. Doms. criticise.

C.O. But revised draft gives effect to their criticisms so far as we accept them.

M/P. Revise para 4. “The Parent States will … but the policy can … the more successfully … “

A.E. GB. U.S. and Dutch to sign.

P.M. What about the French?

H.O. No one to answer for that.

L.S.A. Ques. is wthr. this shd. be done unilaterally or internationally. If latter (which I don’t much care about) then there is no harm in this document.

C.O. I want it because of its position value.

D.O. Next step: show it to High Commrs. tomorrow. Send it to Doms. with reasoned statement of our views on their criticisms.

Ld. Chanc. “Parent State”. Danger of its being used v. us. E.g. W. Indies don’t regard us as Parents. Will support argument “it’s high time you gave them up”. Why not use “Trustee State”?

Wd. also prefer not to speak of “equal status”. Lookg. for trouble of Dominion States in India.

K.W. Debate “equal status” – agreed and retain Parent x/

P.M. “Parent or Trustee”.

C.O. Danger of “trustee” is sugg of impermanence.


S/Doms. Not “equal status and equal opportunity”. We haven’t achieved those.
“Purpose” – Agreed.


Position of India. Don’t you leave her as neither one thing or the other.

She is neither. She is not a parent nor a child.

Will be determined de facto. If when the time comes she has in fact a strong economic or strategic interest, then she can come in to the Reg. Comm.

I don’t object to C.O. view. If that is understood, I am satisfied.

It is Amery’s memo that puts me off.

Conclusion:

We’ve given further consid. How do Doms. like revised draft.

This is what we now suggest.

Explaining why we don’t accept all their amendments.

Then come back to War Cabinet.

Give Doms. a reasonable time to reply.

We stand on W.P.(42)506, don’t we? (My re-definition of Atlantic Charter). Not denied.

More publicity (including films) for our Col. administration.

G. like Hitler, finds his patience exhausted. His six months end 9/2.

Viceroy and Lumley recommend that he shd. be left free in the Palace (?) Other courses wd. cause more serious trouble.

Why give way to h-strike by G?
L.S.A. Won’t do this with any other pr. The G. situation is, however, so difft. tht. we can’t afford to let him die in prison. Not my view but I don’t feel justified in over-ruling those on the spot.

M.A.P. He is such a semi-religious figure tht. his death in our hands wd. be a great blow and embarrassment to us.

Medical opinion is that he will die in 3 days. Only ques. is where he dies.

L.P. If you agree with Govr. he will certainly release him as soon as he begins to fast.

Therefore you have to take the risk that he bluffs you.

If you choose the policy of release, say now you will release at once.

M.A.P. Let them decide there.

L.P. But we must know what they will do. And I believe they will let him out at once: won’t bring him back if he breaks his fast: and wd. bring him back if he begins to agitate.

A.E. This will v. unequal treatment for him as cpd. with other leaders.

And this is clear reversal of our original decision.

L.S.A. It is. But are we to over-ride him.

P.M. Put to him the original decision and ask why he has changed.

L.P. I knew G/India wd. never stand up to this. That’s why I advocated his removal fr. outside the jurisdiction of the G/India.

L.S.A. Cd. we afford to have v. Executive reigning on this.

Position is difft. now. We’ve detained him for 6 mos. and we’ve beaten him.

L.P.S. That is argument for letting him out now. I wd. rather do that.

Simon. Ask Viceroy to reply – you have bn. shut up: Govt. have put this down: and we’ll let you out because we aren’t concerned about your power to do any harm any longer.

P.M. Let him out as an act of State, rather than an act of submission to G’s will.
I wd. keep him there and let him do as he likes.

But if you are going to let him out because he strikes, then let him out now.

Cab. feel v. strongly on principle of release because of strike.

Wd. prefer to release as act of grace because det’d 6 mos. and we’ve beaten him.

P.M. Tell V. we’re astonished.

When we locked him up we clearly understood no release because of strike.

If his release is essential, then as act of State etc. as above.

And get his answer before any further action.

P.M. to see the telegram.

III N. Africa.

P.M. We shd. work for this. I agree with sense of telegram.
III  Civil and Passive Defence in North Africa.

H.O.  a)  Cd. M/H.S. be brought into planning.
b)  Fr. civilian morale : cd. it be stimulated

M/L.  c)  Is under American control.

IV.  Reception and Accommodation of Refugees.

A.E.  Shd. we take line “done all poss. nil more”.

or “This is for U. Nations. We will try more, if others do their share”.

We favour second course.

This is apart fr. what C.O. can do in Pal. for women and children. (Limited nos. give priority to w. and children)

Amendment of para 4 of telegram – agreed.

H.O.  Rec’d. deputation – before A.E. announced decision of HMG.

Miss Rathbone was troublesome.

We must do what we can.

M.A.P.  Para 4 – omit “proportionate”. We’ve already taken a good many.

A.E.  Accepted “a further share”.

M/P.  U.S. takg. less than their immigration quota.

Agreed.


No material to speak of – appreciable results will begin to show fairly soon (i.e. within a month or so). Time will vary with type of modification.

Street-lighting wd. take much longer.

H.O.  Trains – 2 Cos. put down their blinds. The other 2 Cos. won’t do it.
H.J. It’s L.M.S. only.

H.O. They shd. be pressed further.

P.M. Agreed.

A.E. Driving – lights for lorries?

H.J. Doubt wthr. higher lighting wd. be pressed for.

H.O. Accidents. Percentage in b.o period to Oct

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>52.4%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1941</td>
<td>42%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1942</td>
<td>39.2%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

S/Air. Street-lighting.

Approx .002fc.

Wd. be content with dual system.

H.J. Material and labour for this wd. be v. considerable.

M.A.P. Better to ensure good supply of torches and batteries. Then leave street-lighting alone.

P.M. Agree at least to get the torches.

H.O. Similarly, cycle lamps sho. be made more readily available.

M.A.P. Absenteeism due in part to failure to get lamps.

P.M. Committee to report at once on torches and cycle lamps. Agreed.

Dual system – labour stringency rules it out now.

x/ Report also on headlights – wider spread, in particular.

H.J. Motorists don’t come up to authorised standards.

P.M. Make a plan for getting them up to those standards.

Also consider x/

Wd like to turn up street lights – but fuel consumption prob. prevents it now.
Detention of Gandhi.

P.M. Viceroy stampeded by Lumley. Tho’ he does say he will bring him back if he misbehaves : and says he won’t release until life actually endangered.

L.S.A. Sugg’d tht. V. shd. incorporate in lt. to G. examples of Congress misbehaviour.

But para 4 – anxious not to alter draft.

P.M. Don’t say we agree. Say merely not justified in interfering with his discretion though our views remain unchanged.

Agreed.

Food situation in India.

L.S.A. M/F. are sending out Vigor to help G/India. )

M.A.P. Send also someone fr. M/East? – who has experience of hoarding in Persia. )

A.E. Alarming demand for shipping.

L.S.A. V. serious situation – work is being stopped in Bengal.

L.P. Shipping Cttee considering this problem this morning.
Military Operations.

V.C.I.G.S. Account of advance by 8th Army. Opposition met on 15/1 – cleared.
during that night.

Tripolitania.

Trying to get landing grounds as far advanced as possible.

Situation at nightfall on 17/1. Main diffy. bad going. A-t guns and armour
skilfully used by enemy on his right. On left, mines and artillery.
15th Panzer with 34 tanks. Other groups 57 tanks. includg. Italians.
M/East estimates for capture of Tripoli = either 26/1 or 1/2.

When we get them, we must pause for maintenance reasons, until we are
ready to use Tripoli as a port. G. will wreck it before they leave. At least
10 days before we can get any ships in.

By 1/3 we might mass fr. 4/6 Divns.

Benghazi – heavy storm breached the mole (2.000 t. maximum) now limit
(1.500 t. average ) of the port.

Tripoli when ready 2.500 t. p. day. But air and naval defence will have to
be built up.

Burma.

Win 15 miles of Akyab.

New Guinea.

Sanander and Tanakina n. of Buna goiod deal fighting.

Further north Aust. Indip. Co. made succ. raid enemy HQ. at Muga(?)

Since J. landing at Buna July Aust. battle casualties = 4.261 (1286 killed)
+ 11.000 adm³ to hosp. malaria.

Russia.

Rlway statⁿ Murmansk partly demolished by air raid.
S.L. Ladoga R. attack to rejoin Leningrad force.

V. Luki: G. claim remnants of garrison fought their way out.

N. Don: new off. s. of Voronegh. Cleared long stretch of V.Rostov double – hice rlway. This will be of gt. importance.

Stalingrad: 6th Army (now cut off for 8 wks) relentlessly attacked.

Of 220,000: (R. claim – we thought only 100,000) R. say only 70/80,000 left.

That Army can be written off.

Don: After Millerovo, approachg. Donetz at Kametz.
About 50 m. fr. Rostov at confluence of Donetz & Don.

Further south, strong G. resistance.

Caucasus: R. clearly on heels of retreating G. But pockets resistg. far behind.

A v. satisfy. week.

French N. Africa. (Foreign Affairs).

A.E. Not much success in persuadg. de G. to meet Giraud.

Air Raids.

H.O. About 100 s. of wh. 75 on Ldn. Latest estimate is lower.

2 phase attack on Ldn. No substantial damage.

10 pump fire at wharf in City.

Private property bore the brunt of it.

54 K. 174 s. injured. 94 lightly injd.

50 incidents arose fr. AA shells. 10K. 50 injd. 6 trapped: minimum fr. tht. caubs

Don’t seem to arise fr. Z. batteries.

C.D. machine came out quite well.
One v. heavy bomb at Camberwell.

Statement on the Jews.

A.E. Can I and Deputy P.M. settle this tonight. Yes.

Somethg. must be said tomorrow.

Statement in Reynold’s Newspp. about Beveridge Report.

K.W. Someone has bn. talking & imputing views to Treasury.

H.O. May be merely journalistic speculation.

Shackling.

W.O. Ques. tomorrow : “can’t make any statement at present on negotiations [with G. Govt] but will do so as soon as they can ….”.

M/I. Don’t refer to negotiations – or any contact with German Govt.

Say merely “no statement to make at present in the matter of shackling. The restⁿs on prs mail have now bn. removed”.

Or “in commⁿ with P. Power and as soon as posⁿ to make any statement we will.”
Air Raids.


One unfortunate feature – warning in school area after bombs had dropped.

With usual warning some lives wd. have bn. saved.

Ques. – some criticism likely.

S/Air. 1 Tuesd. 3 Wed. Ques.

Break down telephone doesn’t affect problem.

12.23 1st crossed coast : 1st bomb 12.30. Warng. 12.32. wd. have bn. 12.30 if telephone break down had not occurred. So it wd. have made no diff.

Raises however ques. of policy. 7 mins. fr. coast to Ldn. These first for 2 yrs. in daylight save 4. If warning always given when aircraft cross coast v. larger no. warnings wd. have bn. given. Inconvenience – warn. wd. fall into contempt. On this a/c recommend adherence to policy – as expld. (including risks) by J.A. to H/C.

H.O. Agree with that view. If no other fault, will share response with S/Air for risk.

S/Air. Balloons were down in that area. Reason – they were under terminal control.

Accepted rule balloons must be down when calibration is going on. I am reviewg. that.

Reform of Foreign Service.

H.O. On salaries of Asst. U.S. of S. F.O. (£2,000). There may be repercussions on Sqs. Dpts (£1.700) – no particular reason why they shd.d be paid £300 p.a. less.

Agreed.

Colonial Service.

C.O. Brought to a head by Swinton’s fears of break down in W. Africa.

Discussed with Service Dpts – who agree save Admy. below.

Admy. Wish to retain Col. offrs. who don’t want to leave Navy. Small nos.

If of them he needs past. individuals we will consider favourably.

C.O. See how it works out – if exemption wrecks whole scheme I can come back.

S/Air. Hope this won’t set precedent for claims by other Dpts.

Agreed.

Jewish Refugees – Admission to Palestine.


We might say which 30.000 cases outstanding wd. be treated similarly i.e. 80% children. 20% doctors, Rabbis, veterans specl. cases. Say we wd. do it as pract. diff'ces. can be overcome.


Agreed.

Prisoners of War : Shacking.

F.O. Diff’t. present’

Since drafted news of Canadian post’ Canadian Army and Govt. take diff’t. views.
A.C.  High Commr. Canada saw me today. Telegram : Can. Army don’t now wish to reserve right to tie in battle and wish therefore to accept G. condns. Cand. Ch/Staff arrived today : I sugg’d he shd. consult our mil. auths.

F.O.  Re-draft was a) attempt to base ourselves on new W.O. instns.  
       b) G. accuse us of x/- we thought letter to deny it.  
       c) No point in releasg. prev. statements abt. compl. Convns.

K.W.  P.M. will dislike para 5.

Bruce. No hope of getting G. to agree. No point therefore in trying this longer form. Conciliatory with no prospect of success.

Adjourn decision until Canadian views examined with W.O.

Indian Commissioned Officers : Powers of Punishment.

Noted.

Red Army Day.

L.P.  Procedure. Decision about ceremonies on behalf of foreign Govt. Shd. be done only on advice of F.O.

F.O.  We were consulted.

S/Air.  W.O. query – appropriateness of “a general salute”.

V.C.I.G.S.  Sugg’d about parade or march-past. Depends who takes the salute. Difficult if a Russian took it.


Agreed.

Shipping.

L.P.  P.M.’s decision to divert ships fr. M/East and India. Volume already reduced by 25% : 92 p.m. were running. P.M. ruled 40/50 p.m. and C-in-C. ordered to programme to that. They took 50% basis = 46 p.m. P.M. meanwhile said 40. in Jan. there were 40 + 5 Dec. ships delayed.

Decision now requ’d for February.
W.O. can’t yet make detailed programme on basis of 40 p.m. All they have in programme for 46 p.m. (1 fr. U.S. to M/E) These 6 ships are in (2 fr. U.K. “ “) ques. Stores can’t be (1 “ “ “Persia”) defined. (1 “ “ “India”)

On other side, our imports now look even worse than at L.P. Cttee.

If these 6 go, we shall lose them for 6/8 months – in wh. time 2/3 voyages in N. Atlantic.

Propose therefore adhere to 40 p.m. and if W.O. exam shows tht. was too much the diff can be made up later. If the ships go, we can’t adjust in favour of U.K. programme.


U.S. Assist Jan. stops shipping into Feb., tho’ total won’t be diminished.

L.S.A. If you sent 46 now cd. you send 6 less in March or April.

L.P. Quick return in N. Atl. wd. be lost – it is in early months of ’43 tht. important need is greatest.

V.C.I.G.S. Tho’ W.O. + mouthpiece this is view of

5% Admy. 36% Civil ) Load carried.
16% Air Bal. Army )

a) Last qr. ’42 maint requ ms. cut by 25% to find Torch shipping. The C-in-C told these cuts wd. be restored. In fact we cut more. And cut to 40 makes it more serious.

b) C’s-in-C. asked for detailed req ms. on 50% cut basis. They answ d but with grave misgivings.

On return programmes 46 necessary. If now cut to 40 – we don’t know what to cut: and we have no time to refer back again. May seriously affect future ops in Med. and Burma.

c) Send 46 more. Take up later on review of chance of 40 being enough up to June.

C. Dec. 165 ships into UK. M/E. 110 p.m. for some time past. Much of past imports into M/E. went to reserve or capital equipment.
Opns. in E. Med. unlikely unless we open Sic. channel. If so, pity to have sent ships on long route and locked them up. Maintain flexibility.

V.C.I.G.S. Opns. (certain) will go fwd. apart fr. openg. Sic. channel.

L.P. If decided not to send these 6. W.O. exam. programme. They cd. make out a case for adding the 6 later – at cost of ? 1 months’ delay.

V.C.I.G.S. One month might make all the diff.

C. 100,000 t. of imports are involved (for UK).

L.S.A. All turns on opening Sic. channel. This depends on M/E. Unwise to starve them.

S.Doms. Are all the 46 carrying stuff wh. is vital to the operation?

L.P. Issue is – we don’t know what we are cutting. Ques. is wthr we shd. take a risk in the dark.

C. Cable to Cairo : 6 ships are to be cut : which items shall we cut?

Q.M.G. This wd. take 10 days. We cd. do this, if we can produce the ships if they say “not poss”.

C. A prop of this must be other than 1st priority.

M/W.T. We cd. adjust if dec given in a week.

Meanwhile programme on basis of 40.

L.P. If you load up to 40 – you can’t put it right when the answer comes. You may have sent the wrong stuff and will need addit shipping to carry necessaries.

S/Doms. Some illust given. W.O. to guess wh. are lowest priorities and adjust when replies are in.

Q.M.G. I will make arbitrary cuts and invite comments.

L.P. Leave it to them. “If shipping has to be reduced to 40, what items shd. be excluded.

Reply w’in 5 days”.

V.C.I.G.S. Do Cab. decide these cuts must be taken irrespective of effect on opns.
x/ I wd prefer – “this cut must be imposed : or ascertain effect of cuts. Where will you take it and any effect on opns and if so what”.

Agreed at x/.
I. Tank Performance – Parliamentary Questions.

M/P. 2 Ques. about tanks by Stokes.

Propose to use W.O. report. Read draft answer.

S/Doms. Can’t read extracts unless prep’d. to lay whole document.

M/P. I will say “I am advised …” and avoid textual quotation.

S/Doms. Don’t go into details at all – say merely recent reports unsatisfactory.

H.O. Wd. prefer to give some detail.

M.A.P. Genl. imp’n. on troops was that ……………. Agreed.

II. Symbol – Communiqués.

D.P.M. Read P.M.’s message to Stalin.

A.E. Propose give copy Maisky tonight – Agreed: show communiqué and message as late as possible tonight.

D.P.M. Release 3.a.m. tomorrow.

C.R. Messages in UK. all in offices – prevented going on tape.

In U.S. distribution throughout offices on tape. Machine often in semi. public.

Warning also to wait for important statement on air.

If we are to catch out newspp. tomorrow, we must release by 5.p.m. today.

A.E. That is too late for anything to go to Washington.

Ch.Whip. Announce in S. Session just before or at 5.p.m. today.

C.O. H/Lords mayn’t last until 5.p.m. Can I release earlier.

Agreed – no: must be at same time

D.P.M. Announce a) the communiqué

b) de Gaulle’s?  Agreed. Yes.
Will give it to High Comms. this afternoon.

III. Prisoners of War – Shackling.

A.E. Can’t hold pos
th much longer. W.O. to expedite discussions with Canada.

Early decision thereafter. Statement in H/C. next week – Agreed.

IV. Catering Wages Bill.

M/L. Have more alteration on ch. 2 sugg
th by Ty. “make all such enquiries ….”.

L.P. Compare Trade Board Act First Schedule to direct public enquiry. This was form used in Factories Act and Insurance Act. Room for criticism therefore of form of this Bill on ground that no prov
th is made for public enquiry. I wd. advise further alteration to complete the analogy with T. Bds. Act by adding public enquiry.

M/L. Doesn’t hurt me: and it will help in Parlt.

M.A.P. Some delay because of public enquiries – prob. 6 months on average.

L.P. Depends on magnitude of case. May be shorter.

M/L. Compromise on prov
th for takg. evidence in public.

M.A.P. x/: Give Minister discretion to order Comm
th to hold public enquiry. [L.P. Or unless the Minister vice they think obj
inc. frivolous].

S/Dom. Say you can’t have this lengthy procedure in war time.

M/L/ Promised to consider: including x/, because the challenge is in Parlt.

L.P. The Comm
th may, and if so directed by the Minister shall, hold a public enquiry. Preserve the status of the comm
th and its independence of the Minister.
P.M.’s Meeting with Turks.

A.E. Cab. shd not consent to P.M.’s going to Angora. Security posn. bad when I was there – even worse now. Physical diff. also – prob. will go by train.

Balance of advantages – meet in Cyprus.

M.A.P. In train on frontier?

A. E. Syria not v. good.

V.I.C.G.S. Plenty of troops there.

A.E. Better on B. soil

S/Doms. Agreed Cyprus.

M.A.P. Much better to meet President than S : and more likely tht. he wd. come to frontier.

A.E. Not sure: something to be said for leavg. P.M. a loophole not havg. seen President.

M.A.P. Say Cyprus unless some mtg. on frontier with Prs. cd. conveniently be arranged.

A.E. Tho’ B. troops cd. be sent to frontier that wd. become known.

Read proposed draft.

L.P. Shd. we not at least indicate in telegram the alternative of mtg. at Frontier.

“We shd. not take same serious view of severity ques. if mtg. cd. be arranged in train at some isolated place on the frontier.” Addg. a) Takg. pol. and security grds together. On balance Cab. shd. have thought better Cyprus with S. rather than Ismet in Turkey. b) Tho’ there wd. be advantages in mtg. with Ismet. fr. security pt. of view we shd. prefer Cyprus. Agreed b) instead of a).

II. Prisoners of War : Shackling.

A.E. Canadian mil. now agree with me.
V.C.I.G.S.  With proviso – he wd. support our view : but he thought his support wd. be of no effect on Can. Govt. unless A.E.’s telegram went to Can. Govt. If it went to Canada in draft we cd. telegraph in advance supporting it.


Para 5 suggest G. justified in their attitude.

M/P.  Contracd. betwn. 3 and 4. Doesn’t 3 conflict with statement that Conv. applies at once.

K.W.  Stand on prev. text unless G. Govt. likely to be influenced.

V.C.I.G.S.  Can. C.G.S. wd. prob support old draft. It was merits not wording we discussed.

Bruce.  Aust. Govt. wd. prefer first draft. This won’t alter G. attitude “and it will give occasion for argument. – partic. on ques. when pr. comes under Convent. i.e. when he becomes a p. of war.

A.E.  D.O. Tel. 8. to Canada. 12/1 = the old draft.

Agreed – adhere to that draft.

2)  Tell Can. Govt – stressing that no ½ way house betwn. this and agreeing to G. condns.

1)  Get Can. C.G.S. to telegraph in support.

3).  Then send reply to Swiss Govt. and announce in H/C. on Tuesday.

Bruce  on 2)  Can. Govt fear this draft will provoke denunciation of Gen. Conven. Put in 2) therefore the answer : no change of wordg. will prevent that if G. wish to denounce.


K.W.  Terms of resolution agreed. Plans all ready.

Intend to foreshadow need to continue controls after the war.

No mention however of food rationing.  Agreed.

IV.  Secret Session in H/Lords.

Cranb.  Hankey is puttg. down notion on U-boat warfare, in wh. we will go into reasons for our previous failure. His speech may be ok but diff. for Govt to ques. a full reply.

70
Agreed: go into S. Session.

V. Catering Wages Bill.

M/L. 1) “all such investigns. …..” 2) “Shall consider written upns and shall make such further enquiries as they consider necessary………………

L.P. Enquiries may be public. Meet first point. It doesn’t meet the full safeguards of T.B.A. leg” But I will support this on ground tht. Order has to be laid.

K.W. Content to see how it develops.
W.M.(43) 20th Meeting  
1st February 1943

Parliamentary Business.

A.E.  
a)  Statement Tuesd. about P.M. referring to communiqué, Arrange with Greenwood. Agreed.

If questioned when will P.M. speak – say “I am consultg. my R.H.F. and am sure he will make statement. as soon as he can”. Agreed.

b)  Debate on Beveridge Report.

Ch.Whip.  
AG. thinkg. of puttg. down Motion callg. attentn of Govt. – we wd. like P.M. to speak on 2nd day. Agree tht. this wd. be suitable way of opening Debate if appropriately worded Motion.

H.O.  
Why a Motion?

Ch. Whip.  
Because many Members don’t like these discussions taken on Adjournment. Table agrees.

S/Doms.  
Govt. Motion preferable?

A.E.  
Yes : if we are going to define our pos. Are we going to do that?

Feel it will be diff. for us not to take a line. Wd. rather defer for a week and make a statement.

L.P.  
Shd. be in pos. to make a broad statement of our pos.

K.W.  
agreed.

H.O.  
Agreed with A.E.’s view.

K.W.  
Some Members, relying on past statement of intention, want to express their views before Govt. define their attitude.

A.E.  
If asked this week if a date fixed say only “not finally fixed”. Tho’ wd. prefer to stand to that date – i.e. 16/17 Feb. Reserve for moment answer to ques. wthr. Govt. will define their pos.
Foreign Affairs.

a) Poles in Russia. Poles likely to protest v. treatment. Ques. therefore wthr. we and U.S. Govt. shd. make some joint approach to U.S.S.R.

Sikorski may have provoked this, by indiscreet talks in U.S.A.

b) de Gaulle. Saw tonight: likely to be helpful. Recognises his 1st job is to re-create confidence in his chief. (New Foreign Secy. to de Gaulle).


State of Fr. moral v. bad indeed. Russia U.S. and U.K.: 3 powers in the world wh. can be of any influence in Europe.

d) Italy. Cabinet changes prob. due to suspicion tht. some people in his Govt. might be friendly to us. Doesn’t apply to Ciano: but reason for that prob. tht. M. want to have F.O. under his own control.

Prisoners of War.

S/Doms. P.M. has seen and agreed to telegram.

W.O. My orders must issue in next 48 hours.

A.E. No publ of this telegram in H/Commons.

Jamaica: Constitutional Changes.

C.O. In 5 yrs. no changes made, tho’ generally recognised to be overdue.

Reason mainly controversy over bi-cameral system. Felt here to be necessary to insist on unitary system of Govt. All local political opinion has now joined in repns. to me in favour of bi-cameral system. I am not against it. Presidents quoted against (eg Bahamas) based on v. diff’t. and more restricted franchise.

Govt. feels quite a good chance of substantial measure of agreement with these proposals.

S/Doms. Any need to preserve Govr’s right of veto?
C.O. He has the right of the King to withhold consent. De facto, he won’t exercise the right except after consultation with me.

Agreed.


L.P. P.R. Cttee. hope to be able after Tues. mtg. to present to War Cab. their conclusions on all main proposals.

On some points we wd. recommend announcement of final decisions. On others tht. Govt. shd. indicate pros and cons. On others Govt. shd. pronounce against at once. All this subject to our genl. financial review.

Ques. now is wth. Debate shd. take place next week.

K.W. a) Pity to postpone Debate. b) Govt. cd. make useful contribution to it.

Form of Debate. We cd. draft a Motion (Govt) or one to be tabled by Reps. of all parties. Wd. object to Motion by one Party. Much to be said for Govt. Motion: move it formally: and Govt. spokesman intervene later.

A.E. Wd. favour Govt. Motion. S/Dom agreed. Ch. Whip and Ch. Labour Whip also agreed: both wanted early decision.

Ch. Whip wanted announcement Tuesday about date of Debate.

H.O. Cd. we not then say tht. Govt. are devising a suitable form of Motion and will table it.

K.W. Read draft Motion.

A.E. “That the Rpt. be now considered”: coupled with statement tht. Govt. will define their attitude.

K.W. Say Tues. merely “exact date: and I will announce on Thurs. the form wh. Debate will take”.

Ch.Whip. 3 days? Agreed.

India. Treatment of Ghandi.

L.S.A. Viceroy’s Council: have considered again and adhere to prev. decision. Telegram now coming in. Will report when telegram available.
Catering Wages Bill

P.M.  Diff. in view of Divn. to say this isn’t controversial.

A.E.  Our pledge related to party controversy – Conservative Party was divided.

M/L.  1922 Cttee gave me no indic. of opposition. Opponents were a) malcontents b) B’ham group opposed to me personally. Many of oppos. spkers had fin. interest.

Only 30/40 opposition votes were on merits of Bill.

P.M.  Possible there will be long and obstructing Cttee stage.

Try to use Cttee stage to get substantial measure of agreement – 4/5 days.

M/L.  Preserve Comm. and wage regulation : principles of the Bill : and I will meet them on details.

Will continue to keep in touch with A.E.

A.E.  Leave Cttee stage for 2 weeks. or so, and see wthr. by talking to them we can find out what they want.

S/Doms.  Remember that we have had to persist in Govt. proposals against opposition by a majority of Labour Party. If you give way to this Conservative opposition there will be trouble with Labour Party.

M/L.  Remember 80 Labour votes against us on conscription of ) But I persisted women ) in defending 60 “ “ “ pensioners ) Govt. policy.

A.E.  There will be further ques. about the pledge. How shall we answer that?

K.W.  Connected with the war.

S.Doms.  Controversy between parties. This oppos. is only by a section of the Tories.

All reconstruction leg. will provoke some sort of factional oppos.

Ch.Whip.  They will press for reference to Select Cttee.
The Beveridge Report.

Industrial Assurances - wholly to be absorbed by State?

D/P.M. Why do Cttee reject Bev. proposal?

L.P. Because it’s not a part of this scheme. We don’t reject it on merits: we say merely it’s not nec. to this scheme and we need not therefore tackle it now.

D/P.M. Shd. be made clear tht. Govt. are not pronouncg. v. this recommn on merits.

M/Social Security.

S/Air. Wd. M/Pensions come in?

L.P. Not war pensions.

Financial Position.

K.W. Attach gt. importance to paras. 3-6 of Rpt.

Two over-riding claims a) internl security b) maintenance of employment.

Para. 4 : other claims. Can’t now establish priorities here or enter into commitments.

Para 5: I agree, however, tht. political situation makes it essentl. to say something.

Interested parties are keen tht. Govt. shd. make some statement – not only Parly. Parties but outside interests.

State where we stand on as many aspects as possible.

Children’s Allowances : Cttee recommend no income limit. may be said in Debate that in view of fin. posn this shd. be limited to those in need. Exclusions of higher income groups wdn’t bring v. gt. fin. relief. Will certainly be awkward ques. income tax. No hope to be extended of speedy introduction because of long time nec. to work out details – this applies to the scheme as a whole.

The legn requd shd. be bright. fwd. all at once – not piecemeal.
Comprehensive Health Service. Shd. be available to all, if they want to use it.

And all will be required to contribute. But no interference with private practice or vol. hospitals.

H.O. May well be cheaper to introduce a comprehensive scheme than have to give way to pressure on individual items.

Spirit of announcement. Inexpediency of grudging assent. If we are going to pay to Bill, we might as well get the credit for it.

Paras. 3-4. I thought our view was – first intern. security : second security at home wh. includes social insurance. Emphasis needs some revision.

Contributions. Conseqn. of not committg. ourselves to benefit rates in tht. we don’t refer to rate of contribn. Say no ques ….. read out ….

K.W. We can’t be committed on pensions. Agreed.

H.O. We must have right to look at the rates again. But cdn’t we say that broadly speakg. we expect to settle on somethg. of the same order of magnitude.

L.P. A formula on these lines to be settled and used by Govt. spokesman.

H.J. The assignment of the elements (3 contributors) in the contribn. is not immutable.

L.P. Agreed – this has not bn. discussed : B’s proposal not finally accepted.

S/Air. Spirit of announcement – must endorse not only principles but early action on these principles. Safest thing is to give H/C. a firm lead.

M/Inf. Necessary to show real enthusiasm for this Rpt.

M/P. Give impression tht. unemployment can be avoided. Use phrase “maintenance of high level of employment” in lieu of other references to trade. Put it all in terms of employment.

B/Ed. Education Bill will be ready in 2 months. Necessary therefore to indicate in Debate tht. education is not forgotten.

Cherwell. We must emphasise all the other claims. We prob. shan’t be able to do all.
Indicate to H/C. tht. if they plump for B. they will have to do w’out some of the other projects. All depends on full employment. It will be necessary for people to work willingly.

Afraid of going into details – eg. cutting children’s allowances. Lose all the political merit thereby : better to be vague.

O-a- pensions : say merely we can’t tie hands of future Govts.

K.W. I believe it is necessary to make detailed statements. Children’s allow\textsuperscript{cs.} wrong to indicate accept\textsuperscript{cs.} in principle if in fact we mean to give only 5/= Not v. much in favour of cash allowances. Fear benefit will not go to children.

M/L. Not enthusiastic for cash allow\textsuperscript{ces.} – do nothg. in cash wh. will impede development of allowances in kind.

Genl. agreement with view tht. cash allow\textsuperscript{ces.} shd. be kept down to 5/= and leave room to expand the services.

W.A.J. Feeling that B. is “old man’s document”. Many people are against the o.a. pensions proposals and more in favour of what is given to the young.

Cherwell. Withdrew his point – on understandg. that point of presentation is fully considered.

University.

L.P. The point will be taken tht. it is unnecessary to cover those not in need.

What do Cabinet propose to say against that point of view?

S/Doms. Say impossible to define classes wh. are in no risk of ever needing social security. Admin\textsuperscript{vs.} difficulties.

The Subsistence Level.

H.O. Put the argument in favour of principle + factual argument as to what the figure for subsistence is.

K.W. Our Ctte. H.O. was alone in this view “and we therefore avoided the point in the Report (para. 25 of Rpt).

H.O. What wd. you say if ques. raised in H/C?
K.W. “No need to take a decision on pt. of principle ‘little reason to doubt that the rates will be broadly similar to those in B. Rpt.’”

Old Age Pensions.

W.A.J. Read Rowntree’s views.

K.W. We must avoid increasing amounts for people who don’t need them.

L.P. Trouble is violent conflict between sound econ. policy and sentiment.

Can we do more than call attention to the difficulties?

M/L. Put his point about pensions due fr. employers. Trustees etc.

Approved Societies.

L.P. Are we going to take him in Rpt. Or say merely v. serious thing and we’ll wait and see views expd in H/C. The Rpt. is the honest line. Do Cab. want to hedge.

M/N. Rpt. – Because A. Socies won’t talk business about agency work unless it is clear tht. main issue is decided.

L.P. “Operations of Sec. must come to and end: but disposal of accumulated funds will need to be tackled as transitional provisions.”
The Beveridge Report.

L.P.  P.M.’s memo means tht. either a) no reconstruction leg^n at all or b) this ques. of social security leg^n will be given a lower priority than other projects.

S/Doms.  In last war e.g. Education Bill was passed by an even older Parlt.

If P.M.’s line is taken, it will provoke demand for Genl. Election.

L.P.  Don’t accept any commitment now : but difft. to say now we won’t have any leg^n until there is a new Parlt.

P.M.  Impossibility of foreseeing international situation after the war.

S/Doms.  You can’t make plans even w’out reachg. some decisions.

P.M.  Our first promise shd. be to ensure tht. demobilised will get back to their own jobs i.e. under the old regime.

Forward development of industry – suspended during war – used to restore by advance planning.

Beveridge Commission – 4 M.P.’s + 4 Civil Servants to get and keep it all ready incldg. a Bill for introduction early after the last war.

No promises – no commitments – every conceivable preparation.

S/Doms.  Preparations all involve decisions of policy. eg. Agricultural Policy, Uthwatt Rpt. etc.

K.W.  What do we say in our Rpt. wh. is inconsistent with P.M.’s suggestion.

Resumé of paras. 3-6. Reserve to Govt. of the day the final decision, then we go on to indicate provisional conclusions on parts of B. Rpt.

L.P.  Ques. between us now is only this – shall we say definitely now that we shall never legislate on this subject in this Parlt.

P.M.  I wd. agree to leg^n by this Parlt. to prepare for post-war : but not to leg^n takg. decisions binding the future.

H.O.  If we accept the view tht. we can have no enabling leg^n dealing with post-war problems – we shall be in an indefensible position.
P.M. Don’t mean to ban leg

L.P. If you say that “but no leg
at all on Soc. Security” you assign it to the lowest priority.

Whitely. Leg cd. be on basis of “appointed days”.

K.W. We don’t propose to say this week that we shall introduce leg

P.M. Get Bills drafted and have all our prep made.

L.P. What I want to know is wthr. I am to say tht. leg will not be proposed to this Parlt.

M/H. That wd. be fatal.

M/L. And others Agreed.

P.M. Uneasy about the extent to wh. we are drifting away from our constitutional obligations to the electorate.

K.W. Re-capitulated paras. 3-6. All other projects (save 2) will have to be considered in light of circs. at the time – incldg. B. Rpt. But we will indicate our provisional views.

L.P. By the time that Bill is ready, we shall be in a much better pos to see how we stand. No commitment now. But equally no negative commitment. And we naturally hope that, when we have done all that work, we shall be able to proceed with the Bill.

L.P. Two points. a) App Societies. K.W. doubts. L.P. Say “If you are going for B. you can’t have App Soc.

b) Universality Doubtful about strength of feeling.

Godfrey.

C.N.A.S.  Harwood has seen him – he hasn’t changed his mind.

P.M.  Offered 6 : 4 against his scuttling his ships!

A.E. Mission to U.S.

Approved by War Cabinet.

P.M.’s Aircraft.

P.Q. – draft to be submitted to P.M.

Air Attacks on Coastal Towns.


G. object divert offensive to defence of towns when no milt. target. of importee.

5 Squadrons Typhoons – 12% of raiders destroyed as v. our 5.4% loss in sorties over Fr.

500 Hispano Suiza 20mm cannon to be added : not many in each town.

For warnings  a)  R.O.C. to give 1st priority to these and to fire rockets.

b)  Light balloons, a small no. to be worked by gun crews.

   Experiment at Dartmouth. [(b) not a main method.]

   c)  Short-wave narrow beam R.D.F. now being used for det. of surface vessels.

P.M.  Let Taylor move House into S. Session: and let S/Air make statement as above.

Ch.Whip.  Enough if S/Air. met Kent and Sussex Members.

P.M.  Agreed : Ch. Whip to advise what is best course.

Conditions Justifying Surrender to Enemy.
1 Took note.

**Malta : Evacuation of Civilians.**

C.O. Govt. attaches v. gt. importance. Situation has changed. Rescue of those he wants to move tends to lower morale.

P.M. Why not by sea, vice by air?

C..S. Liable to air attack.

C.O. See end of para. 4. Will make whatever use we can of ships.

200 wd. break back of it.

Agreed : provided it didn’t interfere with military interests.

**Evacuation of French Civilians from Tunisia to Marseilles.**

P.M. What authy. has this Naval Attaché, to suggest this?

A.E. Struck me as odd story and that’s why we brought it to Cab. But we felt tht. if no operation ob\textsuperscript{jn} we cdn’t do more than be discouraging.

Don’t see why these civilians shd. want to return to France.

P.M. See complicated naval arrangements.

A.V.A. Didn’t like it but felt we shd. co-operate if it was desired by Eisenhower and Giraud.

A.E. Telegraph to Macmillan and get his views. x/

Agreed at x/

**Black-out Second Report of Committee.**

P.M. Nothing better to offer?

H.J. Torches, batteries and cycle lamps : shd. be all right.

B/T. Prod\textsuperscript{n} up to 1.9m cycle batteries.

Diffy. double squeeze in Oct. a) buses reduced : cycling increased

b) increased Service demands for N. Africa

Whiteley. Result of Debate Labour Party mtg. S/Doms. and H.O. did not convince the Party. They aren’t satisfied with Commn proposal: fear it may become another Assistce. Bd. V. generally, Govt. response to Labour demands is only half-hearted as compared with Govt. response to Tory pressure (e.g. on coal rationing). General public expectg. more from Govt. than has bn. offered. Temper of mtg. this morning v. unsatisf.

M/L. Main point surely is delay in promotg. legn.

H.O. Agreed. The inference that legn will be delayed.

L.P. I didn’t say so. I said we’d go on as fast as we could.

K.W. Posn is tht. immed. after today’s Debate we will begin discussions with interests about Med. Service: Dpts. wd. prepare for ch. allowances: other agreed proposals will be advanced. Dpts. concerned will go on subject to co-ordinn by Jowitt.

Then, when prepns made. Govt. wd. review the other claims and resume consideration of financial posn. That is what every Govt. does before introducing a Bill. What’s wrong with that?

P.M. Agree: save tht. I’m not sure that this large Bill shd. be carried thro’ by this Parlt.

Has the time come to form a Govt. concerned with matters other than the prosecution of the war? W’out a Genl. Election.

Many people concerned with the war. Country wd. oppose a desertion of the Coalition.

S/Doms. Didn’t come into this Govt. on basis only of dealing with War. Always understood tht. we wd. concern ourselves with prepns for post-war problems. Moreover, the public are v. much interested in their post-war conditions.

This Govt. must either govern or get thro’ Genl. Election a Govt. that will.

We have e.g. concluded a 20 year Treaty with Russia. That commits the future: we can’t exclude other things on ground of no jurisdiction.

P.M. Peril to financial security: irresponsible commitments.
We must get our soldiers home and into employment.

I’m not fighting this issue on “No Mandate” basis.

Deal with this on merits of this Bill. Suppose you draft and even introduce it: you can’t bring it into force during the war.

S/Doms: Labour Party are not irresponsible about this.

P.M. Everyone wants it: but can you pay for it? You can’t pass the Bill before you know where you are.

H.O. Introd of Bill. L.P. auth to say wd. go ahead with prep: when it was ready we wd. review the whole pos (in light of financial situation and other claims) and wd. then tell H/Commons what our decision is.

If we said “no leg until after the war”, the H/Commons wdn’t have it.

Political crisis: solid Labour vote in favour of the Motion tabled.

P.M. I must ascertain views of Tory Party.

K.W. Crisis has arisen because last night 3 or 4 Labour Members (administrative Cttee of Labour Party) put down Motion.

H.O. If this Govt. leaves its successor with no legislative prep for post-war period we shall be treacherous to the country.

M/L. We arrived at agreement on Monday. I stand by that.

Our conclusions (reached with C/Ex.) were embodied in Cttee’s Rpt.

P.R. Cttee agreed tht. after Debate we shd. proceed at once with preparations includg. prep of Bill. I’m not prepared to ride rough-shod over people w’out negotiations, whoever they are, whatever Labour Party say.

Ditto. with vol. hospitals. If when we reached tht. stage war was still on, we wd. be ready to go fwd. with Bill reservg. date of operation.

Subject only to review of all financial implications of other projects.

P.M. Whoever is responsible on day when G. is beaten shd. have power to decide.
L.P. Was my speech inconsistent with what you’ve just said.

I said tht. as soon as prep^ns. complete Govt. wd. review pos^n. and wd. come
to concl^n. and put their views to H/C.

Went beyond my authy. on point only : said tht. meanwhile we wd. have a
planning group. Cab. supported this.

M/L. When the time comes wd. prefer a Bd. workg. under definite rule. H.O.
L.P. K.W. agreed. Not a Ministry, with full discretion.

Med. Service to stay under M/H because in state of development.

This is relevant to Motion urging immed. appt^mt. of M/Social Security.

A.E. That case can be argued and put.

P.M. My plan was to win the war and keep the Govt. united for purpose of
putting thro’ a programme of 4/5 projects of social improvement.

However, if appr^d. day can be left blank. I wdn’t oppose introd^n. of Bill.
Tho’ I think it wd. be unwise – occupying much Parly. time and provoking
much controversy. So long as we reserve the right to decide at end of war
when to bring it into operation.

L.P. Bill wdn’t be ready for at least 12 months.

If we are to negotiate with interests affected, as M/L. suggests, it is bound
to take a very long time to complete the preparations.

Ch.Whip. Speaker may call the Labour amendment.

H.O. Arrangement now is for K.W. to speak today and me tomorrow. Better on
the whole to leave this undisturbed.

Am prepared to defend the decisions reached on Monday.

Ch.Whip. Conservatives will be solid, but K.W. shd., deal today with sugg^n. for
early appt^mt. of M/Social Security.

K.W. It wd. hamper the work. This can be got across to the House.

S/Doms. We can have no arrière pensée about a negative commitment, in regard to
legislation.
I. Priorities for Research and Development.

S/Air. I thought date was a little optimistic: but P.M. has since pronounced in favour: don’t press that point.

W.P.54 accepted.

W.O. On W.P.66: additional central point or body unnecessary.

M/P. Suggested Directors of S.R. in Dpts. should make this review: and results should be reviewed centrally.

W.O. It is for Service and Supply Dpts. to review: and very few overlaps with other interests: no need for central review.

M/P. a) Dpts. will have to make the review. b) Results will have to be embodied in a document. c) All that is required is that this document should go to a central body, who will prune the overlaps.

L.P. No use saying this can be done Departmentally w’out risk of waste of skilled personnel, now this is in short supply.

This review will only affect the marginal case.

Many Dpts. using specialised physicists. eg: must involve some central review.

A.V.A. Had hoped that this would not be a one-way traffic: that this body would also be able to help me.

L.P. Acute shortage of radio-technicians.

Nuclear physicists: chemists: very few in number: essential that they should be properly used.

S/Air. Agree with proposal and the survey and that C. should undertake it.

Diffy. however reports go only to L.P. and M/P. Think Service and Supply Ministers should be consulted at that stage. L.P. and M.P. agreed.

M/L. On scientific personnel I have dealt with Hankey and L.P.

Wd. agree to this if L.P. substituted for Ld. Cherwell: because of undesirability of creating fresh organisation.
S/Doms. Leave it Lord President ques. responsible for scientific research generally.

W.O. No interference with Service Ministers views of their own priorities, except on ground of scarcity in skilled personnel, apparatus or materials.

L.P. No authority to decide. Recommns to Minister concerned: tho’ I wd. reserve my right to report to War Cab. if they disagreed with me.

Agreed: L.P. via Cherwell.

II. Interchange of Technical Information with U.S.S.R.

M/P. a) Suggest that Tizard shd. not be bound to insist on quid pro quo. T. wouldn’t go on any other terms.

Views of C.O.S. On original draft implic’n he was to be debarred fr. bargaining.

b) Shd. Mission go at all?

S/Doms. Proposal is tht. T. shd. be free to bargain or not, at his discretion.

W.O. Agree to that as a start: but if he gets nothing that way he shd. not proceed to give away all our secrets if you see you are not getting or likely to get anything in return.

M.A.P. Say to USSR in advance “if we send T. it will be to receive as well as give”.

x/ T. won’t have to stake out a bargaining position: that will have bn. done by Ambassador. Make this clear when askg. facilities for him.

C.I.G.S. T. shd. be made aware of past history.

A.E. Promised to consider x/.

Agreed.

III. Airfield Construction.

M/P. 106 under const’n all but 24 by civilians: of the 82, 57 are for bombers.

Satisft’d. tht. these are all necessary. If that were all, we might get by.

But if remaing., 8 are authorised by M/D. we can’t get by.
M/L.  365.600 by end Mar. for Govt. programme as a whole.

343.000 available.  22.600 deficiency.

If I draw on other sources, can manage: but after Mar. we must proceed with planned withdrawal + 22.600.

If I can’t withdraw then, R.A.F. intake will have to be reduced pro tauts.

A.V.A.  Even w’out the 8, you’ll have to cut other programmes.

M/P.  No: see para. 4.

A.V.A.  Our requiremts. are not in fact being met now.

W.O.  If Casablanca figures of U.S. troops are realised, 80,000 (personnel) addl. 20,000 (storage) labour wd. be required. I am not prep’d to ask for these addl. nos. Propose to squeeze up for personnel accomm^n.

M/P.  All Dpts. working to programme (except W.O. who are ahead of numbers).

Agreed: project for addl. 8 to go to M/Defence.

M/P.  To consider position after 31 March.

IV.  Cereals for Indian Ocean Area.

L.  Demands Feb/June aggregating over 1m. tons.

India  Price position or sight of imports has resulted in easier situation.

Prospects of harvest seem brighter.

Cd. S/S. India release some of tonnage already arranged

Mauritius etc.  Demands met. Don’t want to invite continuing demands.

S.Africa.  Claims not pressed. Doubt if they really need it: they declined a neutral ship at high freight!

N. Rhodesia.  Propose to divert a ship to Kenya.

S. Rhodesia.

S/Doms.  Don’t decide againt w’out reference to Shipping Committee. Agreed.
Kenya. Trying to get butter beans and tapioca from Madagascar. We cd. easily ship it, if M/F. cd. supply it.

Supplies for further months will have to be sustained.

Persia. Russians took some on basis of replacement. U.S. to replace ⅔ but in Russian aid ships : and Russia won’t agree to that. No chance of gettg. supplies there otherwise because of shipping and also port facilities.

Harrisson wants decision : shd. we use this space for R. or P. needs.

W.O. At a time when we are moving forces away fr. Persia : v. important fr. our pt. of view that this shd. go to Persians.

Genl. feeling in favour of urging Americans to ship in acc. with bargains.

Agreed – subject to consid’ by F.O.

Ceylon. Solved by shipping at expense of U.K. imports.

Hope this won’t continue. Supplies of rice either fr. Egypt or India. shd. come in.

S/India. Prospects of new wheat crop are good.

Ready to disregard demand for 400,000 t. after April.

Ceylon (cont). With good prospects for Indian rice crop and something fr. Egypt shd. be easier.

Turkey. Demand 150,000 t. Decided 50,000 t. fr. Egypt. – from U.K.C.C. reserves and they are askg. for replacement : wh. I am disregarding for the present. I hope tht. will suffice. More than this wd. have to be specially shipped.

Turkish ships are lifting the 50,000 t.

F.O. We shd. decide, if so, how to put this to Turkey. 3,500 + fr. U.K. Only 163 t. shipped in Jan. Drastic cuts in their ordinary imports, while we are promised large increase in munitions.

L. P.M. urging me to resist some part of these demands.
3 ships in Australia bound for U.K. Cd. go to Indian Ocean if need were proved to be acute. But general position easing so much that I shd. prefer not to starve the U.K.

M/P. 150,000 t. cereals fr. Turkey in the standard “bid”. Believe reduction in other imports is more serious.

M/F. Can’t afford further cuts in our imports. Danger level coming in March rice June.

W.O. Are not India, Kenya and Ceylon really urgent?

C.O. In Kenya people are dying already. V. diff. fr. Ceylon.

L. Cdn’t S/S. India get some arranged ships for India released for Kenya.

That wd. solve my immed. problems.

S/India. Altho’ some extracted fr. hoarders, India is still short of minimum requirements.


L. Also help fr. India and Egypt for rice for Ceylon.

M/F. Got 76,000 t. may get 200,000 t. of rice fr. Egypt.

C.O. Agreed that this wd. put Ceylon in pos’n of security for some months.

* Turkey. Stand on 50,000 tons pending consid’ by A.S.E.

* 3 ships fr. Australia to load for U.K.
Foreign Affairs.

F.O. Mission flying out to N. Africa.

Air Raids.

H.O. 30 S. Wales and S.W. Tues/Wed. Some concent\textsuperscript{h} Swansea – widespread damage to Bldgs.

12 killed. 44 ser. injured.

Otherwise attacks fairly small.

Shackling of Prisoners.

A.E. Telegram suggest\textsuperscript{ng} it has now become symbolised in some camps. Investigating this : meanwhile we can say nothing more in Parlt.

S.Doms. Was there some alteration in our message?


A.E. Not intentional : will enquire.

Italian Prisoners of War.

A.E. Shd. have bn. joint memo. with M/I.

Worth while at least to have some of these people available.

Success in N. Africa has made Ital. more willing to take view v. regime.

W.O. To be liberated or remain prs?

A.E. If used, wd. be liberated.

W.O. Then they become traitors in Italy : and relatives exposed to reprisals.

Do we have to inform P. Power?

C.D.S. might eventually want to use them for mil. purposes.

M/Ag. “Utilitarian value” in this country already secured by work on land.
Will an agitation in their camps improve their (small) work value.

A.E. Might try it in S. Africa first.

M/Ag. Minority chosen as Pioneer Batns. wd. work better : but others wd. be worse workers.

General feeling : don’t try it here first : develop in India first and then perhaps in B. E. Africa.

W.O. If you liberate and these enlist [as volunteers soldiers] under mil. law, no ques. will arise under General Conventns.

Agreed : nil in G.B. or S. Africa. Extend to B.E. Africa subject to Platts views.

Refugees.


Can we continue to pretend in H/C. tht. we are holding internat. conversns. We here can do so little tht. difficult for us to take it up internationally unless U.S. co-operate.

H.O. I cd. take 1.000 or so as part of U. Nations move – but only to bring the others on.

Rathbone & Co. all pressing us to admit some to encourage other A. Nations. My feeling is we’ve done too much already w’out guarantee tht. other Nations will help.

Danger of anti-Semitic troubles here.

S/Doms. Advantages of explaing. difficns: in Debate – what we have done, and diffic. of doing more.

W.O. Risk of provoking discussion of Jewish Army.

A.E. Agree advantages. Trouble is disclosure of U.S. delay.

H.O. Arrange Parly. Ques. to P.M. askg. what contribn we and Empire have made – and give it publicity.

M/L. Can Cab. Sec draft Answer to show what we have done.
Agreed: Have Ques. subject to Cab. seeing answer.

Otherwise, stand firm.

Have put to U.S. Chargé d’Affaires last week-end 3 points a) mtg. here. b) Agreed – await replies to these points.

Ch. Whips to be asked to discourage undue interest.

Beveridge Report: Circulation by A.B.C.A.

W.O. Ques. tomorrow askg. if A.B.C.A. pamphlet on Bev. Rpt. will now be circulated.

x/. We did suggest postponement, rather than cancel“ because we thought Debate wd. be non-committal.

Now, however, any discussion in Army must be discussion of Govt’s views on Rpt.

Shall I turn down flat : promise cons“ if at any time became practical to discuss coolly : or be more non-committal. indicatg. ultimate dec“ likely to be negative.

H.O. Difficult because of x/.


M/L. “Have considered priorities and are circulatg. Uthwatt Rpt. first”!

W.O. Draft will be submitted to P.R. Cttee.

y/. Answer PQ. “Am considering brief with a view to issuing somethg. more suitable”.

Agreed : as at y/.
I. Invasion Areas – Visitors’ Ban.

H.O. Wd. propose in any event to retain restrictions on persons takg. up permanent residence.

Last year maintained suspension of Ban for prolonged period. No justific^n for maintaining this ban unless v. strong military reasons for it.

Don’t want to destroy the “invasion mentality” – but public aren’t fools.

W.O. Our main point is not that: it is preparations for offensive action.

We shan’t want people unnecessarily to see what we are doing. Fact tht. we are preparing will be known to Germans: but we can and shd. conceal the detail.

Security argument – whatever other kind of D.R. may be necessary for that.

K.W. But you are makg. these preparations in other areas.

W.O. We shall want later to extend the ban westwards.

C.I.G.S. We shall later have to deny entry to coastline: and over a wide area to provide cover.

Better however to re-shape the neg^n with a view to offensive operations.

x/. Extend present suspension of ban to ¼ and meanwhile reshape the plan.

M/H. a) Present instrument appropriate to new purposes: insufft. control also.

b) “Further west” raises v. gt. civilian problems. Earlier proposal to extend present ban to Lyme Regis failed because of extent of economic damage to fresh communities.

S/Doms. Para 8. This control gives you v. little security protection. Business visitors can come in freely.

L.P. I. of W. is a v. difft. approach – this is what you want.

Agreed as at x/. Civil Dpts to consider with W.O.
I. of W. to be treated separately: C.D.Cttee to consider the point about steamer traffic.

II. Training for the Building Industry.

M/L. Results of Cttee appt. by Reith. Plan meets 2 needs a) absorption of labour while industry is re-tooled b) arrears of bldg.

All Dpts. concur in White Paper. Wish to announce in Parlt. this week.

Bldg. industry have virtually agreed to absorb large no. of trainees – thus avoidg. tragedy of period after last war. Scheme wd. be reviewed if programme doesn’t in fact require these nos: but they are minimum nos.

A.V.A. Para 4. Not intended to retain Ess. Work Order?

M/L. Want something like the guaranteed week. Must avoid casual system if we are to get remits.

K.W. Too early to specify details: but nec. to provide tht. employers can carry out guarantee.

T.J. Reduction fr. 1.4m to 1.25 doesn’t involve scaling down of programme. No?

Only appls. for 200 places in traing. scheme now. Publicity will be needed to back this White Paper.

M/L. Intend that Lobby corresp. : regional conferences with the trade.

Need to create confidence in the industry – and we can do it.

Better relations than ever in the trade.

H.O. Para 3 is provisional: I don’t therefore dissent from it.

But Cab. shd. realise tht. this all depends on capital available for investment and priority demands upon it. Man can’t live by bldg. alone. eg. what we said on Bev. Rept.

K.W. Supported this point. Para 3 was amended with this in view

But remember this is the most fruitful source of emplt. I am satisfied with this statement and think it important that it shd. be made.

Draft White Paper approved.
III. N. Atlantic Convoys.

L. No. of ships have increased: nos. now awaiting convoys: complicated by enlarging cycle fr. 6/8 days.

More than 80 ships now per convoy. In Jan. Admy. put a ceiling of 60 but this has bn. raised to 80. x/. Now U.S. say it sho’ not go above 60.

Now U.S. also say tht. they won’t give us more shipping if we can’t eliminate the convoy delays.

Essential therefore either to have no ceiling for nos. of ships per convoy. or to have more escorts.


We have on occasion put nos. up to 90. But we weren’t then contendg. with large packs of U-Boats.

Convoys above a certain size v. diff. to hold together: and stragglers now almost always get lost.

C.N.S. We had considered all the disadvantages but we decided we must take the risk.

But U.S. have the whip-hand because they will hold back their ships.

L. They can by this means defeat the Lyttelton agreement.

We must increase our imports.

C.N.S. Easier to run 80 ship convoy than to run extra convoy.

But as U.S. have turned first alternative down, we must re-consider second.

Can’t say where escort ships will come from. Might ask U.S. to provide balance of escorts. If they refuse, somethg. else must give way.

L. Need we accept the U.S. attitude w’out demur.

You were proposg. to increase prop’n of escort vessels: have you told U.S. this?
And at what level shd. you tell them?

S/Doms. Press them again on highest level your (Admy) can: and promise the addl. escorts if you can.

L. to make simultaneous approach to Harriman: for Hopkins.

L. This will recur and increase throughout the year.

C.N.S. Moor can put this long-term point at this present conference in U.S.A.

Agreed. (C.S.A.B. Ldn. to Washington)
(Harriman to Hopkins) referring to War Cab. wishes.
(Admy. to U.S. Navy)
W.M.(43) 35th Meeting. 25th February 1943

I. India, Home Member of G.Genl’s Executive Council.

L.S.A. Had prev. discussed with Viceroy appt of Usman: but agree in light of recent events pref. to re-appoint Maxwell.

Only a convention tht. a man serves for 5 years.

M.A.P. Maxwell is, and regarded as, exhausted. v. unfortunate effect on opinion to extend.

Health bad.

L.S.A. Mudaliar assumed he wd. be extended.

M.A.P. He wd. be appt for term of yrs. and wd. be regarded as shutting out Indianisation.

A.E. Say we agree in principle: but is Viceroy satisfied he is mentally and physically alert enough for the job.

[Signature]

L.P. Don’t commit yrself to a year’s extension – because of new Viceroy.

Agreed as at x/.

Ghandi.

L.S.A. An up-grade. 15 days out of 21 now passed. Ends next Tues. evening.

II. R.A.F. Squadrons in N. Russia.

A.E. R. originally agreed – staff 4/500. Air Min then found larger nos. req’d. R made diff’s. I saw Maisky who promised help. Reply now recd. is impertinent.

Show-down necessary. See me tomorrow. Admy to give the statement of losses up to date in convoy.

A.V.A. This is already available. No use handg. over because sea work in wh. R have no experience: also co-op” Admy: intelligence: language diff’s. End my upcatg. request and say tht. if facil. not given we must review all convoy plans.

Trouble prs. on U.S. Will see their rep” first. Not quite sure, however, what their attitude will be.
M.A.P. Is Russian reply impertinent?

S/Air. They can’t pretend to understand these methods. They must realise this.

A.V.A. We want a) closest trained co-op

   b) ground personnel for use of latest techn. aids.

Ques wthr. under these cicss we can go on running the convoys at all.

Our ships, our sailors are involved.

H.O. Is it not part of R. anti-foreign suspicions.

Agreed F.O. proposals.

III Civil Air Transport.

M/L. Better to go out for bolder plan. vis.á.vis U.S.A.

S/Air. Part of our plan is to design new types: but it will take at least 4 years.

Meanwhile, we will use available resources.

We must design for ultimate fleet. The biggest will take up to 5 yrs. to produce.

Can’t hope to advance them dates. But meanwhile jig & tool to get most out of types wh. cd. be. adapted to get them into use meanwhile.

Para 2(i) 6/8 enquired for Atlantic traffic. V. high load. 70/100 passengers.

   (ii) Not yet started.

   (iii) Great deal of work done by more than one firm: not yet operationally practicable.

Interim types. Jig & tool for addl. York. and transport version of Shetland and Halifax.

This will enable us to maintain services with reasonably serviceable craft, tho’ not comparable to U.S. types.

York = Lancaster with fuselage adapted for civil transport.
Shetland = larger Sunderland: Clipper.

H.O. How does this fit in with post-war policy.
S/Air. Trying to avoid collision with U.S. interests. Shall discuss with Doms and U.S. But first want authy. fr. W. Cab. to say we mean to have effective air transport organias ² We will not accept solution on basis tht. we won’t build any aircraft : and we therefore want authy. to plan some prodⁿ.

M.A.P. To get interest of industry we must take responsibility for design and ordering of ¾ useful interim types.

M./P. Paras. 7 & 8. “Minimum etc.” Unless R.A.F. will use for operational purposes aircraft constructed with view to civil use ….

a) Employment of labour in the industry.
b) Imperial uses for civil aviation.

This memo. contemplates only about 300 aircraft.

M.A.P. No. Para 8. says minimum no. of types.

M/P. Thought we wd. order about 2,000 : for use partly for R.A.F. This wd. give you real bargaining power.

S/Air. Wd it? U.S. cd. build 20,000, & much earlier.

L.S.A. Must F.O. know about nos? Isn’t it enough to show tht. we’ll have enough to withstand U.S. competition in our spheres.

S/Doms. All tht. is requᵈ. now is authy. to M.A.P. to go on with specified types.

M.A.P. Yes : except tht. we can only get industry together on basis tht. when designing etc. done we shall order. We must indicate tht. we shall go beyond proto-types : tht. we shall guarantee an order of reasonable size. Otherwise individ. firms may go off on their own.

K.W. Don’t commit ourselves now to para. 9 point.

M/P. Ultimately are you thinking beyond minimum nos. – i.e. about 400.

Unless we make a bigger effort we’ll be left behind.

S/Air. Never had figure of 400 in my mind : “minimum” refers only to types.

M.A.P. Enough to say will organise civil aviation on basis of these types and you’ll order enough of them to base civil aviation on them.
M/P. Transport aircraft for Services must be fitted in, so that it can sustain the civil aviation manufacturer.

M.A.P. Agreed. Cd. arrange that.

A.E. a) I don’t want to go so far as Memo. reopen discussions. Want merely background. Amend para.

b) Wdn’t mention nos. We’re going on with our programme : later on wd. like talks : meanwhile am talkg. with Doms.

M/P. Suggd. words at end of para 8.

K.W. Content tht. discussions shd. begin on that basis : but no firm commitment at this stage until proposals brought back to Cab as in para 5. You can make it clear tht. this is p. objective.

C.O. Para 2(v). Internal use in Colonies. We’ve had no opportunity to consider. May be need for addl. smaller type. Caveat.

S/Doms. Talks with Doms. Their internal requirements. difft. fr. ours. And they may want to manufacture for own needs. Caveat.

S/Air. ? Keep them off that now. Types will turn on routes we’re going to work. We don’t yet know them. Premature to discuss types with Doms. now.

S/Doms. Doms. may be our biggest customers to keep our industry empltd.

M.A.P. We shall need these types : and we can produce more for Doms. if wanted. If they want others, we shall consider wthr. we can fit them in. Meanwhile we can get on.
Convoys in Russia – Air Protection.


A.V.A.  Signal fr. S.N.O. Russia : R. removed part of our apparatus – radio set – with view to giving it to U.S.S.R.

A.E.  P.M. endorse our action.

Shackling.

A.E.  Message differed. Swiss given discretion as to what was to be transmitted verbally : what in writing. They have used that – no other difference.


S/Doms.  Amounts to mutiny. News so far confined to N. Zealand. Court of enquiry set up.

M/I.  Keep it quiet as long as possible. Encourage N.Z. Govt. to hold it.

A.E.  P. Power will have to tell Japs.

S/Doms.  Our D.O view was danger of leakage indicated need for early announcement.

W.O.  W.O. D.O. and F.O. had agreed in favour of world statement as early as possible.

Bruce.  Australians most likely to suffer fr. Jap. reprisals. Wd. be better to make world statement. ‘w’out awaitg. result of Court of Enquiry.

S/Doms.  This has bn. done.

W.O.  No Geneva asked not to inform Japs till after results of Court.

Agreed – (press N.Z. Govt. to give early public statement. )

(release P. Power from request to hold it back fr. Japs.)

M/I.  Cd. put out v. brief statement addg. Ct. is sitting.

L.S.A.  As soon as Japs have bn. told thro P. Power.
Use of Wolds Area for Training Armoured Divisions.

W.O. Considered every means of mitigating effects: considered all poss. alternatives.

I may have overlooked somethg. Would L.P. adjudicate? Wd. abide by that.

M/Ag. Have done all I can to meet W.O. demands. This is last straw. Wd. agree to review by L.P.

Agreed.

British Military Administration of Occupied Enemy Territory.

Note taken.

Parliament.


S/Air H/C. interested broad post-war policy. Can only be decided in light of discussions with Doms. and U.S. Many Dpts. interests: W.A.J. co-ordinating.

US of S always answers for Civil Aviation. If handled on Air Min\(^{\text{y}}\) lines and will expect W.A.J. to speak.

H.O. But surely Air Min\(^{\text{y}}\) is responsible Dpt.?

K.W. W.A.J. can’t say anything at all. An Air Min\(^{\text{y}}\) spokesman could.

M/L. Balfour can’t get away again with saying nothing.

L.P.S. H/Lords Debate 3 wks ago. US of S for Air took this line – to the complete dissatisf\(^{\text{e}}\) of the House, who have tabled another Motion.

C’d we say we are in comm\(^{\text{h}}\) with Doms – ques. has bn. opened up with them.

A.E. y/. On technical side, Brab. Cttee reported and accepted – Govt. at work on it.

On other side x/. later we will proceed to discussions with other Powers.
M/P. “Now organising work on designs of civil air transport prototypes”.

K.W. Can’t say y/. until Doms. have considered Rpt.

M/L. “Have read B. Rpt. have bn studying it and are in commn with Doms. on this and cognate ques. Then deprecate further curiosity : say this is a matter wh. can’t be prematurely discussed in public.

S/Air. That’s why I want it said by War Cab. Minister or W.A.J.

M/L. D/P.M. as P.M. not available.

S/Doms. I cdn’t deal with ques of daily adminn. B.O.A.C.

Let Balfour say it in opening statement.

S/Air. You’ll need a v. weighty warning to stop H/C talkg. about it.

Ch.Whip. H/C. will expect more than the U/Secretary.

M/L. Separate this fr. general Debate and let D/P.M. or A.E. deal with it.

L.P. “Have made all prelim studies to equip us for disc with Doms. and other Powers.

Decided to go ahead with design so far as needs of war-time situation permits.

A.E. Ask W.A.J. to prepare statement in consent with M.A.P. M/P and others.

Bring that up later Cab. and decide who will make it.

Agreed.
Mr Speaker’s Possible Demise.

A.E. Verney : Mr Speaker said speaker wd. have wished the Bill to have passed.

Didn’t wish work of Parlt. to be interrupted in war.

I feel, however, it wd. be indelicate to put Bill thro’ now.

Practical diffy. is to secure opportunities for Members to meet to discuss successor.

Ch.Whip. Wd. like leave to make soundings in Parties today – on this account.

Discussion suspended for attendance of Mr Metcalf.

de Gaulle

A.E. Made formal request for leave to visit his troops. (Y/day).

When told opportunity unsuitable, enquired wthr. he was to regard himself as a pr.

P.M. Say “Not considered in interests U.N. at this stage in relations between F. Nat Cttee and countries under Giraud, desirable that he shd. leave the country.” Think of the Americans, who believe us responsible for all de G’s acts.

M/I. We ought to stop de G. broadcasting.

A.P. He can’t w’out pre-censorship by me.

I wd say “exam’d request : not a good time to go, in interests unity between 2 sections : wd. prefer he shd. wait until Catroux has negotiated : not therefore prudent to give facilities for his journey”.

P.M. x/ Ask Press not to discuss it. F. French will try propaganda about “prisoner”.

S/Doms. There will prob. be trouble here – his reputation is higher than ever.

What effect in Syria of holding him from going?

A.E. Nothing. The biggest trouble will be here.
P.M. Put it quite bluntly. And arrest him if he tries to leave eg. by Fr destroyer.

Security measures shd. be laid on to prevent that.

Agreed – including x/.

Message to be delivered to Massigli by F.O. written note.
Air Protection for Russian Convoys.

A.E. Reply fr. Sov Govt. Looks as tho. they will meet us on some points.

de Gaulle.

A.E. Message delivered. M. suggd AE. shd. see de G. vice note. I said no. Note has bn. delivered: but no more heard of it. Catroux has shown tht. He wd. deprecate.

Greek Army.

A.E. Diffy. due to fact tht. King & Govt. are not there. Am seeing ‘King’ today & urging him to go to Egypt - w’out delay - & establish his H.Q. there. Latest move: appln to B. is appoint B. offrs.

We shall have to make up our minds wthr. we are going to back the King & this Govt. throughout: if so, we shall prob. have to discontinue our dealings with Republican agents inside Greece.

Air Raids.

H.O. Sunday day: 19 overland: 13 Eastbourne/Hastings. 9K 22 seriously inj. 30 slight. 6 boys affected by mustard gas in field in Herne Bay. W.O. shd. investigate.

Sunday night: 30 of wh. 2 got to Ldn.

Wed/Thursday night: 30 (60 sorties): 10 in central Ldn.

Bethnal Green Shelter. Soon after alert on Wed. evening. Total killed 180.

Announcement held up for some hours: stress factual statement released after consulta with P.M. & M/I..

Have seen the 2 M.P.s & the Mayor.

People in the vicinity are worried – mtg. at Oxford House on Sat. p.m. Read letter fr. Percy Harris M.P. who attended the mtg. Mtg. wanted immediate public enquiry under a Judge: Harris said I was ready to accede to such a request.
Think there ought to be enquiry, conducted by an impartial person.

**Pro** public enquiry: matter of public interest.

wd. have a re-assuring effect.

public demand locally & in Press.

**Pro** private enquiry: security ques may be raised with published findings:

effect on public morale of continued publicity.

opportunity for propaganda by disaffected local people.

war condns are diff. from peace.

Favour private enquiry by Dunn, Met. Mag.

Statement in H/C or in Press: Tuesday or Wed. Read draft statement.

L.P. Clearly shd. not be held in public.

? Worth while associating assessors with Met. Mag.

H.O. Considered that : but against it. They can be called as witnesses.


H.O. My reason was public realise Met. Mags. know London.

A.E. Announce in House if possible.

Agreed.

Air Transport: Statement in Debate on Air Estimates.

S/Air. M.A.P. objected to para. 12 x/.

H/C will expect something of this kind.

M.A.P. I doubted wtr. A.E. wd. want it in this form: wh. assumes tht. we shall take the initiative, & soon, in approaching the U.S. Govt.

? “Consult8 with the [U.S. and] other members of the United Nations…”
will [no doubt] follow.” “No doubt” objectionable.

Agreed: ommitt [ ] and [ ].

M.A.P. Para. 12 “our exploratory work” is not well-advanced.

“Exploratory work is in hand” – Agreed.


Amendmts. noted in pencil: agreed.

Answer supplement by saying B. mil. types are being converted to transports for reasons

“As H/C aware transport needs of Services have already obliged us to convert some of our best B. bombers for transport purposes.”

M/L Reserve that as answer to supplementaries. Agreed.

A.E. Para. 10 – no change.


L.P.S. Shall I give this verbatim in H/Lords. Agreed. Yes.

C.O. End para. 11. Another factor…… Colonial…..

M.A.P. Supported: but insert it in para. 1.

W.O. Won’t that raise fears in U.S. such as were provoked over shipping in last war.

Disappearance of U.S. Shipping Bd.

Bruce. Unnecessary to stake out a claim at this stage.

Agreed: don’t include at this stage.

H.O. Will this upset U.S.S.R.? Need we mention U.S. in para. 12.

Agreed - omit.

Who shd. make the statement? S/A resisted sugg. That he should do it.
S/Doms. S/Air to say it, beginning “I am auth’d to make this statement on behalf of War Cabinet.”


S/Air. B.O.A.C. will come v. largely under operational control of new Command.

Bruce. If we are to finish Germans first – when time comes for air forces to be transferred to Far/East to finish Japan, is organ’n being planned to make this transfer?

S/Air. This will help.

Election of a New Speaker.

A.E. Geo. Lambert } to propose new Speaker

M.Tinker. }

Royal approval same day.

Ordinary business to be resumed on Wed.

On Wed. also Motion in respect of the late Speaker.
I. Shipments to the Middle East.

M/W.T. Egypt poses more serious because of what they’re doing for Turkey.

Agreed E. would release 50,000+ for Turkey: but only on replacement. Latter is necessary because of releases to eg Persia & Malta. Replacement of that 50,000+ would meet the case qua cereals.

Nitrates also necessary if later need of cereals is not to be greater. They won’t help us to supply other countries in M/East unless they have some assurance about nitrates for their next season’s crops. A good bargain from our pt. of view. Postponement would only mean we’d have to do it in a last-minute hurry which would involve more waste of shipping.

Recomm in memo. is contingent on addl. ships fr. U.S. for the military operation.

In those 14 ships we could probably accommodate (additionally) both cereals & nitrates.

Wd. like to have some forward plan – even if it didn’t extend beyond 4 months. This would meet M/State demand unless Turkey insisted on her higher demand.

M/P. Before going about 50,000+ for Turkey, scrutinize her demands since 1939.

W.O. L. asks for first charge in any circs. – not contingent on getting the 14 U.S. ships.

Agree that these cargoes could be squeezed into those 14 ships.

But if those ships aren’t forthcoming, & this first charge is accepted, then the mil. op will have to be postponed. i.e. that op can only go on if U.S. provide 14 ships.

S/Doms. Remember that M/State programmes have been affected by mil. needs of Malta and N. Africa.
W.O. We have already combed mil. demands to minimum, at P.M.’s request.

M/W.T. x/ You cd. meet that contingency to some extent by paring maintenance needs in certain areas.

W.O. If you don’t get 14 ships, 25% cut in mil. supplies to M/E. in April.

M/W.T. But if the op^n is postponed much more shipping will be available.

C.O. Rice fr. Egypt to Ceylon is going v. slow: promise of nitrates is necessary to get the cereals out of Egypt.

M/W.T. We know tht. Egyptian demands for nitrates is minimum.

Is the Turkish demand really to be met in full? eg. P.M.’s note.

W.O. Only arguable case as at x/ is 10,000t. of food to Malta.

H.O. Isn’t Turkey a “good will” consignment under terms of P.M.’s note.

W.O. Our limit of 40 ships a month wd. have to rise to 75 after March if we are to get fulfilment of all plans agreed at Casablanca.

Another point – if we get only 10 of the 14 ships, this extra civil commitment if given 1st priority wd. make if diff. or imposs. for us to keep our dates.

M/W.T. If we get 14, we can carry this civil extra w’out much mil. diffy.

If we don’t get 14, the op^n can’t take place anyway.

W.O. But excludg. all civil supplies, you might just do it on 8 ships.

M/W.T. But C.O.S. have said 14 is minimum they can accept.

M/P. We can’t decide until we know about the 14 ships. Can’t M/State hold the position meanwhile?

M/W.T. It will be 10 days before U.S. decide.

L.P. L. wants to give firm promise to M/State.

We have asked for 14 ships in con^n. mil. op^n. On that dec^n. op^n. or not turns.

If op^n, then civil oblig^n. can be met thro’ those ships.
If no op^n. we can carry out his oblig^n.s. by use of other ships set free.

W.O. My obj^n. to yr. blanket priority is that it excludes possibility of doing the mil. op^n. with something a little less than 14 ships.

L.P. Remember that success of this mil. op^n. will give a big shipping dividend.

H.S. You cd. give a firm promise now & meet it in either of 2 ways.

a) thro’ the 14 ships.

b) expense of U.K. programme.

If your op^n. is really urgent, then b) is not out of the question.

M/L Inter-departmental disc^n.s needed to present us with clear statement of implications.

R.A. Early decision v. necessary fr. pt/view M/east.

Their imports only 10% of pre-war.

C.O. W.O. argument is based on assumption that normal civil supplies to this area cd. be discontinued. They cdn’t.

Discussion resumed at 6.p.m.

M/W.T. Agreed tht. no diffy. if we have the 14 ships.

If we get less than 14: civil cargo (some of wh. is food for military & rest essential minimum civil needs) represents (of ships loaded with military much = space not otherwise used) 3 ships = what cdn’t be stowed at no military cost.

If therefore only 11 & mil. made no contrib^n.……..

S/Doms Cd. mil. cargo be stowed in 11 ships?

M/W.T. 11 ships wd. meet 90% of their needs.
W.O. If we get 11, can we stow all our mil. cargoes with no civil: answer = yes. If you have to take all civil, 10% loss of mil. needs.

S/Doms. Must you not have a part of 14 ships?

W.O. No.

W.O. With 11 ships I cd. carry 90% of mil. and all civil cargo.

M/W.T. I can’t answer S/Doms. qun. because I don’t know nature of mil. cargo.

W.O. Remember there are 19 B. ships apart fr. the 14 U.S. ships.

M/L. That gives us more elbow-room to take risks.

M/W.T. Remember I can’t risk dropping any large amount of the v. restricted civil cargoes.

M/L. Failure to send food & nitrates to M/East may well prejudice the military pos just as much as loss of 10% of military cargoes.

W.O. We cd. get all, mil. & civil, in 14 ships. If we get less than 14, there is a balancing point at wh. you either prejudice mil. op or wd. have to reverse the first priority for L. I put that balancing point at 11 ships.

L.P. If true tht 14 to 11 wd. still enable mil. op to go on, the issue = cargo of 3 ships. Some allowance must be made for stowing conditions. Always space for deadweight cargo.

M/W.T. Allowance has bn. made already for this.

3 ships = what civil cargoes can’t be stowed in free space of 11 mil. ships.

Without that allowance wd. = 5 ships.

L.P. Margin = 3 ships at worst. If things go badly, at worst we have to find 3 ships to make it good. We cd. take that risk, in view of our total shipping.

W.O. Record tht. if we get less than 14 the risk is tht. you mayn’t be able to ship enough mil. stores to avoid jeopardising opn. i.e. if we have to take the full bump on loss of 3 ships.

Agreed: Give M/State the guarantee & shoulder the responsibility for meeting it w’out endangering the mil. op.
Military Operations.

V.C.I.G.S.

Tunisia.

Enemy attacks slackened save in area in N. 3 attacks on 11/3: all unsuccessful: 200 prs.

14/3 local attack to high ground E. of Tamara: not successful. Elsewhere only patrols in North. Lost 1.500 + 2.000 since 26/2. 10.000 since start of campaign.

Centre. French patrols.

U.S. no further advance. 3 Divns. concentrating there.

South. Fr. irregulars have moved up twds. Gapsa.

6th Arm. Divn. re-equipped by 17/3 (Shearmans): delayed for 17 days thro’ surrender of some tanks to U.S. for replacements.

1st Inf. Divn. will be concentd in fwd. area by 1/4.

? 24th ... . . . . . . . . . . by mid/April.

In north: rains still makg. tank opns imposs. on our front.

Eighth Army: fwd. move complete by 19/3. 50th Divn already fwd.

In R.’s attack on 8th Army. 52 G. tanks destroyed, all but 9 by infantry 6 pdrs.


The Shotts not passable until mid/May.

3.500 b.p. day average discharge at Tripoli. for latest week – exclg. bulk petrol.

880 b.p. day at Benghazi. Redn on prev. week.

By 12/3 we should have 21 days reserve for 6 Divns.
54,000 v. 8th Army = ration strength. Little M.T.

Tank strength 100/120. G. 24 I.

P.M. 2 Panzer Divns have fewer tanks than one B. brigade.

Russia.

Thaw pretty good.

North: attacks s. L. Ilmen prob. ceased.

Centre: Vyazma break thro’ successful. G. withdrawal prob. planned. Tho’ don’t know where they will stand.

Orel: No development of R. threat in last week.

Kharkov: Mainly fr. W. G. have made good progress. G. claim prob. true tht. bulk of city in their hands. 20/25 G. Divns empl’d prob. the whole of their strategic reserve. In Donetz looks as tho’ G. have no bridgeheads across the river.

Taman: Thought tht. R. won’t be able to put on large pressure until mid/April.

Weather will thus enable G. to get most of them away.

G. have moved 16 Divns. fr. France: but many of these replaced fr. Russia & Germany.

Result 18 static 12 mobile Divns. in France: whereas previously proportions were the opposite.

Giraud and de Gaulle.

R.Law. Giraud’s speech. He has come long way to meet F. Nat. Cttee. Of 4 condns laid down by Cttee. 2 fulfilled 100% & the others more than 50%. Genuine basis for agreement.

No direct ref to release of prs. or changes in admin.


Suggest that AE. shd. (as suggd. by Macmillan) provoke joint GB-US statement welc of Giraud’s advance – makg it clear tht. in our opinion no difference of principle betwn the 2 sides.
P.M. de G. actuated by personal motives: “title-deeds of France in his pocket.” Giraud a much better man: and de.G. probably bitter enemy of G.B.

L.P.S. Motion in H/Lords Wedgwood on diff. military and political in N. Africa.

Can I say anythg. about G.’s speech?

P.M. Not until after joint decl.

Get W. to postpone for a day or two.

L.P.S. Will try to bat it off.

Communist Party.

P.M. Amend your memo. by going back a year or two before ’39.

H.O. Wd. like to publish White Paper. But a) reaction on U.S.S.R. b) secret sources.

P.M. Strain it & see what cd. be published at the appropriate time.

Newfoundland.

S/Doms. Comm on Civil Servants with no political sense.

Suggest therefore Parly. mission of 3 – one fr. each Party.

P.M. What of Canadian interest?

S/Doms. Unlikely tht Canada wd. wish to take over. And Newfoundlanders v. independent.

M/L & P.M. What will the Mission do?

S/Doms. Some useful movements under weigh eg. in paper towns. Thought on these subjects is beginning to stir.

P.M. Let S/Doms. decide – as he wishes, so long as he makes sure they have something to do.

Agreed.

Lectures to Troops.

S/Air. Pritt banned in June. At end of ’42 realised it & wrote to P.M. in protest & now to me again about R.A.F. ban.
Has delivered a no. of unobjectionable lectures to R.A.F. before the ban: and I therefore asked wtr. it was nec. to maintain ban in my case. Danger of makg. him a martyr. Cdn’t we let up now?

W.O. Recommend against this.

Before man can lecture frequently to Army he as to get a cert. of employmt. & that is not issued if M.I.5. prove Comm. etc. record.

But individual lectures (one at a time) can be arranged thro’ particular C.O. & by that backstairs method he has crept into Army.

S/Air. ? Don’t ask him, but don’t prevent him.

H.O. V. bad record in this war - on Communist line. Not fit to lecture to troops.

W.O. Signs of Communist nibbling at Army.

Agreed: Maintain ban. Line to be taken in informing him –

“In view of his past public attitude assoc’d with ideas, cdnt expect to be invited to lecture to troops.”

“Anyone so prominently associated with views wh. he exp’d. before R. came into the war …….”
**W.M.(43) 41** Meeting.  
16th March, 1943

I. Portuguese East Africa.

Law. F.O. anxious not to set up S.O.E. organ\(^n\) there at this stage.

M.E.W. Want this to proceed. Smuts v. Keen: worried about Axis activities: wd. take them months before they cd. do anything - & wd. do nil w’out F.O. sanction. Risk tht. if we don’t go on with this Smuts may set up one of his own.

We have no doubt there is Axis activity there: & no machinery for co-ordinated action to study it. No overt action w’out sanction of B. & S.A. Govt.

A.V.A. S.O.E. going there might queer pitch for existg. S.I.S. people there.


M.E.W. Smuts wd. use S.O.E. for that purpose.

Law. Assurances to Salazar tht. we wd. have no S.O.E. in Portugal.

M.E.W. There they were trying to build up anti. Axis activity.

P.M. F.O. Admy. & S.I.S. all greed – v. serious matter to go against their united view.

S/Doms. Undesirable to go on with this now, in view of progress made & relations with Portugal.

Law. Smuts request was based wholly on sub. menace: and that ques has bn. cleared up.

M.E.W. S.O.E. can’t produce results until they have bn. planted a long time.

A.V.A. Most urgent need is to control use of no less by Axis agents in S. Africa.

PM. As  

a) this route likely to become less important.

b) no danger of invasion of Portugal.

c) views of F.O. S.I.S. & Admy.
II. Appointment of Govt. Directors to Companies on War Production.

P.M. How necessary is this to M.A.P.?

M.A.P. Obviates need to appoint controller – who are becoming increasingly diff. to find.

Havg. this power, it wd. be easier to make vol’ arrangements.

Diff. to run a co. thro’ a controller. Have appov’d only 2 up to date.

P.M. Consid. recent improvemt. in prod’n. Is it worth a Parl’ row to have a new power for a few cases? Opportunity for antagonisms to Minister.

M.A.P. Some are v. big concerns. Present diffy. is with the Bristol Company. It wd. be v. diff. to put a controller into that company.

P.M. Reg. in new form is much easier to defend: & is entirely reasonable.

L.P. Remember tht. a Reg. has bn. made - ques now is of amending it.

Ch. Whip. Diffy. in House = general uneasiness about D Regs.: many will join in on basis of oppos’n to leg’n by regulation.

L.P. You can’t make that general pos’n easier by running away on particular cases.

K.W. New form may mitigate some of the oppos’n.

M/P. Think it will upset the industry.

M.A.P. I don’t.

P.M. Is the advantage worth the antagonism this may well provoke.

M/L. That overlooks the fact that we have made a Reg’n. We can’t afford to withdraw that & substitute nothing. That course wd. provoke much stronger reactions from Labour.

P.M. Think it was a mistake to make the original Reg’n Was it necessary?

L.P. No new principle tht. Govt. directors shd. go on the Board if substantial Govt. investment.
K.W. Wd. be politically bad to withdraw.

P.M. V. well: go on & have your row: it may hamper M.A.P. in future work.

M/P. Admin ve pledges – e.g. point of view of firms will be heard by Crown Cttee.

This may help.
W.M.(43) 43rd Meeting. 19th March, 1943.

I. Prime Minister’s Broadcast on Re-construction.

Electricity: mainly distribution: cheap generation & distribution.

Mention also gas: re-distribution.


W.A.J. Forestry. Promised to send passage to P.M.

H.O. How far must legislative preps. wait until end of war?

P.M. I will add phrase indicating that preps. including legislative preps., must be made before end of war?

I will also mention Russia’s continuing sacrifices.

“We shd. be failing in our duty if we did not make preps. now” when referring to the demobilization of the Army.

S/Doms. Govt. has fed the people during this war: & we will go on doing so.

L.P. a) Machine tools. We got most of these on Lease Lend. Better to say expansion of British machine tools industry.

b) Agriculture. nearer a positive pledge of liberal Exchequer subsidy. “As it has to be maintained” + then subsidy = pledge.

P.M. Can’t scrap the whole ag. interest.

S/Doms. Mention civil aviation with railways.

S/Air. Larger families – nearly a positive pledge of liberal Exchequer subsidy. “As it has to be maintained” + then subsidy = pledge.


b) Mention ag. landlord as well as farmer & worker.

H.O. Taxation a) indicate gone v. low in social scale.

Law. Council of Europe – what part U.S. play in that?

Grouping of European States – 11 or 12 States or Groups. Won’t F.O. be asked in which group the various States will be? Better not to mention a number?

P.M. I will say “12 or more”.

M/P. Expenditure on railways & aviation belongs to second stage? Prob. not in first 4 years.
Military Operations.

Burma.

Land advance on Akyab combined in final stages with sea-borne assault.


Small force moved down Kaladan Valley: moved back.

Japs now re-inforced to 9 Batts. We have 15 Batts.

Our battle casualties = 1500. J. = 2,500.

Since end Feb. no figures but believed high.

V. high sickness casualties – record: 25% p. month.

P.M. V. unsatisf. Tho. we outnumber J. they outmanoeuvre us. No unit ascendancy our part.

V.C.I.G.S. Wavell has gone to make personal inspection.

We can’t take advantage of a) our superiority in weapons b) R.A.F.

Admit we are not as good as Japs at jungle warfare.

Russia.

Op^n affected by thaw.

Centre: slowed down.

Orel: some renewal of R. pressure has died down.

Kursk: G. attackg. & claim success joined 1st & 2nd Panzer.
Donitz: Captured Kharkov & now Byelgorod

Taman: major op\textsuperscript{ns} stopped by thaw. G. evac\textsuperscript{n} continuing mainly by sea.

Administration of Territories (Europe) Committee.

H.O. Two phases: a) military + civil admin\textsuperscript{n} with them.

b) Leith.R. more permanent admin\textsuperscript{n}.

Is it certain tht. the 2 hang together? Cd. L.P. Ctte look into it.

W.O. L.R. = relief. Civil admin\textsuperscript{n} after mil. leave it depends on bringing in Allied Govt. concerned. That has gone slow because Am. wdn’t talk.

W.O. and L.R. organisation are in touch.

P.M. x/ L.P. + 3 members of L.P. Ctte. to consider wthr. this is all well, & in order.

Took note: subject to x/.

Refugees.

L.P.S. Debate in H/Lds. Tomorrow. Can I use some of these figures?

P.M. Yes: don’t use ‘em all.

H.O. M/I. to seek publicity for this statement.

Law. “Czecho-slovak nationals” vice Czechs”

M.A.P. Cd. a total be put in: small gobbets don’t give imp\textsuperscript{n} of large total.

K.W. Only if the total is really impressive.

P.M. Consider this point.

Shackling of Prisoners of War.

P.M. Referred to recent telegrams. G. will continue to keep 4.100 men shackled – gone on for 6 months.

Law. New G. proposal for repat\textsuperscript{n} of wounded prs. : wd. like therefore to postpone for a time until particulars of that proposal are available.
P.M. Cd. we say tht. shackling will be another count v. them: &
threaten reprisals against those G. who come into our hands at end
of war? Think it over.
W.M.(43) 45th Meeting. 25th March, 1943.

Proposed Food Conference.

P.M. General warning – risk of angering the people.

M/F. Recognise conference full of potential dangers.

a) may get controlled by faddist – platform for ideas of new nutritional heaven. They will raise hopes, but no machinery.

b) The problems of commodity control & exchange clearing shd. be dealt with by a separate conf. of diff. people.

c) In all-nations conf., when it comes, B. Emp. shd. speak with one voice. If we can’t settle producer/consumer problem in our own family first …..

d) Danger of world food shortage in post-war years. Demand may outrun supply. Consumption increasing everywhere – internal spending power is increasing. In U.S. they are falling down on my demands because increased purchase power in U.S. is leading to increased food consumption. Also food production will decline. Withdrawal of U.S. workers fr. land. Same factor at work in Africa – shortage of ground nuts due to diversion of labour to defence works etc. This exhausts our reserves v. post-war needs. When relief needs arise, enormous drain on stocks. Wise therefore to consider what problems will be in post-relief period – when all stocks have gone & risk of scramble for available food. Anything done now to avoid that scramble will be to our advantage – e.g. continue on a wider basis the work of Combined Food Boards. This is the hope of a Conference – that might emerge.

K.W. Genl. lines we shd. take sugg’d in telegram to Halifax.

a) Decide what issues to be put to U. Nations Conf. Para 1. of Tel. II.

b) Steering Cttee: to get them on right lines & avoid uncontrolled appt’s of Sub-Cttees of Food Conf.

c) Avoid controversial topics – e.g. what scheme.
d) Status of delegates: not too high: so they can’t be expected to commit H.M.G.

Danger: this has bn. rushed w’out proper preparation. Essential to have an understanding in advance with U.S. Govt.

H.O.

a) Illustrates need to clear own ideas re genl. economic problems.

b) We are not in a stage to allow H.M.G. to be committed.

K.W. Some U.S. politics here: they wd. rather be discussing food than e.g. currency.

L.P. Promoted by nutrition enthusiasts in U.S.

Two dangers –

a) optimum nutritional standards for whole world – ludicrous.

b) Or. delegates will be led at once into diff. economic problems for wh. we aren’t ready for discussions.

Nec. to have clear understanding with U.S. Govt. tht. b) will not be handled at present stage.

Desire therefore to stiffen up draft Telegram.

S/Doms. Need also for close accord with Dom. delegates.

Cherwell. We shall be only importing country of any size.

Open conflict of interest between us and Doms.

Support L.P. views.


M/Ag. U.S. selection of our delegates indicates risk of a).

B/T. Dangerous if this spilled over into commercial ques. E.g. cotton agreement now wd. be v. dangerous

Presume will last a good time. Soon we may have cleared our minds on Commercial Policy. Then wd. be gt. advantages qua Food Conf. if we cd. get Comm. Policy etc., accelerated.
I.S.A.  India.  This Conf. is being promoted by high-standard producers.  Doesn’t at all suit low-standard countries like India.  Those parts of Empire whose interests are diffr. fr. Australia & Canada shd. therefore be fairly represented.

Law.  Maisky has told us USSR will say 27/4 is too soon.  If they ask for postponement it will help us.

Must have Conf<sup>e</sup> – want them to confine themselves to resol<sup>n</sup>s on food - want to get talking with U.S. separately on Clearing Union & Commodity Control - possible lever to secure techn. discussions on these earlier is reluctance of U.S. to have these plans published.

K.W., L.P., Law & Cherwell to settle revised draft of telegram.

Agreed.
Military Operations.

Russia.

Railway running nr. Leningrad.

Opp. Moscow – some improvement.

Kharkov – fighting at standstill: G. threat in Kursk held.

Kuban salient R. made 2 dents in bridgehead.

Finland.


Soviet Govt. can’t take initiative, but will outline to U.S. min. condns. for separate peace. Molotov to Adml. Stanley.

I drew attn. to compens. cond. They said they wanted timber + paper, not money. I advised to ask for that in terms & avoid raising ques of indemnities.

Otherwise terms are not unduly severe. Particularly, no territorial demands.

F.O. to prepare reply to Maisky.

U.S.S.R.

P.M. Read messages sent to Stalin about Tunisian campaign, + bombing of Germany.

Read also reply.

Air Raids.

H.O. Attack on Ashford 43k. 79 s.injd. Daylight 14 planes  Wed.  

Today 11.a.m. B’ton & Hove. 2 k 6 s. injd. 19 slightly Hove, 20 casualties in B’ton.

7 mins. delay in warning B’ton.

3 .. .. .. .. Hove.
Visitors’ Ban.

P.M. Agreement reached by L.P. Cttee.

L.P. Described it.

P.M. Hope W.O. will use these powers with discretion.

W.O. Will be done in consultn. with Reg. Commrs.

P.M. Shd. we announce the arrangement about I/Wight, best they plaster it.

Agreed: H.O. to announce in reply to Private Notice Ques.

Committee on Electoral Machinery.

P.M. By-election aspect is considered urgent. Why?

Ch.Whip. Because he will go on opposing Writs until some announcement made.

P.M. Won’t do much harm if he does. Speaker won’t allow him to raise gnl. ques. of reform.

H.O. I don’t think we can concede what Acland wants.

Give him a flat negative now. And then go on considering the gnl. ques.

W.O. Objns to diverting mil. man-power to registering soldiers.

P.M. Go on with prepns – not because we want Genl. Election in war, but because responsible Govts. must be ready for contingencies.

H.O. Shall I tell him “no” at first opportunity?

Ch.Whip. There will be one to-morrow if he opposes the Writ.

P.M. I will deal with it – no concession to Acland. If any concession is to be made give it in answer to Greenwood.

H.O. The Rpt. doesn’t deal with by-elections. Ques. therefore about action on Rpt. wd. be out of order in discussion on Writ.

P.M. { I will consider composition of Cab. Cttee. proposed in Memo.

{ H.O. to arrange a Ques. for Thursday unless point dealt with in debate on Writ on Tuesday.
International Food Conference.

P.M. L.P. to exercise general supervision over instns to delegates.

Agreed.
I. **Naval Construction.**

K.W. Carriers. Won’t be completed (new ones) until ’47.

P.M. But dropping battleships, save Vanguard: and reducing cruisers. And at end of war we must have modern weapons.

Balance is right save for larger destroyers.

C.N.S. Only new carriers can carry larger aircraft wh. can fight land-based aircraft. Destroyers: wd. like all to be Battle class. Must have 4.5 gun going to 80 degrees.

Can’t get all that into inter-mediate type, wh. are therefore only Fleet destroyers - & can’t operate alone for trade protection.

P.M. Strong obj” is unarmoured vessels carrying 250 men. The hunter becomes the hunted if made too large: this is danger of improving destroyers beyond point at wh. it passes out of hunting class. Cost as much as cruisers did in last war.

K.W. And frigates & corvettes cd. be built much quicker.

A.V.A. So many destroyers lost by air attack: & if you wan’t to give crews confidence in their proper work you must give them protection v. the air.

P.M. Wd., if 1st Lord, have contested this development: need for strength in intervening period: wd. have concentrated rather on frigates & corvettes. These are not really destroyers, they are cruiserkins.

A.V.A. Have argued with Sea Lords: only support for this view is fr. Tovey & even he weakens on the AA argument.

P.M. Doubt if we will still be fighting in West in mid ’45 when these ready.

C.N.S. But these are the vessels we shall want v. Japan. We are forced up to this tonnage.

P.M. Balance wrong: 20 of these only – put balance into frigates etc..
C.N.S.: Need = 190. In service 92. v. heavy losses. If these continue, we shall still be 48 short by time these are built.

P.M.: Not convinced. Aircraft carriers will be there to give this prot^n v. air attack with Fleets. Wd. rely on that & give more to convoy prot^n vessels.

C.N.S.: The carriers will need destroyer fringe. Everything is faster: destroyers must have the speed, too.

Switch of prod^n fr. destroyers to frigates v. difficult.

M.P.: Wd. such a switch affect pos^n until beginning of ’45?

A.V.A.: Yes: laying down to completion of frigates = 8 months.

P.M.: x/ Cd. we have report on what additional frigates & corvettes cd. be obtained if the heavy destroyers reduced to 20?

A.V.A.: Break up continuity of production. Wd. try to find a suitable yard, where e.g. you cd. put 2 corvettes vice 1 destroyer.

C.N.S.: As we stand, we’ll be better off in trade prot^n. fleet than in fighting fleet. Wrong to throw this balance still further over.

A.V.A.: U.S. Battle Fleet will be v. large by ’45.

Agreed: {order 20 destroyers (heavy) at once. } Examine also intermediate } destroyers

hold over the b pending x/.

A.V.A.: Great strain in bldg. landing craft. 61,000 men for that by 12 mos’ time, quite separate from Fleet.

II. Gift of Destroyers to Canada.


H.O.: Can’t we also agree now to meet the further request for 2 more.

Agreed: A.V.A. to consider himself free when request is made.

III. Ceylon Constitution.

C.O.: a) gt. importance of Ceylon to war interests of U. Nations.

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b) the constitution is, oddly, working: and the Ministers have
given v. loyal tho’not always efficient support to war effort.

Embarrassingly well – think they’ve done much better than India:
yet India has had large constitutional promise.

The more guarded statement did not satisfy Ceylon. Govr. & C-in-
C. both satisfied tht. unless more is said, Ceylon’s war effort will
be prejudiced.

P.M. No safeguards for B. commercial interests.

C.O. But strong bargaining power, as we take most of her exports. This
doesn’t go as far as C. Ministers want. Can’t guarantee this will
satisfy them.

K.W. Catto’s views.

C.O. But he isn’t on the spot, as Govr. & C-in-C are.

L.P.S. Diff. not to do what C.O. proposes.

On last occasion Govr. & C-in-C misjudged the situation.
But make it clear tht. we won’t be pushed any further.
And don’t encourage them “meanwhile” to formulate proposals.

C.O. Reason for that = make them face up to minority problem.

P.M. Do it only in return for Agreement on B. & Indian commerce.

L.S.A. Aren’t both these last matters for the Commission or Conference.

S/Doms. On separation of Burma, we had a commercial agreement.

W.O. But India & Burma were one as India & Ceylon are not.

P.M. C-in-C. won’t worry of course because he knows he can take total
powers whenever he likes.

Dislike it, but wd. agree if it cd. be accompanied by agreement for
protection of Indian or B. commercial interests.

Also on minorities, will it not be an evil precedent for India.

Refer back for assurances on

{ a) protection of minorities
{ b) commercial agreement.
Agreed { fill in these & other details (drafting requirements of other Dpts)

{and examine it again.

L.P. to consider with L.S.A., L.P.S., K.W. and B/Trade.
W.M.(43) 48th Meeting. 5th April, 1943.

de Gaulle & Giraud.

P.M. Saw de G. & Masigli Frid. Humble and tame. Told him to await AE.’s return & my enquiry wrt. Eisenhower cd. receive him. E. has replied tht. while didn’t wnt a breach with de G. wd. prefer him to wait till crisis of battle passed. Asked F.O. to put that to him.

Cadogan. Passed to Massigli y’day: no reply.

P.M. Announced in Press he wdn’t be going for a while.

Personal Injuries (Civilian) Scheme.

L.P. No diffy. in acceptg equality between men & women.

More diffy. about g. occupied & non g. occupied. But found in practice tht. this wd. be mainly housewives (about wh. no Ty. objn) & o.a. pensioners. Repercussions: T.U.C. consulted & no real ground for apprehension.

P.M. Will this be retrospective?

L.P. New rates will be paid to old cases.

K.W. Before Sub. Cttee apptd. L.P. Cttee decided no action. But tho’. pressure, Sd. Cttee apptd. The recommns. surprised us – qua non gainfully occupied persons. My anxiety is in future the g. occupied demand a higher rate for themselves. How long cd. we hold the position then. On the other hand, admit tht. T.U.C. have promised no risk of repercussions – tho’ don’t know how long it will last.

P.M. The compensation shd. relate to the injury, not the earnings.

M/L Explained history of previous relation to earnings. Present decision involves going over to P.M.’s basis. And T.U.C. have agreed to accept that. If they go back on their bargain, we must fight that issue.

P.M. Defend it on basis of war injury. State endeavours to protect all its citizens alike - & now will compensate them on this basis.

Agreed.
Tube Shelter Enquiry.

H.O. Two aspects - physical & psychological. The more we stress the second, the greater the security risk. We have therefore altered Mr. Dunne’s language: but he agrees fair picture of all that mustn’t be withheld on security grounds

Agreed to publish findings so far as security allowed.

K.W. P.6 shows this situation was envisaged.

H.O. I can’t use this Rpt. to protect Govt.

P.M. Against giving such limelight to this incident.

Flaunting weakest feature. What notice taken of all who died in air attack.

Disproportionate importance - meat & drink to enemy & invitation to repeat.

Say Rpt. received & considered: no need to publish: all its lessons are being vigorously applied.

Why publish - Govt.'s position is unassailable.

Moreover we said earlier “no panic”: this makes it clear there was panic & it was part cause: & this we are with-holding.

H.O. 170 people killed: shook the public: had to hold enquiry: agitation v. its being private: resisted tht., saying Rpt. wd. be published: will be told now that we’ve something to hide.

M/Inf. Short statement in H/C = publication.

H.O. We held off the discontented locals by promise to publish results.

P.M. But you are concealing the truth – panic.

M.A.P. Say {measures suggested in course of enquiry

{defects disclosed & these are being remedied.

S/Doms. Make it clear that panic was not due to Jews and/or Fascists.

H.O. undertook to consider.

Church Bells.
W.O. Ques. to-morrow by Stokes.

Since announcement about Reg. Areas, our pos\^a weaker.

C-in-C. Home Forces thinks bell system cd. be limited to Reg. Areas.

Shall I therefore indicate tht. I will reconsider in relation to Reg. Areas.

K.W. Leave it alone.

P.M. Don’t make any concession on enquiry by Stokes. If any concession, announce otherwise than to Stokes, e.g. to Greenwood.

K.W. Don’t hold out any hopes unless you have decided to change.

Agreed - refer to previous Answers.

Refugees. - Conference.

S/Doms. Rep\textsuperscript{yes} nominated: Law + Peak + G. Hall.

Decisions on policy subject to ref. back to War Cabinet.

Objects - (as read out too hastily).

A.V.A. Diff. to spare G. Hall. - shipyards & labour.

P.M. You must try & spare him for a month.
Imperial Conference.

P.M. Raise with Doms. ques. of Imp. Conf’ce - June or July.

Dom. P.M.’s or their reps: India

Popularise “B. Commonwealth & Empire”

Agreed: D.O. to issue invitations.

Town & Country Planning (Interim Development) Bill.

L.P. Ques. at issue: wthr. at this stage to re-distribute functions of l.a.’s

W.S.M. Discussed with l.a.’s, who are anxious to have the Bill: if altered, wd. have to discuss again & some l.a. Assoc’s wd. oppose.

Postpone review of l.a. functions until larger planning legislation.

P.M. Can you put a risk into inefficient county districts?

W.S.M. E.g. Mersey: B’head & Lipl: we have persuaded them to allow one of our men to make a plan for them both.

Bill provides tht. planning resolution be deemed to be in effect throughout the country.

H.O. a. Great public interest: Govt. will be critised for doing no more than this after havg. Uthwatt & Scott for months. On that satisfied with WS.M.’s arguments. But

b. Wd. prefer transfer of powers in this Bill.

(i) Too many county districts.

(ii) They are too small to take the wider planning view because rates. The County Council more likely to take a broad view.

Politically it wd. help because we cd. say we were doing something big in this Bill.

K.W. More trouble if you do seek to make this change now.

M/H. Wait for policy. Suppose you decide to lead away fr. conflict betwn. town & country: then distinction betwn. county boro’ & county council may be mistaken.

W.S.M. Co. Councils aren’t ideal planning areas. Diff’s must be got over by Joint Cttees: & I shall have power to impose them.

P.M. This Bill is sound because preliminary step to something more. Don’t want to begin with a big Bill.

Wd. agree with H.O. if we were at peace (L.P. & W.S.M. said they wd. too). But don’t want to open these large issues at this stage.

Bold social legislation at this stage is out of place now.

S/Doms. Disagreed: blitzed towns urgently require planning reform. good for men in Services to think of these things in spare time. good for Parl. to practise legislation.

M.A.P. Diffy is tht. you sterilise on basis tht. some auth’s will be responsible for some time to come. Psychologically open to criticism.

P.M. Meet that by stating war time measure.

L.P. We don’t know yet what we are to put in place of existing authorities. Therefore, go on with this Bill & statement at end of L.P.’s memo.

W.S.M. Won’t prejudice that issue when I speak on this Bill.

P.M. Will this Bill give you power to initiate fr. the top & to correct.

W.S.M. Broadly, yes.

L.P. We shall have Reg. Offrs. for the first time. You must take a/c of the establishment of a Minister with a positive function instead of a merely regulative function.

W.S.M. Power to compel appointmt. of Joint Cttee.

H.O. But has the Joint Cttee power to compel the constituent l.a.’s to agree.

W.S.M. The Joint Cttee is an executive auth for purposes of interim development.
H.O. Intolerable tht. a Joint Cttee. shd. impose a rate on a l.a.

P.M. Don’t hurry to introduce this. Let us discuss it once more.

W.S.M. No bldg. any way until after the war. No money yet therefore. Want therefore to get them working on paper.

M/Ag. Urgency = need to stop speculation.

H.O. Admitted there was no Party politics about this - many Labour Members would not agree with my view.

P.M. Emphasise importance of point that no bldg. can take place till after the war.

Agreed: present Bill to be introduced in H/Commons.
I. Post-war Commercial Policy.

B/T Now prefer to proceed as in covering note – i.e. Cab. to take prov. decisions & put these only to Dom. Govts. Urgency – may be raised at Food Conference.

Views A, B & C are not separately held. I adhere to A. Export industries hoping we will be able to clear channels of trade. Very much to our interest to get multilateral agreement embracing max. no. of States - providing for system of tariffs in return for wh. we wd. limit our pref etc., etc. Believe this to be the practical approach.

Para. 7. of memo. a) Yes = my view.

b) Only for narrowly defined purposes.

c) Yes. Some are waiting for a lead from us.

Quantitative import rests - by 20 countries in inter-war periods.

M/Ag & B/T We were able to use their quotas to get some certainty about our exports. We got something in by quota when we cd. not have got anything in under free cond.

P.M. What import quotas did we impose?

B/T. Very little - Danish bacon in return for coal exports.

M/S. Also small quota of steel free of the otherwise high tariffs.

L.P. These were all part of bilateral agreements. No bearing on present issue qua multilateral arrangement.

B/T. Shd. be no M.F. Nation Treatment for people outside the Union.

L.S.A. M.F.N. System has operated v. greater freedom of trade - agree. But needs thought in relation to U.S. who confide in M.F.N. & refer to it in Art. VII. Comm. Union = denouncg. many Treaties. And those outside will be free to discrim. more heavily v. us.
That aspect needs more contribution before we commit ourselves to Doms. Quota - powerful bargaining instrument in bilateral arrangements with e.g. Denmark.

Memo. on Ag. policy involves quota or levy-subsidy: neither of which will be consistent with this plan.

P.M. Indiv. examples quoted (e.g. Denmark) ignore bad ones over rest of field.

L.S.A. Our bargaining asset - high standard of living & rich consumers’ market.

P.M. Depends on export trade & foreign investment.

L.S.A. We can still use our market in bargaining. Bilateral would suit us better.

P.M. Stick to quota argument first. If big enough, might be a good way of getting things started.

M/P. Tactics rather than principles.

Agreement generally that multilateral trading is ideal goal: the question is route to it.

First problem = clearing union.

Quantitative numbers of imports essential to start with, for limited period: everyone would agree. For otherwise, with lack of foreign balances, we shan’t get in the essential imports.

No good therefore making other concessions to U.S. Line therefore is until clearing union established: we can’t get very far with commercial policy. Set up clearing union: then say for 5 yrs. pro. we must maintain quantitative numbers of imports until we’re in position to pay. When U.S. find they can’t get rid of their tobacco etc., they’ll look for ways of helping us to buy.

K.W. That = View B. I agree with that. eg. Para. 5 of B/T note.

M/F. So do I.

S/Air. M/P is consistent with View A.

M/P. Humbug. = will reduce larceny by 50%, but reserve full liberty of action as regards murder. View B. = more honest.
P.M. Why qu. imports necessary? Why can’t that be left to economic forces?

L.P. Only if you allow the exchanges to go.

Exchange will be in danger the moment war ends: so limited must reserve it for essential needs. You haven’t got gold as a balancing factor: therefore reducing bank rate won’t help you.

M/P. Also necessary, if you want to do it that way, to have creditor countries wh. understand the position of creditors. Remember we shall be a debtor, not a creditor, country.

P.M. objecting to this presentation

M/P said - We shall not have the foreign exchange or balance to get the imports.

L.P. Diff. betwn. View A & View B. = View A does not contemplate use of qu. import restns after a period.

K.W. And does contemplate interference then by outside body.

Is it wise now to enter into such an arrangement? Can U.S. say what their policy is to be. What will Russia’s posa be as rgds state-trading.

P.M. Cast iron system of state trading by all.

M.A.P. You’ll be forced to that unless you get agreement to work otherwise. Two ques. a) what you are after b) how to reach it. Are we all agreed tht. multilateral = ultimate goal.

M/P Indirect export subsidy can be done by internal subsidy e.g. cheap rlway rates.

A sham therefore to require “no export subsidies”.

M/Ag. So long as U.S.S.R. continues state trading, we can’t go back to 19th Cent. Free Trade. We must build up our trade by bilateral agreements.

P.M. Fundamentally disagreed. Our aim must be multilateral. Don’t start with small ideas of bilateral details.

Start, tactically, on broadest principles: least restns.

Dangers of economic nationalism.
L.S.A. doctrine = death.


Cherw. Acc. to View A. any country with bad trade balance is allowed to continue with qu. import restns. If our trade is sound, we shan’t need them. Word it “any nation with an unfavourable trade balance is free to continue qu. import reslns”. Then no real diffce. between View A & B. Alter (ii)(c) at top of p. 6.

C.O. Favour club if Rules O.K. But what about low-wage producers - will they be allowed membership.

M.A.P. ? If they will comply with I.L.D. condns of labour.

M/P. Go for multilateral - reconcile views A & B. on Cherwell’s line.

H.S. Alterations to qu. restns = to depreciate currency, wh. can be allowed under Clearing Union plan.

Diffy of maintaining right to retain qu. restns indefinitely is tht. others will do same. No chance of bldg. up or even maintaining our exports if world is using qu. restns.

N.B. Present Trade Agreement with U.S. bans restns.

Ch. Then get them into the club, & then they can’t go on unless their trade balance is bad.

M/P. Main issue = are creditor countries going to play the creditor’s role.

H.S. If you let import restns become a habit, temptn to use them for protectn of new industries.

H.S. Imperial Preference. Can be used v. awkwardly by U.S. They are spending v. much in development in S. America & may post-war in Europe. If they use this argument our way (on analogy of Col. welfare developmt) it will give them a claim to preferential treatment.

C.O. But they invest for profit - we for welfare.

H.S. No. Much U.S. are giving away – not investing. And they’ll do that in Europe.
K.W. This wd. require Treaty. Are U.S. Congress likely to provide 2/3rds majority in favour of this kind of thing.

P.M. Sumner Wellis’ policy is to break Ottawa. We must face this. Tho’ for 40 years I have opposed Imp. Preference.

P.M. Why not ask U.S. what we cd. do with them bi-laterally? Bi-lateral conversations about a multi-lateral plan.

S/Doms. Essential to talk to Doms. before spkg. to U.S.A.


Proceed step by step as practical events allow or compel: but in language use the loftiest!

M/L. Remember Wallace line - expansions, world-wide, of U.S. capital development all over the world. More likely to go down with U.S. business men than the Sumner-Welles line.

A.E. Reason for opening discussions early at high level - cg. Canadian anxiety over Alaskan highway.

P.M. What is effect of U.S. having all the gold? £1200m.

Bargaining weapon for us there?

Enlarged on theory of commodity dollar.

K.W. Bancor scheme is v. like this. And correct that this is closely related to commercial policy.

P.M. U.S. will play to get their Gold Reserve into action - for power.

K.W. We are on to that. They’ve taken our plan pretty well.

P.M. Non-committal expression of provisional view.

Plan A as modified by Cherwell.

All in favour save Amery & Duncan.

M/S. Because we can’t make up our minds before high-level talks with U.S. The U.S. market wd. be most valuable to us. If they were ready to lower their tariffs to us, that wd. be fine.

K.W. U.S.A. are not in fact in position to make any bargain.
A.E. Hull has got his Treaties through -

C.O. He has to renew his power to

S/Doms. Shd. we not first get Doms. to send people over to talk.

P.M. No. Find out on high level what is U.S. view on A. Saying provisional only: we can’t rush w’out Doms.

S/Doms. Don’t let us approach U.S. leaving Doms. in the dark.

H.O. Delay. Better to cable outline View A. & ask for comments.

P.M. ?Enough to tell Doms. we’re doing it - they can talk to U.S. themselves. We can discuss alone, but not decide.

S/Doms. Danger that these ques. may arise at Food Confce. - where interests of Doms. are closer to U.S. than to ours.

Successful talks with Dom. Experts on Currence & Primary Products.

K.W. Less urgent now - because doesn’t now look as tho’ Food confce. Will lead to this.

P.M. Cab. Cttee. for purpose -

a) steps necessary to implement View A as modified.

b) procedure, programme & time-table

c) relation to Clearing Union etc., & Buffer Stocks.


II. International Regulation of Primary Products.

Cherwell. Cd. our rep\textsuperscript{ivs} at Food Confce. be auth\textsuperscript{d} to advise troublesome folk to look at this plan.

M/Ag. Producer countries will never accept this – so don’t talk to U.S. about them.

M/P/ Buffer stocks won’t work unless you control production.

A.E. Let our people be auth\textsuperscript{d} to play this card if need be.

Will serve to warn tiresome people off the grass.
S/Doms. Dom. experts consulted. If appd, wish to communicate to High Commrs.
Burma.

P.M.  Don’t ask for large political decisions about countries wh. we haven’t yet recovered from the enemy.


Bruce.  U.S. didn’t do so v. well - had to bring in Australians.

C.I.G.S. Getting inform^n now re. N.Guinea for help of B. troops in Burma. Casualties in Burma: 5,000 or so excluding sick. (Play down our reverses and make a better plan.)

Foreign Affairs.

A.E. Polish-Russian negotiations - going ill - instructg. C. Kerr to take up in Moscow. Otherwise Pols will declare their pos^n publicly.

P.M. Must try to get R. to let the P. women & children of P. soldiers go. Esp. when R. short of food.

A.E. Polish-Am. relief: some Pols getting better food than some R.: has provoked R.

P.M. Polish force in Persia will lose its morale if the women etc., aren’t allowed to come out.

Tunisia.

P.M. Credit for success in N. Africa due in part to excellent staff-work at W.O., that much abused Dept. At the right moment, I propose to say something to that effect.

Parliamentary Questions.


I have said the Ques. shd. not be allowed.

-   Agreed.

Bruntisfield has flown in one: & warmly commends them.
P.M. Tanks. We’ve gone in for manoeuverability via heavy armour. That suited the desert: it won’t suit the next phase.

C.I.G.S. But the gun has beaten the tank. Can’t use them in all circs. as before.

P.M. Still the bias shd. be twds armour via speed. - at least in some of them.

Must have conf on tanks.

Tho’ no results will mature this year.

Shackling.

A.E. Barren of ideas - can only close down the exchange, by a flat negative. Will produce a draft - statement in H/C next week.

Home Guard.

P.M. If we send Army out, security at home will turn on H.G. Important therefore to stress, for enemy consumption, strength & efficiency of H.G. Shortly 14/5 anniversary of foundation of H.G. Let us have H.G. Week - as for R.A.F. tho’ of course on more modest scale.

Reviews - parades - 10,000 in Hyde Park etc.

40 practice rounds this year, via 10.

W.O. Two troubles – Tho’ Publicity, apart fr. parades, can easily be arranged. Broadcast message fr. P.M. ctte.

a) Just issued inst damping ‘em down - 1st interest prod therefore cut down parades. Wd. prefer Church Parades on 16/5.

P.M. No point in that because no weapons.

W.O. If on Fri. you wd. take 1,000,000 out of production.

b) Organised on platoon basis - v. large org. reqd. there to get a big parade concentrated on the one spot.


M/I. To put the story to invader, v. desirable to have these show parades. If done on Sunday p.m. not inconsistent with recent damping down.
P.M.   Cd. bring in related C.D. services of N.F.S.

H.O.   wd. like to consider that.

View of War Cab. is that maximum effort be made - armed parade.

W.O.   to submit proposals.

**United Nations Day.**

M/I.   Enough domestic parades of our own.

H.O.   Good - not only for war, but to build up for peace.

W.O.   Early notice, if you really want to do it.

P.M.   Must do something Metropolis only - 100/150 of each Nation’s forces to march past.

M/I.   Edinburgh & Cardiff we’d have to have.

P.M.   Do those 3, but report & photograph it thoroughly.

**Church Bells.**

W.O.   Canterbury has asked for Easter Day & Whit Sunday. No objections.

L.P.S.   Really needs re-consideration: existing rules are indefusible.

P.M.   Relax generally - let W.O. go into the thing & make a sensible plan. Alternatives: sirens, maroons. I will submit a plan.
I. Food Conference.

P.M. Incln. of Eire - overwhelming arguments against. Read draft telegram.

A.R. “Pl explain our views to U.S.G. & tell them we shd. prefer them not to be invited to Confce.” In lieu of 2nd para.

Agreed.

II. Foreign Secretary’s Account of his Mission to Washington.

A.E. Political ques. Main point U.S.-U.S.S.R. relations. President troubled - feels Litvinov’s pos’n in Moscow less influential than Maisky: also troubled about his Amb. in Moscow: wants send Davies back when well enough to go. They don’t tell R. as much as we do abt. day-to-day dipl. events. I suggested eg. U.S. Amb. Moscow shd. give them full a/c our talks.

USSR. Terr. claims. Reconciled to Baltic States - fait accompli. Wd. like plebiscite as conscience clause.

Polish frontier. If P. got E. Russia & something in E. Siberia, P. wd. well to accept the Curzon Line. Tactics: we, U.S. & R. shd. agree fair solution & get P. to accept it: better than letting negot’ns between R. & P to get into mess.

Finland: no anxiety: thought terms reasonable. But Welles nervous re want assistee. pact ? Protectorate. I said take this up with R.

Public feeling in U.S. twds R. No sentiment as here, but on whole not unreasonable, even in Rep. Party. “We shan’t be any worse off for havg. tried to come to terms with them.” Hoover line is diff’t. - wd. like closer relations between U.K. & U.S. in order to keep away fr. R.

Our attitude to R. - v. curious about it.

French: Hull loathes de G. & intrudes him into every conversation. Much complaint too about our failure to put U.S. view on French. I concentrated therefore on future. One diff’ce - U.S., even if G. & de G. come together, don’t want to see one
central Fr. authy. - prefer to deal with several. I said we wd. like one, even tho’ we don’t recognise it as a Govt. All the others came out as Govts., wh. puts them in diff. pos'n. Diff. see why U.S. take this view - unless because want to internationalise some Fr. possessions. Even if we go into Fr., they don’t want a Fr. authy. to go in they wd. prefer us to take responsib. for civil adminn.: i.e. opposite view to that on wh. they act in N. Africa.

Pol. side of mil. opns. - agree gone ill in N. Africa. State Dpt. don’t have our close relns. with C.O.S. etc. Agreed shd. try to work out machinery for closer contact. Cd. we send out F.O. man to help Dill? - said we’d consider. Change mainly reqd. is on U.S. side.

Trend of U.S. opinion - away fr. isolation. My contacts confirmed view of Pres. etc. Welles hoped Senate wd. pass resoln soon givg. Pres. more latitude in pursuit of his policy. Pres. thinks this is best development - avoid Wilson’s separation fr. Senate until faced with Treaty. Bringing Congressme etc., into Conferences. Eve of my departure I was shown by 2 members of F.A. Cttee of Congress draft of such a resoln.

Basis of U.S. co-op. World-wide basis essential - also China wd. have to come in:

a) U.S. hatred of Japan (not same feeling v. Hitler):  
b) fears of China lapsing into chaos.  
c) China as counterpoise to R. in Far East.

(Pro-China feeling helps him to bring on opinion favouring war v. Hitler)

Elabor'n of organ. cannot be left wholly to U.K. & U.S. This leads Pres. to play up U.N. on every occasion.

Form. (1) Genl. Assembly, covering all, mtg once or twice a year = Assembly of L/N.

(2) Adv. Council - 4 Govt. Powers (incl. China) & 6 or 8 others to be chosen prob. by Continents. v. near Council of L/N.

(3) Executive of 4 Gt. Powers exercising wide powers delegated by (2). Attached to this an offl. like Sec. Genl. of L/N. “Moderator” Authy. to communicate with (3) or (2) on issues requiring their attendce.

Talked to Welles re Council of Europe. He thought room for this Sub-Cttee of (2). Subjects to be discussed - wd. they deal with
pol. ques: he felt prob. not. See no special diffy. except (3): I believe most will have to be done by (2).

Germany. V. tough attitude. Welles vehemently in favour of dismemberment. They’ve gone into it v. carefully. (P.M. “Liberation of minor components”!) In our mil. occupⁿ we shd. proceed jointly in each area (BA.R.). G. wd. be broken up in mil. occupⁿ into areas approx. to eventual break-down into parts. Pres. agreed, less vehemently. Hull hadn’t made up his mind. I agreed tht. this solution shdn’t be excluded & we wd. consider details. Argument (Welles) - G. bound to have a grievance: therefore give her a good one. “Don’t maltreat your enemy by halves.” (P.M.)

Barvaria: N.Western: Prussia (less E. Prussia etc.): Ruler under internatt. supervision.

Austria sep. at first, tho’ later with Bavaria: Saxony.

P.M. Centripetal tendency of G. will be strong. Poss. ?? in time to implement other ideas. E.g. Confedn. of Danube, as central European bloc. If Wurtemburg joined, it wd. be poss. To go easier with G. states wh. close to Vienna via Berlin.

Czechs. wd. like to join with Poland, if they made proper arrangement with R. If not, they wd. turn twds. Vienna.

M/L. Build up inter-State commerce & with it will come strong T.U.’s bridging the frontiers. Get connecting link thro’ communications.

A.E. Their new idea = fr. 1ˢᵗ our mil. zones shd co-incide with eventual divisions.

Belgium – new State of Wallonia. (Pres.)

France - Indo-China international: Also Dakar & Bizerta (Pres.)

Welles reminded him of declⁿ in favour integrity of Fr. Empire.

Only 4 Gt. Powers to have arms – none for smaller countries. Believe Pres. has dropped that .

P.M. Europe based on comp. mil. service. Any Fr. Govt. wd. insist on Army - so wd. Poland. Can’t wean Europe fr. this conception & excessive nat. armament is by establishment of Council/Europe with internatl. Forces capable of enforcing its decisions. Each constituent country ed. begin by dedicating a portion of its natl.
forces to serve at bidding of Council. A natural part of the U.S. of Europe idea.

A.E. One amendment: Authy. directing that Force shd. be (2) overleaf: the body corresponding body to Council of L/N.

M.A.P. Build up the Army of Occupation on that basis from the start.


Jap. Mandated Islands - internationalised.

Korea - indep. Republic with internat. ??????? to start with.

Siam, Indo-China, Burma & Malaysia: Chinese Amb. said China had no ambition in resp. of these.

P.M. Basis. 1.000 Islands in Pacific & 500 have harbours. B. interest tht. U.S. shd. be secure. War between U.K. & U.S. is unthinkable therefore mobility of U.S. sea & air power = essential B. interest. No need therefore to get into a fuss about Islands.

A.E. Civil Aviation. U.S. Govt, haven’t yet cleared their minds. I arranged we wd. both go on clearing our minds: we say when ready to discuss: meanwhile avoid any public discussion.

Colonial Declaration. Hull has produced new draft, wh. I didn’t see till I left. Bad fr. our point of view. Suggest Ministers shd. look again at this in light of new draft.


P.M. U.S. idea that Husky shd. be Am. enterprise. We have suggd administratively convenient to have B. commander + joint staff all under Eisenhower. But we may have to argue on basis tht. command goes with major forces. In Tunisia we are now 12:4 contrary to original expectns. And no U.S. Navy goes inside Med. On this, Husky cdn’t be more than equal share. Don’t feel we shd. give way.

A.E. Wd. like to tell Macmillan we are against this - Agreed.
I. Supplies to Turkey.

P.M. List proposed derisory. Far more eg. tanks cd. be supplied by M/East. They have 3,000 & 8th Army has only 600.

W.O. Based on shipping & what Turks can absorb.

P.M. Won’t do. Army is using v. little of what it has in M/East.

Wd. ruin our policy. Must examine in detail - most niggardly list.

Say - following (good list) are available as soon as you can take them, & let the absorption capacity put on its own brake.

A.E. A.S.E. mtg. this p.m. - will look at it on this basis.

P.M. I’m having this examined fr. pt/view of our scale of production. Will meet on Friday at noon.

II. Naval Construction Programme.

A.V.A. Losses of destroyers - 7 + 12 dam'd in Torch: more expected in Torch.

P.M. The more reason for more small destroyers via fewer large.

A.V.A. See para. 8. Only 51% of requirements by end/44.

16/18 mos. fr. time of laying down. for intermed/battle destroyers.

P.M. Bldg. an ideal Fleet - not for cond'ns of war, as you will find it.

C.N.S. These vessels will also be needed for war in Pacific, wh. may go on after '44.

P.M. Believe it a mistake: but won’t press my point further.

Agreed.

III. Policy in Burma.

P.M. Thrown out twice - why ca’t we wait till we see some chance of getting into pos'n to decide fate of Burma.
L.S.A. No public announcement - but those going in must have some idea of future & pol. warfare people must know what they can say. Not askg. For fresh promises: askg. leave to go back on promises given. Letter sent to U. Saw, with authy. of War Cab., promised in effect progress twds. Dom. status. Important to make it clear tht. is no longer an early prospect: we'll have to retain direct control for period of years. F.O. agree this wd. help with U.S. opinion, if we specify period I suggest 7 years. Good for a) B. opinion, b) our re-const³ Staff with D. Smith.

Second point = financial help fr. here. Ty. have agreed some of this eg. damage suffered by commercial etc., firms.

Re-establishing B. firms in Burma & priming pump for B. B.Trade.

Want only general approval of principles now - refer again before any public announcement., wh. won’t perhaps be necessary until we re-occupy Burma.

Broad principles - a period of direct Govt. is to intervene after re-occupn³ & we will during that do our best to restore B.’s commerce, trade etc.

P.M. I will oppose giving money to B. on basis of getting out as soon as poss. thereafter.

S/Doms. Basis for pol. warfare = we are going to re-conquer B. & some time thereafter will move twds. Constitutional reform.

Planning: may require decision v 7 yr. interval. But that isn’t requd² for pol. warfare.

L.P. Constitut³y B. is now responsible for internal admin⁴. We must tell the Govr. now whtr. we are going to have direct Govt.

P.M. Before agreeing to liberate Burma, we shall ask what other countries will do about their possessions in N.East.

H.O. At present, pol. warfare won’t be convincing, because of mil. situation. On substance, memo. not consistent. Para. 1. of Annex is not consistent with para. 9 of memo. This is humbug.

L.S.A. Don’t want decision to-day about 7 years. All I want is tht. period of direct Govt. will intervene after war, & tht. measure of fin. help can be relied upon for re-const⁴. This for Govr’s. inform⁴. ? only.

P.M. This will give you worst of both worlds.
Offend U.S. opinion. Hold ‘em down with one hand, repair with other, & after 7 years give it all away.

Tell Govr. that if decided tht. B. infl. shall remain in B., there will of course be period while we rule direct & we shall help with the work of re-construction.

L.S.A. Can Govr. work on assumptn. that, if B. is to remain under our influence, there will be period of direct rule during wh. he can expect help in reconstruction.

K.W. No financial guarantee of priority in the queue.

W.O. Trade is in hands of Burma Oil, Burma Corp & Steel Bros. They want to know where they are.

P.M. “You are Dormant, Smith: & you lie there meanwhile with yr. skeleton staff.”

Agreed - L.S.A. to instruct accordly.
W.M.(43) 55\textsuperscript{th} Meeting. 15th April, 1943.

I. Agricultural Policy.

P.M. W.P.(42) 1013., tho’ not taken by Cab., shd. be regarded as approved.

On new memo. first ques. “what is the hurry?” If you begin these discussions they are bound to become public = … as in H.O. memo. We’ve said we won’t commit ourselves to Bev. Rpt., wh. will benefit many more people. “Will please the farmers.” No: they’ll take this & then clamour for more.

M/Ag. In past ag. has bn. v. diff. to deal with. One of our main objects = try to guide the industry into acceptg. moderate post-war policy wh. wd. fit in with comm. policy likely to be desired. Gt. advantage therefore in bringing them along on this via havg. them to formulate more extravagant demands.

Proposed procedure = wht. Govt. have promised to do on Bev. Has accepted certain principles but reserved final decisions. This is what we want to do with ag. – reserving final decision.

Cost - H.O. has misconceived the £50 m. Doesn’t represent cost of maintaining B. ag. It = what it wd. cost to stabilise c/living, incldg. imported food. C/E has suggd it wd. be £20 m. I’m not sure it need be anything. Can’t estimate closely now diffce in cost of what we cd. buy abroad & what we cd. produce at home.

Result of 2 yrs. work with Dpts concerned - incldg. B/T. & Ty. officially.

P.M. Bev. argument - our hand was forced there.

M/Ag. This is right moment to get industry to agree to this moderate scheme. Commd. to some extent by statement of M/W. Portf. On 1/12 tht. Ag. Minrs. will begin discussions in early spring.

T.J. Political advantages in opening now. After the war, consumer interest will be more clement than now. More likely to reach now a common measure of agreement.

On 26.11.40. Govt. announced “healthy & will-balanced agriculture” pledge - for long enough after the war to put
permanent policy into force. Multitude of separate interests - need for time to talk - can be non-committal.

P.M. Can they be non-committal.

K.W. At least consult Doms. first?

T.J. No. On some aspects at least we had better talk here first. eg. hill-sheep.

P.M. No danger of stopping that subsidy during war or for one year after.

T.J. Wd. like to talk with them about eg. Marketing Bds., canning etc.

K.W. Qua finance, no commitment until we review at the end with other claims. That is accepted. I don’t object to M/Ag. plan so long as no discussion of prices or money - & I hope the Ministers wd. be v. careful about talking to farmers.

S/Doms. But the whole thing is based on prices + money.

M/L. At R.P. Ctte it was left tht. we wd. see whole picture after memo. by M/F. on distribution. Economies in distribution wd. enable the producers to get a better return w’out extra cost to Exchequer.

Are we to approach all these problems fr. angle of producer?

Cost of food distribution has increased greatly in recent years, esp. in perishable goods.

Qua M/L. wd. like to see another ¼ m. employed on land, as cpd. With pre-war. i.e. 1.25 m. via 1 m. Now = 1.1 m.

S/Air. You wd. be swimming v. tide of mechanisation.

M/L. No: mechanisation wd. increase nos. employed, tho’ they might be diff. in kind.

W.A.J. If you have discussions, with no money or acreage, what is left? The answer is principle of mixed farming together with close public control of farming operations.

H.O. Agreed don’t want ag. to go back to slump cond as. Wd. like this discussed before end/war.

But a) not sure this policy is right. Needs further examination. Shd. we go for protective foods? Subsidies or concealed thro’ prices.
Difficult from Bev. because here you will be dealing with interests, & powerful political interests at that. Therefore, we shd. make up our minds & decide before we discuss.

b) haziness about the cost, W.A.J. Rpt. says cost = £50m. + loss on imported food of £36m. This together = initial cost of Bev.

c) P.R. Cttee set up for this v. purpose: priorities, competing claims etc.

Safer therefore to examine it in that Cttee & get agreement among ourselves before discussions begin.

S/Doms. Dissent because gaps.

a) Money can’t be fixed until decided how much marginal land to be brought in: & prices paid to many producers will mean excessive profits to others.

b) Can’t be complete policy w’out distribution.

c) Consider fr. pt/view feeding the people.

M/L. Nationalisation of land. Effect of death duties. If thereby you make it imposs. for landowner to carry out his duties or functions, you must do something. E.g. allow the landowner to pay death duties by surrendering land to the State. Serious about this because it stands in the way of a prosperous agriculture. The Land Comm'n. Method is a less honest method.

A/E. How will M/Ag stand if he opens talks with farmers w’out liberty to take money. May find that he well get so far & will then have either to ask us to authorise money or break off at a diff. time.

Cherw. Where M/Ag. says this is the moment when “they” will be reasonable – does he mean producers or consumers.

S/Doms. Whole basis = fixed prices. Wtr. they involve subsidies or not depends on world prices. But you will commit yourself to fixed prices.

M.A.P. You must be able to offer them fixed prices - that is the quid pro quo. If you can’t offer that, you can’t negotiate.

A.E.&P.M. Both liked the proposals in themselves - but doubted wtr. time was ripe for talks, when war may go on for 2 more years.
No good talking w’out makg. up mind on propts. share to go to ag. Then surely we’ll be told ag. is ahead of Beveridge.

Last thing I want is endless buzz of ardent discussion of post-war problems - esp. when the war may come to a stalemate.

Farmers have a guarantee for whole war and 1 year.

Conflicts too with policy of filling the shop-window before pulling up the blind.

H.O. Yes - this must go to P.R. Cttee on priority.

And cg. Bev. Debate - trouble if ag. appears to be getting ahead in queue.

M/L. R.P. Cttee. shd. finish the work before any other Cttee. muscles in.

T.J. We wdn’t think of discussing post-war policy on marginal land - that is purely a war-time expedient.

S/Doms. But even post-war you’re proposing to make the less efficient land pay.

M/P. Rent looks after that.

T.J. “Reasonably good land” is our basis – not “marginal land”.

P.M. You needn’t give your fin. help by way of fixed prices.

M/Ag. Apart fr. ques. shd. I discuss with farmers, there is the ques wtr. we agree with this policy.

D.O.T. Dissented.

S/Air. Yes - soil fertility is not end in itself: nutrition. Hope those ques. will be discussed further on R.P. Cttee.

P.M. Mustn’t be rushed. Must see the whole picture.

K.W. R.P. Cttee shd. look at this again in light of this discussion. Then submit to P.R. Cttee on the priority point.

P.M. V. bad to bring these things out one by one. Must wait & put out whole programmes, so that one may balance another & one may rub the rough corners off another.
L.P. Studied on techn. aspects by R. P. Let those techn. issues be reviewed again by R.P.: then Cab. on pol. issues: then back to P.R. to put it into the picture.

P.M. Yes: discuss to max. among ourselves, but no discussion outside. That was trouble with Bev – premature public discussion.

L.P. Get far fwd. in our own discns because internatl. confs crop up & we have to take premature & hasty decisions ad hoc.

S/Air. This memo goes v. the small family farm.
W.M.(43) 56th Meeting.  19th April, 1943.

Foreign Affairs.

A.E.

a) G. diplomatic re-shuffle. Weismacker to Rome. Either

  a) utilily later: able negotiator
  b) Ribb. Purge of F.O.: turned out.

b) Telegram from Adm. Cunningham use of Estafa. (Adml. Fr. in Tunisia: prev. let us down)

Genl – feeling that he shd. not be used, in view of past conduct. Anyway have a good look at thim first. French to decide: we don’t want to intervene on his behalf.

c) Offer of mediation by F Kordana. Maisky said this was part of peace offensive.

Need for care. R. upset by Polish statement re murdered offrs.

Germans are widening rift betwn. Pols & Russians.

Effect in U.S.A. will not be good.

P.M.

The line for the pols = we’ll say nothing about this if you’ll let go those you now have – eg. the women & children. Another 100,000 men they aren’t using.

d) N.Zealand Divns.x/ S/Doms. On last occasion P.M. promised N.Z. Parlt. that he wd. consult them before N.Z. Divn. was moved elsewhere. That is why he now says he can’t give persission.

x/ Withdrawal fr. Tunisia for amphibious training for Husky.

P.M.

Why not summon his Parlt. now & have is discussed.

S/Doms: Can’t get the mtg. before 9/5.

P.M. Don’t think his reasons are good enough.

Bruce: Not merely election or political issue - affects whole morale of the people. eg. the Australian troop’s recall.
P.M. When first asked 17/4 P.M. said cdn’t answer at once. Referred to not being able to indicate reason. No security reason, however, why he shdn’t indicate that it was v use of N.Z. Divn. outside Africa. We cd. say publicity wd. not be detrimental for enemy know we are going to attack, but doesn’t know where.

Further telegram inwds. 19/4.

My last appeal to him not yet answered.

C.L.G.S. Better let Alex. use them in this battle, & send another Divn. for training.

P.M. Agree - after waitg. 24 hrs. in case Fraser sends a more favourable reply meanwhile.

Shackling of Prisoners of War.

A.E. Minor amendments suggd by Doms.

W.O. Penultimate para. of reply - does this indicate weakness.

P.M. “will in due couse send a reply in the above sense.” - Agreed.

Repatriation of Prisoners of War.

A.E. Shan’t get anywhere unless accept numerical equality. x/

a) Accept parity b) include civilians (except v. dangerous categories) c) all seamen must be excluded (admy. have now agreed).

H.O. Make it clear tht. we accept x/ tho’ it isn’t the law. Agreed.

M.E.W. Will you consult U.S.? They retained at our request last year 1.000 seamen & technicians.

A.E. Will tell U.S., not ask them.

W.O. Risks

a) offer is fr. High Command. We shall have sold the principle, & Germans may then raise the bid.

P.M. O.K. if you make the point that the law says classes but we will play.

b) We cd. have got this a year ago. We shall be told we have kept our prs. there a year longer than we need.
A.E. Consulted interested people: they won’t criticise on these lines.

Shop-stewards: Communist Propaganda.

P.M. Referred to manifesto from Shop-Stewards at De Havilland’s.

Genl. agreement: no reply.

Communist inspired: shd. not something be done? Get R. to counter order them:

M/L. Don’t countenance R. intervention.

Church Bells.

L.P. Referred to his memo. The “regulated Areas” were established for offensive purposes: don’t coincide with those where risk of invasion is most likely.

x/ If other 2 sets of precautions (immobilisation & road-signs) apply to certain area, the Church Bells relaxation shd. also apply to that area.

S/Doms. Why not let them ring everywhere, even in regulated Areas.

P.M. V. complicated as L.P. proposes.

H.O. Boundary = convenience in admin⁠. Got to have x/: let’s have the same areas.

W.O. We cdn’t agree to letting up everywhere.

P.M. Disagreed with proposals at x/. The need for these precautions is even greater inland - because only necessary now v. parachute landings.

Decided - by a majority: let them ring everywhere.

The signpost & immobilisation proposals shd. go to Chiefs of Staff & be brought up to War Cabinet.

(P.M. This is for C.O.S., not C. in C.)

L.P.S. Immediate announcement?

P.M. Yes - to-morrow: to Greenwood.

Proxy Mariages.
H.O. Demand by Mrs. Adamson, M.P.

On balance, don’t like it. Possibility of blackmail, also.

Endorsed H.O. memo

Select Committee on National Expenditure.

K.W. L.P. & I. to see W. Milne & report back to Cab.

M/P. Dissented on para. 8.

P.M. This not P.A.C.
W.M.(43) 57th Meeting. 21st April, 1943.

I. Material Stocks & Procution Programmes.

M/P. 15.6 m. reduced to 13.4 m. Now is 12.2 m., with float wh. M/S. will draw on as little as poss. Plan to consume 12.5 m. if float is called on. This provides for S.C. cut of 400,000. If imports = 13 m. stock at end 43 will be 400,000. below Dec. ’42 - consid. improvement on present level.

Cuts mainly on M/S who agrees memo.

M.A.P. This affect my steel?

M/P. No: will fall wholly on M/S. No further cut on M.A.P.

Cherwell. Agree because estimate of imports may be optimistic. Any excess imports will go into stocks via consumption.

M/L. Will this involve unemployment?

M/P. Labour force over-all for 43 will exceed that of ’42. Can’t guarantee no pockets of unemployment.

M/L. Timing.

M/S. Bound to be risk of unemployment. If you cut down to conserve materials, you can’t guarantee that people won’t be released at times & places where they can’t be re-absorbed.

M/L. V. awkward in places where transfer of labour. Para 8 of memo. goes beyond present arrangements.

M/P. There will be come local unemployment.

120,000 prev. cut in M/S. by end ’43: now proposed to accelerate this to end Sept.

M/L. Risk of a run of labour – all going home because idea spreads that people aren’t needed.

Cherw. Only amounts to 30/40,000.

M/L. That quantity, if timid, shd. not upset the machine.
M/S. Our prev. releases were to free labour, for wh. there was a demand. Now we are being asked to cut, to save materials. We can’t time that to suit M/Labour.

M/L. But collaborate with me, so tht. any possible recruits for Army can be drawn off.

M/P. Content to use existing machinery.

Shipping Situation.

P.M. Shipping Rpt. M/F. can apparently carry on with less than in 1941. Why?

M/F. Because in 1941 undisclosed stocks in consumer/retailers etc., hands had not bn. fully exhausted.

L.P. Misleading to reckon only on gobal figures. For we now have special diff"es. On items: and this needs a “cushion” in the global totals.

M/F. E.g. bacon now depends on current deliveries.

Chew. Explain this to U.S., who are always triying to drive down our minimum figures.

P.M. Per contra, dispersal = larger stocks: & air-raid risk diminished.

Material Stocks & production programmes (contd.)

P.M. Accept M/P. Report: but bear in mind needs of Army for more men.

M/L. Agree: place on record need to plan this so that proper a/c is taken of the man-power needs.

M/P. We must make these reductions qua materials, but equally we must do so in the way most likely to meet the diff"es of M/Labour.

P.M. Cab. shd. be warned of any large discharges w’out prospect of quick re-absorption. Anything over 500 in any one place.

M/P. Prefer monthly report.

Bombing of Essen: Poison Gas: Home Guard.

P.M. Message from Stalin. Congrats. to Bomber Squadrons re. Essen.

Reason to believe G. will use gas on R. front.
Will issue immediate warning of retaliation - from No. 10 to-morrow - to re-inforce H.O. warning y’day. Tone up machine?

H.O. Have done all that’s necessary.

M.A.P. Get everyone to produce their masks at their factory. H.O. will consider that.

P.M. Let H.G. carry masks on their celebration parade. Also let them mount guard at Buck. Pal.

Shipping Situation.

P.M. Can’t promise 66 ships a month.

W.O. Don’t ask for that – only tht. no firm decision be now taken against.

In Washington they will think we’re aiming at 27m. tons.

P.M. Read revised draft of telegram to Washington.

W.O. I do wish to commit Washgton. to 66 ships.

Chew. We must say we are considering our position - or we’ll be committed to 66.

M/W.T. Washington aware of 26 m. in S.C. Rpt. We’ve said this assumes 19 m by us + 7 m. by U.S. The 26.4 m. = requirement: but we don’t expect it. They will infer they must work on 26 m.

Chew. Say it’s somewhere betwn. 26 m and 26.4 m.: and we are considering what we can do with least prejudice to our plans.

P.M. There is a margin because of hopes to have smaller losses.

I wd. fight on 26.4 m.

M/W.T. They will say - because you want more fr. us or because you think you can do more with your own.

P.M. Our rock must be the 7 m. tons offer. No whittling away of that.

a) Despatch telegram as drafted.

b) On 26 or 26.4, we don’t see doig more than 19.: or more than 7 fr. U.S. L.P. & M/W.T. preferred to take 26 m.

Agreed: stet. 26 m. tons
Government Building Programme.

M/P. Labour fixed to 31/3. But defic. Rising to 55,000 between supply & demand. No good trying to meet so large a gap by my allocations.

M/L Believe Labour is enough for programme: not influenced by estimates.

W.O. Not much more slowing down of Bolero: unless you stop works already started.

P.M. Too much upkeep of roads?

M.A.P. May cost more rubber.

L.P. L.a.’s wasting labour?

M/L. Direct that programme be carried thro’ on present labour force: it will be done.

W.O. Cuts pro rata, to avoid argument.

S/Air. No: must have regard to priorities.

M/L. Transfer more bldg. work to M/Works & you’ll get more economy.

P.M. ( W.O. & Air Min Ministry to show cause why further transfers to M/Works shd. not be made. L.P.Cttee.

P.M. ( M/P. to make allocations & let the appeals come together, to War Cabinet.
I. Post-War Commercial Policy.

K.W. Cttee of Ministers: general agreement reached. Need to carry Doms. with us - Hal to avoid, if possible, opening it with U.S. Govt. until we had consult ns with Doms, save for one contingency (Food Conf cc) wh. now looks unlikely. Procedure: consult ns with experts from Doms.

S/Doms. Australia & N.Z. built up one on tariffs & other on state trading. Important therefore to get the experts over & see they understand the whole picture. This method had worked well in past. No ques yet of agreement betwn. Dom. Govts. Draft telegrams approved: subject to L.S.A. amendment.

II. U-Boat Warfare.

P.M. Annoyed tht. Senate Cttee shd. have published losses figures w’out consult ns with us. A v. embarrassing period to have quoted. Harriman is complaining to Hopkins. F.O. shd. make a more formal complaint. President may then warn Senate tht. if they behave thus they won’t be given figures.


P.M. Will send message sympathy with U.S. over killing of U.S. airmen by Japs. Take the opp. of indicatg. our men looking fwd. to joining in punishing these Japs.

IV. Food Conference.

L.P. Short notice. Delegates may have to leave next week. Shortages: therefore co-ordinated purchase & distribution. But disc n of broad economic ques e.g. stabilisation can’t be dealt with by Food Conference. No commitment at all at this Conference on particular commodities e.g. cotton. Questions for decision on p.11. Only serious one for War Cab = No(2).

M/F. Increasing conc n of world shortage of food after war. Need therefore for organisation to deal with that situation a) betwn. us & U.S. b) with allied Govts. Useful results if we can at this Conf. persuade producers to
increase their prodn. On (2) all we need is to state principle (wh. is obvious) while avoiding detail both on commodity & quantity.

K.W. P.M. & President agreed no public statement need be made on this.

A.E. This time it is not, as before, rationing to feed others: it is rationing as necessity for us too.

L.P. Danger: if shortage, & we give not assurance of co-oper\textsuperscript{a} to assure supplies, there will be scramble & market will go.

M/F. Face realities. These countries are already trying to buy food - e.g. Norway are trying to buy meat in Argentine. Buying for the future: forcing up prices.

Cherwell. Believe fears of shortages are exaggerated. There will be plenty of wheat. Shortage of meat & fats. Diffy. about shipping & paying. If you agree to co-ordinated purchase etc., under (1) you needn’t add an explicit reference to rationing.

P.M. Mistake for us to take the lead in self-sacrifice. This is God’s role for God’s own country – the fountain of food. If they take the lead, we can say we’ll not be behindhand in generosity to the starving peoples of Europe.

L.P. Then we can tell our delegates to agree with (2) if U.S. offer it first.

S/Doms. Mistaken to think we can rely on Doms. Need to stop rocketing prices.

K.W. O.K. for delegates to join in with offer in P.M.’s terms if U.S. offer it first. Agreed: redraft in these terms.

M/L. Rationing for home consumption essential to get the export trade going again quickly. (i.e. commodities other than food). People will be better disciplined after the war if control is maintained but relaxed. Freeing of all controls rapidly wd. produce chaos.

L.P. Delegates R. Law only Minister. Some senior officials.

P.M. Agree (1). Redraft on (2) to be submitted to P.M. Agree (3). Genl. line to take “we’ll accept anything wh. U.S. will impose on themselves”.

175
Refugees.

A.E. U.S. have asked if we cd. take few hundred Stateless refugees. ? Say we’ll take a few more if U.S. will take a few.

Reduction of A.A. Command.

Took note.

Anniversary of Home Guard.

W.O. a) King wants take salute in H. Park Parade vice guard at Buck. Palace.

P.M. I wd. submit to H.M. tht. he also agrees to guard.

W.O. b) small contingent fr. Provinces to join in London show.

Airmails for H.M. Forces Overseas.

W.O. Not dissatisfied - no complaints - but P.M. asked how to ensure & only way is 1st priority.

S/Air. Mails do get over-riding priority already: only after prov'n made for them do Priorities Bd. allocate remainder.

O.S. Figures now out of date. Increase in mails. In para 4 – no longer any balance to speak of.
If troops or no. of people writing to them increase more than the 12,000 ltrs. will be reqd.


W.O. As in para. 23 of memo.

P.M. Shy of Army magazine. Press can do it better than W.O.

W.O. Reason (one) = one of newspp. Blighty may give rise to scandal & have to be shut down.

M/I. Makg. a lot of money: is a scandal: published by toughs who say it’s supported by H.M., P.M. etc. Rotten paper.
W.O. This is the main reason for my proposal - because Blighty may have to be closed down.

P.M. Then let other newspp. flow into the gap. Get a body of journalists to do it for you.

M/I. My people agree with W.O., but I think they’re wrong.

S/Air. If done at all, let it be for all 3 services not one for each.

A.V.A. Agreed with last point.

K.W. Ask Press as a whole to get together to see what can be done as Paper for all Services at home & overseas.

P.M. a) Ask Press for ideas about producing an Army newspp.

M/I. No good askg. them to get together. Much better to get them to get more existg. newspp. to the troops. Get them more paper for that purpose.


W.O. Para. 23(b) of memo. cd. be accepted at once. Combine with (a) & let us have a report.

M/S. Cd. Cttee also consider corr. redn. of allocn. For civilian use. No commitment.

Credits to Enemy Countries.

K.W. Say: no objn. ............ ) Accept the principle: F.O. & K.W. Also have points on wording. ) to agree on amended wording.
W.M.(43) 63rd Meeting.  3rd May, 1943.

Military Situation.

Air.  Bomber Command.  6 days - only 1 night.  834 sorties  37 missing 4½ %.

Essen 800+.  12 lost.  Blind-bombing: effect not yet known.
3 nights  1100 mines  23 lost.  Feature of week = mining.  This %age of loss is not higher than average of loss to mines laid over long period.

P.M.  10 % on this occasion vice 4%.
840 + - week  11.180 for April  9.600 on G.  10% of all in war.

Coastal.  485.  185 A-UB.  lost 8 (21 attacks 2 prob. 2 promising
(7 dam.
(16 in Biscay.
3 merch. ships.
Sat.  Rpt cruiser SW Norway:  torpedo Bo’s:  lost 3 + 4 fighter w’out seeing target.
U-Boats beginning to fight back fr. surface.  Read rpt. of engagement off P. Ortagal(? ) Will prob. find it expensive.

Fighter.  2.160.  770 off.  lost 8 + 2 U.S.  9 vessels sunk or damaged.
10:3:2   Night 1.
Total.  11:2:6 for 10f.  27b.  8 coastal.

Sat. weather.  All forecasts proved wrong.  8 – 10/10 cloud.  One U.S. formation flew out of cloud over Brest at 800 ft.  Lost 7 bomb. + 2 fighters.
Enemy tried bombing Fortresses fr. above & got one.

P.M.  First time out for 2 wks.  Lost, of 102.7.  V. ineffective weapon.

S/Air.  Containing 1100 fighters.

Enemy.  0 by day.  4 by night:  1 destroyed  3 bombed open country

Mediterranean.  10.200 Allied Sorties
2.200 enemy ..
During ground lull all diverted v. shipping.  41 craft hit:
18 ships  23 small craft  2 destr.  1 corvette  3 merch.
3 barges believed sunk.

Pacific  5 for 4 of ours.

Naval.

C.N.S. 26/4 – 3/5. Losses 12. 80.000+. 47.000 April 23.000 in May.
3 Atlantic 7 Freetown 4 Australian

C.A.S. They had airplane wh. was sent back to look for another U-Boat. Then, returning, convoy was out of sight in rain.

C.N.S. Must drive the sub. Further out.

P.M. These attacks w’in 70 miles of Freetown: yet with 2 attacks no help (air or sea) reached them in interval. V. heavy blow - valuable cargoes. Destroyer reinforcements being put in. Also Catalinas to come in. Considering wtr. we can bring more down fr. Gib. Pending arrival of Catalinas.

P.M. Demanded details (fr. C.A.S.) of no. of flying hours’ prot for this convoy and in genl. on system of air support for these convoys. Also (later) for convoys in Mediterranean.

C.N.S. 281.000 for April. May rise to 365.000 with marine losses etc. Coastal Forces in Channel. 2) Destroyer. 3) Terschelling.
Med. also active.
2 Destroyers: sank 1 E-Boats dam. 2.
Subs. bank 1 destroyer 1 merchantmen: but 3 overdue.

P.M. Give me rpt. on Channel activities of mosquito fleet. V. good work being done. Cd. they be given a corporate feeling - ? a new name.

C.N.S. Dutch sub. sank merch. ship in Malacca St.
Enemy subs. in Bay: estimate 2 sunk 2 prob. failed return
In the month 13 certainly sunk.
Signs of more mechan. brkdowns.

P.M. G. claim only 165.000 sunk by U-Boat in April. Attribute it to shortage of targets!
CNS Pacific Nil. More Japs in Alentians

Military

C.N.S. V. heavy fighting part 1st Army. Gains in ground slight: but heavy losses to Germans.
N. French pushed fwd. 3 miles on average. Enemy retiring to defensive posn covering Bizenta.
1st Army. 3 miles on 3 mile front nr. Longstop Hill. 46th Divn.
4th Divn. Standing fast.
French made 15 miles in centre & are on outskirts of Pont du Fahs.
8th Army. Minor attacks: but no big offensive. Main drive now 3,600 prs (11,500 casualties since April 20th incl. (6,000 1st. 2,000 8th 1,000 Fr) 2 day’s heavy 2,500 G (bal. = U.S.) fighting to be added to those figures.

P.M. 75% on infantry. In whole month 64% = Infantry. In drafts give that weight to infantry vice R.A.S.C. & R.E.M.E. etc.

C.I.G.S. Based on experience of African campaign as a whole.
W.M.(43) 64th Meeting. 4th May, 1943.

I. Loss of U.S. Aircraft en route for Iceland.


II. International Regulation of Primary Products.

K.W. May be raised at Food Conference. But if not, better to leave it for separate handling later & wd. then not hand the aide-memoirs to U.S. Govt. until after the Food Conference.

M/L. Discuss separately from Commercial Policy?

K.W. Hope so. Guess U.S. Govt. won’t want advance discussions with us alone: but will prefer prelim. disc⁰ by officials of all Allied countries.

M/Ag. Para. 6. Shd. wait till full delegation arrives - so tht. M/Ag. rep⁰ can be there when the document is handed in.

Agreed: in fact M/Ag. rep⁰ will arrive not later than Robbins.

III. Post-war Agricultural Policy.

L.P.S. Debate in H/Lds. was due on 9/5: but short postponement now obtained. H/Lds. will want some assurance tht. Govt. means business. As there are diff⁰ in Cabinet, felt a formula shd. be approved in advance.

P.M. No harm in this formula: but take care to avoid any verbal alteration wh. cd. be twisted into a pledge.

H.O. Refer to statements in Bev. Debate - to show tht. all these ques. have to reviewed as a whole from fin. Point of view, & tht. agriculture is not put higher or lower.

IV. Honours.

P.M. Knighthood for Noel Coward.

V. Ban on Signposts etc., in Rural Areas.

L.P. Zoning. Zone A (coastal) rest⁰ wd. be substantially maintained. Zone B (inland) they wd. be withdrawn. C.D.S. now recommend approval of proposals (subject to one small point on craft in waterways).
Approved.
Egypt – Constitutional Crisis.

A.E. L. advised that we should advise King to allow Nahas to go to the country if he wished - to prevent King from dismissing Nahas summarily.

Approved here. Service Commanders then indicated doubt: C.O.S. instructed them to support L.

Further telegram 890 - Commanders felt unhappy about it.
P.M. minuted me - implement decision of mil. auths.

G.O.C. took political consideration into account.

What is troubling them, however, is the importance of avoiding repetition of 1941?

Casey’s telegram explains anxieties - sent after meeting of Def.Cttee.

Instructions must go to L. Read out draft.

a) Can’t rule out in advance coercive measures.
   HMG not committed to present stage.

b) No ques of “appeal”. Shd. be formal advice.
   Any mil. movement shd not be directly associated with visit to King.
   If disen. N. no coerc. act before ref. home.

c) Advice:
   a) B.Bk.
   b) Personal boycott of Min.
   Not consistent with war effort.
   Elections. To be handled carefully.
   Attitude of country & successor will affect our decision.

Not necessary to depose King because he rejects our advice.

S/Doms. L. will be weakened if he doesn’t know now that force will be available.

W.O. Agreed. These instructions won’t put L. any further on.

M.P.

a) K. will have memory of last in mind & will therefore resist more easily.

b) All these pre-occupations there before & more so because Rommel was advancing. Not a mil. ques: it’s a pol. ques. wrt. the fuss is worth it. The size of the trouble doesn’t constitute a mil. problem.

V.C.I.G.S.

Mil. difficulties:

a) Immed. diffy of finding the troops – internal security
   b) Egypt. Army may refuse to play – wh. will mean 20,000 troops to be found by us.
   c) Might affect troops training for Husky.

But haven’t considered views of C-in-C.

S/Doms. Yielding now wd. mean showing we’ve given way to Palace & E Army.
M.A.P. Fundamental ques. = (d) in 1095. Are you prep’d to turn King out to keep Wafd in.

A.E. Para 4/5 in 855. 5(a) is what I mean to say to him.

M.A.P. You will give L. the line he wants if you say that we will in last resort be prep’d to turn King out to keep Wafd in.

W.O. ? Wait one day to mar mil. view before deciding that.

S/Air. You wd. have as much trouble qua internal security if you kept King & estranged Wafd.

M/P. Either a) give advice & back it with force – w’out further refce to Ldn. or b) do no more.

W.O. Don’t give appearance tht. you let down yr. friends - esp. in the East. If we all agree to back Nahas, can’t we wait for mil. view.

S/Doms. Can we wait 24/36 hrs.

M.A.P. = Say to L. “If he has to act in 48 hrs. do this. We will consider again when we hear from mil. commanders.” & confirm.

L.P. If we are going to act contrary to mil. advice, surely we shd. wait & see what the mil. advice is.

A.E. “Tender advice assuming that if force is necessary it will be used.” Say so now.

M/P. Add we have had to reach this dec’d w’out considering mil. advice: act if you have to: but if you can wait 24 hrs. give us a chance to re-consider & confirm after considering mil. advice.

General Andrew’s Death.

A.E. Wd. propose to telegraph sympathy. Funeral & memorial service. Winant wants it here. Awkward because C.I.G.S. etc., won’t be here. Announced absence on 12/5. Will talk to Winant about this.
W.M.(43) 67th Meeting.  10th May, 1943.

Foreign Affairs - Poland.

A.E. Propose to try to get R. to agree to release Pols. (Polish & other newsp. here to damp it down. (thro’ M/Inf). Pity tht. D.Worker won’t come into line.

M/Inf. Waste of my time to talk to them.

H/O. And dangerous.

M/I. Postpone decision to lift export ban on D.Worker? Done it v. often.

L.P. Certainly postpone for a time.

K.W. What reconst of P. Govt. do R. want?

A.E. They don’t know. We must take time over the genl. issue.

Film: Colonel Blimp.

W.O. Rank film re Col. Blimp. Cab. decisi. tht. we might stop if derogatory to B. Army. Film now seen & not thought likely to bring Army into disrepute. V. dull film - likely to do neither harm nor good. Propose therefore to let it go.

Refugees: Bermuda Conference.

A.E. Neutral countries to take more. Camp in N. Africa to relieve immed. pressure on Spain. Revival of inter-Govt. Ctte. These are the 3 main points. Encouraging tht. we & U.S. delegates (not all easy) got on v. well together.

G.Hall. a) Diffy of U.S. doing anything: for 2 days: then they came along v. nicely

L.P.S. Anti-Semitic letters: put it on basis of all refugees, not Jewish refugees – i.e. by describing them by nationality not race.

L.S.A. P.5. India has taken 11.000 not 5.000. para. 14.
W.O. Para. 15. Arabs have already got the farms. We have now asked them to put up camps

H.O. Minor corrections - notify to appl. Authy. for record?
A.E. Debate. Peake to open qua Conference. Senior Minister to wind up (? Member of War Cabinet)

L.P. Giving assurance to neutrals that they won’t have to keep them indefinitely. Does this mean they will go back whence they came?

H.O. This is the understanding. Our only undertaking is to see that they get back.

H.O. Trickle still coming here at 10,000 a year. Agree many came to fight. But remember that when you get more than a certain number you begin to generate anti-Semitism. Doubt wrt it wd. bring the U.S. on.

Peake. Say little or nil until ques. of camp in N.Africa settled.

A.E. Can you say what nos. are actually coming - adding that mainly they come to fight?

O.S. Swiss telegram. “Children” fr. Bulgaria: Jews nominated only boys of 16!!

Peake. H.O. will be target of criticism in Debate. ? Statement on Rpt. early by War Cab. Min. & let H.O. answer the criticisms.

A.E. Opening statement shd. be by someone who was there. Can also say that Cab. accept the Rpt.

H.O. Cd. Whips get some balanced speeches on the other side - so long as they aren’t too extreme. Supporting the middle line.

Ch.Whip. Nothing to go on. Can we give them some material. Yes: Peake wd. see them.

Parliament.

S/Doms. H/C. will expect P.M. to make announcement to-morrow. Tell them in S.Session (Leader of H/Commons) that he’s away & that a public statement will be made later. Will be announced late Tuesday (9 or 10 p.m.) for Wed. newspp.
A.V.A. She may arrive mid-day (G.M.T.) Tuesday.


Memorial Service to General Andrews.

W.O. To-morrow noon in Guards Chapel. Hope as many Ministers as can will go.

Thanksgiving.

S/Doms. P.M. has suggested bell-ringing & thanksgiving Service on Sunday.

L.P. Reserve all this until Africa is wholly cleared. All agreed with this.

Church Bells.

H.O. El. Alamein: then Xmas Day 1942: only exceptions until recent decision. Order stem made 21/4: ringing only on Sundays, Good Fri. & Xmas Day only for purpose of summoning people to Church. Any ringing for celebration will have to be specially authorised. Wd. prefer therefore to remove all restrictions now.

A.E. No problem until Africa cleared: & P.M. may be back by then.

H.O. Other embarrassments - e.g. Angelus.

Agreed: leave this alone & stand on present order for a time.


A.E. Workmen’s Comp” Debate. “Regret present state of business can hold out no [present] hope of time being found for discussion of Granville’s Motion.” : will say that in statement on business.

H.O. ? Add [ ] because may be ques of it if our discussions prosper.

Ch.Whip. Don’t promise disc” on this Motion. Say, instead, “on this subject”.

H/Lords: Question about Admiral Godfrey.

L.P.S. Winster: Ques. on Godfrey: persuaded to postpone for a week. Will that be enough?

A.E. Prob. not. Depends on wtr Fleet comes over.

L.P.S. Diff. to get him to put it off longer.
S/Doms.  I will see him & let him know they’re in the bag.

_Russo-Polish Dispute._

A.E.  Draft to Stalin by P.M.  Unhappy about it.  
Handed in P.M.’s draft and own alternative.  
Read P.M.’s message about his own draft.  
I had taken a less optimistic view of Stalin’s message.

M.A.P.  I took optimistic view, not because it was friendly (wh. it wasn’t), but  
because it was so frank.  
A number of drafting amendments suggested by various Ministers.

L.P.  Have you dropped the point about definition of “Polish subjects”?

A.E.  No.  Proposed to send separate telegram to Clerk-Kerr.

L.P.  Won’t this telegram appear to concede the point.  
Prefer to say nothing about the Polish subjects: no gratitude.

K.W.  ? Add: “I will be communicating with you on that.”

M.A.P.  Say “I’m glad it’s not yr. policy.”
Captured German Generals.

M/I. German generals arriving to-night. Suggest these be photographed, filmed etc., and all publicity organised. G. did it v. our Generals. R. did it with success. Rub it in that G. genls. have surrendered to us. Do it under official control: in acc. with Geneva Convention. 

Agreed: to be done by official photographers & release if found suitable.

Celebration of Victory in Africa.

S/Doms. Put the alternatives.

H.O. Don’t lose anything by Sunday week. Avoid competition with Home Guard: and get more time to do it properly.

K.W. Alternative A + a Special Thanksgiving Service in next week (? Wed) at St Pauls, [attended by H.M. King] Announce that too, less [ ].

A.E. Not in favour of 2nd para.

M/I. Against anything wh. interferes with H.G. Anniversary. U.N. Day 14/6: to be used also to celebrate African victory. 

Agreed: leave that for the time being.

S/Doms. a) Para 1 of notice: b) pealing of bells: c) special Service at St Paul’s. 

Agreed a) & b). Approach H.M. on c).

M.A.P. Add words about clebration of Home Guard anniversary. 

Agreed.

A.E. Understand some G. prs. going to U.S. Must be careful of this because U.S. tend to say that p.o.w. held in their territory are their prs.
Foreign Affairs.


M/Inf. Cd. say in H/C. tomorrow: we’re preventing D.Worker fr. being exported. Messages offens. to U.N. not to be telegraphed abroad. They will curse us for that. No ques of threatening suppression.

H.O. Maisky might be told he can’t complain about Pol. press while D.Worker is under his Govt’s orders. Fair retort.

M/L. Don’t acknowledge to Foreign Amb. tht. he can interfere with B. newspaper.

L/P. H.O. means merely “remind him how D.Worker reviles us: don’t complain of Poles.”

Thanksgiving Service.

A.E. Decided ask only Amb. of countries {actually at war v Axis. {wh. have broken off relations

S/Doms. Then I don’t ask Eire.

Air Raids.


Thanksgiving Service.

H.O. 6.p.m. will suit H.M. If immed. danger what shall we do? Definite decision required. Proceed to Faraday House?
K.W. Wd. never get there in time. Better sit tight.

Agreed.
Foreign royalties asked for 5.50. Others shd. therefore be there by 5.45.

S/Air. No mil. will be present save 18 wounded.
Odd to have no more rep of fighting Services.
Genl. feeling tht. there shd. be fair representation of Services - small detachment of each.
If poss. men who had served abroad. - H.O. to reconsider.

Ch.Whip. May Clerk & Serj. Arms be auth to inform applicants of change of time.
Those who aren’t at Secret Session won’t hear of the change.
Agreed tell them to go to Secret Session to hear what is time of Service.

Resolution of Thanks for African Victory.

S/Doms. Will move this is a v. short speech.

M/L. If you mention names, give a show to Anderson & 1st Army.

W.O. Weekes: some comment at top: Anderson is receivg. protests tht.
1st Army hasn’t had a fair deal.

M/I. 5 columns in D.Express in praise of 1st Army.
Draft approved.


H.O. a) Shd. decision await P.M.’s return? More convenient for me not to wait.

K.W. Better wait. Enough to say you’ll make the statement before Whitsun.

S.Doms. Take provisional decisions & cable for P.M.’s approval.
Agreed: don’t worry him.

K.W. Don’t press my point of view - but little pressure.

Ch.Whip. I cd. see them & say we’re waiting for P.M. return.
Adjourned.

P.M. Invitation to Visit Mexico.

A.E. Message asking P.M. to go on to Mexico.
“Hardly worth while. They asked me & I didn’t.”
Agreed.
Refugee Debate.

A.E.  Wed. Refugee debate. Plan for getting Jews thro’ Bulgaria to Palestine. Some talk of this - result G. have crossed frontier. Worried because they may get closed Spanish Frontier thro’ wh. we get, not only refugees, but also valuable people - if in Debate there’s talk about getting refugees thro’ Spain. We can’t v. well debate this in Secret Session.

L.P.S.  Why not?


H.O.  Favoured whole debate in Secret. Diff. to debate w’out talking about Spain.

K.W.  Say to-morrow why you want to hold the whole Debate in Secret.

A.E.  Best prs. to warn them in Secret of danger of talkg. about Spain in public Debate.
W.M.(43) 70th Meeting. 18th May, 1943.

Widow’s Pensions.

S/Doms. Widows with dependent children - shd. they go back to Public Assistance when their children cease to be dependent.

M/H. If you did otherwise - diff. anomaly: 2 widows one with children no longer dependent the other never having had children will be treated differently. What logic in that?

K.W. This is inherent in Govt. decision tht. the special arrangemt. shd. be confined to women with dep. Children. Cdn’t have provided for childless widow w’out providing same for spinsters.

L.P. We faced this when we decided that some widows shd. remain on Publ. Assistance & tried to meet it by assimilating P.A. & A.B. rules.

M/H. Title of Bill & Fin. Res speak of widows with dept. children. }/x

M.A.P. Meet that by continuing benefits to widows once qualified. }/x

M/L. Need has to be re-assessed, certainly, but Asst. Bd. cd. do that. No adminve. Diffy. Proposal is merely “once on Bd., remain on Bd”. Not to apply to widows who never applied for relief while children were dependent.

L.P. Nibbling at an arrangement wh. isn’t easy to defend anyhow.

S/Doms. Take a/c of feeling v. the Poor Law.

K.W. Must have time to consider, including x/.

Agreed: bring up again to-morrow, after Ty., AYL and M/H have considered.

Parliamentary Secretaries.


a) Suggest I shd. ask them if they want it.

b) If a minority of decent men object to it, I wd. drop it – to avoid unpleasant Debate.

H.O. ? All of us see all of them together.
K.W. Yes – no approach to Labour Party until near the time.

M.A.P. Is this enough to make it worth while?

Whiteley. Some Lds of Ty. are receiving less than salary of M.P.

K.W. This is not true at £1.500 p.a. It may be for those at £1.000.

A.E. Agreed - as at x/ under strict secrecy.

Agreed.
No record.

III. Ceylon Constitution.

C.O. Amendments in para. 5 made to meet views expressed by War Cab. By altering to meet views here we’ve made it less likely to satisfy views there. Ceylon Leg. meets again 25/5: resol n down in favour of complete post-war independence: feared that this will pass unless we make this announcement first. If we are to do that Govt. must have it this week. Cdn’t make the announcement after such a resolution has bn. passed.

L.P. Agreed - P.M. shd. be consulted first.

C.O. Govt. thinks it’s worth while to make this statement - tho’ I don’t put the chances v. high.

L.P. Reserved Bills reduced fr. 17 to 3.: & control over domestic affairs is conceded.

C.O. This our last word.

M.P. ? Nec. to refer to P.M. - as his points are met.

C.O. Add to draft telegram statement tht. Cab. feel v. strongly this shd. go off at once. To make it clear “now or never”: no use trying it later

Agreed.

IV. Mr Gandhi’s Request to see Mr. Jinnah.

L.S.A. Disagree with Viceroy for following reasons –
a) Can’t let those 2 meet w’out admitting logical consequence that the Working Cttee & Jinnah’s people would have to see G.
G. is doing this only because stock has fallen. It wd. fall further if we refused & let that be known.
This is 3rd try-on: rebellion: fast: now this.

b) U.S. touchy about Phillips have accepted that decision on basis tht. no one is being allowed to see G.

c) Snub to Jinnah will be good thing.

d) Difficult to insert our condtns later. We must stipulate those before we allow these 2 to meet.

Recommend therefore action as in para. 7 of memo. – informing G. & J. of reasons.

S/Doms. Welcome every effort by Hindu & Moslem to settle their differences, but can’t do it on G’s present policy. He must recant before he can be allowed to start.

M.A.P. Care how to turn this down, if you do. Refusal to let leaders meet will be misinterpreted. Extremely careful public statement must be made at once if you’re going to refuse.
My view = only safe ground: you can’t allow G. to communicate with anyone until posn. & policy of Congress has bn. cleared. If he repudiates his policy, you will then be forced to let him converse etc.

W.O. Indeed, release him.

Simon. G. interned for security. Inconsistent with that to allow him to have series of mtgs. with various people. If he is allowed to write to, & then interview Jinnah, where will you stop.

H.O. Took the same view. He is in because it isn’t safe to let him out.
Then it isn’t safe to let him start pol. conversations inside.

L.S.A. This merges with the other – take the line tht. this can’t be allowed until Congress recants.

L.P. & W.O. Base decision on his policy.

W.O. Precedent. After 1931 Civil Disobedience campaign Willingdon refused to see G. until Congress had recanted.
Draft telegram to Viceroy to be considered by War Cab. to-morrow.
I. Widows Pensions.

M/H. Poss. to amend Bill, but Fin. Resn will need alteration.
Proposal = concession limited to widows actually receivg. suppl. Allowances.

K.W. Agreed. New financial Resol will be moved.
Agreed.

II. India. Gandhi’s.

Amendments by S/Doms & M.A.P. approved.
Last sentence. P.M.’s feeling don’t announce until you must. Modify last sentence - “As it understood facts .. made public.”
Telegram agreed, as amended.

III. Government Building Programme.

M/P. Best I can do with labout available.
Memo. by S/Air points extreme picture -
a) because takes insuff. a/c of concen on most urgent work.
b) makes no allowce. for v. good weather.

W.O. If we are to be ready by 1/4/44, we can’t defer the call-up.
Bldg. Labour. I will proceed by allowg. all conflict betwn. our requirements & Bolero to be resolved in favour of my requirements.

A.V.A I will be content.

S/Air. I can’t take this cut w’out new policy decisions.
As rgds. M/P. remarks. a) inconsistent with his earlier Memo.
My estimates have bn. v. thoroughly scrutinised by M/P. & survived.
b) doesn’t apply because my calculations not based on what we cd. do p. month – averaged over the year.

I cut my requirements. below safety margin: omitting reserve for contingencies.
Actually we’ve done only 27% as against 30% of programme.
Para 5 of Memo = heavy & medium bomber squadrons 800 B & 900 U.S. aircraft.
M/P. Has whole shortfall in labour force bn. applied to these aerodromes? Has it bn. spread over all Air Min^\text{a} work.

S/Air. No: it has been spread. Scottish rural housing. Arithmetically alloc^n shd. be doubled - if the labour is available.

M/L. Can’t produce men for Army (as P.M. desires) & for bldg. Economy cd. be secured by transferring men to M/Works. The jobs cd. be done with total labour available if they were more efficiently used.

S/Air. Strong arguments v. the transfer. E.g. our knowledge of actual requirements of operational squadrons.

M/L. No reason why Air Min. staff shdn’t go to M/W. to deal with these planning ques. All I want is to secure tht. all control of bldg. labour & operations is w’in’ control of single Dpt. E.g. 1.000 skilled builders empld. On maintenance alone in Aldershot.

L.P. We agreed in principle to transfer & Ty. is considering detailed appl^n

M/W. Referred to M.A.P. arrangement.

S/Air. But on a more optimistic view of these economies, it wd. not bridge the gap.

K.W. Expedite review of transfer proposals: & see what we can get out of it.

S/Doms. You are askg. for an allocation wh. must be at expense of Army.

S/Air. To enable me to fulfil my programme.

M/P. By a certain date. My proposals only involve delaying completion.

S/Air. Either I get the labour or the policy must be altered.

M/P. Must admit U.S. may be more up to date in future in arrival of squadrons.

S/Air. Suggest I confer with M/P. & then put the cost to C.O.S. here & in Washington, in policy of accepting this cut.

K.W. Expedite Barlow enquiry & refer this problem to L.P. Cttee or ad hoc body.

M/H. Warning about growing diffy. over housing.

S/Doms. Must go to Def. Cttee.

L/P. Room for techn. enquiry into more economical standards? By independent expert, provided by M/Works, to consider with Service repres (Air Miny). Also U.S. shd. be told authoritatively tht. their standards must be reduced.

W.O. The U.S. must be forced to send over more construction troops in first wave. Agreed.

S/Doms. Def. Cttee must decide between Army & R.A.F.

M/P. All this bother is over 2 months’ delay in completion date. Not imposs. tht. technical devices may go some way to bridge that gap.

W.O. Meanwhile, can’t we proceed on this allocation. We must have some decision.


1. for decision of strategic grounds.
2. Also Barlow enquiry & techn. enquiry as suggd by L.P.
3. Operate on this Memo. until it is changed, for purpose of immed. allocations.

M/Ag. Not for me because I can now billet with farmers.

S/Air. I cannot accept the cut until policy changed.

W.O. And I can’t accept any postponement of call-up.

M/L. Accept this memo. & instruct Depts. to make do. When they know they won’t get more men, they will for the first time find alternative means.

M/W.T My Dpt. alarmed about cut in our programme - 25% of our allocation. We shall have to allow a deterioration of highways wh. wd. affect rubber & petrol economies & efficiency of transport. Wd. like to discuss with M/P. & W.O.
I. Operation Lifebelt.

V.C.I.G.S. Para. 4. C.O.S. Washington. May mean either:

a) genl. plan, not knowg. what’s involved.
b) some U.S. help, of wh. we don’t know, may have bn. offered.

We thght we cdn’t do it earlier than mid/Aug. because of lack of ships & l. craft.

We shall have plans to-morrow wh. we will wire to Washington.

V. difficult. a) Effect. Attack w’out warning on oldest ally - whom we’ve recently bn. helping with arms - who have Treaty with Spain: it wd. strengthen hands of those in Spain who favour Germans.

b) U.S. comm^b 90% Portug. Strongly pro-British. If we did it alone, oppos^b wd. not be strong. U.S. v. unpopular, however - inter alia because suspicion tht. U.S. covet the Azores. If this is largely U.S. operation, diff^es much greater. More important therefore tht. this shd. appear B. than it was tht. Torch shd. be U.S.

c) I wd. prefer v. much to try the diplomatic approach. We think there’s quite a chance we’ll persuade: if we fail, we’ll be in a better pos^a to take by force.

S.Doms. Affect on other P. possessions. We can’t do it w’out consulting Smuts – for whom it wd. be dangerous precedent.

M/P. Wolfram stocks in G., & prod^a small. Requirements about 6.000t. Only sources are Spain & P. Recent agreement with Salazar: G. gets 50% of output.

F.O. Only 50% of output of mines other than ours. Amb. to-day: likely to get 1.800 tons. Agree even that = too much.

M/P. Possible tht., if you do this to Azores, P. might get more Wolfram & we correspgly. less. We might get on without. Importance = supply to Germany.

F.O. U.S. don’t care: not their allies: no likely re-action in U.S.

S/Doms. New sugg^a tht. this is urgent & vital. Prev. we were told only that it was desirable. Remember we can’t save P. fr. attack by Axis.
L.P. If absolutely essential we’d have to do it. But wolfram: put ourselves in wrong.
A.V.A. C.O.S. memo is dated 10/5: no reason known why we shd. change our view.
V.C.I.G.S. The C.N.S. never wished to give imp\textsuperscript{th}t. we’d lose the B/Atlantic w’out Azores. Read C.O.S. memo. 
F.O. Maisky to-day. R., tho’ expectg. attack, have’nt had it. If G. don’t attack on R. front they wd. have reserves wh. they cd. send into Spain if we did this.
V.C.I.G.S. R. front is major G. problem: and they can’t divert much from it. Seeing our prep\textsuperscript{ns} in Med. G. dare not move reserves into Peninsula.
S/Doms. Effect on Husky of G. occup\textsuperscript{n} of Peninsula?
A.V.A. Serious for passage of W. Med.
M/P. Compensated by extra strain on Germans.
V.C.A.S. Wd. be serious. But not easy for G. to do. Cd. divert air strength fr. Russia, but much more likely to use it in central Med.
L.P.S. Saving 1 m. tons of shipping (P.M.) How long for that to mature? 8/9 months.
M/P. P.M. exaggerates element of surprise if value of Port. Army is put so low. No serious reason why you shdn’t give them the warning involved by starting by negotiation.
V.C.I.G.S. Don’t minimise the fight wh. P. on defensive might make v. our sea-borne landing.
M/L. a) Wd. spoil Husky by diverson of shipping. 
b) Something still to be gained by treating an Ally decently.
S/Doms. My obj\textsuperscript{n} is doing this to an Ally when we can’t defend her. We cd., & did, defend Greece in 1916.
A.V.A. P.M.’s telegram over-rides the advice given prev. by C.O.S. After Sept. our escort increase comes in. In summer, if this done & escorts diverted, we shd. have to stand a heavy loss of merchant tonnage.
Diff. to persuade Ally tht. this is vital after P.M.’s recent reference to success in U-Boat warfare in last 3 wks.

V.C.I.G.S. Mil. ques. is in para 7.
Ref. in para 4 “next 3 or 4 wks” – not nec. the basis of the plan.
C.O.S. wd. insist tht. Husky shd. have priority & tht. this shdn’t be done until it cd. be done w’out prejudice to Husky.

W.O. Mil. obj’s go only to time.
Real obj is the moral one. Vital to retain some shred of integrity for post-war.

M/L. a) Moral ground b) Mil. wrong to divert forces fr. Med.

S/Doms. Moral issue: only thing wh. cd. over-ride that = absolute necessity: no case yet made out for that.

H.O. a) Husky must be safeguarded. b) But subject to that I sympathise with P.M.’s desire. Adv. of havg. Azores must be put v. high.
c) If we try diplomatic approach, I wd. have thought most unlikely he’d agree. Then forewarned, with little advantage. d) Port. Have not behaved twds. As “oldest ally”. e) Re-action of B. public not likely to be unfavourable eg. Altmark & Torch.

L.P.S. Against this. Our power in the world depends on our behaving well. In the long run we shd. lose by it.

S/Doms. On. H.O. view, why haven’t we taken the Irish bases.

F.O. Gains of trying dipl. approach first are v. great.
Loss only putting P. on their guard.

M.P. Tactics. Tell P.M. only that “our mil. advice is tht. this can’t be done for x months: let us therefore discuss on yr. return wtr. it shd. be rape or courtship.”

W.O. Obj’ P.M. is settling strategy for a year ahead.

M/P. My formula: preceded by statement that we don’t like this at all.

II. Ceylon: Constutional Reform.

P.M. Doesn’t dissent. Decision stands.
III. Godfroy.

A.V.A. Proposes to signal to Vichy tht. he is going to adhere to Giraud.
Recd. message fr. Vichy notifying him of promotion of one of his offrs.
Have told him to take no action.
Giraud will be contacted: & asked to order him not to communicate with Vichy.
Hope he will obey their orders.
Agreed: leave it to C-in-C. Med. & Giraud.
Operation Lifebelt.

S/Doms. Don’t understand the hurry.

A.E. Told before Campbell rtd. to Lisbon this wdn’t arise. 
Understood before R. wanted to do it: now appears that he doesn’t & will need persuasion.

M.A.P. P.M. won’t in the event call it off. “If …if…and…if” in this sentence.

V.C.I.G.S. This reply sent before C.O.S. had considered our telegram.

A.E. In eyes of P. and the world, if we invoke the Alliance & S. says “no”, we shd. be in much stronger position to use force. This P.M. plan gives us worst of all worlds.

H.O. Agree on basis a) no interf. with Husky b) diplomatic approach 48 hrs. before c) no withdrawal if S. says “no”.

S/Doms. If you decide on this you must go thro’ with it. No last-minute withdrawal V.C.N.S. supported this qua escorts. Generally agreed.

A.V.A. No guidance re. time of operation.

V.C.I.G.S. 20/7 is earliest date of assumption of v. full U.S. help.

M/L. Totally against this project – not a “hard decision” but a wrong one. Wd. undo much of our progress twds world esteem.

S/Air. When you wd. make the diplomatic approach?

A.E. A week before ready to do it by force.

H.O. Oldest ally hasn’t played the game.

S/Doms. But we’ve not bn. able to defend them.

M.A.P. Justifiable only if absolutely vital = & not shown to be such.

L.P. N.B. He now has to persuade F.D.R. Apparently only P.M. is keen on it.
V.C.N.S.  Exp^ld advantages of Azores – extend air cover so as to avoid need to go north across Atlantic thro’ worst weather: wd. be specially valuable in autumn/winter.

A.E.  [In reply to ques] we are advised tht. S. wd be more ready to yield to diplomatic approach rather than by pistol to head at short notice. Only disadvantage in dipl. approach = P. on toes via heels. Repeated several times.

V.C.I.G.S.  Interval of 7 days: v. little mil. diff. If approach made now & fails, not much diff. again because they will think all blown over before blow falls.

M/P.  Make the d. approach when ready to go by force. Then P. have a better answer to Germans.

S/Doms.  Say: consider d. approach has some chance of success. If it fails, we can then take action on much better grounds.

A.E.  Produced a draft telegram.

V.C.I.G.S.  Diff. betwn. length of warning under P.M.’s plan or under A.E.’s plan is not considerable. Any warning is mil. undesirable: but if you give any it makes no v. great diff. whether its 1 day or 7.

M.A.P.  Why not make d. approach & don’t mount exped^b until he’s refused.

A.E.  That wd. be more diff. militarily?

V.C.I.G.S.  He might go to sleep – thinking nothg. more wd. happen. He might make more effective prop^ns. Even tell the Germans: but cd. they do anything. That course wd. involve increased mil. risk.

M.A.P.  If exped^a gas already sailed before d. approach made, then feeling will be bad because thought to be eye-wash.

V.C.N.S.  A week’s notice wd. enable G. to draw their U-Boats down to attack our exped^a if S. leaked to the Germans.

M.A.P.  x/  Much more likely tht. S. will do this on basis of Alliance than on a threat. Wd. re-act v. badly to a threat – that sort of man. This view was shared by S/Doms, M/L. Why not include x/ in telegram? There, but better brought together.

M/P.  Exped^a to be laid on.
Dipl. approach, w’out threat, when ready to sail } Add to telegram:
Then threat. } summary of
Then use force. } proposed action.

C.O. There wd. in any case be 4 months’ delay.

M/L. In 1940 we had far stronger reasons for takg. drastic action re. Irish ports.
Not prep’d to agree to tear up Treaty.

S/Air. An attraction to S. wd. be that if he yielded to d. approach it wd. not
involve U.S. occupation. – by implication, if we use force it wd. by
Anglo-American.

   Genl. feeling: a) make dipl. approach – soon.
   b) get on quietly with plans.

L.P. Don’t let us a have dipl. approach wh. is a mere cloak to force.
Have exped’n laid on: but don’t have it said that we were going in anyhow
& only used d. approach as whitewash.
If you’ve tried w’out success, you’ve demonstrated tht. Treaty is valueless
& you’re the more entitled to take other measures.

   Agreed: F.O. to prepare draft telegram.
W.M.(43) 77th Meeting.  

24th May, 1943.  
(5.30. p.m.)

Comintern.

A.E. Read draft statement for H/Commons.

H.O. ? Nec. to express any welcome.

M.A.P. Welcome the advice to concentrate on anti-Hitler war.  
Omit “this is not time to go over old controversies”.

M/L. Factual: [not for us to comment on recommn of internatl pol. organisation.]  
Start by explaining its independent position: then go on as [ ].  
Agreed: in answer to Priv. Notice Ques by “respectable Tory”.

Civil Aviation.

Canada doesn’t want us to approach U.S.  Want expert conf’ee with all Dom-Govts.

K.W. All we’ve put to Doms. is views on international approach. We haven’t tried any practical alternative scheme.  
Thus agree to early mtg of Ctte - for debate can’t be so much longer deferred.

S/Air. Expected earlier response fr. Doms. Appoint a day for mtg & tell Dom. High Commrs to come with their replies.

S/Doms. We know tht. Doms. will give divided views.

S/Air. Then we may have to take a line. But first need is to expedite Dom replies to enquiry of 7/4.

S/Doms. We’re not ready for Debate because can’t get Doms. into line.

M.A.P. 2 Americans over here for purpose of discussions on civil aviation.

S/Doms. Can’t get views out of Canada because they have a Ctte wh. hasn’t yet bn. reported.

W.A.S. Meet alone first, w’out Dom. rep^es.
K.W. Yes - & then report again to Cab. Prob. Wednesday.

Ch.Whip. Next Tuesd. Cons. Fund Bill: wd. avoid the Motions if we debated it then.

S/Air. M.P.’s will press for a) Imp. Conf°. b) separation of post-war civil aviation fr. a Service Dpt.

S/Doms. On a) you can’t have it until Doms. are ready for it.

L.S.A. Won’t we have to give a line to the Doms.

K.W. Probably.

A.E. And then prob. will have to hold a Conference.

Agreed: Debate on Tuesday next. Decide on Govt. spokes man after mtg. of Cttee.

Refugees.

A.E. Miss Rathbone – realises why we cdn’t say more in Debate: cd. I now receive a dep°. {Cantuar, Samuel, Cecil ......}

{Cazalet, Hill, Grenfell, Willnick, Roberts, Rathbone.} Diff. to refuse. ? Write say doubtful value: cdn’t say more because pledge to U.S.: ask for notice of points.

H.O. Treated v. well. Several dep°: now Debate: immed. after ask for this. But I don’t mind.

A.E. x/ Or, say wait until Law returns.

Agreed as at x/ in first instance.

Operation Lifebelt. See below.

de Gaulle & Giraud.

de G. finds lr. brought by Catroux acceptable

Nat Cttee met to-day: no pt. of imp. betwn their views & Gir. lr 17/5.

C. will return at once

De G. likely to leave this week.

Terms of telegram to P.M. (as above) approved.

Operation Lifeboat.
W.M.(43) 78th Meeting.  27th May, 1943.

I. Capital Case - Espionage.

H.O. Blackmail on Port. Govt. - some success, some spies in Lisbon arrested. Point for Cab. - withholding public announcement because we shd. make diff² for P. Govt. & limit the success of our blackmail. Propose to put to Judge case for not announcing.

M.A.P. Publish verdict w’out mentioning reprieve.

H.O. That wd. be misleading.

L.P. The rule as to publⁿ is based on death – irrevocable. Fact that death sentence is not being carried out takes the case out of the category of those wh. ought to be made public. Support suppression for time being, strongly.

Agreed.

II. Civil Aviation.

A.E. Discussion at Cttee. Wide interest in H/Commons. Member of War Cab. shd speak.

S/Doms willing: & appropriate because of share eg. Doms.

M.A.P. will furnish informⁿ on techn. progress.

How soon shd. S/Doms intervene?

When shd S/Air speak? Need for him to defend appointⁿ of Critchley.

S/Doms. Doms. views. – still considering - we can only express need for discⁿ with Doms, taken it up with them, want them to send experts here about mid-June. Then & only then discuss with U. Nations. Remember can’t have Dom. Conference until Doms will accept invitations.

L.P.S. H/Lords Debates show a) argument doesn’t go well tht. we’re too busy with the war.

Ch.Whip. Timing - 2.30 p.m. for S/Doms. S/Air is wind up.

Agreed.

III. de Gaulle.

A.E. Personal telegram fr. Halifax re de Gaulle. Disturbed about stream of telegrams w’out ref² to me or Hull.
State Rpt. & White House wd. be phased at a breach: but it wd. not meet with favourable response fr. informed U.S. opinion or U.S. genl public, who appreciate our policy.
I. Airfield Construction: Building Labour.

M/P. Since memo. new factors. We have throughout taken risks – cutting short on W.O. – on assumption that U.S. won’t achieve their promises. Passing that stage now: in air anyhhow reason to think U.S. will begin to arrive. U.S. have put in written request for men to accelerate airfield consta. Saw M/L. y’day: can’t re-establish original figures: but I asked M/L. to stand-still on bldg. call-up. We now say call-up of bldg. labour be put at back of pack for June.

M/L. Notices issued for 7,000 bldg. labour for 3/6. Another 7,000 due for 17/6. Agreed to put them at back if pack: will try to find them fr. other industries or fr. bldg. not on airfields. Promised steady inflow to Army because of training arrangements. Must therefore try to find the 7,000 from other sources. 90,000 for July/August & 80,000 for Sept. I will postpone. i.e. no withdrawals fr. airfields, as fr. 3/6 to end/Sept.

M/P. U.S. fields unsatis. because no agreement wht. they want. Mtg Fri. - schedule of work to be given dates & agreed with U.S. If they don’t agree, they will have to bring in own labour to accelerate.

S/Air. In adda Washington Conf. appd U.S. bombing plan. Heavy bombers (703 now) coming in fast. U.S. say (& C.A.S. agrees) essentl. for them to attack G. fighter factories else they will outpace the offensive: this means large no. bombers needed for deep penetration.

M/P. Does this mean more fields than now planned?

S/Air. Yes.

W.O. Same with me. New programme of arrivals involves re-inserting 4 depots wh. I had deleted fr. programme.

S/Air. If we adhered to W.P.219 at A. we shd. be short by 4 U.S. & 2 R.A.F. stations short by end/Sept. Due to a) diffy of labour in E. Anglia b) need of U.S. for depots wh. we cut out. We can’t afford to go below that.

M/L. Demand 110,000. Given 90,000. If extra 20,000 man effort needed, I can get it taking over w’out extra men. I estimate you have x thousands in W.
Scotland wh. is not urgent & cd. be transferred. If the man-power were in one pool, I cd. get extra flexibility.
Misuse of labour at airfield at Desborough.

S/Air. Our use of labour has survived examination by M/P. and M/W. I will submit to decision on this by L.P. Cttee.

M/P. Tho’ work is done efficiently by Air Min\(^y\), it may still be true that you wd. greater mobility by creating one pool.

M/L. Don’t want to break up the bldg. organisation of Serv. Dpts.

W.O. Not so simple as M.A.P. because our organisation is mil/civil inextricably mixed.
M/L. arrangemts described earlier may mean W.O. won’t get their intake. Will, however, accept M/L. assurance tht. our intake will be found fr. other sources.
W.O. bldg. for U.S. If they come in Dec/Feb. in nos. contemplated they will have to go into tents in Spring of ’44.
New demand = 5,000 extra civilian labour fr. now to x/ Oct. ie. for 3/4 months.

M/L. Inspect\(^a\) of W.O. maintenance staff: by M/L. M/W. & W.O. jointly. Wd. expect to y/ draw fr. these much twds. new demand.

W.O. The depots for dispersal are essential.
I will take chances on living accomm\(^a\) & hospitals, but not on that.

Agreed x/ to be met by y/ & other M/L devices.

S/Doms. Airfields. Met largely by postponements as expld. by M/P. & M/L.
M/L. believes lift of 20,000 in man effort can be secured thro’ transfer of responsibility to M/Works.

M/L. If all bldg. labour under one control, I wd. put a ring round all: & wd. move the men where I wanted to put them acc. to my view of priorities – because I know what the P.M. wants.

W.O. Propos\(^a\) before was transfer of bldg. responsibility.
Now it is merely a pool of labour.

L.P. But M/L. wants one auth\(^y\) to deal with (i.e. M/Works) not several.
One Dpt. dealing with the contractors.
Enquiry - to see what is wanted.

L.P. L.P. Cttee: decision in principle: Cttee under Barlow has report in draft: that will expose diffics. we must face this - if bldg. labour to be in one pool some one authority will have to exercise discretion over bldg. work of Services. Unless tht. auth' can take tht. responsibility he can’t do any good. Mtg. of L.P. Cttee with Service Ministers early next week to consider Barlow’s Rpt.

M/L. Other diffy. – I can’t go to Unions w’out fear of being let down as on Bolero.

M/W. My diffy. - M/P. looks to me to co-ordinate but I can’t do it w’out getting all the inform’n fr. Service Dpts.

S/Air. If we can retain priorities on Air Min’y work, and get all the labour I want, I wd. agree.

W.O. Who wouldn’t?

M/W. Allocation of materials - with 22 Dpts - works v. satisfactorily.

M/L. On bldg., you accept allocation of materials by M/Works – why not labour?

W.O. Different in practice, if not in principle.

S/Doms. ? Decide on 15.000 deferment. % {Transfer ques.: to be considered at once, as proposed.

S/Air. a) can we get more fr. the 200.000 immobile bldg. labour. b) Can U.S. ship move constructional troops.

M/P. On b) this wd. have same effect in delaying operations because shipping is bottleneck. Prefer to proceed as overleaf - get agreement with U.S.

S/Air. Can we have majority in E. Anglia?

S/Doms. That arises anyhow. { (Want this request recorded) Agreed - as at %.
M.A.P. If this means takg. substantial nos. fr. M.A.P., we shall have to reduce our programme.

Standards.

M/W. Standards of bldg. = the same. Standards of accomm” Higher

S/Air. Double bunking a) materials in short supply. M/Works denied this. b) increased risk of cerebro. spinal meningitis – involvg. 16,000 addl. hospital beds. W.O. We’ve had no significant increase. S/Doms. No reason for diff” between Admy. } & R.A.F. W.O. }
c) U.S. standard = 14. We must be able to move squadrons as betwn. U.S. & U.K.; & we can’t ask U.S. to sleep 18 in a hut. But prep’d to consider with M/Works. Decided: standard of 18 p. hut to be adopted. Para 4 - misunderstanding. a) reluctance of contractor to release before his scheduled date even tho’ work finished. b) slowness of M/L. machine. S/Doms. Points in W.P. 220 to be settled by L.P. Ctte. L.P. This is diff’t fr. original remit to L.P. Ctte. Let M/W. indicate in memo. how he wd. exercise this responsibility.

II. Salaries of Junior Ministers.

K.W. Met the Ministers (I, H.O. & Simon). Grave diff”es of views. 30 present: 15 voted against, 14 in favour. One didn’t vote. Mtg. swayed by Tomlinson, who said he didn’t want to be put in the post of havg his personal benefit discussed. Doubt therefore wrt I can go fwd. They thought it wd. create adverse comment in country. Agreed - drop it.
Military Situation.

P.M. Lisbon air-service.

C.A.S. Stopped by day.

C.A.S. We must have stiffer rules about flights over Atlantic.

U-Boats.

P.M. Congrats. to Admy. on 34 kills in May. F.D.R. has suggested monthly statement - then tell Press to say no more. I think this cd. contain somethg. genl. about tonnage lost.

C.N.S. 295,000 May. 34 kills. 9,500 June to today 2 certain 1 prob. kills.

P.M.’s Mission.

P.M. Journey justified - diff\textsuperscript{ce} in view point: U.S. masses’ atten\textsuperscript{n}. Turned mainly on Japan & tend to think it more important to keep China in than Russia. At outset sharp diff\textsuperscript{ees} betwn. staffs. Sugg\textsuperscript{d} tht. concent\textsuperscript{n} on Italy & Med. wd. interfere with Bolero and wd. even prolong the war. But personal contacts & personal friendships broke this down & agreement was reached. This doct. agrees on Italy being the target: but we’ve undertaken to move some troops back at intervals for Bolero. Anakim - diff\textsuperscript{ees} also. We came to concl\textsuperscript{n} no reason to re-open Burma Rd. until mid/45. But all the same we must fight, wherever we can engage the enemy. More energy needed on that front, w’in the limits prescribed. U.S. public hadn’t realised until I said it to Congress tht. greater part of U.S. forces are deployed in Pacific. U.S. Executive treats Congress as an enemy - surprised at the sort of speech I made, tho’ I explained it was common-form for H/Commons. U.S. opinion quite cool about N. Africa. Strategic issues settled in broad outline. Whereas a year ago we had to say “Hitler first & Tojo after” there is now enough force to take a rather diff\textsuperscript{t} view – a matter of emphasis now, not a choice. Saw Evatt: think he’s coming here. Eisenhower inclined to go for Sardinia before Italy: I strongly advocate second, then first will fall in. I therefore went to see Eisenhower & took Genl. Marshall with me. Marshall rewrote the paper for communication to Russia - W.Cab. shd. see
Circulate X: this document: evidence of great mental grasp. His visit to Africa with me has done him good - widened his app\textsuperscript{o} of importance of African campaign.

Alexander & Montgomery were v. confident of success.

Good work of long-range U.S. bombers in daylight. e.g. Trieste cruiser.

Giraud & de Gaulle. V. satisf. Ctte. Gave them all lunch y’day. - and a speech in my best anglicised French. In the new Ctte de G. can count only on Philip for support “right or wrong”: and Catroux & Massigli will keep him on right lines.

Two stages of recognition  

- a) the authy. to whom arms may be given and money paid. At once.
- b) as represtg. France & if so to what extent F.O. and State Dpt. to consider their document: F.D.R. & I may have to settle. I hope we can go a long way for we need someone to speak to on behalf of France.

F.O. shd. consider what revision shd. be made in lrs. wh. I have sent to de G. from time to time.

A.E. I think de G. will come along all right.

P.M. Alexander came home with us. Wants to remain in private. Better too to allow G. to think he’s still there. Wd. like him to come to War Cab. on Monday.
III. Trade Disputes Act.

K.W. Recited the facts. Summarised the law.
Affiliation can’t become effective until Annual Mtg. of T.U.C. in Sept.

P.M. Other action at law?

K.W. Yes: if member of Union applied to courts for injunction
v. P. Workers Union (not T.U.C.) an action wd. lie. Then if succeeded
action for contempt wd. lie v. Union.
Ty. have no discretion. They must by statute make the Regs: & under the
Regs. they must act.

P.M. Then only fresh legislation cd. alter the situation.
Doubtful if Govt. cd. carry it thro’ H/C. Then H/Lds., who have the
weapon tht. they can refuse to prolong the life of H/C.
We must help our friends if we can. Citrine’s speech was a mistake.

M/L. The Trades Council cases are prob. not objectionable & prob. not v. the
law. Regret Citrine’s speech. But even if we got over this we still have
trouble about the T. Dispute Act. It’s a Co. Union reqd. by law. The Act
has bn. ignored in R.O.F.’s - wh. cdn’t have bn. run otherwise. And v.
many est. C. Serv. are in T. & G. Workers’ Union.
Special & impartial enquiry into op^n of sections 5 & 6 of Act, with a view
to recomm^ns Don’t think you’ll ever settle this unless you take it out of
politics.
Claim used to be for repeal of whole Act. Now demand only repeal of 2
sections. If this were settled, the rest of the Act wd. stand as an agreed
Act.
Awkward now tht. this move has bn. made. Won’t negotiate with T.U.C.
in view of step taken. Agree we cdn’t negotiate until threat withdrawn.

K.W. Ty. have no feelings.
Conserv. support of Act strengthened by action of T.U.C. in defying the
law.
Since 1927 3 Genl. Elections: why shd. this have bn. raised now?

M/L. Not a matter wh. T.U.C. wd. raise at an election.

Whitely This has not yet gone too far – yet.
Strong feeling. T.U.C. have bn. trying 4 yrs: limited now to 2 sections:
don’t want to create diff^ns, but feel they’re bn. ignored: they believe
P.M’s own view is tht. SS. 5 & 6 cd. be reviewed.
P.M. I take that view & wd. use my influence to get Cons. to agree. But v. diff. for me to do that now that T.U.C. have used threat. Reckless behaviour. Feel that a little time shd. pass. Tell Press to play it down. ___ out of room ___

L.P. “No merit in this”. More in it than I thought before this resolution was passed.

P.M. No reason why postmen shdn’t affiliate - telegraphists wd. be more important.

M.A.P. S. 5 & 6 wdn’t decide wrt postmen joined in Genl. Strike.

M/L. T.U.C. can’t now call Genl. Strike - individual Unions haven’t empowered them to.

P.M. a) Keep temperature as low as poss.
    b) Do nothg. to bring it to a head - let risks sink in.
    c) If fav. opportunity, & no threat, wd. be disposed to do somethg. about ss. 5 & 6.

S/Doms. Don’t let things drift until Sept. Have an enquiry - after the threat has bn. withdrawn.

P.M.G. P.O. Eng. Union (to-morrow) may reach a diff't decision.

L.P. a) Strength & unanimity of feeling in Cons. Party about ss. 5 & 6.
    b) Govt’s duty to Civil Servants – if this course doesn’t produce results wh. we hope, Govt. shd. make it clear to C. Servants what their pos’s will be if the Unions persist. They shd. be told that automatic loss of pensions etc.

A.E. Bring up in 3 week’s time.

M/L. But meanwhile say nothing, & don’t bring T.U.C. into this.
Films – Col. Blimp.

M/I. P.M. says doesn’t want it to go abroad. Can’t prevent it. And, if I could, how cd. I stop it when so many Ministers attended the premiere.

Operation Loader.

P.M. Went Fri. p.m. by air to M/East, where he is now visiting Army – with P.J. & Sinclair. To be announced in Press to-morrow.

Air Raids.

H.O. 27 overland Sun/Mon. 17:45
     16   ..  Sat/Sun.  5:43.

P.M. Publish casualties?

H.O. We do: monthly.

P.M. See that people realise it: in U.S. they aren’t aware of it.

Pensions.

P.M. Small anomalies - e.g. disqual\(^n\). When on short leave. Can’t these be remedied, from common-sense angle. Clear away the minor irritations.

A.V.A. eg. Casualties at Downside because negligent flying - rights at common law have been extinguished.

P.M. Principle shd. be effect of injured, not cause. Don’t let us be hampered by small points.

K.W. M/Pensions is even now preparing proposals.

Administration of Liberated & Conquered Territories.

P.M. Don’t mix up the two - as the Americans tend to do.

L.P. No final settlement of arrangements for this when lib\(^n\) or conquest follows joint operations: but now looks as tho’ satisfy sSolution will be found. Important a) nos. to go shd. be limited to essential few - under control of mily. commanders.
b) they must be good.


L.P. Ad hoc. Arrangements - for we shd. have no one on the spot. We’ll be ready here to make such arrangements: but can’t avoid some interregnum.

M/L. Gather W.O. want help - e.g. to contact underground T.U. movements. Give the W.O. some help here.

L.P. The Cttee at W.O. includes repres. of Ty. & F.O. & other Dpts can be brought in.

H.O. C.D. Reg. organisation - with post-blitz experience. Cd. it not help?

L.P. Only if earmarked beforehand & assurance given tht. they will be available. Then they can be trained as others can.

C.I.G.S. Confirmed.

Report approved, subject to points raised in discussion.
Generals Giraud and de Gaulle.

P.M. Read exchange of telegrams with President. U.S. Govt. have evidently lost patience. Feared d.G. wd. have majority on the enlarged Ctte of 14 - as he would have had on paper. E. saw both y’day & spoke as soldier to soldiers: G. must have effective military control. de G. represented this as infraction of Fr. sovereignty. If Ctte. bow to wishes of C-in-C., de G. may resign. Has talked in Press about (a) commanding a Divn.: wd. leave open path of reconciliation: Alternatives: (b) going to Syria, Brazzaville or S.W. Africa. That wd. be unsatisf. - wd. stir up trouble in Syria = radio in B. etc., (c) remain in Algeria: mil. auth’es wd. then have to be satisfied tht. he was not makg. trouble in a mil. zone. If he resigns & make a fuss I’ll have to make a statement in Parlt. if pressed: but that will mean making the case v. de G. Greatest living barrier to re-union & restoration of France: insensate ambition.

S/Doms. On other side, tho’ de G. has behaved like a fool, equal suspicion of Giraud as a re-actionary leaning twds. Pétain. Don’t pin all hopes on G. as tho’ he was v. good. Remember too that the name “de G.” stands throughout France as the spirit of resistance: the man who never gave up etc. Hopes are on the reasonable people, who may preserve the balance. U.S. views v. unreliable, they know nothg. about France.

L.S.A. Agreed as regards feeling in France. de G. had bn. difficult: but largely because he, being as exile, has had to maintain an aggressively pro-French view. Don’t believe him to be an enemy of this country. Dropping him won’t restore U.S. prestige in France: it may ruin ours. President’s telegram shocked me.

A.E. The U.S. story: so exasperated v. de G. that nothg. we can say will effect them. Hull & President can’t be spoken to about him. Benes thought U.S. was not anti de G. but rather anti-French. Don’t seem to want to see the Ctte succeed. Ctte is only sign of Fr. unity: & U.S., instead of nursing it, sabotage it.

P.M. But v. dangerous to break with U.S. at this stage on such a point as this. I wd’n’t. nor wd. I acquiesce in de G.’s gaining control of Fr. forces & underground movemts. Wd. hope him to remain on Ctte, tho’ not dominating it.
Delusion that de G. represents Left Wing in France. His followers increasingly copy Totalitarian Fascists methods & views.

S/Doms. Danger of breach betwn. Fr. in N. Africa and Fr. in Met. France. The fighting French are solid behind him: if he is dropped many of them wd. turn to the Communists.

M/L. Test is: if there were a Fr. Army behind our l of c., cd. we trust de G. to command it. Must shape our political course acc. to our decision on this.

L.P. Alternative: de G. worked in to a Cttee w’out power to step into posn of C-in-C.

M/L. But present issue is – who is to be in command of the Army. If L.P.’s alternatives were possible I’d accept it. But haven’t we moved beyond that now.

A.E. Weakness of our posn, in arguing with U.S., is that I wd. not feel happy about de G. in command of the Army.

M/P. I wd. never be happy about this.

H.O. a) Do we stand by the Cttee of Seven. Much easier: collective responsibility.
   b) If you have to choose between the 2 men: experience shows tht., tho’ Giraud at first made political mistakes, he showed himself adaptable to persuasion & logic & influence - whereas de G. obviously isn’t.

P.M. On apptment of Cttee of Seven we transferred to it our prev. relations with de G. Then enlarged to 14. But I rest on statement tht. we rely on the original Cttee. But his attempt to get effective control of Army = attempt to undermine or by-pass the Cttee. We must stick to our pt. tht. our relations are with the Cttee of Seven. Can’t acquiesce in de G’s seducing Fr. troops fr. their allegiance to Giraud. We must avoid a serious row with U.S. administration. Above all things important. Without their help & good-will our power to carry on war wd. be gravely hampered. France can only be liberated by “Anglo-American blood wh. will flow in ever broadening streams as the campaign develops.”

A.E. Fundamental point: I wdn’t mind arguing this out if I were really confident in de G. as controlling Fr Army. But I’m not. Leave him as member & joint President of the Cttee, so long as he isn’t allowed charge of the Army.
Evatt: Cdn’t Cttee place their forces wholly under Supreme Commander. Thus avoid the issue.

P.M. Not if character etc., of Army continues to be influenced by de G., and its control used as blackmail v. Commander.

Cab. agreed: military aspect must prevail.
   (if de G. prances out of Cttee, then he is a private person only.)
   Await result of to-day’s mtg. of Cttee.
Russian proposal to recognise the Cttee. Suggested postponement of this because v. embarrassing if Cttee bust up soon after in consequn. Anglo-Am. pressure.

Allied Govts. in London - Publication of Newspapers etc.

M/I. Warnings in Parlt. have had some effect.
Recent misinterpretation of P.M. speech - Poland wd. fight on tho’ Russia dropped out - after rep^9 made Polish Govt. fired the Editor.
Action as in para. 7 approved.
Civil Aviation.

W.A.S. Obvious tht. U.S. & Doms, will retain their internal services. Thus, internal services for us must mean inter-Empire, not intra U.K. i.e. we must get as near to that as possible. Hence search for formula. Room for bi-lateral agreements w’in an international frame.

L.S.A. Present convention enables us to reserve inter-Emp. traffic entirely. We think however that conception shd. be generalised. Analogy of coastwise traffic wh. many countries reserve tho’ “Freedom of the seas” accepted. French, U.S. & others will insist on this qua air. We must reserve for Col. Empire. e.g. between W. Indies. Inter-Dom.

Criticism of W.A.S. Doesn’t look well to give free landing w’out free picking up. Believe U.S. & we wd. be suited by wider policy. E.g. right of any 2 countries to pool by bi-lateral agreement so as to share their reserved internal traffic. U.S. cd. conclude such agreements with Canada & Mexico. Small Europ. Countries wd. benefit too. Not purely fr. advantage to B. Empire.

S/Doms. This is only an elaboration of our scheme & not inconsistent with it.

L.S.A. More generous - Cttee disagreed. Wd. include v of P.M.’s Memo. omitting words in brackets.

K.W. Confine this discussion to procedure.

S/Doms. We tried to get prior agreement with Doms. Canada disliked & sugg’d mtg. in Ottawa with U.S. We didn’t want to leave out Russia. Now Canada object to our mtg. among ourselves in advance. We must resist them on that. This memo. to be basis for discussion with Doms. & India + U.S. & Russia.

K.W. May get agreement on some issues before we go to Ottawa.

H.O. Pity to abandon internationalisation. Prefer to let U.S. wreck it.

S/D. But Doms. turned it down.

K.W. We’ve tried it for 12 months: & Doms. won’t support it. We’ve lost time over it.

H.O. Worried about U.S. resources in prod & oil.
x/ Hope we’ll at least try for internationalisation in Regions -
e.g. W. Europe & Far East.

S/D. We contemplate x/: and want fullest practicable international agreement. Internat*: what was put to Doms. was full internat*. Wd. not wish to exclude internat* in Europe. How long otherwise shall we be able to deny civil aviation to Germany? Shd. be an objective to get the main lines in Europe internationalised.

P.M. Strictest repression of all aviation in vanquished countries - suspn. + penalties. Agree must then be able to say we’ll carry for you. e.g. Wagon-Lits: and we might get hold of it.

M.A.P. Para 2(viii) wd. the ground facilities in ex-enemy countries be provided internationally? Yes.

P.M. Not amalgams of all countries: each country wd. contribute & internat. org* wd. control (Council of Europe).

A.E. The internat services might (or must) take on the internal services of Germany - & prob. all European countries save France. Spain wd. be incapable of running their own.

P.M. Side-deal with U.S. - we taking prominent part in Europe against conceding to them American Continent incldg. Canada.

A.E. Incorporate in our instructions Balfour on Freedom & Rates?? & Frequencies. Operators Conference to deal with rates, subject to } Agreed. Appeal to internat. Council. }

L.S.A. Poles French etc., will insist on havg. their own aircraft. - Cab. disagreed: they can be held down, for lack of money petrol etc.

Cherw. Put some Convention into Peace Treaty - authy. of World Council. Ques is: to what extent do we wish to press for freedom of air. I wd. include right to pick up as well as set down. Wd. also have compet* to allow B. planes to fly fr. Warsaw to Berlin.

M/W.T. This will work only if you control frequencies.

Cherw. Let only un-subsidised lines compete?

S.D. You will never get U.S. agreement to that. Nor will you control subsidies in fact tho’ you may in theory. M.A.P. & others agreed
H.O. You can fix rates & rely on that. Subsidy then = diff. betwn. that rate and the operating costs.

L.P. No system that depends on audit wd. work. Generally agreed [Cherwell dissenting]

S/D We shall have to subsidise for Doms.: Colonies. O.S. agreed.

P.M. Proper control of rates & frequencies wd. cover most of what we want.

O.S. Also freedom to pick up not de jure but by bi-lateral agreement. This makes it possible to prevent e.g. French fr. going too far, by excessive subsidies.

M.A.P. Control over frequencies & rates by internatl. organis will be the Key. The scale of operation (wh. P.M. fears) will be controlled by by frequencies - not only on one service but generally. A part. Country might be allowed no operation on part. Routes.

L.S.A. Only limit on subsidies in last analysis = Budgetary considns.

M/W.T. The subsidies cdn’t be applied twds. rd of rates.

P.M. Wd. like to see how frequencies are defined. Add “quotas.”

W.A.S. Route fr. Ldn. to Sydney. Can U.S. come in & compete there on equal terms?

P.M. Why not? Ships can, with tourist traffic.

M/W.T. By bi-lateral agreement on reciprocal basis – not as of right.

Casey. Must have prior Dom. talks, at least w’out Canada. eg Pacific position & shipping history U.S. denying tht. Aust - N. Zealand is not internal.

S/D. Canadians suggest talks on official level. Think this must be insisted. Agree Russia shd. be invited.

H.J. British ascendancy in Europe to be traded v. concession to U.S. in Latin America. Advise caution on this sugg by P.M. Tenure wd. be shaky.

P.M. One Minister shd. now take charge of marshalling & presenting the case.
Suggest L.P.s with Cab. Ctte. of not more than 4/5 mtg. when required. {? M/W.T., Air Min², Cherwell, M.A.P., O.S.

S/D. Pressure in H/C. V. urgent to have it focussed & get on.

K.W. Cd. we agree a) Annex C. as notified in discⁿ shd go at once to Doms. b) Mtg. with Doms. in advance of Ottawa. c) Russia to be invited to the wider conference with U.S.A.

P.M. Agree: b) on basis tht. those who want to talk will meet: & Canada needn’t come if they don’t want to. Hold it elsewhere if Canada don’t want it there.

M/L. Proper staff requᵈ. Agreed: L.P.S to make proposals.

S/D. Must tell Canada first, for they will have to summon the Conference.

P.M. When we know where we stand, I want to find out direct what President thinks about it all. Broad underlying understanding with U.S. is essential. Simple main outlines to go to President.

M/L. What about the functional organisation to operate. Will L.P.S. do that? Makes all the diff⁶ if this can be visualised at same time as discⁿˢ go on about conventions etc.

P.M. We wd. build on B.O.A.C.

M/L. This wdn’t be enough, alone.

L.P. Some control in central Govt. over B.O.A.C. We must be ready with that. There are bits in M.A.P., Air Min², M/W.T. Nothg. pulled together. Our State function shd. be developed concurrently.

P.M. Agree – L.P.S. to consider what Dpt. shd. handle this, functions, staff, Relations with B.O.A.C., wrt. a new Minister or M/W.T.
W.M. (43) 91st Meeting.  1st July, 1943.

I. Food Conference.

A.E. Decision only on form of statement.

L.P. Our rep\ve on Interim Commn. You’ll be asked.

L.P.S. Debate in H/L on Tues. next.

A.E. Try then to make the announcement then. Question time.

M/Ag. Hope Rpt. of Conference will be published as White Paper as well as Resolutions.

L.P. Shd. be published. Diffy. will be to get U.S. to comply, esp. with Res^n 12. - problem of next few years = to get U.S. to speed up their agricultural prod^n & re-adjust their balance.

L.P. Danger of Relief Comb Organn getting into central and dominant pos^n to prejudice of C??? Bds.: & then finding there’s not enough food in the world to relieve Europe - as there won’t be. Danger also: the Organ^n will take line tht. job of relief - provide food for all countries wh. can’t pay for it with exports - inldg. us among those eligible for relief. Memo. accepted.

II. Post-war Agricultural Policy.

P.M. This Motion goes beyond existg. Govt. undertakg. New decision if we agree to support.

S/D. No mention of fair prices to consumers.

P.M. Implies quotas - is this consistent with our Comm. Policy & Buffer Stocks.

Gives high place to fertility of soil.

Final words commit us to country w’out balancing favour to the towns.

Vague & general - but will be construed as a pledge.

Cdn’t this be Debated w’out a Motion.

Ch. Whip. Must have a Supply Day anyhow.

Considering wtr. rules re Supply may be widened to enable discn^s on post-war matters to be discussed - now debarred by rule re not discussg. matters involvg. leg^n.

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P.M. H/C. shd. have opportunities for full discn of these post-war problems w’out getting tied up with Motions.

Ch. Whip. Whitely. Either amendmt. of S. Orders or by stereotyped form of Motion. Speaker has recently allowed more latitude on this point, as war-time measure.

K.W. Try & get this settled before this agric. debate.

P.M. Say - in order tht. the discn may be free, the day will be counted as Ag. Supply Day pro forma, but will put down a simple Motion on wh. the Debate can run.

M.A.P. Take care not to stop thereby discussion of admin.

Ch. Whip. Try to get it settled by end of next week.

{ We’ve resisted most of these Motions: they will prob. be content if
x } they get the Day’s Debate.

Agreed: try x/ first. New procedure.
[ If not, Minister shd. hatch Motion wh. wd. be acceptable.]
[ Or refuse discussions on a Motion (this wd. be difficult).]

III. Post-War Shipping.


P.M. Cdn’t agree to nationalisation of shipping. Much to be said for state control rlways, electricity, gas, some mines etc., - monopolistic public utilities.
Not afraid of that - not unsound.
Shipping much more Kittle-cattle - lives by v. narrow margins & enterprise. Not a good specimen to put on the list.

A.V.A. Diffy = Govt. subsidy of other powers. If we give such subsidies there will be demand for control.

P.M. Then Govt. directors.

S/D. Dangers of transfer to foreign flags.

P.M. Praised para. 3(ii) of Memo. This is a good answer to criticism.

M/W.T. Greenwood & Shinwell are satisfied with this.
H.O. Labour Party may not press for natn of shipping: but no hint here of any position policy.

M/W.T. Don’t want to open up publicly until we’ve gone further with U.S.A.

P.M. Line shd. be tht. Govt. is not so composed as to be able to make a decln on this subject.

A.E. Para 3 gives a line for Govt. spokesman.

M/W.T. Noel Baker wd. be happy to follow this line. Salter cd. join in later. Debate is better restricted to this topic only.

IV. Constitution of Malta.

C.O. Want merely to say now tht. after the war we will give them back what they had before 1933. The old diffes are over. There may be new ones. Agreed.

V. General Giraud.

A.E. Giraud going to U.S. 14/7. Wants to return via N. Route. Scotland. Macmillan suggests we shd. invite him here. Wd. like to: but will it arouse suspicions that we favour him at expense of others. Wd. inflame de Gaullists unnecessarily.

P.M. Wiser to ask him to return to Gib. direct. Unwise for him to go at all: wise to return as soon as he can.

M.A.P. We shd. do all we can to strengthen the hands of the Ctte. - esp. the civilians.

P.M. Yes for arms & money (if they need it). But U.S. won’t agree to our negotiating with them.

A.E. Build up civil power against the Genls. Agreed: advise Giraud to return via Gib. - adding tht. we think he wd. be wiser to stay in Africa.

VI. Rural Cottages.

P.M. This story is a reproach - tho’ due to efficiency of our war-machine. Repns by Winterton.
L.P. Don’t think it’s been handled with due urgency. But M/H. being unfairly attacked. He did not put to us propo tht. these shd. be built as emergency Govt. scheme. He made it clear tht. he wd. build thro’ l.a.’s. I think tht. tho’ working thro l.a.’s they shd. have done it on emergency basis.
W.M.(43) 92nd Meeting.  2nd July, 1943.

I. Mr McGovern: Visit to Eire.

H.O. McG. Wants to go to N.I. & thence to Dublin - will speak on I.L.P.: is G.B. going Communist. No argument re N.I.: allowed to go there before. Eire is however neutral: ques. is therefore wrt. it can be shown in natl interest. My answer to that is “No” – as before. But we did let Stokes & Aneurin Bevan go. And our High Commr. reported it helpful. Mr. McGie M.P. (Stokes supporter) also wants to go: pol. work in Eire: told he wd. have to show natl interest & tht. objects cdn’t be secured by conce. Is it worth havng. Parly row? Tho’ I can’t see natl. interest served by either.

P.M. Do distinguish between N.I. and Eire.

S/Air. Diff. to distinguish between McGov. & Stokes. You let him go.

H.O. But he has business interests there.

P.M. “Travel to neutral countries won’t be allowed save when Govt. satisfied tht. def. public advantage wd. be served or bona fide private affairs wh. won’t admit of delay. In present circs. not the policy of HMG. to facilitate …..

A.E. I have told S. Hoare tht. Astor can’t go to Madrid.

II. Palestine.

P.M. Summarised Casey’s memo.

M/State. Brought to M/E War Council because
(a) rising temper of extremist statements: their intent to force our hands: important arms-running case.
(b) effect of trouble there wd. be wide throughout M/East. I directed attent of Council to (i) not to discuss merits of W.P., wh. is widely accepted by Arabs. (ii) not to recommend long-term policy: next 18 mos. only, and minimum requirements only. Convinced situation in next 12 mos. will pass out of control, & involve heavy mil. commitments because repercussions throughout M/E and we’d
be bound to try to protect Jewish Cttees. Quiet M/E essential to our strategy. Recommend therefore (a) damp down extremists.  
(b) maintain prestige of moderate elements.  
(c) Keep reasonable no. of troops in neighbourhood.  
(d) 31/3 next: no guillotine: allow balance of unused quota for immigrants (circ. 20,000) to continue to be used.

(1) Welcome proposed statement circ'd by F.O.  
(2) Ensure maintenance in & near Pal. of no. of troops desired by C-in-C.  
(3) Bring Pol. up to strength.  
(4) Seize arms where known: no blind source.  
(5) Don’t cut off immigration: as in (d) above.

C.O. Subm’d memo in May drawing attent’ to deterioration of Pal. position. Jewish feeling there is v. diff’t fr. Weizmann etc.: they are totalitarian, aggressive & expansionist. Wedded to Biltmore Resolutions involving adoption of Jewish State. They are trying to run a state w’in a state v. much on Nazi lines. They were running compulsory enlistment with beating up as sanction. There is still a moderate Jewish opinion inside & out of Pal. Must encourage it.  
(a) Short-term. Favour the issue of suggested Anglo-American statement. This wd. strengthen hands of moderates, who have bn. telling extremists that their behaviour is antagonising B. & U.S. Govts. Search for arms. As in Casey’s proposal, if suff. Force available to do it.

P.M. I’m committed to creation of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. Let us go on with that; and at end/war we shall have plenty of force with which to compel the Arabs to acquiesce in our designs. Don’t shirk our duties because of diff’rences.

S/Doms. Don’t dissent. But what I want is to face up to formulation of a proper post-war policy.

P.M. Not a good time for statements on long-term policy.

C.O. (Resuming)  
(b) Long-term policy. We must look again at W. Paper policy – agree can’t be maintained. And was going to suggest Cab. Cttee to consider that.
Meanwhile, recognise the difference between J. Nat Home and J. State wh. the extremists now demand. At least, let us seize the chance of a joint Anglo-Am. declaration.

A.E. I cdn’t support the extremists’ case of J. Nat. State for all Palestine. And I think we shd. warn them off that line soon.

P.M. Asked F.D.R. wrt intended in establishg Jewish colonies in Cyrenaica, Tripolitania. He thought they wd. be returned to European countries of origin.

S/D. I want to consider the Jewish position as a whole – world-wide.

M/State. Violence in Pal. may cause renewed persecution of Jews all over the world.

H.O. a) Jewish Nat. State in Pal.: if Trans-Jordan cd. be added & deal made with Arabs.
   b) Wider issue: nos. of refugees: wd. like new Colonies in Tripolitania etc., possibly as daughter states of Pal. Remember tht. when percentage of Jews in any one European state goes above a certain level, there’s bound to be anti-Semitism.

S/Air. Agree with H.O. on long-term view.
Short-term problem. Jews in Pal. are nervous: have reason to fear Arabs: natural that they shd. want arms to protect themselves. Fear also of economic consequences post-war - 50,000 workg. in arms factories. Need therefore to allay their fears. Declare eg. tht. we stand by our promise of J. Nat. Home: tht. we will protect their economic interests. Above all don’t take away their arms.
Support M.A.P.’s proposal for Conference.
Welcome Anglo. Am. decln (prefer U.S. form because warmer to Jews)

A.E. “Fear” S/Air is out of date. This was true a year ago. Now what they want is arms with which to seize Pal. as a J. Nat. State against HMG. not against Arabs. “You clear out & we’ll settle with the Arabs”. M/State confirmed.

L.S.A. Can’t be stampeded by J. extremists. But let’s understand why they are extremist. The W. Paper broke our pledges & convinced the Jews tht. violence & organisation is the only thing wh. will do v. B. Govt. Eg. my speech on that occasion as well as P.M.’s.
Don’t object to joint Decln. But couple it, as M.A.P. suggests, with repetition of our old assurances to both sides. And get down quickly to consider long-term policy - before calling the Jews into conference.

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The grand-maternal wagging of a forefinger by 2 Gt. Powers will not, alone, suffice.

P.M. Timing Don’t want to queer Turkish pitch by bringing Arab ques into public prominence. Hence anodyne Decl only: some easement on immigration; then no public discussion of long-term solutions until the war turns more in our favour.

L.P.S. Jews & Arabs both playing off v. us. But we must have at war in statemt. to show tht. we won’t have a forcible. Solution in Palestine.

M/State. Shirtok expects anti-Jewish Govts. in U.S.

Wavell. Close personal contact with this country for many years - know all the leaders on both sides - visited all parts of the country. Agree that Jew is better civilisation & better man. And if we stood aside, the Jews wd. win & take the place for their own. But Arabs qua pledges have a good case. They all believe we gave a pledge for Arab Palestine. Also 2nd part of Balfour Declaration. Pledge in Nov. 1918. And final word in W. Paper. Thus, we have our obligations towards the Arabs. Fr. pt/view of security of B. Empire, present aspirations of Jews in Pal. are a real menace to our position in M/East & subsequently in India.

M/P. (a) Don’t be stampeded. (b) Broaden the basis of argument, and of settlement. No solution until we can get more elbow room for settlement of Jews.

L.S.A. If partition, give Jews the coast + the Nejab. (for what it’s worth).

M/P. Suck out the Arabs fr. Palestine by irrigation in Euphrates’ area.

P.M. Wd. prefer to leave them with arms to fight it out!


P.M. In the crisis of 2 years’ ago, these J. arms wd. be turned in our favour.

M/State. Don’t suggest “disarming” the Jews. Discourage extremists: encourage moderates: seize any cache of arms wh. is publicly known to exist.
S/Air. This wd. mean disarming the Jews but not the Arabs.

K.W. One-sided discussion: one wd. assume there was no Arab case.

C.O. On arms, Casey’s proposal = no more than re-affirm 1940 decision of W. Cabinet.

Joint Declaration.

L.P. Include a clear warning about solution sought by force. As suggd by Casey.

A.E. 2nd Sentence in 2nd para. of U.S. draft may be thought to throw all (incldg. W. Paper) into the melting-pot. F.O. & C.O. to draft despatch to U.S. Then ask High Comms. for obsns. of that draft.

Immigration:

Agreed: Immigration to continue after March.

Arms.

Stricter control of admission. No seizure w’out notif to War Cab., but War Cab. may be asked for leave to seize when particular cache is known.


II. Immigration into Palestine.

Approved.
Records of Paris Peace Conference - Publication.

F.O. U.S. shd. at least have consulted us. And H.G. shd be consulted. Distinction betwn. diplomatic documents & rough workings.

P.M. Effect on peace discussions. May be great impediment. I wd. be ready to put this to F.D.R. indicating how embarrassing it might be for him. F.O. meanwhile takg. a stiff line diplomatically.

{ We cd. at least insist on all B. contributions being omitted.

Agreed.

Committee on Women’s Services.

P.M. Any steam in this now? Need we say anything?

S/D. Anxiety in Women’s Services.

H.O. Won’t do any harm.

M.A.P. Last sentence but one will comfort some.

Agreed.

Conditions in Detention Barracks.

P.M. Set out facts.

Croft. W.O. enquiry started to-day. First thought: to extend this enquiry to other Barracks. Recognise however purely mil. enquiry mightn’t meet popular feeling. Wd. welcome enquiry by High Ct. Judge. Cdn’t agree to Select Cttee.

P.M. If decided to do it, there cd. be a good enquiry - Oliver, Singleton, Asquith. Attach Bishop/Portsmouth or Bishop/Newcastle.Doctor e.g. Lord Moran. Thus spiritual, medical & judicial. But is there sufficient public unrest.

A.V.A. Recent suicide sugg’d to me there was a case for enquiry into Naval Det’d Barracks.
S/Air. Ours are accommodated by W.O.

P.M. Service Assessors. Complete in a month.

M.A.P. Wd. prefer Oliver.

Agreed.
I. Enemy Leaders and War Criminals – Warning to Neutrals not to grant Asylum.

A.E. If desired to stop them going to neutral countries, better warn the neutrals now than try to dig them out later. But no strong feelings if not disposed to press the point post-war.

P.M. F.D.R. inclined to let our troops shoot them out of hand!
I suggested U.N. to draw up list of 50 or so who wd. be declared as outlaws by the 33 Nations. (Those not on list might be induced to rat!) If any of these found by advancing troops, nearest offr. of Brigade rank shd. call a military court to establish identity & shd. then execute w’out higher authority.

Simon Earlier public declaration by Allies “Punishment of war criminals .... lists .... Armistice terms shd include prov[n] for their surrender. FDR has signed this.

P.M. My scheme wd. be a refinement on that.

Simon. Distinct[n]. Between leaders H & M. (political ques) and list of blackguards proved guilty of bestial behaviour. Second class = concern of the U.N. Commission for Investigations of War Crimes. We have selected our member & others are doing so (incldg. U.S.).

S/Doms. Hand over to most injured nations like Norway & Poland.

M.A.P. Private rather public warning.

A.E. That is an arguable point, I agree.

L.P.S. Debate in H/Lds. (Vansittart) 14/7.

S/Doms. Quns at mtgs.

A.E. Consult U.S.A. & main U. Nations & if they agree give warning privately to neutrals most concerned. Then tell Vansittart in confidence. (E.g. warn Switzerland because of Italians. Sweden also because G.)

Simon. Neutrals concerned, not so much v H & M., but in the smaller man who have done bestial things. Allied Govts. are v. keen that some warning shd. be given.
P.M. Premature to take any action. ? Postpone for 6 months. Time not ripe even for private warning. Wd. prefer to win a few battles first.

A.E. May I ascertain wrt. U.S. and other main Allies wd. favour a private warning & wrt. they think it cd. be given soon? Then we cd. avert debate in H/L on grd. tht. we were in disc with Allies.

P.M. When time ripe, wd. prefer to proceed by Resolution of 33 Nations. Again in 3 months. Meanwhile x/ with U.S.A. informally.

II. States of Tibet.

A.E. Guidance to our rpres. needed on lines indicated.

P.M. Agreed: v. necessary.

III. Copperbelt: Mr Maybank.

O.S. S. African Unions refused to touch the case, after investigation.

M/L. I agreed to his removal for fear of a) bloodshed in our territory b) trouble with the Congo.
And I am prepared to defend the action taken.
Dalgleish of my Union was one of investigators – quite satisfied.


P.M. Why not in Army?

M/L. Will consider - after Sept. Congress of T.U.C.!!

IV. Sikorski - Public Funeral.

P.M. Had thought a public funeral - to be organised by the Poles, with mil. honours.


V. Union of Democratic Control.

A.E. Mtg. held by Communists under Ld. Marley, at wh. violent attacks of Yugoslavs.

H.O. Answered a ques. last week discouraging meddling in these affairs.
A.E.  Don’t want any more attacks on Michaelovich – prs. next it will be v. King/Greece.

M.A.P.  Reflection of Russian suspicions of Michaelovich.
War Pensions. Revision of Royal Warrant.

P.M. Cost?

L.P. Can’t be estimated.

P.M. Is it enough?

L.P. V. substantial.

II.

A.G. After L.P. Ctte conclusion M/P. & I saw interested Members. Broadly they were content.
   a) They stressed most the point that existing Warrant puts onus on man.
   b) Man shd. be entitled to benefit eg. reasonable doubt.
   c) Cd. “one-up” be given to man discharged with a complaint wh. he hadn’t got when he went in, accordg. to records.

*Amend para. 5 as shown in ms. Adopt the position form. Agreed.

Omission of “directly” (attributable) will help – in (a)(i)
   .. .. “to a material extent” .. – in (a)(ii).

Repudiation of onus in (2). Shows duty on Govt. to go into the case.
Also benefit of reasonable doubt - also will help.

P.M. Is there much between this and “Fit for Service, Fit for Pension.”

M/P/ Yes –vast diffce in fact (eg v.d.) and in principle.
Also diffy of claims made 15/20 years after end of war.
Of 600.000 drawing pensions now all but v. few are working.

*MA.P. This amendment by A.G. will mean that M/P. has no discretion to refuse a pension. Definition by exclusion at present.

A.V.A. Make it clear that this applies only to
   x{service under war-time conditions} x
   \{persons entered for war service. \}

A.E. Will this meet legitimate demands - because we can’t retreat from position we take up now. We must stand & fight on present decisions.

L.P. * If it has to be met, try formula pencilled in my copy.
P.M. Better use the original words, if you can’t use the AG.’s formula. The amendment is a wobbly alternative.

Agreed: Stand as in print unless AG.’s amendment can stand. Later: “Provided” in lieu of “if”.

III.

P/M. In this war rates raised twice on a/c rise in cost/living. But anomalies by comparison with men on 1919 rates. Proposals here met old claims of B. Legion. But later on they will press for increase rates for last-war cases. I want to say tht. we put these pensions on same level as old war: & tht. if c/living rises both classes will be increased.

L.P. Say nothing about rise to match rise of c/living.

IV.

After much talk - passed w’out amendment.

P.M. Cost?

K.W. 2 3/4 m. p.a. at once. 16-18 1/2m. p.a. if casualties equal to /half of last war. Proper for war-pensioners. Wdn’t follow, however, tht. consequential improvements wd. follow e.g. in Service pay & conditions. This was accepted.

VII. Post-Injury Marriages.

P.M. Pearce. Danger of abuse. Post-injury marriage shd. not be accepted in principle.

H.O. Anxiety re repercussions on W. Comp - where many men are unemployable because of their accident.

P.M. Dangerous to give any man the right to confer pension rates on woman willing to marry him.

M/P. We have narrowed the field w’in which abuse may arise.

Agreed: Fight on this.

VIII.
A.V.A. Commodore’s widows. i.e. Flag Offrs. returning from retirement to act as Commodores of Convoys. (e.g. Lady Brownrigg will come down from £1450 to £290.)
13 Admirals have died at sea in these circumstances.
Specially difficult because no gratuity as there wd. be for death in action.

M/P. Other ranks get no such gratuity.

Agreed: Admy. shd. clear this up with Ty - [preferably before the Debate.]
{ and if necessary submit to Ty.

IX. Parent’s Pensions.

Approved.


Recommendations approved.

War Pensions - Appeals Tribunals Bill.

A.G. Right of appeal now a) v. refusal to grant.
       b) v. final assessment.
But no right of appeal against interim awards.
I think this v. diff. to resist. Agree tht. final award shd. not be hastened.
But decision tht. he is 40% will affect him for years until final assessment is made. M/P. says kept under constant review.
Members: v. well have time limit: can only appeal again after a certain time & on ev’n of deterioration of cond’n.
They will divide v. this & I sympathise with them.

L.P. How can Appeal Tribunal keep pace with “continuous review”.

P.M. This means transferring the admin’ion from Minister to Tribunal.

L.P. Also everyone wd. have a shot at it & Tribunals wd. be overloaded.

P.M. ? Right to appeal after 2/3 years or v. final assessment.

A.G. They might be content with 2 years.

Agreed: M/P. to consider that & re-submit to W.Cab.
Appeals against Discretionary Decisions.


A.E. War Cab. Minister shd. help in these Debates.

P.M. To settle with Leader of House who it shd. be.

Leakage to Press.


M/L. Article on demobilisation cdn’t have bn. written save by someone with knowledge of memo. Same is true of the Education leak. - and the H.O. leak.

P.M. (b) Strengthen & bring up to date the note of April 1942. (a) Investigation by S/Doms. L.P.S. and A.G. Refer to recent instances.
I. Anti U-Boat Warfare.

P.M. First of monthly statements. Cab. Office to instruct Dpts. to lay off other statements or discussions.

II. Black-Outs.

P.M. Is it hindering production? If so, Air Miny. will consider what can be done.

M.A.P. Yes – where black-out means workg. by day in artificial light.


Report w’in a week.

III. Man Power.

P.M. L.P. has reviewed: I have taken his memo. as basis & altered emphasis. All these are marginal figures - only therefore ques. of adjusting emphasis. I have altered the emphasis in favour of aircraft. Traced thro’ figures in Annex II. But I doubt if more than 175 can be absorbed before end/year.

M.A.P. wrote down his target when he assumed office - won’t meet even that programme w’out a full flow of men. Last Dec. I gave full emphasis to anti-U-Boat: now I think it shd. be transferred to M.A.P. Running now with nearly 2 crews to each aircraft - tho’ justifiable on bombers, we must remember tht. aircraft = limiting factor.

Budgeting now for deficit of 71.000. Realised deficit must be spread pro rata except for M.A.P.

M/L. Have considered M.A.P. position. With wastage, 31,000 p. month net increase wd. involve input of 80,000 p. month. If it’s given this absolute priority – it means

a) v. few tradesmen for Services.

b) R.E.M.E. demands for techn. offrs. wd. have to be cut further.

c) F.A.A. & fitters for R.N. wd. have to be cancelled.

d) certified engineers for U.S. ships - 90% of these are in aircraft. 5/600 key men. If they are to be supplied they must come out of M.A.P.

e) 9,000 RAF mechanics in M.A.P. They must stay where they are.
f) R.A.F. deferred service shd. go into MAP dir before being called up. They wd. also have to be kept on in the factories. (S/Air, save for aid-crews) (this was accepted)
g) Heavier cut on M/Supply than those discussed: & they must be in places where M.A.P. can take them.
h) Minimum intake of women into Services.
i) Further cut on C. Defence. 25,000. (L.P. Additional? There is not much more to come.

M/L. I agree tht. if an additional 25,000 were combed out you wd. reduce it to part-time basis.)

M/P. 30,000 men for 2 months to meet U.S. bldg. requirements Result of doing this statistically by end/43 wd. mean 31.000 p.m. in M.A.P. 
  32,000 “ out of M/S.
Even if MAP cd. take these M/S. cdn’t release. With more time, beyond Dec M/S. cd. yield the nos. Important therefore tht. we shd. know quickly what M.A.P. can take.

M.A.P. 20/25,000 a month. All depends on when we start.

M/P. Last sentence in para. 9. Important tht. intake for July shd. be reduced to 1/6th of remaining allocation. Otherwise v. little margin.
Cancel future option for women. “If you’re tardy you mustn’t be choosy.” Can’t be done at 32,000 p.m. from M/Supply. Cd. do it with elbow-room either on slower intake into M.A.P. of extension of period.

M/S. Our releases have bn. greater than M.A.P. increases. You can’t in fact match intakes & releases like this. We plan to give up another 52,000 before end/Sept. Don’t believe it humanly possible to reach 215,000 by end/year w’out creatg. such confusion as wd. cause public discontent. We will accelerate our discharge: & reach 215,000 by end/April. Unemployment is already appearing in some areas.

M/L. Yes: & loss of labour inevitable on transfer fr. M/S. to M.A.P. Don’t believe you will achieve M.A.P. expansion by 175,000 by end/year: result of this attempt will be to starve other activities of labour they cd. have had.

M/S. Firms we’ve closed all beginning to tell us tht. labour released is not being re-absorbed.

Admiralty.
Para 2(c). assumes further economies. We’ve already scraped the tin. We’ve paid off the armed cruisers to man escort vessels. We’d already decided to pay off the R-Class battleships save Ramillies, + also 4 cruisers. But demands on us for combined ops. outweigh these savings. We’ve always spread our allocation evenly over the year. Because we haven’t taken an excessive propn on first half we are now cut below Dec. allocation. Total lift on Overlord will be reduced by 1/3rd. - B. share in it by ½.

Comb-Ops. - requd only for short periods for special duty. Much too expensive to treat them as separate force. Once harbours have bn. seized beach landings become unnecessary. After Overlord, R.N. shd. eat up most of the l-craft fleet & bud them out again.

9,000 of the key men for this fleet have bn. provided by R.N.

Med-victories already gt. relief to M/W.T. If we clear Med. satisfactorily there will be a further gt. relief to R.N. - much of the force there can be bright home,

1st Sea Ld. You can do this a) when G. defeated: & escort vessels no longer requd; or b) when you know no more comb. opns will be requd save in F/East. Until then, no possibility of such inter-change. The men can’t be swopped over fr. Fleet to l.craft w’out period of training: & we can’t get time or interval for that training. No dual-purpose use is possible this year:

Agreed.

P.M.’s allocn wd. mean paying off all cruisers!

31,500 men requd for Fleet itself. This wd. mean leavg. unmanned 41 cruisers or 135 destroyers. 35,250 for l. craft. Loss of these has effects above on Overlord.

My main conten is tht. all the remedies wh. P.M. suggd to warrant his reduction have already bn. taken into a/c before our demands were formulated.

War Office.

We’ll do our best with this allocaton. We’ve combed a lot already: and combing is hindered by 406,000 lower than Cat. A.
Consequences likely = scrap one Divn. now & another in spring. Will get P.M.’s authy. for this.

Riflemen. lman p. section (3b) has bn. adopted vice 72.

Results of getting no tradesmen may be serious.

M.L. Civil industries now on par with munitions. No longer “less essential.”

And coal. Now down to 706.000. Can’t get them now even by direction.

War Office (resumed).

W.O. a) Only about 25.000 more after end/July. Want highest prop^n of these to be A.1. men.
b) Bldg. labour shd. be settled to-day. Only quick decision = make the best of M/P.

x/ earlier decision.

R.A.F.

S/Air. Effect of this allocn = 7.000 increase after allowing 57.000 wastage in year.

But if M.A.P. requirements met 20% more aircraft to be manned with force no larger.

This can only be met by expedients like those wh. you have sugg^d for R.N.

P.M. Suppose improvent. in N. Atlantic continues. Isn’t it poss. to bring over 20.000 U.S. labourers for airfield cons^n.

W.O. Arranged for later in year. U.S. can’t provide their constructional troops now.

M/P. U.S. refuse my request tht. they shd. bring over constructional troops.

P.M. Don’t actually stop any of these airfields. U.S. will take it to mean we don’t think they’re worth their keep.

M/L. I can give the labour for run-ways - it’s the building of the huts etc.

F.O. Why can’t they live in tents?

S/Air. Operating in winter weather.

W.O. Repeated x/: and M/Labour agreed.

M/P. What shall we tell the Americans?
P.M. When will you be ready to talk? M/L and M/P shd consider & rpt. by Tuesday.

C.I.G.S. In C.C.O.S. we made it clear they must send right prop\(^a\) of constr. Labour - & someone is now trying to go back on that.

M/L. Decide not to give addl. 5,000.  
Let M/P. Portal & me meet & see how we can do the airfields.

Cherwell. a) Better off than we planned 155,000 more in Army than we aimed at.  
b) Don’t like budgeting for a deficit. No diffy. in disposing of a surplus.

P.M. Resume Tuesday. I will see Adm\(^y\) Monday. U.S. pos\(^a\) to be cleared by then (M/P.)
Military Operations.

C.I.G.S.  Explained dispositions in Sicily. Strengths opposed to us in E. of Island 150 It. 43 Germ. 200 tanks.
[in Island as a whole 260.I. 56.G.]
Landings successful & early objectives secured, in almost all cases. Canadians landed acc. to plan & took 700 prs. with v. few casualties. 45th (U.S.) Divn: not many reports.
1st (U.S.) Divn are holding Gela: under tank attack by Germans. 6.000 prs. up to date – evening communiqué. Seven enemy counter-attacks with tanks repulsed durg. day. Towns & forts, Syracuse Avola Pachino Scoglitte Gela Ispica Liceata Rosolini Noto all captured. Ital. morale v. low: civil pop mainly friendly.


Russia.

R. holding the attacks quite well. Determined to avoid mobile warfare. Telegram 10/7 suggests intensity abated. R. expect fierce fighting for some time. G. equipment on lower scale: older types aircraft being flown. Fighting 8 days: rarely has offensive done so little in such a time. Not much in reserve behind this attack.

Poland.

A.E.  Nikolaichi agreed form a Govt. & accepts - as C-in-C. But diff only postponed –
   a) N. says C-in-C. shd be under Govt. not under President. This ed. be accepted.
   b) C-in-C. shd. not succeed President on latter’s death. This was O.K. for Sikorski, but awkward now. [I said a) was reasonable: on b) they shd. seek a non-controv. figure.]
   c) P.M. wants assurance he won’t be dismissed by President. [I doubted if we ed. support this]
   d) Control of secret organis partly under H.O. & partly under C-in-C. - want them all under Govt. control.

P.M.  Get Press to lay off taking sides on these points.
M/I. Poles put out a great deal to our Press.

Took note.

Sikorski.

W.O. Maladroit behaviour of G.W.R. in bringing in the coffin.

P.M. Let M/W.T. tick them off.

Air Raids.

H.O. 9 H.E. 100 lbs. dropped at East Grinstead. One fell in front of screen in Cinema. Casualties (for whole raid) 83 : 65 : 49. 2 raiders destroyed

S/Air. Attack on Powers (gyroscope) factory: serious: but now working 90%. Croydon. Message of Sympathy to go fr. Cabinet to E. Grinstead (Mayor)

Basic English.

P.M. Wd. like Ministers to turn minds to this. Propagate our language all over world is best method. 850 words (+ 100 for each specialist subject). Bible in B.E. doesn’t do at all badly. As means of communicatg thought, might be the great auxiliary language of the world. Also preface to study of English proper. Results of 10 years work. Fraternal assoc with U.S. - this wd. let them in too. Cttee of Ministers to see wrt there is anything in it: then a Wpl Cttee to carry on if thought good. Times talks 50,000 word vocabulary: ordinary person 10,000. This = 800. Harmonises with my ideas for future of the world. This will be the English speaking century. Can be learned in 2/4 weeks.

L.S.A Taught in Africa - as result of my takg. it up with Col. Educ^nl Developmnt. Cttee years ago when I was at C.O.


L.P. Add India Office.

S/Doms.  Add Chuter Ede because a teacher.

B/Ed.  Cd. we also consider other methods – eg. Essential English by Eckersley 2,000 words.

P.M.  Don’t get led away by rival theories. Stick to the simple way. But I don’t exclude the other methods.

Parliament.

Educational Reconstruction.

P.M. Broadcast?

B/Ed. Friday evening if publ\(^d\) in time.

K.W. Don’t do it before you speak in H/Commons.

B/Ed. Lay W. Paper on Friday.

Whip. 2 Day-Debate 2 wks. After presentation.

A.E. Agree H/C. will prob. want 2 days.

B/Ed. Wd. be content with 1 long day.

Whip. All parties much interested.

B/Ed. There will be some controversy.

P.M. Yes - let feeling of H/C emerge.

S/Air. Maintenance allowances for children at secondary schools?

B/Ed. No provision up to leaving-age 15. Rely on Bev. & children’s allowances.

K.W. Agreed.

H.O. Confusion if this were added to Bev.

B/Ed. Exis\(t\)g. prov\(^n\) for secondary schools wd be continued.

P.M. Timing with P.Q.


B/Ed. Accepted.

P.M. Will B/E. give us a memo. on use of instructional films in education?

M/L. Transfer Univ. Grants Cttee fr. Ty. to B/Ed.

Casey. Teaching about B. Empire.
B/Ed. Special courses in schools.

Casey. Dramatic films wd. help a great deal.

Civil Aviation.

S/Doms. Answer fr. Canada: don’t want prior conf & want it on offl. level.

P.M. They can stay away & we can meet in Bermuda.

S/Doms. Canada don’t want the main conf now at Ottawa.

Re-distribution.

H.O. P.M. had 2 fears a) wtr commns Cd. visit const & re-adjust irr of rights of Parlt. We can cover that. One review in a Parlt. Provide tht. commns. Will report when asked by Parlt. In this Bill authorise comms. to ask when asked.


P.M. Not too frequent - Once in a quinquennium.

H.O. Parlt. can & will control that.

S/Air. Paras. 3 + 4 of memo. Over 100 names to Motion callg. for changes in electoral system. Disc of elect. reforms shd. not be prejudiced by ambarkg on re-distribution related to present elect. system. E.g. a quite diff. re-distribution wd. be needed for P.R.

K.W. No reason why you shdn’t have another re-distribution if elect. system changed.

H.O. P.R. Bill wd. be first-class measure & re-distrib. Cd. be provided for - no real ques of prejudicing disc of elect. reform.

S/Air. Will H.O. make this clear in reply to Supplementary?

H.O. Yes. I suppose you will inspire it?!

P.M. As Parlt. is supreme, prs. this will do. Statement may be made in terms of Annex.
French Committee.

P.M. U.S. are getting themselves into diff'ces. We mustn’t be drawn in - esp. as it wd. look like B. opposn to F.D.R. U.S. shd. not have made public use of private document giving P.M.’s views of de Gaulle. I will consider makin a remonstrance & urging them to lay off. Fr. Cttee must be alarmed at active hostility of U.S. twds. them.

A.E. Cttee is getting stronger & civilian element gaining ground.

P.M. U.S. will not recognise Cttee because fear tht. de G. will have gt. influence on it. But their action has effect of strengthening de G’s position.

British Policy in Middle East.

A.E. M/State wanted this.

P.M. Para 12. Use the formula wh. you are sending to Willant (warning to the Jews). neighbouring Arab countries. in para 12. Bad hats in State Dpt. will make trouble over every word of it.

M/State. a) U.S. have no policy in M/East. F.D.R.’s adviser Wallace Murray hates our guts: & his policy is merely to frustrate our policy. Unless we can get closer to them they will go off on their own to promote U.S. infl. there. By frankness we can get them to recognise that this is an area of paramount interest to us. F.O. memo wd. enable me to deal more frankly with Americans – if it cd. be accepted at the highest level in U.S.A. b) Economic interest. M.E.S.C. Our only chance of projecting or influence post-war is thro’ economic side. Wd. therefore like to develop twds M/E. Economic Council via M.E.S.C. Reasons: scarcity of shipping for 2 years: need for MESC. screening & control/imports roaring inflation in M/East: will not be controlled by the local Govts. w’out our help & guidance. get these countries to realise tht. cont’d assistance depends on their taking it thro’ a M/E. Economic Council. Wd. therefore advocate explan’n to U.S. - wd. like it even more frank - get them to recognise tht. their interest in M/E. is mil cpd. with ours. Get them to work with us in a team wh. we lead & they take a
subordinate role.
Don’t want to go fast  - wd. seek Cab. approval at successive stages.

M/P.  All right on short run because people don’t want to export.
But when people do want to export & importg. Countries have to pay, then
strain will come.

M/State.  Trouble also about U.S. ambitions re oil.
If we were frank with U.S. about oil -

P.M.  Why open up these wide ques.  At the peace we’ll know how much each
of us counts.  We don’t need U.S. help in this area, & aren’t likely to see
many of them there from now on.

M/S.  Much underground activity by U.S. in oil in this area.

H.O.  Bad record of U.S. oil magnates in interfering with politics.  Their form of
imperialism.  e.g. civil aviation.  Apart fr. this memo. I had thought this
was main factor in creating ill-feeling betwn. us & U.S.: and wd. have
wished this taken up with U.S. (F.D.R.)

P.M.  Our rights in oil are settled  - best leave it alone.  Stand on our rights &
Stonewall.

W.O.  B. & American oil cos. are always concession-hunting in M/East & India.

S/Doms.  Approach via State Dpt. wd. be dangerous.  Approach (verbal) to F.D.R.
first wd. be better.

A.E.  I wd. talk to Winant first: seek his advice: prs. wd. send it privately to
F.D.R. or Hull.

S/Doms.  Wd. rather begin with talk.

F.O.  Halifax cd. begin by talk.  Document of this sort wd. be necessary as instns
to Halifax for verbal conversations.

I.S.A.  Why detail?  Enough to make them see tht. we regard M/E. as vital to us
qua communications, as the Monroe Doctrine to them.

M.A.P.  Let Hal. Open it and see what kind of document may be needed later.
Economic Council.  Can’t this grow gradually out of M.E.S.C.?

S/Air.  Shd. this include civil aviation?

M/State.  Not my idea.
S/Doms. Consult Dom. Govts. before action taken. EEB. to summarise for further disc".

Bombing of Rome.

P.M. Lord Fitzalan on behalf of R.C.’s protested v. bombing Rome. May be better things to do than bomb it. G. will give us 24 hrs’ notice before he does so.